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**DISSERTATION
FEATURES OF THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL CONFLICT BETWEEN
GREECE AND TURKEY**

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In fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

The dissertation presents the results of the author's research. The use of ideas, results, and texts of other authors is accompanied by references to the relevant sources

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АНОТАЦІЯ

Сампсон М. Натаналідіс. «Особливості міжнародного політичного конфлікту між Грецією та Туреччиною». – Кваліфікаційна наукова праця на правах рукопису.

Дисертація на здобуття наукового ступеня доктора філософії у галузі соціальних та поведінкових наук за спеціальністю «052 – Політологія» – Київський національний університет імені Тараса Шевченка, Київ, 2025.

Актуальність теми дослідження обумовлена необхідністю теоретичного осмислення особливостей міжнародного політичного конфлікту між Грецією та Туреччиною та необхідністю пошуку ефективної моделі запобігання політичним конфліктам ще до їх виникнення.

Дисертація є першим комплексним політологічним дослідженням чинників міжнародно-політичного конфлікту між Грецією та Туреччиною, оскільки в ній досліджуються фактори впливу колективного почуття власності (приналежність) та національної ідентичності в процесі ескалації протистояння в контексті загострення конфлікту національних інтересів та розкривається роль колективного почуття власності (приналежність) та національної ідентичності як чинника єдності, національної згуртованості та консолідуючого матеріалу в ході міжнародних конфронтацій.

Дисертаційне дослідження є одним з небагатьох наукових проєктів, який аналізує концепції та механізми міжнародного політичного конфлікту з акцентом на вивченні колективного почуття власності (приналежності) та ідентичності. Робота робить інноваційний внесок у розуміння ключової ролі міжнародного політичного конфлікту, представляючи нові підходи до визначення та розуміння його сутності та значення в сучасному політичному контексті. Дослідження висвітлює розвиток міжнародного політичного конфлікту та його роль у сучасному політичному діалозі,

вказуючи на новітні механізми, особливості суспільства, в якому він відбувається, ролі, причини виникнення, управління конфліктними ситуаціями, прогнозування наслідків (як каталізатора політичних змін, як засобу, що сприяє здійсненню дій зі зміни стратегії, можливості опонентів визначитися з власними позиціями, об'єднанню всередині держави, появі нових лідерів).

Аналіз наукової літератури, нормативно-правової бази та сучасних тенденцій розвитку безпекового середовища обумовлюють нагальну необхідність теоретичного осмислення меж міжнародного політичного конфлікту. У дослідженні визначені фактори, які впливають на виникнення політичного конфлікту; розбіжність політичних ідеалів, ціннісних орієнтацій; процес ідентифікації, усвідомлення своєї приналежності та причетності до політичних, соціальних, релігійних, субкультурних спільнот; політична система з певною організацією влади. Таке формулювання визначає важливість врегулювання міжнародного політичного конфлікту, спрямованого на досягнення консенсусу з політичних питань.

Для реалізації визначеної мети було використано сукупність загальнонаукових і спеціальних методів політології, які відповідають меті та завданням дисертаційної роботи. Серед них: системний, порівняльний, структурно-функціональний, історичний, соціологічний, герменевтичний методи.

Результати дослідження мають наукову новизну, яка конкретизується у таких положеннях:

Вперше:

- обґрунтовано цілісну *теоретико-концептуальну модель* аналізу міжнародно-політичного конфлікту між Грецією та Туреччиною, яка синтезує підходи політичного реалізму, конструктивізму та конфліктології з урахуванням категорій почуття власності (на територію, історію, культурну спадщину) та національної ідентичності. У межах цієї моделі показано, як уявлення про «свою територію» та

«історичну справедливість» структурують сприйняття загроз і визначають логіку дій обох держав;

- розроблено *методологічну рамку політологічного аналізу* греко-турецького конфлікту, у якій почуття колективної психологічної власності (приналежності) та національна ідентичність операціоналізовані як окремі аналітичні змінні. Запропоновано систему індикаторів (дискурсивних, інституційних та поведінкових), що дозволяє емпірично досліджувати вплив уявлень про належність територій, історико-культурних об'єктів та символічного простору на формування зовнішньополітичних позицій Афін і Анкари.

Набуло подальшого розвитку:

- теоретичні уявлення про *роль внутрішньополітичних чинників* у трансформації міжнародно-політичних конфліктів: на конкретному прикладі Греції та Туреччини показано, як націоналістичні наративи, політика пам'яті та ідентифікаційні практики держави відтворюють “почуття власності” на спірні території (Кіпр, Егейське море, питання меншин) та конструюють образ “іншого” як історичного суперника й конкурента за ресурси, легітимність і статус;

- наукові підходи до розуміння *впливу зовнішніх акторів* на динаміку затяжних міжнародно-політичних конфліктів. На матеріалі греко-турецьких відносин деталізовано механізми, за допомогою яких міжнародні організації (ЄС, НАТО, ООН) та провідні держави (США, Велика Британія) модифікують баланс між прагненням сторін до самоствердження, заснованого на історичному почутті власності, та потребою у регіональній стабільності й безпеці (зокрема енергетичній).

Уточнено:

- зміст та класифікацію *стратегій мирного врегулювання* греко-турецького конфлікту шляхом виокремлення їх культурно-ідентифікаційного виміру. Систематизовано підходи до використання міжкультурного діалогу, освітніх і гуманітарних програм, політики історичного примирення та заходів зі зниження

символічної ворожості як інструментів пом'якшення почуття взаємної загроженості й трансформації конфліктної взаємодії у напрямі взаємного визнання та співжиття;

- роль *європейської інтеграції, міждержавної дипломатії та “м'якої сили”* як комплексного інструментарію трансформації конфлікту між Грецією та Туреччиною з позицій історичної пам'яті та почуття власності на спірні території. Показано, за яких умов європейські норми, інститути та практики співпраці здатні не лише обмежувати ескалацію, а й поступово переводити історико-політичні суперечності у формат партнерства, спільної відповідальності та взаємовигідної регіональної взаємодії.

Ключові слова: колективне психологічне почуття власності (приналежності), етнонаціональна ідентичність, міжнародний політичний конфлікт, шляхи розв'язання конфліктів, війна, інформаційна війна, інформаційна безпека, греко-турецькі відносини, міжнародні відносини, політичні комунікації, етнічна напруженість, насильство, НАТО, ЄС, геополітика.

ABSTRACT

Sampson M. Nathanailidis. *“Features of the International Political Conflict between Greece and Turkey.”* - Qualifying scholarly work submitted as a manuscript. Dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the field of Social and Behavioral Sciences, specialty **052 – Political Science** - Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, Kyiv, 2025.

The relevance of the research topic is determined by the need for a theoretical understanding of the specific features of the international political conflict between Greece and Turkey, as well as by the necessity to identify an effective model for preventing political conflicts prior to their emergence.

The dissertation constitutes the first comprehensive political science study of the factors shaping the international political conflict between Greece and Turkey. It examines

the impact of collective feelings of ownership (belonging) and national identity on the escalation of confrontation in the context of the intensification of conflicts of national interests, and reveals the role of collective ownership (belonging) and national identity as factors of unity, national cohesion, and consolidation during international confrontations.

The dissertation research is one of the few scholarly projects that analyzes concepts and mechanisms of international political conflict with an emphasis on the study of collective feelings of ownership (belonging) and identity. The work makes an innovative contribution to understanding the key role of international political conflict by proposing new approaches to defining and comprehending its essence and significance in the contemporary political context. The study highlights the development of international political conflict and its role in modern political dialogue, identifying new mechanisms, societal characteristics in which it unfolds, its roles, causes of emergence, conflict management practices, and the forecasting of consequences (as a catalyst for political change, as a means facilitating strategic shifts, enabling opponents to clarify their own positions, fostering internal consolidation within states, and contributing to the emergence of new leaders).

The analysis of scholarly literature, the regulatory and legal framework, and contemporary trends in the development of the security environment underscores the urgent need for a theoretical rethinking of the boundaries of international political conflict. The study identifies factors influencing the emergence of political conflict, including divergences in political ideals and value orientations; processes of identification and awareness of belonging and involvement in political, social, religious, and subcultural communities; and political systems with specific structures of power organization. Such a formulation highlights the importance of resolving international political conflicts aimed at achieving consensus on political issues.

To achieve the stated purpose, a set of general scientific and specialized political science methods was employed, corresponding to the aims and objectives of the

dissertation. These include the systemic, comparative, structural-functional, historical, sociological, and hermeneutic methods.

The results of the study possess scientific novelty, which is specified in the following provisions:

For the first time:

- a holistic theoretical and conceptual model for analyzing the international political conflict between Greece and Turkey has been substantiated. This model synthesizes approaches of political realism, constructivism, and conflict studies while incorporating the categories of ownership (of territory, history, and cultural heritage) and national identity. Within this framework, it is demonstrated how perceptions of “one’s own territory” and “historical justice” structure threat perceptions and determine the logic of actions of both states;

- a methodological framework for the political science analysis of the Greek–Turkish conflict has been developed, in which collective psychological ownership (belonging) and national identity are operationalized as separate analytical variables. A system of indicators (discursive, institutional, and behavioral) is proposed, enabling empirical investigation of the influence of perceptions of territorial belonging, historical and cultural objects, and symbolic space on the formation of foreign policy positions of Athens and Ankara.

Further developed:

- theoretical notions regarding the role of domestic political factors in the transformation of international political conflicts: using the case of Greece and Turkey, it is shown how nationalist narratives, memory politics, and state identification practices reproduce a “sense of ownership” over disputed territories (Cyprus, the Aegean Sea, minority issues) and construct the image of the “other” as a historical rival and competitor for resources, legitimacy, and status;

- scholarly approaches to understanding the influence of external actors on the dynamics of protracted international political conflicts. Based on Greek–Turkish relations,

the mechanisms are detailed through which international organizations (the EU, NATO, the UN) and leading states (the United States, the United Kingdom) modify the balance between the parties' aspirations for self-assertion, grounded in historical feelings of ownership, and the need for regional stability and security (particularly energy security).

Clarified:

- the content and classification of strategies for the peaceful settlement of the Greek–Turkish conflict through the identification of their cultural and identity-based dimension. Approaches to the use of intercultural dialogue, educational and humanitarian programs, policies of historical reconciliation, and measures to reduce symbolic hostility are systematized as instruments for mitigating mutual perceptions of threat and transforming conflict interaction toward mutual recognition and coexistence;

- the role of European integration, interstate diplomacy, and “soft power” as a comprehensive toolkit for transforming the conflict between Greece and Turkey from the perspectives of historical memory and feelings of ownership over disputed territories. It is shown under what conditions European norms, institutions, and cooperative practices are capable not only of restraining escalation but also of gradually transforming historical and political disputes into a format of partnership, shared responsibility, and mutually beneficial regional interaction.

Keywords: collective psychological ownership (belonging), ethno-national identity, international political conflict, conflict resolution strategies, war, information warfare, information security, Greek–Turkish relations, international relations, political communications, ethnic tension, violence, NATO, EU, geopolitics.

СПИСОК ПУБЛІКАЦІЙ ЗДОБУВАЧА ЗА ТЕМОЮ ДИСЕРТАЦІЇ

Статті у наукових фахових виданнях України:

1. Натанаїлідіс С. М. Пропаганда топоніміки як інструмент просування конфлікту. *Політологічний вісник*. 2023. № 91. С. 159–167. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.17721/2415-881x.2023.91.159-167>

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3. Sampson M. Nathanailidis. The collective sense of ownership and its influence in the relationship between Greece and Turkey. *Вісник Львівського університету. Серія філос.-політолог. Студії*. 2024. Вип. 54. С. 133–144. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.30970/PPS.2024.54.16>

Статті у зарубіжних періодичних виданнях, які індексуються в міжнародних наукометричних базах:

4. Nathanailidis, Sampson M., The Political Risk of Converting Hagia Sophia Back into a Mosque in the Year 2020 (August 30, 2021). *Global Journal of Political Science and Administration* 2021, Vol.9, No.2, pp.34-41, Available at SSRN: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3913998>

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LIST OF THE APPLICANT’S PUBLICATIONS

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INTRODUCTION

The rationale for choosing the research topic is conditioned by the need for further research developments of effective methods and analysis of conflicts, which is the basis for the creation of management strategies at both the theoretical and practical level.

