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THE ROLE OF THE HUNGARIAN SAMIZDAT IN INTENSIFYING OF OPPOSITION-MINDED PUBLIC (1976 – 1988)

The paper reviews the origins and development of samizdat in the Hungarian People's Republic. The samizdat for a long time remained the only way of doing opposition activities. It contributed to the spread of uncensored information and dissident's consolidation. The main opposition groups were urban and populist. The principle of the "popular front", which had deep historical roots in Hungary, meant joint efforts of various actors. It played an important role for their consolidation during the work on the collection of papers "In Memory of Bibó". The authors questioned the legitimacy of socialist states in Central and Eastern Europe. They had also written a program for achievement political pluralism, multi-party democracy. There was a positive impact of the political legacy of the philosopher to the ideological development of the urban group. The reaction of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party to the "In Memory of Bibó" testified a deep understanding of the causes of origin and prospects of the opposition's growth. Thematic areas of the leading samizdat journals "Beszélő", "Hirmondó", "Demokrata", their contribution to the consolidation of opposition-minded part of the Hungarian society were estimated. In this paper for the first time in the Ukrainian historiography we gave an account on the image of the Ukrainian dissident movement in the Hungarian samizdat.

Keywords: Hungary, samizdat, urban and populist opposition groups, I. Bibó, L. Kostenko, V. Stus, V. Chornovil.

УДК 94 (477:474.5)

<https://doi.org/10.17721/1728-2640.2017.132.1.16>

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ILLUSION AND REALITY OF STATEHOOD: THE SEARCH FOR PARALLELS BETWEEN THE LITHUANIAN ACTIVIST FRONT AND THE ORGANISATION OF UKRAINIAN NATIONALISTS

The present article analyses the relationship between the Lithuanian Activist Front and the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and their activity parallels in order to reach the Lithuanian and the Ukrainian independence in 1941. The research focuses on the attempts of the OUN and the LAF leaders to project the future Lithuanian and Ukrainian states in the 'New Europe' headed by Germany. Reaching for counterbalance against the USSR and the Communist ideology, the LAF and the OUN organizations aimed at taking into consideration the military and political power of Germany, while Škirpa, the leader of the LAF, coordinated his activities with the OUN leaders, Stetsko, Yaryi, and Bandera. Fanatical chiefs of the Third Reich manipulated with the Lithuanians and Ukrainians' feelings of revenge against the Bolsheviks and the will to feel Europeans; however, they involved a part of Lithuanians and Ukrainians to the massacre of Jews rather than allowed to contribute to Wehrmacht fight against the USSR. Important lesson here that Lithuania and Ukraine did not obtain any independence but just became a part of the Third Reich, which controlled the so called 'New Europe' at the time.

Key words: The OUN, the LAF, Kazys Škirpa, Stepan Bandera, 'New Europe,' German policy in Central Eastern Europe during WWII, Antisemitism

Introduction. Since the beginning of the war in Ukraine in 2014, this country has received special attention in political life in Lithuania, which has been one of the most energetic and noticeable its supporters. In the Lithuanian public opinion, historical past is one of the main denominators for expressing support for Ukraine. The trust in civilizational commonness between Lithuania and Ukraine is also expressed by the main strategist of foreign policy, President of the Republic of Lithuania Dalia Grybauskaitė, who states very clearly that 'If Ukraine is sold today, we'll betray ourselves because it will be our turn after it' [1]. Some influential Lithuanian politicians and public actors relate these events with historical reminiscences of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, i.e. a common past in this state; they also revive the concept of 'antemurale,' which was popular in the Lithuanian-Polish Commonwealth and which refers to the former Eastern border of that country as a boundary between the Western and the Eastern Civilization, or, to put it simply, the boundary between Europa and Russia; therefore, it is considered that support for Ukraine is not only the Lithuanian, but also the European interest [2]. On the other hand, one cannot maintain that this position has been influenced only by a military conflict in Ukraine as ex-President Valdas Adamkus clearly expressed the motive to make Lithuania the center of the East European region in his foreign policy, first referring to the former lands of the GDL; Lithuania had to encourage their integration to the Euro-Atlantic space [3- p. 283-285]. The war in Ukraine added one more dimension to the public life in Lithuania: some opinions in the media have been expressed that the events of recent years have formed a new political nation in

Ukraine [4] and that they have inflamed patriotism in Lithuania, which was fading [5].

The present article aims at discussing the events at the beginning of WWII from a historical perspective, taking into consideration the fact that there were similarities between Lithuanians and Ukrainians at that time, which have some impact on the present-day life. One of such similarities is a resolute struggle for independence and the attempts to gain (in the case of the Ukrainians) or reestablish (in the case of the Lithuanians) their statehood in 1940-1941. Therefore, the present article compares the activities of the Lithuanian Activist Front (subsequently, the LAF) and Orhanizatsiya Ukrayins'kykh Natsionalistiv (the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists; subsequently, the OUN), which attempted to create the independent states of Lithuania and Ukraine in 1941, from several perspectives.

The present research is topical not only because of contemporary events but also because of a historical controversy as it was attempted to reach independence in the context of fierce fight between Germany and the Soviet Union. This fight required support from one of the fighting sides and had tragic consequences because the bloody WWII required many lives. On the other hand, it was these organizations which aimed to gain their state independence and, thus, more or less contributed to the sovereignty idea. Even though now, after 75 years, the idea of Lithuanian and Ukrainian independence seems to be different, its significance may be doubted now if it had not been fought for in 1941.

It should be noted that the present article is a comparative research in the sense that it directly does not compare all ideology forms of the LAF and the OUN, and

archive documents are used only from the Lithuanian perspective, while the Ukrainian perspective is presented as a possibility of representing a more global process. The analysis of archive documents mainly employs the documents of the Lithuania Central State Archive (subsequently, LCSA). The funds used in the present research are the following: 648 (the Lithuanian Legation in London) and 671 (the Lithuanian Legation in Berlin), as well as R-952 (Tomas Remeikis's Fund). Mainly, this is the material of mutual correspondence; however, there are also many secret documents which are not devoted for public use. The main published source is the memoirs by Kazys Škirpa, which should be evaluated with caution [6]. The attitude of Germany, which dominated in Europe at that time, is revealed by Adolf Hitler's, the main policy planner's table conversations, which explain some political nuances of the Third Reich policy [7]. This topic is represented by a sufficient number of historiographical sources.

The sources on the LAF and the OUN should be distinguished. A part of contemporary historians are particularly critical on the OUN. German historian Grzegorz Rossolinski-Liebe should be emphasised, who wrote a PhD on one of the main Ukrainian underground actors Stepan Bandera. As Bandera is particularly negatively depicted in the dissertation, the cycle of lectures by this historian in 2012 provoked a political storm, and the only place where the lectures were held was the German Embassy in Kiev. On the other hand, the book tells about the relationship between the OUN and Lithuania, Germany, and other states, which is very important in the present research [8] [9]. A similar and very critical attitude is also expressed in the works by famous Ukrainian historian John Paul Himka [10] [11]; nevertheless, they also provide much useful information on the circumstances in 1941. The evaluations by Canadian historians David R. Marples and Paul R. Magosci are more neutral ideologically, and their syntheses provide a comprehensive picture on what was going on at the beginning of the 20th century in Ukraine [12] [13]. Much work has been done by Swedish historian Per A. Rudling, who attempts to find the answers to the questions on what the OUN ideology was, how it changed, and how these events have been reflected in the works by historians [14]. Ukrainian historian Serhy Yekelchuk still has remained the most famous in Lithuania as his solid synthesis of Ukrainian history has been translated into Lithuanian [15]. His research is distinctive in the sense that it demonstrates what torments the Ukrainian nation had to suffer during Holodomor and how it suffered from Stalin's repressions; therefore, the OUN activities may be analysed taking into consideration a full context. On the other hand, some historians provide a more idealized image of the OUN. Among them, Ukrainian historian Taras Hunczak should be mentioned [16] [17]. Nevertheless, after working in the archives of various countries, this historian has also noted the OUN cooperation parallels with Lithuania.