The relevance of the research topic is determined by the peculiarities of the current political situation in Greece and Turkey. Conflictogenicity has led to the need for in-depth research into the phenomenon of conflict, knowledge of the consequences of ignoring it and the importance for society of preventing and resolving international political conflicts. The lack of scientific and theoretical research on the issue hinders both the development of the relevant field of science and the solution of problems in practice.

The Thesis explores the possibility of aggravated intra-ethnic tensions and the diversification of foreign policies to incorporate guidelines on National Identity and Sense of Ownership, to inform about the risks of conflict escalation. In the context of the psychological concepts of “we” and “our”, it’s been suggested that a collective psychological sense of ownership (belonging) can be malleable under interactive dynamics.

The sense of collective psychological ownership (i.e., the possessive feeling that an object belongs to someone) has been identified in bibliography as a potentially important predictor of people’s attitudes and behavior. Men who share an ethnic area, a historical era, or an economic pursuit are guided by common images of good and evil. Infinitely varied, these images reflect the elusive nature of historical change. Collective psychological ownership (belonging) is defined as the psychologically experienced phenomenon in which a person develops possessive feelings for a target, object or an idea.

The lack of effective mechanisms and methods for conflict resolution and incompleteness of international law complicate the situation and increase the level of global conflict and tensions.

The experience of political settlement of international political conflicts shows that this process has a spontaneous and unsystematic character. In many cases, the political leadership lacks a well-thought-out strategy and tactics for resolving controversial national issues, which leads to protracted crises. Therefore, an important task of conflict studies is to find new, effective ways to resolve conflict situations and avoid violent forms of conflict behavior. The emphasis on the study of the specifics of conflict situations allows us to identify the factors that determine the dynamics of state development, and the study of the origins, genesis and specifics of conflicts makes it possible to find the most efficient ways and methods for their settlement.

The relevance of the topic of this dissertation research is determined by the need to find an effective model of preventing Political Conflict before it occurs. This research will seek to show that when the sense of ownership of an idea, a historical heritage or land in the form of one's individual identity, is shaken in its foundation, the risk of political conflict or a return to historical political conflict between nations increases.

Connection of work with scientific programs, plans, topics, grants. The dissertation work was carried out at the Department of Political Science of the Faculty of Philosophy of Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv within the framework of research topic 23БФ041-02 “Improving the mechanisms of interaction in the system “government-business-civil society” in the conditions of European integration” (state registration number 0123U101996).

The purpose and objectives of the study. The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the peculiarities of the international political conflict between Greece and Turkey.

The implementation of the research purpose made it necessary to address the following **tasks**:

- to reveal the main theoretical approaches to the study of international political conflicts, in particular ethno-political and territorial disputes, which are deeply rooted in history and culture;

- to develop a methodological framework for research that involves analyzing the role of national identity and a sense of collective psychological ownership (of land, history, cultural heritage) in the formation of international conflicts;

- to show how domestic policy supports a “sense of ownership” over disputed territories and constructs an image of “the other”;

- to find out how external actors influence the balance between the drive for self-assertion and the need for stability;

- to identify possible strategies for peaceful conflict resolution, taking into account the cultural and identity differences between the parties and the role of national pride in the reconciliation process;

- to identify effective tools that will contribute to transforming historical and political conflicts into cooperation and partnership.

The object of the research is international political conflict between Greece and Turkey.

The subject of the research is the features of the international political conflict between Greece and Turkey.

Research methods. The scientific foundation of the study was the analysis of a well-established term in the Bibliography of Psychology, the “Sense of Ownership” and its integration to a social group’s “National Identity”. This conflation combined with historical data or political conflicts that share similar basis was hypothesized to be a barometer to the advance of political conflicts, not only as a source of generating conflicting points, but rather as a loudspeaker to the crowds, when the crowds are being demagogued.

A variety of scientific methods were used to realize the defined purpose and solve the set tasks. Among them are: *systemic, comparative, structural-functional, historical, sociological, hermeneutic.*

The *systemic method* made it possible to analyze the concept and essence of national identity as a multifaceted phenomenon and a theoretical generalization of its mechanisms. The *comparative method* made it possible to find out the experience and conduct a comparative analysis of the practices of abusing the sense of ownership and national identity of nations who are linked by historical conflicts. The *structural-functional method* made it possible to analyze the political mechanisms and conflict resolution methods and their applicability to the sense of ownership and national identity. The *historical method* helped trace the genesis of approaches to the power mechanisms of sense of ownership and national identity through the lenses of past conflicts. The sociological method made it possible to assess the effectiveness of the conflict resolution methods by enhancing the sense of ownership connection between the affected countries. The *hermeneutic method* made it possible to clarify the key elements of the collective sense of ownership and national identity.

The process of regulating political conflict was considered in terms of a systemic approach which includes a set of actions, methods, techniques, measures, technologies which together represent a defined strategy to influence the conflict in order to transform it.

The scientific novelty of the obtained results is due to the relevance of the proposed problem, the set of tasks, as well as the means of solving them. The most significant achievements, which reflect the author's contribution to the development of the researched issues and determine the scientific novelty, are the following results:

For the first time:

- a holistic *theoretical and conceptual model* for analyzing the international political conflict between Greece and Turkey has been substantiated. This model synthesizes

approaches of political realism, constructivism, and conflict studies while incorporating the categories of ownership (of territory, history, and cultural heritage) and national identity. Within this framework, it is demonstrated how perceptions of “one’s own territory” and “historical justice” structure threat perceptions and determine the logic of actions of both states;

- a *methodological framework for the political science analysis* of the Greek-Turkish conflict has been developed, where collective psychological ownership (belonging) and national identity are operationalized as separate analytical variables. A system of indicators (discursive, institutional, and behavioral) is proposed, enabling empirical investigation of the influence of perceptions of territorial belonging, historical and cultural objects, and symbolic space on the formation of foreign policy positions of Athens and Ankara.

Further developed:

- theoretical notions regarding the role of internal political factors in the transformation of international political conflicts: using the case of Greece and Turkey, it is shown how nationalist narratives, memory politics, and state identification practices reproduce a “sense of ownership” over disputed territories (Cyprus, the Aegean Sea, minority issues) and construct the image of the “other” as a historical rival and competitor for resources, legitimacy, and status;

- scholarly approaches to understanding *the influence of external actors* on the dynamics of protracted international political conflicts. Based on Greek-Turkish relations, the mechanisms are detailed through which international organizations (the EU, NATO, the UN) and leading states (the United States, the United Kingdom) modify the balance between the parties’ aspirations for self-assertion, grounded in historical sense of ownership, and the need for regional stability and security (particularly energy security);

Clarified:

- the content and classification of *strategies for the peaceful settlement* of the Greek-Turkish conflict through the identification of their cultural and identity-based dimension. Approaches to the use of intercultural dialogue, educational and humanitarian programs, policies of historical reconciliation, and measures to reduce symbolic hostility are systematized as instruments for mitigating mutual perceptions of threat and transforming conflict interaction toward mutual recognition and coexistence;

- the role of *European integration, interstate diplomacy, and “soft power”* as a comprehensive toolkit for transforming the conflict between Greece and Turkey from the perspectives of historical memory and sense of ownership over disputed territories. It is shown under what conditions European norms, institutions, and cooperative practices are capable not only of restraining escalation but also of gradually transforming historical and political disputes into a format of partnership, shared responsibility, and mutually beneficial regional interaction.

Practical significance of the obtained results. The main provisions of the dissertation research deepen scientific knowledge about the nature of political and military conflicts between countries and specific recommendations that can be implemented and can become the basis for improving modern methods of resolving international conflicts. The results of the study provide a deeper understanding of how political conflicts emerge and what factors specifically influence their development. Theoretical developments, analyses and generalizations of the dissertation can be used in research of political conflict or psychology, to help in further understanding or resolving of current conflicts that arise in the process of their regulation. Conclusions and recommendations stated in the dissertation can serve international organizations, governing parties in the process of developing a constructive strategy for influencing political conflicts even before they occur, in particular, to facilitate dialogue or activate domestic and international mechanisms that will help extinguish conflicts in their conception.

Personal contribution of the researcher. The dissertation research is an independent scientific work that proposes solutions to specific scientific problems related to studying the features of the international political conflict between Greece and Turkey and determining a possible strategy for peaceful conflict resolution. All the theoretical, methodological, scientific, and analytical conclusions and recommendations were made by the author independently.

Approbation of research results. Theoretical concepts and practical conclusions of the dissertation research were discussed at meetings of the Political Science Department of the Philosophy Faculty of Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv. The key propositions of the thesis were presented and discussed at various scientific events, including scientific and practical conferences and round tables, in particular: “The Days of Science of the Faculty of Philosophy – 2019” (Kyiv, 2019); “The Days of Science of the Faculty of Philosophy – 2024” (Kyiv, 2024). Participation in these events made it possible to convey to the scientific community the main ideas of the work, to receive feedback, as well as to carry out discussions on the main aspects of the dissertation research.

Publications. The results of the study are presented in 7 scientific publications. In particular, three scientific articles have been published in domestic professional journals of “B” category, in the field of Political Sciences, one article has been published in foreign scientometric databases, and three abstracts have been presented at scientific conferences.

Structure and volume of the dissertation. The dissertation consists of an introduction, 3 chapters, conclusions and References. The total volume of the thesis is 220 pages, where 176 pages are the main text and 32 pages are the list of references (340 titles).

CHAPTER 1

THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE STUDY OF THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL CONFLICT BETWEEN GREECE AND TURKEY

International political conflicts are multifaceted phenomena that entail struggles between sovereign states or between state and non-state actors across national boundaries, primarily over political, economic, territorial, or ideological issues. These conflicts are characterized by their international scope and the involvement of multiple actors with varying degrees of power, interests, and motivations.

As defined by Vasquez (2009), international political conflicts are “disputes that involve disagreements between two or more countries regarding the policies or actions of one of them that are perceived to affect the interests of the others” [322, p. 55]. Such conflicts often stem from deep-rooted historical grievances, competition for resources, power imbalances, and divergent national interests [167]. These conflicts can manifest in various forms, including diplomatic tensions, economic sanctions, propaganda wars, military confrontations, and proxy wars [215].

According to Waltz (1979), the structure of the international system, characterized by anarchy and the absence of a central governing authority, plays a crucial role in fostering international political conflicts. States, driven by the need to ensure their survival and security in an anarchic system, often engage in power struggles and alliances that can escalate into conflicts [329]. Furthermore, Snyder (2002) emphasizes that ideological differences, such as those rooted in nationalism, religion, or political ideology, frequently exacerbate these conflicts, making them more intractable and complex to resolve [298].

In the contemporary context, international political conflicts are increasingly influenced by globalization and the interconnectedness of global economies and societies.

This interconnectedness means that local or regional disputes can have far-reaching implications, drawing in various international actors and organization [181].

Features of the international political conflict between Greece and Turkey in the context of research in Greece and Turkey were also studied by the below researchers: H. Anastasiou [34], M. Ataman [41], H. Basaran [51], M. Bayar [52], C. Borou [62], E. Boubougiatzi [65], A. Bozkurt [66], P. Chrysopoulos [86], V. Ciftcioglu [87], A. Dural [112], E. Ekinici [115], F. Ergül [116], M. Gavouneli [136], Y. Gürsoy [148], S. Hacaoglu [150], A. Heraclides [158], A. Huseyinoglu [171], H. Isiksal [173], J. Kakissis [180], N. Kampouris [182], I. Kostarella [199], G. Koukoudakis [200], A. Kyridis [203], E. Lazarou [208], D. Tsarouhas [80], V. Volkan [328].

To analyze the features of this conflict between Greece and Turkey, scientific political science works were studied: article of American historian and political scientist Jack Levy “Historical trends in Great Power War: 1495-1975.” [215]; the classic work of American political science in the field of international relations – H. Morgenthau “Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace” [239].

Popularization, technologization, commercialization, and professionalization are not only features of conflicts between states, but also the causes of their occurrence. Nationalist, patriotic and populist ideologies, which appeal to the feelings of every citizen – inhabitant of the country, became a feature of the reasons for the popularization of wars.

A feature is technological changes in the means of conducting military operations – an increase in the destructive power of weapons, diversity, accuracy of defeat, penetrating ability, mobility of weapons systems and their delivery, speed and efficiency of military transport and communication systems.

A feature and reason are the commercialization of wars, a process that began in the 17th century. Trade brought the wealth needed to wage war, and war was a means of promoting trade. Michael Howard, an English historian, in his monograph “War in the History of Europe” calls the period from the end of the 16th to the beginning of the 19th

century. Gradually, the interest of the entrepreneurial state in wars is fading, and the idea of free trade is replacing it. However, the connection between entrepreneurship and warfare was not severed, economic growth contributed to the state's ability to wage war.

However, the growing destructive power of wars between states cannot be explained only by economic or other factors. It is a whole range of interrelated political, socio-economic, and cultural factors that have led to this.

J. Levy put forward the hypothesis that the pattern of conflicts between states is a decrease in the frequency of military clashes with an increase in the destructive consequences of wars, put forward assumptions that could explain discovered regularities. To develop a research model that confirms or refutes the proposed hypothesis, it is necessary to determine the following research elements: determine the criteria for wars between states; determine the criteria for assessing the consequences of wars and their duration [215].

A component of the hypothesis is the statement that the destructive consequences of war between states are increasing. During five centuries, wars between states become more serious in terms of indicators, except for duration. The duration of wars remains the same as at the end of the 15th century, but the scale of wars has increased dramatically. On average, wars last about 5 years. The number of states participating in the war grew on average by one state every two centuries.

The factor of the conflict is the strengthening of the rational factor in the organization of the military force of the state and its use. Wars of honor, revenge, or the enrichment of kings and nobles that were typical of the Middle Ages were replaced by wars as an effective political tool to achieve political goals, first by monarchies and later by nation-states.

One of the characteristics of conflicts is that they are a manifestation of "society division". The dividing lines forming opposing groups are not always along ethnic or religious lines. Many different factors in various combinations become the basis for the

formation of conflicting groups. It is the difficulty of determining the general factors that form groups in conflicts that led to the idea of “identity” conflicts.

Ernie Rieger points out that identity conflicts appear when society, in response to unsatisfied needs for economic and social well-being, turns to strengthening its collective identity to fight for political recognition. Almost two-thirds of current armed conflicts can be defined as identity conflicts, and almost 70 contemporary political conflicts involve groups formally organized to strengthen a “collective identity”. J. Burton emphasizes that it has already been proven that “identifying groups striving for recognition of their own identity and self-determination have more power than just military power”.

To study processes in the political sphere, Ukrainian and foreign researchers use the terms “collective psychological ownership”, “national identity”, “international conflict”, “political conflictology”, “territory”, “political consciousness”, “political culture”, “patriotism”, which reflect the ambiguity, complexity, multidimensionality of political development. For the study of political identity, the terms “national identity” and “collective psychological ownership” are of particular interest, and they will be the focal points of this study.

Analysis of researches and publications on the problem considered in the dissertation, identified aspects of the problem. The identity of a person is a broad concept, which is studied by social psychologists, philosophers and teachers. It covers the whole variety of human identifications with social models, ideals, idols, large and small groups, norms, psychological types of people, other people, their roles, statuses, etc. [23, p. 108-118].

The researchers of the popular political conflict between Greece and Turkey aimed to reveal possible solutions to the contradictions that appeared as a result of the functioning of political institutions. Analytical works of researchers show that there is no systematic and complete theory of the national political conflict between Greece and

Turkey. An integrated approach that takes into account the importance of new approaches and new concepts is the basis for the validity and verification of research.

Analyzing the historiography of the problem, it should be noted that the international political conflict between Greece and Turkey has practically not been studied in Ukrainian political science. At the same time, the analysis of the source base demonstrates that it is wide and diverse. The study of the international political conflict between Greece and Turkey in both foreign and Ukrainian historiography should be differentiated on the basis of specific classification criteria.

In this dissertation, according to the content of specific aspects that formed the basis of the analysis of scientific research, we can single out the following groups of sources.

The first group is represented by official legal acts. These include the Constitutions of Greece and Turkey.

The second group is represented by the works of foreign researchers regarding the international political conflict between Greece and Turkey.

The third group is the works of Ukrainian scientists, which reflect the phenomenon of the international political conflict between Greece and Turkey, for example, the works of O. Batrymenko [1], D. Dvornichenko [9], M. Yurkevych [26], D. Khalileva [22], E. Solovyova [19], Ye. Gaber [6], A. Dzhilavian [10].

In Ukraine, among the researchers who studied the peculiarities of the influence of national identity on political conflict, the following scientists should be noted: P. Kravchenko [14], I. Ivanov [12], B. Ivanenko [11], L. Nahorna [15], I. Kysla [204], I. Hubeladze [8].

The fourth group consists of dissertation studies on the problems of the international political conflict between Greece and Turkey, for example, the dissertation for the degree of candidate of political sciences by the Ukrainian researcher D. Dvornichenko titled "Europeanization of Greece's domestic and foreign policy in the context of the European integration process", Dvornichenko D. Yu., 2013, which is devoted to the analysis of the

features of the Europeanization process in the domestic and foreign policy of Greece in the context of European integration. The categorical and conceptual apparatus of transformational processes in the conditions of European integration is analyzed, its own definitions are formulated taking into account the peculiarities of the subject of the research. The impact of European integration on the economic and institutional and legal systems of Greece is studied, the most problematic issues between Greece and the EU are determined. The evolution of Greece's foreign policy priorities is analyzed, the approaches of the Greek leadership to the formulation of a single EU foreign policy line and the implementation of a common foreign policy are investigated. Opportunities for Ukraine to use Greece's European integration experience are outlined [9].

Ukrainian researcher M. Yurkevych in her work "Formation and constitutional development of the Republic of Turkey (XX-XXI centuries)" described the scientific interest in statehood and law, conditioned by three aspects. The first one is historical. The second one is political and legal. The third one is European integration. [26].

Ukrainian researcher E. Solovyova as part of her work on her dissertation "Foreign policy strategy of Turkey in Central Asia (during the reign of the AKP)" examines the interconnection of Turkish political culture with foreign policy [19]. The study shows the link between Turkey's domestic political dynamics and its foreign policy trajectory. At the initial stage (2002-2007) the AKP adjustment strategy led to a more restrained foreign policy position. It has been established that, at the initial stage, emphasizing its secular nature, the AKP promoted cooperation with Euro-Atlantic structures, guided by the conviction that the adoption of Western democratic values would help address Turkey's internal challenges and avoid conflict with the military leadership within the country. In the thesis, it's emphasized that military influence was the main internal factor, which is why the AKP tried to show that Islam and democracy could coexist peacefully, positioning Turkey as an example for the Muslim world to follow, while seeking EU

membership as proof of the compatibility of Islamic norms with democratic principles on the world stage.

The fifth group of sources includes the works of Ukrainian sociologists, which analyzed the results of sociological and political monitoring of the national political conflict between Greece and Turkey.

Sixth group – materials of seminars, conferences, meetings of experts.

The seventh group consists of electronic documents posted on official websites and Internet resources that describe the experience of political change in countries. These include resources belonging to the central executive bodies of Greece and Turkey, the Institute for Balkan Studies, the V - Dem project, and the Cato Institute. <https://www.cato.org/blog/old-nato-nightmare-returns-possible-war-between-greece-turkey>, German Institute for International Affairs (<https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/political-implications-of-the-hagia-sophia-reconversion/>), Legal Information Institute – Cornell Law School (https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/international_law), Oslo International Peace Research Institute (<https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010601032002002>), Montaigne Institute (<https://www.institutmontaigne.org/en/blog/whose-sea-greek-international-law-perspective-greek-turkish-disputes>), and others.

Conflict refers to disagreements or disputes involving people or organizations, where both sides are engaged using resources or force. There are different types of conflicts that affect different aspects of life, such as economic, social, environmental, and political conflicts. However, political conflicts are common due to their nature and the fact that they can affect other countries and impact many people both within and outside different geographical regions.

The problem of clarifying the essence of Ukrainian national and civic identity as a socio-psychological phenomenon was analyzed by Ukrainian scholar I. Petrovska [16; 17]. Scientists paid considerable attention to the identity problems of different population

groups of Ukraine (V. Vasyutynskyi [3]). The issue of identity formation is addressed in the works of researchers in the field of educational activities (I. Bekh, K. Zhurba, S. Fedotenko [29]).

Since there are two types of identity, national identity is a person's sense of belonging to a state, nation, or territory that transcends citizenship [170].

National identity is seen in psychological terms as the “awareness of difference”, the “sense and recognition of “us” and “them”, who share a sense of a common identity; identical nations, even though they are made up of several constituent ethnic groups. A nation’s history, culture, traditions, folklore, symbols and common language form bonds between its people. National identity is associated with patriotism, or loyalty and devotion to one’s country. This is the feeling of “the nation as a cohesive whole, represented by distinctive traditions, culture and language” [256]. It is the result of the presence around us of national symbols, colors, language, historical memory, culture, music, cuisine, etc. These collective elements are rooted in the nation’s history. Psychologists call this feeling the word “we” or the experience of “interdependence of fates”, which they consider the main criterion for belonging to a group. National identity means that a person has formed personally meaningful national beliefs and values, and he embodies these values in daily practice.

On the other hand, “ethnic identity” is similar in essence to national identity. Researchers offer a generalized understanding of ethnic identity as a means of distinguishing and attributing by a person and a group of oneself or other persons according to certain characteristics (awareness of one’s unity, common origin, historical fate, culture, complex of stereotypes of consciousness and behavior) to a certain ethnic community [15, p. 30-42].

National identity is strengthened through socialization, especially when a nation faces an external or internal enemy or other threat.

The concept of civil (state) identity in Ukrainian science is defined as a person's awareness of his belonging to the community of citizens of a certain state, a person's identification of the status of a citizen with his personal status: "I am a citizen of the state" [204].

V. Stepanenko discovered that civic identity is, on the one hand, the identification with the community of citizens of the nation-state entity, and on the other hand, awareness of oneself as a member of civil society. These definitions draw attention to two different aspects of the relationship between the individual, the state and society. The first is related to a person's territorial identity and can be an analogue of "national identity", when national identity is considered within the boundaries of a political nation as a common citizenship, a community organized on a state-political basis [35, p. 23-24]. In this case, a political nation is characterized by a collective identity, which implies the presence of a certain national community that has its own name, historical territory, common myths, historical memory, mass and civil culture, economy, and uniform legal rights and obligations for all members. An individual person appropriates such a collective identity and transforms it into a part of his own multiple identity.

The second definition of civic identity concerns the specific components of the development of civil society. It is about conscious and active citizenship, which is manifested in the possibility of participation of citizens in the life of the state through mechanisms of self-organization of civil society. It involves citizens' loyalty to the state and conscious identification with it in exchange for state care, social protection, and protection of rights and freedoms. It manifests itself in those spheres of an individual's life that relate to the citizen's relationship with state institutions, political activity, and characterize the degree of declarative support and acceptance of various directions of social development.

An interesting, very broad interpretation of the concept of "civic identity" (actually close to the concept of "social identity") is also found in the American researcher D.

Owen, who writes that ideas about civic identity: assume an association with a geographical area, such as a district, city, state or nation; may be associated with racial, ethnic, gender, religious identity, party affiliation, ideology, socio-economic stratum and other deeply rooted characteristics; provide for the duties and rights associated with membership in the community. Fulfilment of certain duties, such as voting, membership in public organizations and participation in public events, military service, contributes to improving the well-being of the community; involve a connection with a community defined by proximity, for example, students at a school, members of a political organization or a local community [256].