As for Lithuanian historiography, it is sufficiently abundant; therefore, it is necessary to discuss the most significant research. The synthesis by Alfonsas Eidintas 'Lietuvos žydų žudynių byla' ('The Case of Lithuanian Jews Massacre') should be mentioned [18]. He collected a wide variety of various authors' attitudes on the most controversial questions of the Holocaust in Lithuania. The problem is that this book appeared in 2001; thus, many changes have been introduced. Among them, the works by Christoph Dieckmann and Saulius Sužiedėlis or Liudas Truska and Vygantas Vareikis [19] [20] are worth mentioning, which have been ordered by 'The International Commission for the Evaluation of the Crimes of the Nazi and Soviet Occupation Regimes in Lithuania.' A slightly

different perspective is provided by Sigitas Jęgelevičius in his article on the driving forces of the June Uprising, which is important in the sense that it reveals the real attitude of Lithuanian citizens towards Wehrmacht and to what extent it could/could not coincide with the attitudes of the LAF actors [21]. The people who would like to find out more about the life and former activities of the LAF establisher Škirpa can find this in a previous article by this author on Škirpa's diplomatic activities in Poland in 1938 [22]. Considering the problematics of the whole region, Alexander Statiev's work has remained significant, which discusses the events from a different perspective, i.e. through the activities of repressive structures of the USSR in the territories of Lithuania and Ukraine [23]. The German policy towards Eastern Europe is revealed by Christopher Browning in his solid work on the tragic destiny of European Jews [24]. In a general sense, Timothy Snyder's works could also be viewed as synthesising, which have received considerable attention and various evaluations; therefore, they still arouse discussions [25].

The aim of the present article is to compare the attempts of Lithuanian and Ukrainian resistance organizations to regain/establish the statehood of their countries in 1940-1941.

In order to reach the aim, the following objectives have been formulated:

1. to identify the common features of the LAF and the OUN activities in 1940-1941;
2. to analyse the relationship between Kazys Škirpa, the Chief of the LAF, and Ukrainian resistance fighters;
3. to determine the reasons which hindered reaching the main aim, i.e. the Lithuanian and Ukrainian statehood, and turned it into an illusion rather than reality.

With respect to structure, it should be noted that the introduction of the article discusses the beginning of communication between the Lithuanians and the Ukrainians in the first half of the 20th century and their subsequent interactions during the interwar period. Hopefully, these similarities will help to understand the present-day position of these independent states. Nevertheless, the chronological basis is from June, 1940 when Lithuania was occupied by the USSR to June, 1941 when the German army invaded the territory of the USSR in order to focus on the most complicated period. Thus, the present investigation comprises the period when Lithuania and Ukraine belonged to the USSR and active political movements of both countries aimed at changing the established status quo by all means. On the other hand, only a relative comparison of the OUN and the LAF is possible as the former organization aimed at establishing while the latter aimed at regaining statehood. It should also be stressed that further relationship between German structures and local governance (e.g. the Lithuanian temporary government) are not discussed in greater detail. This issue could be a part of a separate research. Finally, it should be emphasized that the LAF and the OUN were the organizations which aimed at representing Lithuanians and Ukrainians; however, this does not mean that they managed to implement their ideas. The attitudes and actions of the LAF and the OUN were visible very well, but they did not represent each Lithuanian or Ukrainian.

The Genesis of the Relationship between the Lithuanians and the Ukrainians in the 20th century.

One of the first people to start collegial cooperation between the Lithuanians and the Ukrainians was the future President of Lithuania Antanas Smetona, who published an article in the newspaper Viltis titled 'Artikimės su ukrainiečiais' ('Let's Get Closer to the Ukrainians') in 1909. This article critically discusses the attempts of Polish

national revival actors to reestablish the Lithuanian-Polish Commonwealth; as a contrast, the common idea of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania is presented, dissociating Lithuania from Poland [26 – p. 291]. From Smetona's point of view, the rising national movement of Ukrainians surpassed Lithuanians; therefore, when formulating the aspirations of our nation, we could use their example [26 – p. 291]. It should be noted that this idea was produced by Mykhailo Hrushevsky, one of the leaders of the Ukrainian national revival, who raised the question of possible cooperation among Lithuanians, Byelorussians, and Ukrainians in the newspaper 'Literaturno – Naukovii Vistnik' in January, 1909. However, the future President of Lithuania was the person who published Hrushevsky's article in Viltis with his own commentaries and entitled it 'Friends of the Lithuanians. The last Smetona's commentary was really powerful: This voice is a real brother's voice. You can respond to with an echo. And they will do. And we'll come to our senses. And then it will be much easier for us to fight [26-p. 289]. Even though the events changed their direction soon, one can note very easily that at the beginning of the 20th century historical reminiscences from the common past played an important role in looking for better future perspectives.

During WWI, a part of Lithuanians dispersed in the wide territory of the Russian empire and also reached the Ukrainian land. On March 26, 1917, local Lithuanians gathered in the Kiev University premises, discussed new events in the front with hope, and even sent a greeting to the head of the temporary government of Russia at that time Alexander Kerensky. The Lithuanian soldiers and officers gathered in the meeting supported the idea of establishing a national legion actively [27]. In the 19th century already, the Kiev University was an important place for the Lithuanian national revival to develop as Vilnius University was closed for Russification purposes. One of the Lithuanians who studied medicine at Kiev University was Bronė Neniškytė, who later became the wife of the future Chief of the LAF [28]. Kazys Škirpa himself, who served as an officer of the Lithuanian army being created at that moment, was sent as a commissioner by the Council of Lithuania in 1918 to bring Gen. Silvestras Žukauskas to Lithuania, who soon became the Chief of the Lithuanian Army [29- p. 132].

The end of WWI had different consequences for the Lithuanians and the Ukrainians. Lithuania managed to strengthen its independence in 1919-1920, while geopolitical circumstances were harsh for the Ukrainians, and this nation remained divided mainly by Poland and Soviet Russia. Naturally, this influenced the possibility to look for allies elsewhere. The Ukrainians placed hopes on Germany, which was the main powerful state at that time. Therefore, there is no wonder that the first relationship between the Ukrainians and the Germans were formed in 1921 when Richard Jaryi had established relationship with the people who became famous later on, such as Alfred Rosenberg, Hermann Göring, and Ernst Röhm [30 – p. 223]. Since the main body of the OUN organization originated from Western Ukraine, which belonged to Poland at that time, the organization focused much of its activity on the fight with this state, and this corresponded to Lithuania's interests. The USSR was the only state which officially proclaimed that Vilnius belonged to Lithuania; therefore, the latter avoided supporting the Ukrainians in their anti-Soviet fight. On the other hand, Lithuania always tended to support them in the fight against Poland, which was viewed as the main and often the only threat after Vilnius occupation in 1920.

Therefore, there is no surprise that Evhen Konovalts, one of the main fighters of the Ukrainian national movement, was the Lithuanian citizen and would frequently visit the building of Lithuanian Riflemen's Union in Kaunas, which is reminded by a memorial board on this building. This person played an important role in the Ukrainian resistance movement since WWI when he established military divisions of Ukrainians, serving for the Austrian-Hungarian army in 1915 [12, p. 293]. This is very similar to the activities of General Staff Colonel and diplomat Kazys Škirpa, one of the most important military actors in Lithuania, who came up with the idea to establish national military units, serving in the Russian army in 1915. It should be noted that they were of a similar age as well [31]. In 1929 already, Konovalts became the chief of the newly-created OUN movement, which mainly aimed at the establishment of the independent state of Ukraine. Due to the fact that this organization became an important opponent of Poland, the Lithuanian intelligence soon established relationship with it [32, p. 95]. Kaunas was the point which was used for Ukrainian fighters' correspondence with Berlin [32, p. 107]. In the temporary capital of Lithuania, their newspaper Surma was published, which was disseminated in Western Ukraine. Furthermore, the OUN representative Ivan Reviuk-Bartovych also resided in Kaunas. Taking all this into consideration, it is understandable why after Konovalts's murder in Rotterdam in 1938 by NKVD, the Lithuanian consul went to his funeral [12, p. 95].

Even though after Konovalts's death his duties had to be performed by his comrade Andrii Melnyk, who supported more modest measures, a large part of the fighters followed the representative of a 'strict arm' Stepan Bandera, who became especially famous for organizing Bronisław Pieracki's, the Minister of the Interior of Poland, murder in 1934; therefore, he attracted the fighters who sought to reach their aim by all possible methods, including terror. It should be emphasized that not only Bandera and his supporters were convicted but also the Polish court attempted to involve Lithuania. It was accused of supporting the OUN: as it did not have its own terrorist organization, it supported the foreign one in order to harm Poland [8, p. 136]. A part of these accusations were right as, being alone in the conflict with significantly larger Poland, Lithuania was desperately looking for allies based on the principle 'my enemy's enemy is my friend.

The Factor of the Ukrainians in Škirpa's Diplomatic Activities. In order to determine the connection between Kazys Škirpa, the first Lithuanian army volunteer, and the Ukrainian underground, the circumstances of becoming a diplomat should be presented. In 1926, he was a Chief of General Staff in the left-wing government; however, on December 17 of the same year, during the coup d'état, he stood against its organisers in order to maintain a democratic system. This way, he was unfavoured by the new political and military regime and sent to a diplomatic service in Germany. This was a usual 'punishment' for influential political opponents in interwar Lithuania. Serving as a military attaché in Berlin in 1928-1937, Škirpa established connections with many Ukrainian fighters. In 1937, he was sent to work as an envoy to the League of Nations, and to Warsaw after the Polish ultimatum on establishing diplomatic relationship in 1938. Only when Germany had started evidently pressing Lithuania at the end of the year, he came back to Berlin as an envoy. On the occasion of coming back, at the beginning of 1939, he talked to Werner von Grundherr, the adviser for the Baltic countries of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs and claimed the following:

When I was a military attaché, I had a similar conception of Lithuania's relationship with Germany for many years, <...> i.e. to align to Germany first, but I was too "small" at that time so that I could fulfill my idea [32, 1.9].

It was an attempt to arouse Germany's interest, which was viewed as an equally serious threat. Attention should be drawn to the fact that soon after his statement he was visited by one of the OUN leaders, Richard Yaryi, whom Škirpa described as an old acquaintance <...> who had close relationship with NSDAP institutions, gen. staff and other "springs of the German expansion dynamism" [33, 1.22]. This person maintained relationship with Admiral Wilhelm Cannaris, the Chief of Abwehr and provided information to Škirpa with his or another German officer's agreement that Germany did not aspire to press Lithuania about Klaipėda as it aimed to deal with Poland and after that it would use its force against the USSR and destroy it. In both cases, the Nazis were planning to do this with the help of the Ukrainians, who were harmed in both countries [33, 1.23]. However, according to Yaryi, Lithuanians could also be more active and win substantially from the situation, especially taking into consideration the fact that Germany would not take Klaipėda from Lithuania and it could enlarge its state in the East as the Germans were considering whether to establish the Byelorussian state or to incorporate it to Lithuania [33, 1.24]. At that time, Škirpa was establishing a certain group of people, who aimed to maintain Klaipėda in the territory of Lithuania and to fit into the pro-German geopolitical orientation. Georg Leibbrandt, the Director of the Eastern Department of NSDAP Office of Foreign Affairs, was negotiating with Škirpa on Lithuania joining the Anti-Comintern Pact [34, 1.18]. Nevertheless, Lithuania did not agree at least to consider such ideas. However, the Germans seem to have appealed to the Lithuanians and the Ukrainians using the territorial prism, hoping to influence the aspiration for freedom of small nations and to destroy the USSR; this conception was formulated by Hitler, who was looking for allies for the Anti-Comintern Pact [35, p. 26]. Lithuanian leaders could not agree with this because they feared violating strict neutrality and receiving criticism from other states. Therefore, political elite opposed to closer relationship with Berlin because they felt a significant threat and did not cherish support. Meanwhile, the OUN fighters did not have anything to lose and could negotiate more actively with the Germans. This was not a great secret. It seems that these plans were known in Poland very well. They were also reported to his authorities by Anthony Drexel-Biddle Jr., who served as the USA ambassador in this country. In his report in December, 1938, he wrote that the Germans were planning to destroy Poland totally, using Vilnius region as a certain bait for Lithuania. At that time, the plans of Nazi authorities were not based on the racial basis entirely; therefore, the idea of 'Great Ukraine, which had to become a German 'granary' and an effective mechanism to control Russia, was usual in Berlin intelligence and diplomatic circles [36 – p. 260]. It is more shocking that Škirpa himself transmitted this information to the American, working as an envoy in Poland, with whom he got on very well. After being withdrawn from Warsaw and preparing to move to Berlin, in December, 1938, Škirpa told Biddle that the possibility of an agreement between Germany and the USSR was very high [37 – 1.155]. He claimed that Drang nach Osten conception would be implemented first by an attack to Poland [37 – 1.156]. Half a year remained to the attack against Prague and the famous Hitler's speech in Reichstag where he attacked Poland. Therefore, Škirpa foresaw the German strategy very well or simply knew it because of his connections [22, s. 107-112].

The events started changing quickly after the beginning of WWII. Škirpa was doing everything what he could so that Lithuania would support the Germans and would march to regain Vilnius, while Ukrainian fighters conflicted with each other. Thus, the interests of both countries were sufficiently similar. However, both the Lithuanians and the Ukrainians had some disappointments. Škirpa with more radical officers and students was not supported by the state political elite and was involved in constant arguments with his authorities, whose decision to take Vilnius from Soviets' hands Škirpa considered to be a mistake; on the other hand, a large part of Ukrainian ethnos ended up in the territory controlled by the USSR, which started looking for and destroying 'the people's enemies, i.e. everyone who did not support the Communist ideology.