The analysis makes it possible to understand why the formation of civic identity in Ukraine occurs more slowly than national identity. An obvious factor influencing the consciousness of citizens here is the long period of stateless development of Ukraine, which causes a certain mistrust of citizens towards the state as a social entity, towards state power and state institutions, unfounded paternalistic attitudes of some citizens towards the state, lack of development of the habit of responsible performance of duties, opposition to one's own and state interests. Summarizing the analysis of the essence of these two formations, we note that they are different in certain characteristics, but some of their features coincide, which makes it possible to talk about general approaches to the formation of these personal formations in the learning process. This requires an analysis of the modern theory and practice of the political education system in this direction, without which such planning cannot be carried out.

The formation of identity, especially national identity, starts in childhood at the subconscious level and is the initial stage for its further development [11].

It is obvious that, in the context of public authorities' activities, these identities are formed through the development of the components of this complex personal formation: cognitive (epistemological, cognitive) – a set of relevant knowledge; emotional and value (motivation to act); behavioral orientation toward activities [12].

There is a need not only to fill these components with educational content within a particular educational field or type of education, but also to determine the methodology and methodological ways to ensure that students master this content. In other words, it is necessary to define a specific system of knowledge, abilities, skills and attitudes that ensures the formation of national and civil identity in the teaching of history and civic education.

For example, in order to form civic identity, it is essential to understand aspects based on democratic values. Moreover, it is necessary to present facts about the needs, motives, and interests of the people who created such values and sought to bring them to life, their attitude toward the world, and how they acted within the context of a specific time and space [14].

For the formation of civic identity, one's own experience is important: involvement in self-government, participation in the life of the territorial community, communication with local self-government bodies, public organizations.

The concept of collective psychological ownership (belonging) is largely ignored, although psychological ownership manifests itself not only at the personal level, but also at the collective level (“our”). Most studies in political conflictology focus on the processes of resolving political conflicts, social categorization, stigmatization, realistic and symbolic threats. The theory of psychological ownership (belonging) has been actively developing and has become widespread [265, p. 298-310]. However, issues of collective psychological ownership were considered through group dynamics at the local community level, while at the state or supranational levels, they were hardly studied in full.

Analysis of researches based on the concept of collective psychological ownership shows that the sense of ownership is traditionally considered by scientists as a socio-psychological phenomenon based on the instinctive need for ownership, which is closely related to the formation of personality and the functioning of group consciousness. This

is a psychological attribute of the individual, which has differences from others, at the basis of categorization and differentiation. They are possible only in social interaction [21, p. 113-121; 268]. The sense of ownership is a specific and subjective form of existence, a need for possession based on a person's experience and sense of belonging. It is based on a person's ability to expand the property that belongs to them, they can define it as "mine" or "ours" [21, p. 113-121]. It forms self-awareness, the meaning of ownership is realized in social practices, and it is a factor, as well as a result, a consequence of interpersonal interaction. It is a multidimensional float, a model, the specificity of which is determined by the organization of components. The sense of ownership has a meaningful character and acts as a pillar of existence, where things and relationships can become symbols of stability in the socio-cultural, international space [268].

Ukrainian researcher of political conflictology O. Veleshko, in her work "Ethnic Identity as an Object of Political Manipulation: The Victimological Aspect", noted that outside the academic ethno-political discourse there were issues related to manifestations of victim psychology in the political behavior of repatriates; the accumulated theoretical potential of various sciences (psychology, political science, theory of international relations) helps to expand the range of problematic issues related to the political dimension. A special role is assigned to the use of the achievements of victimology for the analysis of relations and political processes.

Ukrainian researcher of political conflictology I. H. Hubeladze analyzed the problem from the perspective of the threat of losing territory for citizens of countries who feel or are actually experiencing it, but determine the level of actualization of collective ownership and readiness to defend it [4, p. 141-146].

Ukrainian researchers of political conflictology, N. Khazratov and M. Lutsenko, determined that a sense of ownership contributes to the formation of a system of values and goals (i.e., individuals or communities), and the ability to achieve a certain result. It

helps to express yourself in the outside world, self-determination in relationships with others [21, p. 113-121]. The sense of ownership is formed on the basis of the need for ownership, but depending on various socio-psychological factors, it can change levels, forms and methods of manifestation at different stages and conditions. This is a subjectively meaningful connection with the ownership goal, the ability to control and influence it.

According to R. Pipes, a collective sense of ownership develops in a person a sense of self-worth, faith in own strength [268]. Pierce defined that a sense of ownership is manifested at the personal and collective levels, which is reflected through “our” [266; 324, p. 1021-1039]. The individuals in a village perceive themselves as “we” in a specific form. “Our”, a small word that arises as a result of common events, when collectively experienced, as the collective psychological ownership dictates [266]. This is unfortunate because, as we will try to show, such statements can play an important role in group dynamics. On the one hand, a sense of collective ownership often promotes intra-group cooperation and solidarity, but on the other hand, it can fuel intergroup tensions and conflicts [266].

The opposite approach is demonstrated by Geert Wilders, leader of the far-right Freedom Party, in an interview on national television, February 22, 2016: “We have less and less to say about our country and our borders, and that scares me. The Netherlands should be a sovereign nation (...), at least it should control its own borders. You [the interviewer] also want to be the one who decides who to let into your home, you don’t go to Brussels for that. Like everyone else, you can decide who will enter your home and who will be excluded”.

The concept of collective psychological ownership differs from so-called common or public property, according to which, objects, resources and places are freely available for use by all people, for example, a park or a piece of land open to all for sports or recreation. Collective psychological ownership involves a specific group or community

that has a presumptive right or right to determine how to use the ownership's purpose and who can use it [240, p. 121-130]. This is a variant of the collective level of personal psychological ownership, according to which an individual is perceived as having the right to decide on the use of what is owned.

Turner notes according to the self-categorization theory, which describes that people spontaneously take certain criteria into account: 1. personal features determine a person's personal identity ("I") and social and collective identity form self-determination group and collective identity ("We") [312, p. 66]. Dignity is connected with a group community to which it belongs [3].

From a different angle, Verkuten and Martynovych studied the nature, relevant to the collective sense of ownership, and determined the sense of "our", the intergroup relationship. Collective psychological ownership is the main source of tensions between groups [324, p. 1021-1039]. This approach was the opposite of the integrative approach theories. Thus, the collective sense of ownership was studied through the political prism of psychological ownership, modeling, intergroup threats, external international factors, through group responsibility. Such socio-psychological processes can be applied to forms of ownership, including international, national and local settings, as well public organizations and communities [324, p. 1021-1039].

Ownership claims on behalf of one's group are widespread in a variety of contexts, such as institutions, organizations, neighborhoods, regions, and countries [69, p. 577-594; 224, p. 236-249]. Adults, as well as teenagers and younger children, tend to make claims about collective ownership. For example, a sense of collective ownership is a source of social isolation and conflict among youth and one of the roots of gang behavior [85, p. 195-205; 191]. There are many situations when groups of children claim a certain physical space, for example, when children turn the playground into their own play area, club or hiding place [121, p. 142-154]. There are many situations when groups of children claim a certain physical space, for example, when children turn the playground into their own

play area, club or hiding place [121, p. 142-154; 257, p. 14-25]. Furthermore, among adults and at the level of countries and ethnic groups, collective psychological ownership serves as a powerful justification for territorial and nationalist claims to sovereignty, and disputes over the ownership of objects, cultural artifacts, and territories are frequent and tend to escalate into violence within inter-group conflicts [309, p. 185-198]. Similarly, the notion of collective psychological ownership plays a role in the rejection and exclusion of immigrant minorities in conjunction with opposition to European integration.

Political philosophers in China, along with legal scholars have written a lot about the issue of personal property “mine” [237, p. 730-755; 281, p. 73-88; 297, p. 200-206], there are empirical studies of personal psychological ownership in management and organizational sciences [266], sociology [80, p. 23-46; 224, p. 236-249], political geography [242, p.531-548; 243, p.193-214; 301, p. 79-88], developmental psychology [244, p. 243-247], as well as social psychology [54, p. 365-380; 99, p. 345-357]. However, the concept of collective psychological ownership is largely ignored, although psychological ownership manifests itself not only at the personal level, but also at the collective level (“our”) [128, p. 165-184; 266].

The main aspect of personal property is control over tangible (objects, places) and intangible (ideas, arguments) goods that are “mine”, not “yours”. When you own something, you decide what happens to it, not someone else.

Ownership includes a set of rights: right of use, right of transfer, right of exclusion [297, p. 200-206]. Firstly, it is the right to use what is owned: to use or not to use at one’s discretion. Secondly, the owner has the right to decide whether to keep the object of ownership, or to give it away, or to sell, share or lend it. Third, it involves the right to exclude others and decide whether or not others are allowed to use or have access to the facility. It has been argued that this “guardian’s right” is a sine qua non of ownership and takes precedence over the other two rights [237, p. 730-755]. Thus, the defining feature of property is the right to regulate the access of others to one’s property or its use. Property

rights tell us not only what may properly be done to or with an object, but especially what others may not do: “It is a fundamental right not to interfere” [284, p. 120-121; 297, p. 200-206].

What counts as “ours” can be an aspect of how we perceive and understand ourselves. Collective ownership can underpin and strengthen the development of a sense of who we are and what we are about. This feeling can also lead to claims of ownership vis-à-vis other groups (“it has to be ours”). What we have can become part of who we are, as in the case of luxuries among the wealthy.

An example of ownership that defines group identity is when members of a dominant group are accused of exploiting and appropriating the cultural assets of less privileged groups (i.e. tribal names, images, folklore, and Native American artifacts) [287].

An example of ownership that defines a group identity is collective property that symbolizes a higher social class, the prestige of a subculture, or ethnic and racial heritage. This means that in addition to the need for control served by ownership, specific identity motives may become important for understanding the socio-psychological dynamics of collective ownership.

An example of property that defines group identity is property, which provides a sense of collective self-esteem, positive difference, belonging, meaningful existence, empowerment, and continuity of identity [326, p. 403-432]. For example, symbolic self-enhancement theory [330, p. 89-114] has been used to argue and experimentally demonstrate that people use material objects that are collectively owned (historical buildings) as symbols of their group identity and for communication of their group identity to others [141; 212].

An example of property that determines group identity is group bias in the evaluation of property objects among people with low extrinsic motivation to respond without prejudice [234]. The home advantage effect refers to the advantage enjoyed by the owner of the territory over a visitor or intruder [233]. One can identify advantages of

being in one's own territory for effective social influence and successful negotiation [153, p. 644-657].

Thus, collective ownership (belonging) can help people define themselves, feel at home, have purpose and direction in life, feel strong and powerful, and have a sense of collective continuity over time. However, these motives are not related to property as they form additional features of the property experience. Identity motives can arise in situations where a sense of ownership is not involved. They involve psychological processes that are different from the sense of control that ownership provides.

The principle of first possession means in political theory the term "historic right", rights to a plot of land as a result of the first settlement [242, p. 531-548]. It is based on the fact that the first user of a natural resource, such as a piece of land, did not move or dispossess anyone else to take possession of it. In international law, terra nullius describes a territory that no one owns, so that the first nation to discover it has the right to take possession of it, as "finders-keepers". In South Africa, in the 19th century, European settlers propagated the "empty or vacant land theory" to claim land, and it is still used by some groups of European descent to support their claims to land ownership in the country [63]. European settlers also claimed Australia as terra nullius, allowed them to disregard the ownership and use of the land by its native inhabitants and claim it for themselves. Nowadays, the term indigenous is used for more than 5,000 groups that are classified or considered to be first indigenous people, such as the Inuit and First Nations in Canada, the Aborigines in Australia, and the Maori in New Zealand [132, p. 381-398; 165, p. 1037-1049]. Examples exist of restorative justice where indigenous groups successfully reclaim territory and rights based on the (alleged) fact of first possession and subsequent illegal deprivation [236, p. 65-88; 280].