The Soviet Occupation in Lithuania and the Changes Influenced by It. In September, 1939, the USSR occupied almost all territory inhabited by the Ukrainians, and the same situation arose in Lithuania, in June, 1940. In the territories occupied, the destruction of the old norms started very quickly, while the suspects of resisting to the NKVD were repressed immediately. In this situation, the OUN ideas were spreading in a wider part of Ukraine, especially in Western Ukraine. Naturally, the number of Bandera's supporters was increasing. Even though this resistance movement did not avoid terror in its activities, this was acceptable for a large number of fighters due to the fact that their main and most important aim was the independent state of Ukraine, and they were ready to do absolutely everything because of this idea [12 – p. 101]. On the other hand, it should be noted that the activists of the parties which had been operating earlier (before the Soviet occupation) and socialist supporters of Ukrainian sovereignty were sufficiently quickly eliminated by the NKVD, while the OUN supporters were saved by their ability to survive in the underground [38 – p. 18]. In addition, until spring, 1941, there was an open conflict between Bandera and Melnyk supporters, and they even divided themselves into two groups: the OUN-B and the OUN-M. The internal conflict paralysed the possibilities of the organization to resist to the Soviet terror [15 – p. 212]. A similar conflict between different groups could also be observed in Lithuania; nevertheless, political means were used in this case, and they never turned into a physical fight. Undoubtedly, this was influenced by the experience of the Lithuanian statehood as the elite of diplomats, politicians, military officers, and intellectuals could be identified, which in fact made decisions in the authoritarian state. Still, President Smetona remained the main strategist of foreign policy, who was considering that in the case of choosing a German or a Soviet occupation, it was worth becoming the victim of the latter. In this case, the President was choosing from two evils; he only believed that the Soviet occupation would provide more possibilities to protect the country from assimilation, which was more favourable than to become a part of the German culture [39 – p. 44]. The largest part of the political and intellectual elite also supported his idea as it usually viewed the USSR as a counterweight to Poland [40 – p. 61]. This may be one of the most important reasons why there was no armed resistance against the Soviet occupation in June, 1940. The loss of statehood changed the situation. In Berlin, Škirpa was trying to unite the people who viewed the possibilities of statehood reestablishment through cooperation with Germany; however, a large part of other diplomats, such as Bronius Kazys Balutis in London, Povilas Žadeikis in Washington, and ex-President Antanas Smetona believed in support from Great Britain and the USA and hoped that the recovery of statehood depended

on the will of these countries [41 – p. 431]. Nevertheless, these countries were trying to reach their own interests and did not show much enthusiasm in fighting against the Soviet Union, which had occupied Lithuania. Naturally, Škirpa's idea was understandable to most Lithuanians, who were experiencing the occupation. It should be stressed that not too many people trusted the Germans; however, there was no other solution in this situation. For instance, Petras Klimas, an envoy in France famous for his anti-German attitude, claimed that Škirpa believed in the victory of Germany and was living in illusions, concerning regaining Lithuania's independence with Hitler's help. Even though he stated that Škirpa was the only diplomat to hold these ideas because others did not trust in the good will of Germans, Klimas admitted that there were no more realistic alternatives at that time [42 – p. 166]. The assumption dominated that the enemy of my enemy was my friend; therefore, everyone was enthusiastically waiting for Wehrmacht movement. Naturally, Škirpa famous for his pro-German geopolitical orientation received more attention from the Lithuanians supporting his ideas. An additional incentive could have been provided by a letter to Škirpa from a group of more radical officers, the so-called 'voldemarininkai' [43], who expressed their loyalty to him; however, talking about the German Reich, they expressed very clearly that we have to show a complete disposition to him [44 – 1.120] in the future fight for Lithuania's liberation from Soviets.

The situation of the Ukrainians was even more complicated as they did not have any other alternatives. Lithuania had envoys in Washington and London, who had been approved by the local states, and they also adopted the policy of renouncing the occupation of Lithuania. Meanwhile, the territory of Ukraine was viewed as an integral part of Russia or Poland in a long perspective, and no one supported the ambitions of the OUN fighters. Active diaspora of the Ukrainians in Canada started raising these questions only in 1942, and this was related to Anthony Hlynka's activities in the Canadian Parliament [41 – p. 260-269]. What could be said about the Ukrainians, who did not have their state, or Lithuanians, who lost it, if Marshall Gustav Mannerheim, the Chief of the Finnish Army, described Finnish foreign policy in 1940-1941 the following:

Our scope of foreign policy was very narrow if it was possible to speak about any scope at all. In fact, all our foreign policy and, as one can note, the existence of Finland as an independent state depended on the relationship with Germany [45 – p. 418].

If Finland, which had preserved its independence after the Winter War, was implementing this policy, one can perceive why the LAF and the OUN fighters tended to cooperate with the Third Reich, desperately seeking for counterbalance against the USSR.

However, at least in the case of Lithuania, it should be noted that political management from Berlin did not play as important role as it is often believed. According to historian Jegelevičius, programme texts prepared by Škirpa and the LAF did not disseminate in the underground widely [21 – p. 125]. Resistance and the June Uprising in 1941 were first spontaneous processes caused by anger against Soviet repressions, especially deportations a week ago. Therefore, anti-Soviet uprising of Lithuanians did not surprise famous Russian dissident Alexander Solzhenitsyn, who justified the behaviour of the Lithuanians, Ukrainians, and other nations, which rebelled against the Soviets, as influenced by the brutality of Bolsheviks [46 – p. 101]. The repressions shocked all Lithuanian society and affected not only Lithuanians but also minorities. Juozas Venckevičius, one of the youngest

uprising participants, who was only 14 at that time, remembered the advent of the German army the following:

Everyone was waiting for them because everyone despised the Russians. It was because of deportations, which started on June 14. If the war had started at least 10 days earlier, before massive deportations, maybe the relationship between Lithuanians and Russians would have been different. And then, during the days of the uprising, thousands of armed people started driving the Russians away (bold mine – S. J.) [47].

This conclusion is worth highlighting in order to remind that until the occupation in June, 1940, the USSR was considered to be a lesser evil than Germany, and this contributed to the state policy at that time. Many participants of the June Uprising greeted Wehrmacht in 1941 because it was the force which drove away the NKVD terror rather than because they were supporting the Third Reich policy [21 – p. 130].

This was the reason why a large society part considered the Germans to be a lesser evil or even liberators. Even considering the Jewish ethnic group, they had heard many facts about the anti-Semitic German policy; however, genocide activities were not performed in the Third Reich before the operation 'Barbarossa.' Thus, a large part of Jews did not expect mass massacres from Germans.

It should be remembered that the Lithuanians did not ask the Germans' permission to rebel against the USSR, either Škirpa in Berlin or the citizens of occupied Lithuania. The aim was to demonstrate that the Germans entered the independent state of Lithuania rather than a part of the Soviet Union. In addition, the situation was more serious after the deportations in 1941 and the massacre in Rainiai, Pravieniškės, and other places in Lithuania carried out by the Red Army and/or NKVD at the beginning of the war. It was these cruel repressions that caused the feelings of grievance and revenge rather than the occupation itself. The LAF encouraged these feelings, and this corresponded to the German interests.

The situation was similar in the territory of Ukraine: after Wehrmacht's invasion, mass gravesites were found where the NKVD was killing political prisoners. This caused fierce anger and the feeling that the Soviets had been and would be the main enemy of Ukrainians [48 – p. 11]. At the beginning of the war, the main Jewish pogroms in Lvov took place near the locations where the NKVD was massively killing political prisoners [10 – p. 211]. In total, the NKVD killed from 15,000 to 40,000 people in Volyn and Galicia [13 – p. 624]. A more important problem was that the feeling of revenge was addressed at the abundant Jewish community, which had suffered from the Soviets, rather than the real collaborators and occupants, who retreated to the USSR. Only more radical Jews, who did not cherish community traditions and religion, collaborated with the occupants. However, everyone was blamed because of their nationality. This preconditioned the tragedy of 1941 when absolutely innocent people were suffering, and the main perpetrators managed to escape the punishment for people's anguish. When trying to defuse the situation, the rebel leadership warned that it is strictly forbidden to do justice themselves. Everyone... who is guilty against the Lithuanian nation will be punished on the basis of the court decision [49 – p. 1]. This way, attempts were made to manage spontaneous anger and revenge, hoping not only to maintain statehood but also the status of a legal state. On the other hand, the above-mentioned quotation reveals that the main attention was focused on Lithuanians from an ethnical rather than civic perspective.