The essence in the concept of primary occupation is a valid justification for territorial claims, national sovereignty is a key issue in violent conflicts and war [308, p. 185-198]. For example, the genocide of the Tutsi in Rwanda stems in part from Hutu claims to the

original occupation [28, p. 175-188], claims that play a role in the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict [189, p. 187-212]. In addition, the concept of primary occupation is used in relation to immigrants. For example, Malays have always considered Malaysia as their home because they claimed to be the indigenous people, making non-Malays immigrants [251, p. 714-726]. In the European discourse about immigration and multiculturalism, in the far-right discourse, primo-occupation and the related package of rights are presented as natural and self-evident and usually accompanied by an “implicit call for the exclusion of foreigners (“alochthons”), whoever they may be” [84, p. 385-407].

The term “historical right” that is used in political theory refers not only to the first settlement of a territory, but also to the formal significance of that territory for collective identity [134, p. 58-79; 242, p. 531-548]. There is the concept of primacy of the group in the “empty” territory, the constitutive primacy of the territory in the formation of the historical identity of the group. An example is the belief among indigenous communities in North America that their native identity is inescapably tied to the land or mother earth, a belief linked to valuing collective land reclamation efforts [140, p. 182-191]. Many Jews claimed not only that they were the first to maintain an organized settlement in Palestine (Eretz Israel), but that the Jews’ early experiences in Palestine shaped their collective identity. Thus, the Jews would have a historical right to the territory not so much “because they were the first among modern peoples to occupy it, but because it was of primary importance in the formation of their identity as a historical integrity” [140, p. 58-79].

The principle of designing collective identity is used to substantiate claims to ownership in various contexts. Perceptions of “formative value” and associated deep knowledge of a particular “object” are at the heart of many intergroup conflicts in which history is interpreted selectively and self-servingly. People of British descent in the United States and Australia cannot claim to have been there first, but they claim the importance of the country’s formation in contrast to recent immigrants. They display slogans such as

“we grew up here, you flew here” to tell Arab and Asian immigrants that they are not welcome [110, p. 210-228].

The investment principle of collective identity determines the moral basis of ownership. The political philosopher John Locke recognized the first principle of habitation as the moral basis of land ownership, but for him it was also important that the land should be cultivated or used productively. When justifying the confiscation of the occupied territories, Israeli officials sometimes refer to the law of the Ottoman Empire of the 19th century. According to this law, the state can appropriate a plot of land if it has not been cultivated by its owner for a long time. More generally, he proposed the labor principle, which states that a person has the right to claim ownership of an artifact or territory if its existence or cultivation is the result of physical labor. Everyone owns the labor of his body, and therefore has the moral right to own, and therefore exclusively use the results of their hands and the fruits of their (creative) thinking. [98, p. 207-220]

E. Durkheim (1957) argued that when a person creates an object, he owns it almost as much as he owns himself. Investing in a goal appears to be an important principle for justifying ownership [95].

Past investment in an object provides justification for ownership [54, p. 365-380]. A study of early adolescents found that compared to simply being there first, settling and working on the land strengthened the sense of ownership of the first comers [325, p. 868-882]. In addition, research has shown that ownership decisions are based on creative work in the UK, Japan [183, p. 320-329]. It has been found that the person who creates an object is considered its owner, especially if the creation was intentional [214, p. 103-109]. This effect was found even when controlling for other factors commonly associated with ownership, such as physical possession.

This principle of formation is used to justify ownership claims in a variety of contexts. Perceptions of “formative value” and associated deep knowledge of a particular

“object” underlie many intergroup conflicts in which history is interpreted selectively and self-servingly.

The theoretical and methodological foundations of the research are based on conceptual foundations. In the methodology of national identity of politics (political conflictology), researchers use a socio-conciliatory approach. In the political space, national identity is described as patriotism, when a person feels great love for the country and nurtures positive emotions for its well-being. In extreme cases, national identity is expressed in terms of chauvinism, when a person believes in the superiority of a country and has absolute loyalty to a certain country or group of people [8].

The methodology of political identity substantiates the interdependence between democracy, territorial ownership, and national identity. A collective sense of psychological ownership (belonging) in respect of the country has affective and cognitive role of appropriation, annexation of property to the state as an object of property, which can be described as “our” as a result international focus groups. In high level supranational identity is formed in conditions of stable national development, a sense of security of citizens regarding the integrity of the country, formed civic identity under the conditions of a sense of threat of loss of territories or real facts, citizens called to demonstrate level actualization of their collective sense of ownership for their countries, readiness to protection, protection national identity (language, symbols, traditions).

Collective sense of ownership (belonging), on the one hand, is a source of unity of like-minded people who form a group within countries. On the other hand, it can increase the opposition within a country (provided that there is no civic identity, national idea formed) and with representatives of other countries in international relations.

Let’s define the socio-psychological factors. Manifestation of a collective sense of ownership to one’s own country may depend on socio-psychological factors: experience, common collective emotional states), internal and external (realistic, symbolic, personal threats, feelings of dominance or dependence, intergroup and group comparisons, threat

of property loss, self-investment, psychological collective sense of ownership, social competition or reconstruction civil identity) [8].

Collective psychological ownership (belonging) is discussed and explored in various political contexts. However, we will focus primarily on situations where the sense of ownership of citizens of regions or countries is threatened. These are conditions where the demands of collective ownership occupy a prominent place in political discourse. For example, politicians make statements such as “this is our country”, “we must take back control”, “they stole our country” or “we want to be masters of our own home” when claiming ownership of countries in relation to immigrants and in response to globalization processes in general. The consequences of collective ownership claims at the local and especially national level can be far-reaching and disturbing, threatening social cohesion and international relations. However, the discussed socio-psychological processes can also be applied to material and immaterial objects (for example, folklore, creative ideas), as well as groups and environments (for example, institutions, organizations), international conflicts [8].

The chronological framework of this study covers historical events where active conflict has been documented between the Greeks and the Turks. The Greek-Turkish relations throughout history have been accompanied by mutual enmity and brief periods of reconciliation since Greece gained independence in 1821 from the Ottoman Empire. Since then, the two countries have faced each other in four major wars: the Greco-Turkish War of 1897, the First Balkan War (1912-1913), World War I, and the Greco-Turkish War of 1919-1922. After the end of the Greco-Turkish War of 1919-1922, the timeline highlights moments when both sides were involved in the conflict in one way or another: the 1955 Istanbul pogrom, the 1974 Cyprus crisis and the Turkish invasion, the ongoing Aegean dispute of 1996 and the ongoing conflicting areas since 1999 [255].

The lower chronological limit (or lower periodization limit) marks the period of the fall of the Eastern Roman Empire and the events of the siege of Constantinople, to capture

a significant event where ownership of land, territory and symbols changed hands. The choice of the upper limit (or upper periodization limit) covers contemporary conflicting points between modern Greece and Turkey. The research analysis proves that in the context of history, the stages and periods of conflict formation and development of tensions between Greece and Turkey, their place and role in the general system of international relations of both Greece and Turkey are interchangeable, with overlapping interests and national identities.

The author's analysis proves that in the context of recent history, the stages and periods of formation and development of Turkish-Greek conflicts, their place and role in the general system of international relations of both Turkey and Greece are clearly defined. The author's concept of the periodization of bilateral relations consists of two main distinguishable stages, the past conflicts from the fall of Byzantine Empire up to the Cyprus Crisis that spans a period of 550 years and works as a pool of information and historical evidence, and the second stage which covers modern conflicting points that are the basis of the conflict resolution suggestions in the third chapter.

Let us define what is meant by the concept of international political conflict between Greece and Turkey. The political conflict between Greece and Turkey is a complex, multi-level confrontation covering territorial, security, historical-identity, and geopolitical aspects.

Opposing identity constructs have emerged as a source of systemic conflict: Greek identity is European, defensive, and legalistic; Turkish identity is regional-imperial, active, and power-oriented. These two cultural and civilizational models reproduce conflict at various levels: in symbols (law vs. power), in narratives (victim vs. potential leader), in strategies (diplomacy vs. regional expansion), in perceptions of each other ("we are defending ourselves" vs. "they are blocking us"). Therefore, conflicts between Greece and Turkey are not just a matter of borders or energy. They are a profound clash

between two different models of national identity, which is historically and strategically reproduced [219].

The political conflict is long-standing and involves several interrelated components, each of which enhances the others, forming a persistent conflict dynamic. First, there is the territorial and legal dimension. This block is at the heart of the conflict and covers: the Aegean Sea, specifically the demarcation of territorial waters (Greece seeks to extend them to 12 nautical miles, while Turkey has declared such a measure a *casus belli*). Continental shelf and exclusive economic zone (EEZ) are the subject of a dispute over the right to explore energy resources. Airspace – Greece considers 10 miles to be its own, while Turkey only recognizes 6 miles to be under Greece’s sovereignty and claims ownership over small Greek islets and rocks (Imia/Kardak, etc.) [219].

Secondly, disputes over maritime boundaries in the Eastern Mediterranean involve Cyprus and areas of potential gas production. Turkey’s “Mavi Vatan” (Blue Homeland) doctrine significantly escalates the confrontation [255].

Thirdly, the Cyprus issue is a separate but integral element that includes the following contradictions: division of the island after 1974 (following the Turkish invasion), the unrecognized Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), the role of Greece as guarantor of the Republic of Cyprus and Turkey as guarantor of the Turkish Cypriot community, the status of negotiations under the auspices of the UN. The Cyprus issue is one of the most sensitive, as it involves territorial claims, security concerns, and issues of identity [219].

The political conflict has a military-security dimension due to the militarization of the Dodecanese Islands. Turkey considers it a violation of the Treaty of Lausanne; Greece explains this step as the need to protect its rights and Greek sovereignty of the islands. There have been combat incidents – air interceptions, maritime incidents, maneuvers near islands. The formation of defense doctrines by both states is a preparation for deterring

each other. The role of the US and France in ensuring Greece's defense capabilities is growing.

Historical and identity-related factors of political conflict are identified. Fundamental causes of the conflict are national myths and historical memory (Ottoman heritage, Greek War of Independence, Asia Minor catastrophe of 1922). There are differences in the formation of identity: Greek identity is European and Hellenic, while Turkish identity is the heir to Ottoman power. Mutual negative stereotypes have formed, which are supported by the media and political rhetoric. This process determines the role of Orthodox Christianity in Greek identity and the Islamic narrative in Turkish politics.

This component makes the conflict "hard" – one that is almost impossible to resolve through rational compromise.

Territorial behavior or territoriality is a way in which people demonstrate their belonging to a space, especially a space they use regularly (the aforementioned place in the classroom, office cubicle, favorite spot in the living room) or a space currently surrounding them. Territorial collective ownership refers to a group's collective claims to and control over a specific geographical territory based on principles such as original settlement, shared values, or historical ties. This can be a legal concept, such as collective ownership of land in a community, or a socio-psychological concept, where a group feels a sense of "belonging" and "responsibility" for a territory [301].

This concept is important in territorial conflicts and the management of shared resources, where it can impact both reconciliation efforts and, in some cases, serve as an obstacle to them. Legal and economic ownership implies formal, legally recognized ownership by a collective, such as a community, cooperative, or state. An example would be land that is collectively owned prior to distribution among individuals.

Psychological ownership is a sense of belonging to a territory based on group identity, shared history, and values. It can be perceived by the intragroup as exclusive rights and is often associated with markers of control, such as flags or boundary markers.

This sense of ownership can be a source of conflict and differs from affection for a place. Territorial community: in a legal and administrative context, this may refer to a territorial-administrative division with local self-government, such as the French «collectivité Territoriale» [301].

The key characteristics are shared values and responsibility. Thus, collective psychological ownership (belonging) promotes a sense of shared responsibility and inclusiveness, fostering social cohesion and cooperation. Initial settlement and past investments give rise to claims that may be based on the principles of first inhabitants or investment of labor and time in the land. Territorial boundaries define property rights tied to geographical areas.

A distinctive feature of international political conflict is the influence of international actors. The EU – Greece is a member, Turkey is a candidate, which leads to asymmetry in terms of influence. The US – strategic balance between NATO allies. France – strengthening support for Greece in response to Turkish activity in the Mediterranean. The Russian Federation traditionally uses contradictions to undermine NATO unity. NATO's role is complicated by the fact that both countries are allies, but the conflict is becoming an internal challenge within the alliance [79].

A distinctive feature of international political conflict is that it has a legal framework in international law. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) – Greece has ratified it, while Turkey has not. Different interpretations of the Treaty of Lausanne and Treaty of Paris. Discussion on the rights of islands to EEZs and continental shelves [315].

A distinctive feature of international political conflict is that it involves internal political factors. In every country, elites often use conflict as a tool: strengthening national unity through the image of an “external enemy”, the influence of political cycles: elections, changes in government, political competition, the strengthening of the role of nationalist parties in Greece and Turkey [258].

A distinctive feature of the international political conflict is that it has an energy dimension due to the struggle for control over potential gas deposits in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean, and the formation of new energy alliances – the Gas Forum, Greece-Cyprus-Israel.

Thus, the definition of “political conflict between Greece and Turkey” is understood as a systemic, multidimensional confrontation covering territorial disputes, security risks, historical and identity narratives, energy interests, and international legal disagreements. It is fueled by domestic political motives and asymmetries in relations with external actors.

The nature of the political conflict is influenced by differences in Greek and Turkish identity. The national identities of Greece and Turkey were shaped by different historical narratives, civilizational codes, and political and cultural traditions. These differences significantly influence their mutual perception and conflicting approaches, primarily with regard to Cyprus, the Aegean Sea, and the Mediterranean Sea.

Firstly, there are the historical and civilizational foundations of identity. Greece is the heir to antiquity and European culture. Greek identity is based on several core ideas: ancient heritage (democracy, philosophy, the spirit of the polis), Orthodox Christianity as the basis of national unity, the perception of Greece as part of European civilization, and the historical trauma of Ottoman rule, which has created a long-standing latent distrust of Turkey [116].

This shapes the image of Greece as: a successor state to Europe, a democratic nation with deep cultural rights in the Eastern Mediterranean, a party that believes itself to be “civilizationally superior”.

Turkey has a mixed Ottoman-national identity. Turkish national identity is multilevel. For example, the Ottoman imperial heritage is a source of pride and a perception of regional importance, Kemalist nationalism, which turned the empire into a secular modern state, the Turkish-Islamic synthesis (“defender of Turks in any part of the

world”). This results in two key narratives: a secular-national (Kemalist) narrative emphasizing territorial integrity, security, and modernization; a neo-Ottoman (Islamist-conservative) narrative emphasizing historical mission, influence, and the right to geopolitical influence [116].

The nature of political conflict is influenced by differences in the political and ideological prism of self-perception. Thus, Greece considers itself the front line of the EU and NATO in the Eastern Mediterranean, acts within the framework of European norms, law and multilateralism, accepts international law as the central instrument for resolving disputes, and relies on the concept of the “Greek diaspora” as part of its identity. Turkey relies not so much on international law as on the balance of power, strategic interests and military-political instruments, treats the region as an area of traditional Ottoman presence, believes that the great powers underestimate its interests, and forms its policy based on the principle of “deterrence through strength” and the “Blue Homeland” doctrine (Mavi Vatan) [145].

The nature of the political conflict is influenced by differences in relations between the two sides: mutual stereotypes and the image of the “other”. According to the Greek perception, Turkey is seen as: a force that threatens the territorial integrity of Greece; a revisionist state; the heir to the Ottoman Empire, which once dominated the Greeks. This leads to a conflict psychology of defense. Greece is constantly forced to react. Turkey’s perception of Greece is as follows: “an outpost of the West” that blocks Turkish interests; a country that tries to “deter” Turkey through the EU and NATO; a politically weaker but diplomatically active state. This leads to a conflict-oriented psychology of attack. Turkey believes that it must act aggressively in order not to lose its sphere of influence [259].

The nature of political conflict is influenced by differences in religion and cultural memory. Thus, Greek Orthodoxy is a key element of political culture. The church-national narrative unites the elites and society. Conflicts with Turkey often tend to have civilizational overtones. In Turkey, secular Kemalism formally separates religion, but

with the Erdogan era, the role of Islam in politics is growing. The identity becomes more Islamic-conservative, which strengthens opposition to the Christian West and Greece [145].

Differences in identity and foreign policy affect the nature of political conflict. Thus, Greece is oriented toward diplomatic coalitions: the EU, NATO, Cyprus, France, Israel, Egypt, and takes the position that all issues should be resolved on the basis of UNCLOS, international law, and arbitration. Turkey is focused on geopolitical maneuvering: its own military potential, energy ambitions, the “blue homeland doctrine,” and its position is that it does not recognize UNCLOS and demands a review of the status of the islands and airspace [116].

The nature of the political conflict is influenced by differences in the impact of identity on the Cyprus issue, the Aegean Sea, and Mediterranean tensions. Greece considers Cyprus to be part of the historical and cultural community of Greeks, seeing Turkey's presence on the island as an illegal occupation, and it has a strategy: international law, diplomacy, and European solidarity. Turkey treats the Turkish Cypriots as a national community that needs to be protected, sees Northern Cyprus as an area of legitimate Turkish presence, and has a strategy: military control, direct intervention, and a policy of “two states” [260].

The relevance of the topic can also be demonstrated by the politicians who attempt to manipulate their nations in order to cause conflicts by referring to critical issues that affect people. In particular, politicians constantly engage the sense of ownership to incite people to violence with the promise that they will benefit. Politicians blame one group for the problems of regions or countries, and therefore the “oppressed” move quickly and turn against those who caused the situation, according to the politician. Some of the issues manipulated by politicians include national identity, land, religion and natural resources. The politician appeals to people’s feelings by pointing out the cause of their problem in a competing group, so the fights faced by ordinary people fade away. Fights help politicians

achieve their goals mostly by intimidating rivals and thus electing and consolidating their power. Thus, this dissertation will explore how politicians use the sense of national identity to evoke the feelings of their followers, initiate conflicts, and thus promote their political interests.

Defining the main concepts, we can conclude that the research terminology has a certain specificity. Considering the national specificity of each state, the concepts of “national identity” and “psychological ownership” have different meanings. In the course of studying and analyzing a specific country, it is worth using a definition that is characteristic of the internal policy of this particular state.

National identity is a state when a person or a group of people identifies with the values of the state or group. It is the feeling that a nation is unified through different cultures, languages and traditions. National identity is a subjective feeling that a person feels about a certain nation and shares with other people. This results in people sharing the same feelings and wanting to be part of a group. People who share the same national identity are not necessarily united by blood, but profess the same culture, have the same language or traditions [8]. People may not have met or known each other, but they were united by a common identification. Thus, identity is more of a psychological and social term, as different people perceive their similarities and understand that there is a difference, which is mostly based on abstract ideas that have arisen in their minds. Identity arises from the point of commonality of people, for example, in relation to national symbols, history, cultural artifacts and historical consciousness.

Collective psychological ownership (belonging) shows that the sense of ownership is traditionally considered by scientists as a socio-psychological phenomenon based on the instinctive need for ownership, which is closely related to the formation of personality and the functioning of group consciousness.

Political and civic identity is the awareness of oneself as a citizen of the state, involvement in social processes (civic), and belonging to political structures of society

(political); spatial-territorial – correlation of oneself with a specific place of residence (local), region (regional), country (geopolitical), continent (continental), with the whole world (identification of oneself as a citizen of the world); religious – correlation of oneself with one or another religion and professing one or another faith; sociocultural – involvement in social structures and social relations (social), identification with a certain system of cultural values (cultural); personal identity or self-identity – the unity and continuity of life activities, goals, motives and meaningful attitudes of an individual. [16, p. 397-409]

Identity is the result of psychological processes of self-awareness, socialization, identification, personal integration, acquired by a person in the course of individual development, etc. As an individual learns socio-cultural patterns, norms, values, accepts and learns different roles in interactions with other people, their self-identification changes. If a person fails to solve the task of identity formation in a timely manner, an inadequate identity is formed. The mechanism of identity is a necessary condition for the continuity of the social structure and cultural tradition.

There are positive and negative identities. Consolidation of a negative identity (“criminal”, “crazy”, etc.) of an individual can be facilitated by the practice of “hanging labels”, special individual or group pressure. The process of identity development can last quite a long time, passing through different stages of development: *a blurred identity* is a state when an individual has not yet made a responsible choice (profession or worldview), which makes one’s image of “I” vague and uncertain. *Unpaid identity* is a state when a person has adopted a certain identity, having gone through a complex process of introspection, the choice was not made consciously, but under the influence of the outside *r according to a ready-made standard (for example, belonging to the religion of parents)*. *Deferred identity* (identification moratorium) is a state when an individual is directly in the process of professional and worldview self-determination, but postpones making a final decision until later. *Achieved identity* is a state when a person has already found

themselves and entered the period of practical self-realization. It is possible for an individual to lose their identity, connected either with age-related psychological crises or with rapid changes in the socio-cultural environment. *The loss of identity* is manifested in the following phenomena: alienation, depersonalization, anomie, marginalization, mental pathologies, role conflicts, deviant behavior, etc. One can identify themselves with social (in a broad sense) groups of entrepreneurs, car owners, fishing enthusiasts, agnostics, rock music fans, Galicians, and fantasy readers. Sometimes there is *a conflict of identities*: for example, it is difficult to be a Buddhist and a Jediist, a Ukrainian and a Russian, a lover of sweets and tea without sugar at the same time.

The circumstances of the external world and their reflection in the psyche contribute to the conscious process of self-identification. The number, strength and intensity of a person's connections with the outside world contribute to the formation of stable identities. They can be multi-level, multi-faceted, and their presence and level of formation indicate the maturity of the individual [16, p. 397-409]

Correlating oneself with a group of people (ethnos) that shares a common language, material and non-material culture, and territory is ethnic identification. The ethno-identification markers of the ethnic development of the community include climate-geographic (common territorial origin), socio-cultural (a single language, common historical past, common features of material and spiritual culture, politically framed ideas about the homeland, economic specialization, religion, etc.) and psychological (a sense of individuality, awareness by members of a group of their belonging to it, architecture, ethnonyms, law, flags, personalities) [15, p. 49-83]

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identity are not necessarily united by blood, but profess the same culture, have the same language or traditions [170]. People may not have met or known each other, but they were united by a common identification. Thus, identity is more of a psychological and social term, as different people perceive their similarities and understand that there is a difference, which is mostly based on abstract ideas that have arisen in their minds. Identity arises from the point of commonality of people, for example, in relation to national symbols, history, cultural artifacts and historical consciousness.

In the political space, national identity is described as patriotism, when a person feels great love for the country and nurtures positive emotions for its well-being. In extreme cases, national identity is expressed in terms of chauvinism, when a person believes in the superiority of a country and has absolute loyalty to a certain country or group of people [170]. Chauvinism is dangerous since the extremity can motivate one to engage in an unlawful act as long as this portrays the particular group as superior. As identified, national identity is not a new trait but a socially constructed element considering the commonality established. It is therefore apparent that people with hidden or outright interest can manipulate the point of commonality to advance their interest for self-gain [170]. People are influenced towards accepting or condemning a particular group under social, economic, or political influences after which the subjects incorporate the transferred beliefs into their daily practices either by free will or coercion.

National identity has for long existed as a static idea but is increasingly becoming flexible. People are not fixated to their national identity but are ready to adopt new ideas if they promise more benefits and bring in more resources. For instance, some people with Caucasian background in America are embracing the ideologies held by African Americans contrary to how things were before where Caucasians had nothing in common with the other groups. Different people in the world have no problem accommodating others in spite of their identity since globalization has erased the unique personalities that existed and singled out different people [103, p. 191-215]. The American society

comprises of diverse groups, most of which are immigrants and hence lack a real national identity like in other parts of the world like Africa. Americans enjoy a national identity in the political arena only since this is adopted and admired by any new person while remaining excluded in the social and cultural sphere. In this case, minor groups have different and sometimes conflicting social identities.