Retrospectively, the perspective of the Ukrainian state seemed to be more favourable. On May 9, 1941, Alfred

Rosenberg, who had become a special Hitler's representative for the occupied countries in the East, proposed a project which suggested to provide a limited independence to Ukraine. Rosenberg hoped that he would collect four million soldiers to Wehrmacht from the territory of Ukraine in return for independence [12 – p. 119]. Naturally, then the status of Ukraine in the 'New Europe' would not be much different from German satellites, such as Slovakia or Croatia. This factor should be focused on and analysed in greater detail what real circumstances and possibilities were and why they did not turn to reality.

Attempts to Get into the "New Europe". Attention should be drawn to the fact that one of the most important roles both in the LAF and the OUN programmes were paid by the 'New Europe' motive, which was especially used by the Germans. It had to make the European countries to support the side the Third Reich. On June 30, Stetsko addressed Hitler, hoping that Germany would tend to develop the 'New Europe' to the East [8 – p. 217]. This was one of the strongest motives, which led to the attempts to trust the Germans. Both the Lithuanians and the Ukrainians considered that only joining European nations led by a powerful European state could save them from the Soviet repressions that they had experienced before. This is also supported by the following Škirpa's quotation: Lithuania <...> will contribute to the formation of new and better Europe, the creator of which is already standing on a firm path [50 – 1.115].

Germany was also liked because of its technological and economic advantages. This conditioned even such broad generalizations like the following: Lithuania will have all best chances to use the creative sources and various experiences of new Germany in order to reach progress in all areas of state and nation life [50 – 1.116]. The same motive was repeated that the SSRS was perceived as a part of underdeveloped Asia, and everything which is westward was a part of progressive Europe. Attention should be paid to the fact that Škirpa did not feel special hostility to the Russian nation as such. The main evil, in his opinion, was disseminated by the Bolshevik ideology. The fight against it had to become a unifying factor for the nations of the 'New Europe.' Lithuania had to contribute as much as it could, with weapons as well under necessity, in order to destroy the Communist ideology forever [51 – 1.60]. This attitude could be viewed as a certain reminiscence of the common past in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania when this state considered itself to be the 'watcher' of the European border. Škirpa also viewed Lithuania as a shield, protecting Western Europe from Asia and explained that in history Lithuania resisted fiercely against the surge of the Slavs and Asians to Western Europe [52 – 1.115]; therefore, it was ready to continue this work this time as well. His attitude could not be clearer: Lithuania is the first avant-poste against the Russian-Asian Communism and barbarism [53 – 1.135]. A sufficiently colourful detail is the fact that in his introductory lecture during the establishment of the LAF he believed in this 'New Europe' very sincerely. This is proven by the following quotation, which would remind the speech of a nowadays politician, holding Eurofederalist views. Talking about the European countries, Škirpa claimed:

In the future, contrary to now, the nations will aim at developing the welfare of Europe together, with joint efforts rather than trying to exterminate each other. <...> The New Europe has to be the connector of creative attempts of all nations rather than the basis of conflict for all nations living here [53 – 1.131].

Therefore, geopolitically, Škirpa aspired for a strong union of the European states where the most

technologically and economically advanced state would play the leading role. He had appointed this role to Germany. The main architects of the OUN tended to think the same. The fighters of both organizations were craving for feeling Europeans so much that they did not always thought about the price needed to be paid.

The Question of Antisemitism in the Activities of the LAF and the OUN. Naturally, the orientation towards Germany caused the adaptation of some of their activity features. Undoubtedly, the anti-Semitism phenomenon was the most painful one as in Middle and East Europe, there were many Jews living, unlike in Germany. As has been noted by historian Sužiedėlis, the Western culture was not a panacea and did not protect the Nazis from inhuman behaviour [54 – p. 294]. Of course, the main remaining proof of this is the Holocaust crime. This suggests that the people who trusted in the Germans, were programmed to contribute to this to a certain extent. In the LAF and the OUN writings, Antisemitism was clearly felt. These organizations were based on ethnic rather than civic traditions; therefore, all national minorities were mistrusted, while the organizations expected to complete their territorial programme in such a way that in the future Lithuanian and Ukrainian states there would be as few foreigners as possible. Special attention was paid to the Jewish people, litvaks, who had lived in these areas for a long time. At the beginning of the war, the LAF cancelled the hospitality provided to the Jews by Vytautas the Great and indicated that their final aim was to expel them from Lithuania, as has been indicated in the LAF's proclamation [55 – 1.102 – 104]. Škirpa himself believed that Russian occupants and their Jewish collaborators were guilty for all evil that happened in Lithuania in 1940-1941 [52 – 1.56]. In such a case, a scapegoat was necessary, and the Jewish people became one. The myth created by the German Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels and exploited in the German army was that all Jews were communists and it was they who were responsible for all the cruelties performed by the Soviet system. The LAF did not take it into consideration that many Jews, citizens of Lithuania, were among the Soviet victims. Among them, the people should be noted who participated especially actively in the civic life of Lithuania, also the members of the right-wing Zionist organizations, which dreamed about the trip of all Jews to the Promised Land. Many Jewish people, who participated actively in social activities, were against the USSR occupation. However, in the LAF's opinion, 90 percent of the members of the Lithuanian Communist party were the Jews [56 – 1.182]. However, even if this had been true, underground Communist party had only several thousands of supporters, while there were more than 200,000 Jews in Lithuania. The LAF made a mistake, thinking in national stereotypes and adapting to the German anti-Semitic policy as they viewed all Jews to be guilty about the activities of some infamous NKVD staff, such as Nachman Dushansky. Therefore, all nation was considered to be responsible, even such Jews who viewed the Communist utopia fearfully and demonstrated loyalty to the Lithuanian state became 'Bolsheviks' because of some individual activities [57]. The situation was analogical in the case of the OUN. For instance, in April, 1941, the OUN decided in their congress in Krakow that the Jews were the most loyal supporters of Bolsheviks and Moscow imperialism in Ukraine; however, the OUN attempted to direct attention to the fact that Moscow was the main enemy [17 – p. 40]. One of the main ideologists, Stetsko, always emphasized that the main enemy of the OUN was the USSR, which he referred to as the Moscow Empire, even though he did not avoid harsh anti-Semitic speeches

[12 – p. 102]. The same views were held by the organization ideologist Dmytro Dontsov [9 – p. 25]. He, as well as Škirpa, blamed the Jews for serving Moscow. Nevertheless, different opinions were held by different OUN-M and OUN-B actors. For instance, one of the OUN-M ideologists Mykola Stsymborskyi had been married to a Jewish girl [9 – p. 26]. The OUN-B group viewed this as a betrayal and always mentioned this to its opponents. It is also surprising that the wife of one of the most influential OUN-B actors and Škirpa's acquaintance Yaryi was a Jew as well; therefore, Melnyk supporters blamed Bandera supporters for double standards [8 – p. 155].