When people identify themselves as a nation with similarities, they develop a sense of belonging to their nation and the members of their group. When people identify themselves as a nation, they tend to work and think as a whole rather than as individuals. Minor differences between them cease to exist, and all are joined by a common goal of working towards the good of the other [337, p. 189-227]. All the major elements of the community are collectively owned, and the people, therefore, feel a sense of ownership towards everything. Ownership motivates people to identify themselves as a whole and to protect each other in case of problems. People are united by their identity, which makes them a solid team that becomes a single entity in all its aspects. Each person recognizes the other, including in matters related to, for example, culture and language.

Possession and a sense of ownership are related when it comes to national identity. Possession entails the personal feelings one has concerning material and immaterial objects. The feelings of possession are common in people sharing a common identity and can largely remain private but eventually explicitly objectified publicly. The people after adhering to national identity show it openly to other people, especially the rivals, and this creates a sense of ownership [39, p. 461-482]. People who explicitly show their possession of other likeminded individuals demonstrate their wish to be part of the likeminded individuals. The sense of belonging also motivates the people sharing identity to attract a sense of power and control over others. Possession and ownership thus go hand in hand since people sharing national identity are brought together and wish to stick due to their similarities.

According to the theory of social identity the integration of the individual in a group is based on social categorization, i.e. on distinction between in-group and out-group, by activating the mechanism of social comparison. This mechanism serves to maintain a positive social identity at the individual and collective level, while reinforcing prejudices at the expense of the out-group. When individuals experience a negative social identity, adopt certain strategies in order to avoid its degradation [304. p. 178].

The classification of Blanz, Mummendey, Mielke and Klink (1998) describes four categories of strategies for safeguarding the threatened social identity, depending on their individual or collective character and their cognitive or behavioral background: (a) Individual mobility or assimilation is behavioral type individual strategy, in which individuals try to look like members of the out-group. (b) Personalization refers to the effort to separate oneself from the members of the in-group and is a cognitive type of individual strategy. (c) Social competition is based in the search for positive discrimination through direct conflict with the outside group and is a behavioral type of collective strategy. (d) Social creativity is a collective cognitive strategy and involves its re-evaluation dimension of the comparison, so as to favor the intra-group. This is achieved with various ways, such as reducing the attributed value of the comparison criterion, and the identification of new comparative dimensions and the adoption of downward (versus upward) comparisons [57, p. 697-729].

The choice of strategy is a function of the permeability of the boundaries between the groups, the stability of the internal group position and the legitimacy attributed in the social system. In the example above perceived threat to the detriment of ethnic identity, it is indicatively stated that the flexibility of citizenship provisions can encourage individuality immigrant mobility, acceptance of social stability stratification may lead to strategies of social creativity while the questioning of the legitimacy of the system may intensify social competition through open conflict [304. p. 178].

Extending the theoretical model of social identity, Turner and his collaborators formulated the theory of self-categorization. According to the theory, social conditions set boundaries between the various groups, the degree of sharpness of which varies according to the context and recommends the springboard for the activation of binomial phenomena, such as prejudice and conflict. As social constructs, identities are based on self-categorizations according to different levels of abstraction (diatom, group or supernatant), on the basis of social comparisons emphasizing relative differences between groups [304, p. 66].

In contrast to the above approaches, the theory of processing mechanisms of identity avoids the dichotomy between individual and social identity as fictitious. This theory suggests that in the construction process, two mechanisms are involved: the assimilation-adaptation of new information to identity structure and evaluation of the content of the identity. The mechanisms they are guided by four driving principles: the timeless and the intermittent coherence, uniqueness in relation to other identities, self-efficacy / sense of control and self-esteem [70, p. 83].

Dominant theoretical model in the study of identity from a developmental point of view is undoubtedly that of Erikson. Erikson described its configuration personality as a dynamic process of resolving development crises. Its evolution has a specific rhythm and sequence, while taking place in a number of critical periods-stages. The formation of the identity of the Ego coincides in time with adolescence and is the result of biological, psychological and sociocultural factors, in order to adapt to the constant changing social demands. The importance of psychological identity for transition to adulthood is associated with the fact that the adolescent is called to explore and engage in a range of topics, such as profession, roles, ideology (religious, economic, political), philosophy of life, the role of gender, values, as well as and the importance of national identity, culture and ethnicity. In this light, the formation of a healthy identity is part of its optimal

psychological function and is indicative of his mental health developing person. [327, p. 397-409]

The case of Greece and Turkey reveals how the established national discourses and identities can fuel the conflict. Both countries' narratives are constructed by the historical memories and the contemporary political discourses that often emphasize the national pride and victimhood, which only contributes to the negative cycle of hostility and mistrust [106, p. 467-485].

The theoretical basis of international political conflicts using Steven Lukes' three-dimensional view of power in politics can explain how the elite manipulate the masses and sustain enmity [49, p. 662-675].

Steven Lukes' classic theory of power dimensions offers a more nuanced view of power than a simple consideration of the acts that are observable. His model, as outlined in "Power: A radical view", categories power into three dimensions: decision making power, non-decision making power and ideological power. This scope covers different levels of influence, from the open to the hidden ways through which power dynamics affect societal systems [223].

Lukes' three-dimensional concept of power gives an effective structure for understanding conflicts of the international politics area, offering the opportunity to see forces which are obvious and those which are hidden. This model has proven to be especially relevant to the current conflicts between Greece and Turkey, which are a combination of historical resentments, territorial conflicts, and cultural antagonisms.

Power in the Greek-Turkish context is apparent in the decision making in both countries' foreign policies and military strategies. Hence, each government of the countries involved takes measures that have a direct effect on the dynamics of the conflict highlighted, for example, Greece's military enhancements in the Aegean or Turkey's audacious gas exploration activities in contested waters. In Greece and Turkey, decision-making power is openly seen through actions of the government, which is directly up to

another side or provokes the other. It also refers to military deployments to contested territories and intransigent positions taken during international talks. Such decisions are usually announced and presented as legitimate actions to protect state borders that are meant to attract public opinion through manifestation of power [286, p. 129-142].

Greece and Turkey also exercise non-jurisdictional power by determining the topics that are discussed in international forums. For instance, Turkey has skillfully employed its strategic location as well as its diplomatic relations to block the advancement of some deliberations within NATO and the EU which are in favor of Greek interests on Cyprus and waters limits. Political elites in both nations use non-decision-making power by monopolizing the national discourse on these conflicts. Most of such issues that may result in peaceful resolution or compromise are underemphasized or not included by the mainstream media which tends to concentrate on nationalist narratives. This distortion guarantees that some policy alternatives will not get enough public attention or support which would threaten the status quo [49, p. 662-675]. The ideological power is, perhaps, more significant in the context of Greek-Turkish conflicts. Both governments and media in the two countries breed narratives that reminisce about historical wrongs, focusing on the other side as an ever-lurking threat. Such stories are passed on through educational systems and cultural institutions, promoting a generational chain of enmity and hatred. The deep-seated ideology not only legitimized aggressive policies but also makes the public more willing to accept government measures that sustain the conflict [106, p. 467-485; 48, p. 29-52].

The ideological aspect is however most clearly evident in the national narratives both countries create concerning their past and current conflicts. Education systems, media, and political propaganda are all used to nurture a national identity that sees the other side as a constant enemy. This perception manipulation serves not only to bind domestic support to governmental policies but also to formulate international advocacy campaigns [106, p. 467-485].

Stephen Luke's concept applied to the Greek-Turkish conflicts enables one to comprehend how power is used on various terrains, determining the direction and the character of international actions. Understanding the processes of decision-making, the suppressed or ignored issues, and the ways expert ideologies are disseminated enables policymakers and scholars to deal with these disputes more productively and to develop more effective conflict resolution strategies. This fine understanding of power relationships underscores the need to deal with ideological and structural issues which make long-term conflicts to continue beyond mere diplomatic engagements.

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Conflict is a widespread phenomenon in the modern world, which is related to many factors, including identity, land, and traditional values. There are many types of conflicts, although their complexity and dynamism make it hard to classify them casually [176]. Some of the common disputes involving nations are both internal and external and a touch of economics, ethnic groups, and religions. Most conflicts in a nation are intrastate, that is, they involve people who are likely to be within the same state. The disputes do not result in a fully declared war but are nonetheless evident since it disrupts the normal function in the country. The conflicts in a national level are mostly driven by identifying factors where one group views the other with suspicion courtesy of political influence.

Most states have problems mostly involving the minority groups which have formed their identity but face oppression from the majority ones. In the current world, some of the major conflicts emanate from identity factors revolving around, religion, sect, and ethnic groupings. However, these are fueled by politicians who organize their followers and show them how the other group has exploited them. Identity can be the result of a long-lasting identification or it can be artificially created for the sole purpose of escalating tensions. Some people formed third identities long time ago and hence have distinguished themselves as the minority or the oppressed. Others have already established themselves as superior, and this brings all the people holding such ideals together [107, p. 1-8]. In America, for instance, the blacks and the Native Americans have historically entrenched their position as the oppressed and disadvantaged while the whites are the superiors. With such sentiments revolving around a specific group, conflicts arise either from the group's initiative or through the politicians [107]. The identity is also created artificially where a person shows people with similarities how they are neglected or misused by another, leading to tensions.

Identity and language are tied, and each depends on the other. Politicians understand the link too well and hence use language that is recognized by one group to attack the others. Language does not entail the words spoken only but also the context of the words

used. For instance, when talking to African Americans, words like oppression, discrimination are enough to communicate the message of who is portraying them and the need to rise against these acts. Language is a strong mobilizing factor that is used by politicians and other social influencers towards a group on how their identity is injured or at stake and hence creates conflicts [288]. Politicians use language to appeal to different groups, particularly by attributing a certain group to competition, scarce resources, and other social challenges. In the United States of America (USA), for instance, the immigrants have been blamed for increased crime and reduced resources by the politicians leading to tensions. Political leaders use language to show that a particular group is a reason behind the challenges.

Some political leaders manipulate the sense of identity among a group of people to demand autonomy leading to civil wars. In most cases, the politician looks for a void in the group's interests and entrench violence with the excuse that they want to ensure the affected people get justice. People who share common elements are shown that they are oppressed by those in power, especially people subscribing to other identities [319, p. 281-301]. One group feels oppressed and hence takes up arms against the other, leading to conflicts. The conflicts fueled by identity are dynamic, and this presents challenges on how to counter the problem, especially when the politicians perpetuate them. Once a group of people is informed that the state and other groups oppress them, they rise in arms fighting not the government but the perceived enemies. The state may intervene to reduce the impacts of the conflict, and this leads to more conflict since it is regarded as helping the opposing groups. The conflict escalates when people sharing a sense of ownership feel threatened and rises against a common enemy.

A nation enters into conflicts due to social fractionalization attributed to national identities. The society is organized into social groups that interrelate freely, especially if there is no tension between them. While adhering to the doctrine of social factionalism, the society is virtually or physically divided into groups with each of them advancing its

interests. These groups are divided into identity lines where each group occupies its line of identity that is different from the others [37, p. 562]. There are different groups in society with different social function, meaning all have varied interests. The interests make cohesion difficult since each group has conflicting interests, and when the issue of identity is used, wars become evident. In this case, people fight because their identity interests overlap, and hence, one group have to pave the way for the other.

Traditions also form a major component of conflict, since different people follow different traditions. Traditions are things that are practiced collectively by a group of people and that make them different from others. Some people agree with other traditions while others oppose them, and this does not go well with the concerned groups [209]. The values held by the people are also diverse, and this acts as a catalyst for conflicts. The people's values sometimes involve the utilization of resources, which lead to the conflict to enhance their values. In other cases, groups form values that are detrimental to others, especially those opposing them and if this does not go well with them, conflicts erupt. In the United States, for instance, the blacks as a formed group generally believe they are not being respected as human beings and on the other hand white supremacists who oppose to this group express a completely different view resulting in creating traction. These issues, once held by a group, lead to competition that causes conflicts among people in a state or beyond the borders.