Taking all this into consideration, an idea arouses to what extent was anti-Semitism deep or more conjunctural in this organization, i.e. formed because of a will to orient towards Germany. It is strange that the organization whose leaders were married to Jews suddenly attacked all nation. Here attention should be drawn to the fact that since the times of the Russian Empire, the Jews in Ukraine tended to identify with Russia rather than Ukraine, and this hurt the Ukrainians, who started viewing the Jews as a potential 'fifth column' in the context of the fight with the USSR [58 – p. 95]. The LAF leaders shared similar opinions [56 – p. 1.182], who did not notice the fact that both during the fights for independence and later many Jewish citizens fought for the Lithuanian state. On the other hand, Škirpa's earlier activities did not have any features of antisemitism; rather, he was very close to the Popular Peasants Party, which shared center left-wing ideas and, therefore, viewed the Jews positively. Some of them, for instance, Kazys Grinius interceded the persecuted Jews during WWII and, therefore, suffered from the Germans. In Škirpa's case, the situation changed after his visit to Kaunas at the end of June, 1940, when he had attempted to check what happened half secretly. In Škirpa's opinion, most of the Jews were afraid of the Reich and supported the Communists, went to the demonstrations, and this encouraged anti-Semitic ideas in society [59 – p. 95]. In the case of the Ukrainians, the Lithuanians were insulted by the Russian language used by the Jewish people, which reminded them of Tsar times [59 – p. 95]. However, here one can also notice Škirpa's attempts to analyse the situation and to try and perceive what happened. One should remember that the environment of the total war distorts attitudes and encourages paranoid mixture of real and imaginary enemies, and the situation of 1941 is an extreme example of this. In order to reconstruct the thinking of that period, one should note that a part of the OUN fighters believed that the NKVD directs the Ukrainians' anger towards the Jews, aiming to contrapose nations and to direct anger away from the real culprit [8 – p. 159].

Attention should be drawn to the fact that domestic anti-Semitism penetrated society; however, antisemitism per se does not encourage massacre and even does not guarantee approval [19 – p. 21]. Apparently, the decision on killing all Jews was made by the chiefs of the Third Reich. Even if a part of the LAF or the OUN supporters contributed to this, they did not have any possibility to change this decision; meanwhile, the Germans continued the tactic divide et impera more actively, which had already been used by the Soviets and which had to set the nations at variance. This might be noted in the interrogations of Einsatzgruppen members during the Nuremberg Tribunal where they confirm that this was done on purpose and that this was not always easy for the Germans to do [17 – p. 42].

The Beginning of the Nazi – Soviet War and its Main Controversies. On June 22, 1941, the German army moved to the West, and the Lithuanians and the Ukrainians were the first to meet it because the Red Army was

retreating in a wide front. However, the main aim of both the Lithuanians and the Ukrainians was neither help the Germans nor kill local Jews. The aim was an independent state at least on such a basis as it was understood by the LAF and the OUN fighters. Because of this reason, the OUN fighters sought to occupy as much territory as they could before the Germans appeared [8 – p. 162]. Škirpa had also formulated the same aims.

In order to reach this aim, Škirpa aimed to receive the Germans' support, but he clearly aimed to reach the heads of Wehrmacht. His idea was that the Lithuanian nation cannot change the situation by using only its small powers [59 – p. 97]. Therefore, naturally, the main ally had to be the German military forces. A part of refugees who reached Berlin in 1940-1941 suggested him to maintain relationship with security institutions, while Pranas Meškauskas-Germantas suggested introducing him to Reinhard Heydrich, the Chief of Gestapo and acting through this influential institution [6 – p. 114]. However, German security offices seemed to be unreliable to Škirpa not only because of personal dislike but also he did not see any possibility how they could liberate Lithuania. On the other hand, it was seemingly easier to contact military officers as he was an officer himself and had many good acquaintances among them [6 – p. 114]. Škirpa mentioned the surnames of the people who visited him at his flat when he was working as a military attaché: Wilhelm Keitel, Walter von Brauchitsch, Wilhelm Cannaris, Friedrich Olbricht, and Alfred Jodl [6 – p. 110-111]. It might be observed that some of them were not loyal Nazis and even participated in anti-Hitler activities especially Cannaris, Olbricht and another good Škirpa's acquaintance, Ludwig Beck. Škirpa believed that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its military forces (Wehrmacht) were favourable to Lithuania, while the National Socialists Party (NSDAP) and the repressive structures (Gestapo) were not favourable; however, he believed that the former ones would settle more in the case of a war. All misfortunes in cooperation with Germany were considered to be intrigues of the latter part.

It should be admitted that in the case of an uncompromising fight, considerable sacrifices are often needed. In critical situations, when the existence of millions of people is risked, the theory that the aim justifies the means often turns into practice. Famous Ukrainian thinker Dmytro Dontsov was one of the ideologists of this approach, who had major influence on the underground [9 – p. 11]. Bandera also believed that even millions of sacrifices may be required by a high aim [14 – p. 4]. Meanwhile, the LAF was inspired by one of its members, philosopher Antanas Maceina, who did not hold a very radical attitude and opposed Škirpa to a certain extent; he even doubted during the meeting of the LAF establishment if the Third Reich was willing to act independently regarding the small states [60 – p. 1.138]. Apparently, the role of this person should not be over-estimated because Škirpa tended to dictatorship and made the most essential choices himself. He also held the attitude that the aim justifies all means:

Fighting and the activities seeking for the noble ideas of freedom of the nation and making blood sacrifices are always historically evaluated as 'causa noble' [6 – p. 553] (bold mine – S. J.)

Even though the LAF and the OUN had sufficient similarities, one of the main differences should also be discussed. Ukrainians nationalists aimed at creating their state, while the Lithuanians aimed at using the historical statehood experience. One of the main arguments was history. As Škirpa put it:

There shouldn't be any doubts about the maturity of the Lithuanian nation for state life <...> this maturity is proven by the noble history of Lithuania <...>. It preconditions an undebatable right of our nation to have our own state without even mentioning its, as well as of any other nation's, natural right of existence, provided to us by God and equal to the rights of other nations to exist, no matter the nation is big or small.. [51-1.55] (bold mine – S. J.)

Škirpa believed that the Third Reich would take into consideration the ethnographic principle when creating the 'New Europe' and the attempts of the Eastern European countries to help in the fight against the Bolsheviks, and this would guarantee statehood to every country.

The Attitude of Germany towards the Position of Lithuania and Ukraine in the "New Europe". Even though the Lithuanians and the Ukrainians were not only passive observers of the historical processes, the main role was played by two especially powerful forces, which managed to mobilise almost all civilization's potential of their states and were fighting in a decisive battle for domination: National Socialism in Germany and Communism in the Soviet Union. As in 1940-1941 the LAF and the OUN oriented themselves to the former force, modelling its states in the utopian 'New Europe,' it should be discussed how the architects of this idea, German National Socialists, could have evaluated the perspective of these countries to exist in the 'New Europe.'

They did not see any meaning in incorporating Lithuania and Ukraine to the 'New Europe' as independent states. Hitler himself stated soon after invading the USSR that it was the Germans who created the Baltic States and Ukraine in 1918; however, the independence of these states was not useful for them in 1941. In addition to that, he aimed at fighting against Christianity in these states because it encouraged the unity of local residents [7 – p. 34]. Ordinary German soldiers and administration viewed local residents as uncivilized and unable to develop Western values, and this motive affected their thinking from the occupation experience during WWI [24 – p. 252].

Because of the German policy, the LAF and the OUN leaders were isolated. Both Škirpa, who was not allowed to leave Berlin and return to Lithuania, and Stetsko and Bandera were experiencing a certain honour arrest in Germany because they were not prohibited to send letters and various political proclamations. After the arrest, Škirpa sent letters to Juozas Ambrazevičius, the Prime Minister of the Provisional Government, where he gave instructions how to behave, concerning the relationship with the Reich [6 – p. 456]. The leaders of the OUN sent messages to the fighters in Ukraine, where they did not want to give up the Independence Act signed on June 30 [16 – p. 6]. In this case, the main position of both Bandera and Škirpa have clear similarities concerning the position not to negotiate about the independence. Škirpa was sufficiently surprised and emphasised that the Germans had not promised anything to the Ukrainians, who had been earlier lured by the most favourable promises [6 – p. 479]. This is understandable as, being a realist, he perceived the greater significance of Ukraine to the German war machine as it had significantly more residents than Lithuania. Therefore, the fact that the Germans did not show any pleasant gesture to the Ukrainians undoubtedly irritated him. One should understand that both independent Lithuania and independent Ukraine were not useful for the Germans. That is why when the war between Germany and the USSR started neither Škirpa, nor Bandera were allowed to leave for their homeland and were arrested by Gestapo. They doublecrossed interests of the Third Reich.

Taking this into consideration, there is no surprise that the LAF and the OUN coordinated their activities at the end of June, 1941 [11 – p. 241]. Škirpa himself perceived a similar situation of the Lithuanians and the Ukrainians [6 – p. 478]. At that time, Stetsko met with Škirpa in Berlin. There Stetsko also met with Japanese ambassador Gen. Hiroshi Oshima even twice [8 – p. 247]. Škirpa was very close to this ambassador. When they both were military attaches, they would go to diplomatic receptions in one car in had lunch with families [6 – p. 239]. Oshima was one of the rare diplomats who attended personal Hitler's receptions. It is likely that Škirpa could have helped organising a meeting for the Ukrainians with the ambassador influential and respected by National Socialists. One more fact could be added that the Japanese were interested in the problems of Ukrainians in the composition of the USSR [25 – p. 52]. Oshima was a very close friend of Admiral Wilhelm Cannaris, who was the Chief of the Germany military intelligence Abwehr [61-p. 149]. Differently from ideological fanatics, NSDAP leaders, both Oshima and Cannaris were politicians-pragmatics, who thought that the liberation fight of Eastern European nations could weaken the USSR. This office was the only one which provided real help for the OUN and the LAF. In addition, Cannaris was a good acquaintance of the leaders of both organizations. As was found out later, Abwehr attempted to remain ideologically neutral and concentrated only on the anti-Soviet fight because Cannaris hated Hitler and his regime policy fiercely. Therefore, Abwehr seemed to be a reliable ally for most LAF and OUN fighters. Undoubtedly, Oshima had some idea about the problems of the Baltic countries and Ukraine. Even in 1943, he would remind the officials of the Third Reich that the rise of the independent Baltic countries and the Ukrainian state would have facilitated life for the Germans themselves [62 – p. 748]. During one meeting, he even reproached Hitler for his strict policy regarding the Baltic countries and Ukraine [63 – p. 83].

In reality, Hitler never thought of independent Ukraine. According to Timothy Snyder, he did not doubt that the Bolsheviks impoverished Ukraine, but he himself could make it the country where milk rivers flow [25 – p. 40]. On the other hand, he compared the significance of Ukraine to Germany to the significance of India to the British Empire. He viewed Ukraine, Byelorussia, and the Baltic countries to be fertile and full of resources, but their agriculture system did not receive the best of them; however, he expected to use industrial methods and create an inexhaustible granary for his empire. Heinrich Himmler himself had to become the main industrialist [7 – p. 128]. It was also well-known that Hitler was adverse to the existence of Kiev University [7 – p. 34]. Apparently, the Germans hated Kiev because they established the capital of Reichskommissariat in a small town called Rovno [15 – p. 230]. A cynical attitude of the German Führer is revealed by the fact that, in his opinion, it would be enough for Eastern Europeans to know road signs and that the Reich capital is Berlin, which should be visited at least once in a life time [7 – p. 588-589]. They could read and write in German, while it was not necessary to know mathematics at all. However, it was the consequence of a long-term attitude of Germans towards Eastern Europe rather than the policy of National Socialists [64]. This was also clearly noticeable during WWI when the locals were viewed as underdeveloped and unable to develop political life [65]. The ideas discussed above in 1936-1938 were an exception because then Germany did not feel strong and it needed a geopolitical buffer against the USSR, and both the Baltic countries or Ukraine could take this role.

As for the Baltic countries, in Hitler's opinion, they could be in the 'New Europe' only if they were colonized by the

Germans, the Dutch, the Norwegians, or other 'true' Aryans [7 – p. 16]. The Baltic Sea had to become an internal lake of Germany and other related nations. If the General Plan OST of Germans was fulfilled, the Lithuanians (as well as the Latvians and the Estonians) had to inhabit the area of Archangelsk and Onega Lake. At least this was suggested by Reichsführer and SS Chief Himmler, and, taking into consideration the fact that his influence was increasing during the war years, this plan could be implemented in the case of German victory.

Despite all LAF and OUN's hopes, real decisions in the region were made by the Germans. Lithuania became a part of Ostland Reichskommissariat, while a large part of Ukraine became Reichskommissariat instead of an independent state. Paradoxically, Galicia, the basis of the OUN, was subordinated to the General Province and, from an administrative perspective, belonged to the same territory as in 1939, Poland, just this time being controlled by the Germans. Apparently, there could be no place for Lithuania or Ukraine in the 'New Europe.' The Germans needed diligent collaborators rather than patriots of their own countries; therefore, the Temporary Government, which was working only for six weeks in Lithuania and was headed by well-known intellectual Ambrazevičius instead of isolated Škirpa, was dispersed by the Germans at the beginning of 1941. In Ukraine, in July, 1941, the Ukrainian National Council was established, which was created by respectable people in society, such as Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytskyi and Kost Levitskyi; the office was operating until the summer, 1942, even though it was not appointed any real authority. This institution was dispersed after Sheptytskyi demonstrated his strong will, denounced the massacre of Jews, and even wrote about it to Himmler [13 – p. 627]. Besides, Gestapo started shooting the representatives of the OUN-M group [15 – p. 232]. The soldiers of the Red Army, both Lithuanians and Ukrainians, were kept in terrible conditions in war prisoners' camps. Only the military situation on September 8, 1941, caused the Germans to release all Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians, Ukrainians, and Byelorussians from war prisoner's camps and appoint them some task [66 – p. 16]. This supports the fact once again that the policy of Reich was similar, regarding these countries. These territories were necessary for the German in order to obtain resources, while the residents were doomed to help doing the hardest works, and the Holocaust was the most tragic example of this. One should understand that the leaders of the Third Reich, ideological fanatics, aimed at involving the nations of the Central Eastern Europe to the Holocaust crime rather than attain that the soldiers of these nations would join Wehrmacht and this way tried to change the balance of forces in the Eastern Front.

On the other hand, the initiatives of the LAF and the OUN demonstrate that these movements were ready to pay a huge price if they got to the mythical 'New Europe' [57 – p. 132-133]. Only after perceiving that the Germans became occupants and their aim was to use human and economic resources the LAF and the OUN changed their mind. According to historian Alexander Statiev, the Lithuanians and the Ukrainians started distancing from belief in the Germans in the same 1941 [23 – p. 61]. Purposefully, in March, 1942, Joseph Goebbels, the Propaganda Minister of the Third Reich, mentioned that the national movements in the Baltic States and Ukraine seemed to be more audacious than they had expected [68 – p. 114]. The Lithuanians, following the LAF's direction, and the Ukrainians, following the OUN's direction, remained alone in their fights with much more powerful forces. It did not take much time for brighter minds to

perceive how cruelly the German National Socialists misled the ones who sought to become their allies in the 'New Europe.' Therefore, after a short period, unarmed resistance started against the Germans in both countries; in Ukraine, in some places it changed into an armed fight [23 – p. 75]. The reason for the Lithuanians never fighting with arms against the Germans and the Ukrainians not avoiding such actions might be that the Germans considered the Slavs to be lower (Germ. *untermensch*) and behaved crueler with them. Still, resistance never became a priority to the Third Reich because of two reasons. First, even though the Germans did not fulfill the aspirations, it was hoped that their policy could change and their regime could soften and, eventually, a possible separate peace could be signed with the Western allies. Second, when choosing between National Socialist Scylla and Communist Charybdis, the main threat was still considered to be the USSR by most Lithuanians and Ukrainians mainly because of Communist ideology, which was a foreign body because it destroyed such important components as religion or private property. It seems likely that important actors of the Third Reich understood this perfectly well, and this might have contributed to their decision not to do anything [68 – p. 77]. Still, Goebbels, the Propaganda Minister, admitted at least in his diary that the Germans were not able to use the fact that the Ukrainians had met them as liberators from Bolshevism and managed to turn them into enemies [68 – p. 185]. Naturally, this applied to the Lithuanians as well.

Even though the LAF and the OUN were united by common enemies and a sufficiently similar worldview, their main similarity was orientation towards Germany noticeable in 1940-1941; however, it faded quickly when the Germans started controlling the territories of Lithuania and Ukraine and started their repressions. The leaders of the LAF mentioned that the Ukrainians, the Byelorussians, the Latvians, the Estonians, and Caucasus nations aspired to break the Soviet power, and demonstrated that these countries tended to look for allies [69 – p. 1.193]. When preparing to fight against the USSR in 1935, the OUN formulated its aims to expect the Byelorussian underground as well as help from Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Finland [14 – p. 9]. The reason which was not less important was that the LAF and the OUN movements and resident groups living in the present-day territories of Lithuania and Ukraine were isolated geographically. The Polish underground Armia Krajowa viewed the Germans as the most important enemy, even though it was adverse to the Soviets; in addition, there was its natural contraposition with Lithuanian and Ukrainian national resistance, which did not trust Poland as well and had viewed it as the main threat until 1939. In Byelorussia, there was no national movement contradicting to the pro-Soviet direction as Stalin had exterminated practically all intelligentsia; therefore, geopolitical orientations were different, and there were no fighters among Byelorussians similar to the LAF and the OUN members [23 – p. 50, 60]. Taking all this into consideration, it becomes clear that a friendly relationship between the Lithuanians and the Ukrainians, especially noticeable during the war in Ukraine, was programmed not only because of reminiscences about GDL but also painful experiences in fights for statehood in the 20th century. The main parallel between the LAF and the OUN is very clear: it is the attempt to protect themselves against the East (the USSR) and to find support in the West (Germany). This was a tragic experience because the Germans looked down on the Lithuanians and the Ukrainians, did not consider them to be equal partners, and wanted to use them for their own purposes. Here the proverb might be used that one should beware of untrue friends even more

than of enemies. The LAF and the OUN attempts to 'integrate' to the 'New Europe' created by the Third Reich had very painful consequences. Their mistakes should be evaluated critically in order to avoid repeating such history in the future. On the other hand, these mistakes do not diminish the meaning of fights for freedom in order to reach Lithuania and Ukraine to be independent states.

Conclusions. 1. There were many common features in the LAF and the OUN world view. Both organizations embodied the aspiration of their aim: to fight for the Lithuanian and the Ukrainian statehood by all means. In their activities, they were both forced to orientate to Germany, which was viewed as the main enemy of the Soviet Union, which controlled the territory of Lithuania and Ukraine, and was the only force which could eliminate Soviet domination. Here the LAF and the OUN fell under the influence of the Germans and propagated Antisemitic ideas in their ideology. Support for Germany had to ensure the possibilities for the states to gain statehood and to have a suitable place in the 'New Europe' dominated by Germany. On the other hand, it is difficult to determine to what extent the attitude towards the Third Reich was based on the ideological influence or conjunctive in order to reach a counterbalance for Communism and the USSR influence. This describes a tragedy for the nations of Central East Europe as well as there were no other possibilities in the deadly fight between Communism and National Socialism.

2. One of the most important personalities in reaching for contact between the Lithuanians and the Ukrainians was Škirpa, the inspirer and leader of the LAF organization. Being one of the creators of the Lithuanian army, he visited Kiev in 1918 and maintained relationship with the Ukrainian underground, working as a Lithuanian military attache in Germany. The highest OUN leaders were among personal Škirpa's acquaintances: Konovalts, Yaryi, Bandera, and Stetsko. Škirpa met with the latter several times at the end of June, 1941. Probably, they were shaping a common policy and acted through common acquaintances, trying to convince the leaders of the Third Reich that independent states of Lithuania and Ukraine are purposeful. From the point of view of the LAF and the OUN leaders, Germany did not have to interfere in the reestablishment of the Lithuanian state and the establishment of the Ukrainian state because of its own interest as this way it would ensure that these states would become active allies in the fight against the USSR.

3. The main reason which prevented the LAF and the OUN from implementing their programme and ensure the existence of independent Lithuanian and Ukrainian states in 1941 was Germany's opposition to these plans. The Germans needed the Lithuanian and the Ukrainian national movements in order to conquer the USSR more quickly and to direct against the numerous Jewish national minority, which lived in Lithuania and Ukraine. This could have been reached manipulating the aspirations of national freedom and revenge against the Soviets for fierce repressions. In this way, part of Lithuanians and Ukrainians contributed to the Holocaust, and this could have been influenced by Antisemitism propagated by the LAF and the OUN actors in addition to other reasons. The Germans perceived that real statehood of Lithuania and Ukraine would inhibit them from reaching their aims. It was more important for the ideological fanatics, the leaders of the Third Reich, to have the Lithuanians participating in the extermination of Jews rather than joining Wehrmacht in the fight against the USSR. Meanwhile, the territories of the present-day Lithuania and Ukraine were necessary for the Germans to obtain the important resources, and in the case of success in the war, they had to become a part of the 'New Europe' dominated by the Germans with a vague

perspective for the Lithuanian and the Ukrainian nations, at least living in the territories of present-day Lithuania and Ukraine. In the deadly fight between National Socialism and Communism, the LAF and the OUN chose the former because they believed that Communism would be more dangerous for the nation and state existence. Attempts were made to join the structures of the future 'New Europe,' however, it appeared that Germany, the creator of this project, was not a reliable ally and caused existential threat. This parallel should be perceived as a lesson for the future because false ally could be as dangerous as open enemy. Nevertheless, it does not deny the idea of Lithuania and Ukraine as independent states, for which the LAF and the OUN activists had the right to fight.

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ІЛЮЗІЯ ТА РЕАЛЬНІСТЬ ДЕРЖАВНОСТІ: ПОШУК ПАРАЛЕЛЕЙ МІЖ ЛИТОВСЬКИМ ФРОНТОМ АКТИВІСТІВ ТА ОРГАНІЗАЦІЄЮ УКРАЇНСЬКИХ НАЦІОНАЛІСТІВ

Аналізуються відносини між Литовським фронтом активістів та Організацією Українських націоналістів (ОУН) та їх паралельні дії задля досягнення незалежності Литви та України у 1941 р. У фокусі дослідження знаходяться спроби лідерів ОУН та ЛФА змодельювати майбутню Литовську та Українську державу у «Новій Європі» на чолі з Німеччиною. Військова та політична сила Німеччини, на думку ОУН та ЛФА, мала урівноважити комуністичний СРСР. Шкірпа, лідер ЛФА, координував свої дії з лідерами ОУН – Стецьком, Ярієм та Бандерою. Фанатичні очільники Третього Рейху, у свою чергу, маніпулювали почуттями литовців та українців, які бажали помститися більшовикам та відчувати себе справжніми європейцями. Однак німці радше залучали литовців та українців до вбивств євреїв, ніж до безпосередніх дій Вермахту проти СРСР. Це стало важливим уроком для Литви та України: вони не здобули цим незалежність, але стали лише частиною Третього Рейху, який на той час контролював так звану «Нову Європу».

Ключові слова: ОУН, ЛФА, Казис Шкірпа, «Нова Європа», Степан Бандера, німецька політика у Центрально-Східній Європі у Другій Світовій війні, антисемітизм.