According to the classic traditional realist theorists, diplomats, and politicians, anarchy and conflict prevail in international relations, rather than cooperation. War is inherent in the international community and can only be avoided through the balance of power. In the anarchist international society there is no scope - or there is little scope - for ethics and principles, because in the international community there is no world government. Thus, the national interest necessarily prevails, which is based on the power of each country, which knows no boundaries on the basis of ethics or law, since the priority of the state in the international arena is the national interest. This trend, also

known as *raison d'état*, is intertwined with the school of realism, mainly known as *Realpolitik*, i.e. the politics of power (power politics), which advocates that in matters concerning the state, its survival and development, there is no room - or room is limited - for principles and ethics, the state or national interest transcends moral, political and legal principles in relations between states [296, p. 177].

The American theologian, philosopher and scholar of international politics Reinhold Niebuhr (1892-1971) argues that man is inherently selfish. His main motivation is selfish passion. He harmonizes with society only if his egoism is neutralized, mainly by turning his energy to the service of society. The national interest, Niebuhr observes, presupposes personal sacrifices and subordination to society as a whole, to a higher collective idea of interest, to the interest of society as a whole. Under it in the sense the choice of national over individual interest can be seen as progress from an ethical point of view [111, p. 97].

On the other hand, Edward Hallett Carr, British historian, Sovietologist, and international political theorist (1892-1982) in his book *The Twenty Years Crisis 1919-1939* (1939) emphasizes the anarchy of transnational relations, where power and narrow national interest play a decisive role and not the international altruism. In Carr, a key point in his critique of idealism (as he calls it) is the idea of harmony of interests. In the international community, he argues, this harmony does not exist and, to the extent that it exists, it only serves the interests of the strongest and most dominant groups of states and its own their status quo. The so-called "harmony of interests" between states (a well-known principle of many liberals) they are essentially social Darwinism, since they identify the whole with the good of the most powerful states. Also, idealistic ideas are simply an expression of the scholar's desire for something better internationally and not a scientific analysis of international becoming [296, p. 177].

On the other hand, as mentioned before, one other quite important classical School in international relations is the one of Idealism. Idealism, appeared in the early 20th century and remained on the brink of World War II. Its main representatives were the

political scientist and US President Woodrow Wilson, British journalists and publicists Norman Angell and John A. Hobson (1858-1940), the German-British internationalist Alfred Zimmern (1879-1957), the British historian Arnold Toynbee (1889-1975), the British philosopher Bertrand Russell (1872-1970), the sociologist David Mitrany and some pioneering legal internationalists.

There is no doubt that one of the main sources for the formation of the theories of the School of Realism in international relations is inheriting, realists believe that strong states do what they can, and weak states do what the strong allow them to do.

Any state of international relations depends on interactions between the few great powers. Idealists emphasize that wars have their roots mainly in the human mind, that is, on how we think, in our perceptions, and that it is a product of conditions, e.g., of imperialism in Hobson's penetrating remarks. Wars and conflicts are not inherent in human societies nor are they based on some indelible aggressive-destructive nature of the human species. People, societies and states could learn to be peaceful, why transnational violence does not only is it morally and legally reprehensible, but it brings other violence, it does not reduce it. In addition, armed violence is unprofitable, has such a high cost that it is not recommended as an extension of the policy by other means. One of the keys to peace is the end of imperialism and colonialism, the self-determination of the peoples and a system of collective security for all states [321, p. 291].

Central to the various manifestations of the liberal philosophical and scientific tradition is the protection of individual liberties, and primarily individual freedom, the representative government based on a liberal constitution, the belief in the rationality of man, the peaceful relations and common interests and cooperation between states and peoples, the positive for the peace role of freedom of international trade, the possibility to educate people and the peoples for the good of peace, the peaceful settlement of disputes and the possibility of creating effective international institutions (international organizations and international mechanisms) and principles (international law,

international ethics) to get international politics out of the uncertainty of international anarchy and conflict [321, p. 291]. As for the nature of man, idealism believes that man is neither good nor bad and however, not inherently aggressive. What is certain is that it can be improved, this also applies to the human societies that can go from aggressive to accommodating and peaceful.

Furthermore, liberalism and other more modern trends, such as the study of international ethics and of normative international relations, the study of international organizations and of course international law (as a milder form of realism that some have called liberal realism) argue, in contrast to classical realism, that international rules and principles as well as international ethics exist as a parameter of international life, if nothing else because these are principles and rules that have been adopted by states and internationalists precisely to serve the well perceived interests of the states. These basic principles include non-aggression and non-use of armed force (the abolition of aggressive war), the principle of sovereignty and independence, the principle of non-intervention, territorial integrity, the inviolability of borders, etc. [307, p. 302].

One could, for instance take under consideration, at this point for instance, the ideas of Jeremy Bentham. The latter considers wars inherently destructive and obsolete, which they are retreat, they serve only the monarchs and the ruling class, who expect profits from the armed conflicts. On the contrary, the peoples suffer from the armed conflicts. Wars also strengthen executive power at the expense of democratic governance. According to Bentham (as well as according to Kant), democratic regimes are generally more peaceful than monarchical ones, and admits that in some cases public opinion leads the intransigence, criticizing the peace leaders [295, p. 211].

Norman Angell (1872-1967) is considered a central representative of idealism-internationalism. A few years before the start of World War I he published a highly acclaimed book entitled *The Great Illusion* (The great chimera), in which he argued, with a series of economic and other rational arguments, that, contrary to what most believed at

the time, war was not a rational choice with which a state derives benefits from. On the contrary, it has a huge cost in today's unprecedented era of economic interdependence of developed industrial nations, appearing internationally historically from the mid-19th century onwards (and not before). [93, p. 66]

Conflicts are associated with loss in terms of money, resources, and time. In most cases, both parties to a conflict suffer losses, and one of them loses and the other gains. The losses can sometimes include death if war erupts, and for this reason, many people avoid conflicts as much as possible. Conflicts also lead to permanent enmity meaning that countries or groups that engage in conflict cannot collaborate any further, for instance, in commerce and sports. The ordinary people are the ones affected most by the conflicts since the whole burden of the repercussions falls on them. People who were engaging in trade fail to do so, and some citizen is pushed out of the countries. In spite of these countries, leaders can gain a lot when a country enters a conflict, and this informs why some of them are passionate about conflicts [333, p. 772-788]. The leaders gain economically, become popular, and gain new territories.

There are many economic gains leaders stand to gain from conflict, especially in the current world. During the pre-industrial period, conflicts were attributed to resources where the winner acquired control of them hence maintaining an edge over the others. During that period, the winner of the conflict was rewarded or looted resources such as land, animals, gold, and silver. The same case happens today, but the parties in a conflict can gain oil, minerals, and other materials, particularly if the conflict escalates to war [333, p. 776]. For instance, when the United States conflicted with Iraq, the country and the leaders gained access to billions of barrels of oil.

A country's leader who navigates successfully during a conflict instills a sense of nationalism and is therefore seen as nationalistic hence becoming popular. The leaders become popular and may grow to be a form of cultism in the country. Consequently, this helps them since they may end up being respected or feared leaders which entrench their

political position. The leader becomes a symbol of national identity where every person seeks to associate with them and claim ownership. Such cases happened in Cuba, where Fidel Castro, who was the leader during the revolution, grew into a nationalistic leader who ruled the country for a long time [232]. The conflict, therefore, presented an opportunity for Castro to be seen as nationalistic, which helped him throughout his political career. There is also a widespread notion that conquering other people, and maneuvering conflicts bring honor to the conqueror. The leaders in a conflict can gain this honor depending on their success in the conflict.

Conflicts can sometimes lead to territorial loss or gain. If a leader gains territory from a conflict, it becomes advantageous to both the country and them in person. The leader who wins more land for the people becomes popular and has a higher chance of assuming senior offices. Sometimes, the leader acquires a portion of the new region for private use [232, p. 43].

The Greek-Turkish dyad remains one of the oldest and dreadful rivalries between neighbors [158]. Murky Turkey's relations with Greece are significantly impacted by conflicts in antiquity, regional rivalries in reality and shaped by present implications compatible with the contemporary global issues [177]. The trust between Ankara (capital of Turkey) and Athens (capital of Greece) was too fragile to be repaired. At the same time, the relationship between these cities is still trapped within the records of history. Ever since Greece won Independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1830, the ties between Greece and Turkey have been observed with alternation periods of hostility and reconciliation effort [177] Greeks and Turks are ordained by geography to be mutual friends. Still, as Richard Clogg asserts, "Greeks and Turks are convicted by antiquity to be adversaries and where antiquity and geography collide, history often emerges a victor" [89; 157].

Gaining insights into the Greek-Turkish relations necessitates a complex examination that should connect the past to the present. The systematic structure and a

brief overview of antiquity purposes at retaining the analytical cogency and expressive applicability as an analysis of what has come before and after. Specifically, I will emphasize how the Greek Revolution of 1821, the fall of Ottoman Empire and how the Ottomans turned against Armenians and Greeks before and after the first World War, the Greek Forces landing in Smyrna, the Turkish war of Independence, and the fight for Constantinople and Istanbul fueled the Greek-Turkish antagonism.

Moreover, this section analyzes how political leaders on both sides “weaponized” their citizens, and how the military and ideology of past conflicts are used in the modern world to fuel tensions. Last but not least, it looks at how national identity, a sense of ownership, especially of the land where people live or used to live, and the politicians' motive to create and fuel conflict have extended the Greek-Turkish rivalry.

Chapter 1 Conclusions.

It has been stated that international political conflict is viewed as a clash of historical narratives. The Greek-Turkish conflict is not only territorial or security-related, but primarily civilizational and identity-related one. Its core is competition for historical legitimacy, symbolic space, and collective memory, manifested in discussions about Cyprus, the Aegean Islands, maritime borders and the status of water areas, airspace, and cultural and religious symbols (e.g., Hagia Sophia). Thus, the conflict is not solely the result of geopolitical calculations, but is largely based on emotional and symbolic determinants, where a sense of ownership and national identity are fundamental consolidating factors.

In accordance with the tasks set, the source base was studied; classification was carried out according to the criteria of purpose and origin of documents; official publications; analysis of statistical data on the international political conflict between Greece and Turkey was carried out; publications of political leaders and statesmen; public opinion; media materials were summarized.

The concept of “international political conflict” has been defined, which at the current stage has a full-fledged substantive (conceptual strategies) and political-organizational (practical politics) character as its core, as well as a criterion for direct or indirect collision of interests between two or more parties (states, groups of states, peoples, political movements) based on the objective and subjective contradictions between them, with an assessment of the potential of the political elite, the authorities, and the opposition.

In the process of research, the main concepts of the scientific and categorical apparatus were clarified. In particular: “national interests”, “national security”, “collective security”, “territorial conflict”. The key concepts that reflect the content of the dissertation research are analyzed: national identity, collective psychological ownership (belonging, involvement), the Greek-Turkish relationship, violence, politics of national memory, revisionism of historical science, political revanchism, manipulation of the rhetoric of property into political discourse, support of the loyalty of the occupied population, glorification behavior of political leaders.

At the same time, it has been proven that priority should be given to national security as the protection of the vital interests of citizens, society, and the state in various spheres of life from external and internal threats, which makes it possible to ensure the sustainable development of the country; and collective security as a system for ensuring peace and security worldwide or regionally, which is achieved through the joint coordinated efforts of all participating states; and the conflict of identities as a sociocultural conflict of post-traditionalism, which is based on differences in values and worldviews, contradictions that cause crises and transformations of cultural identities; and territorial conflict as a conflict over the territory of state authorities and government bodies or their administrative status, or over the rights of certain population groups to these territories, to their possession and disposal.

The conceptual approach to the analysis of the international political conflict between Greece and Turkey involves the “inclusion of the object” of this process in the “problem space”. The problem-oriented concept is designed to indicate how the solution of individual conflict problems can be integrated into the implementation of goals and objectives. Such a concept should demonstrate how the purposeful action of subjects, supported by state and public institutions and their resources, is able to realize the set goals and objectives. Thus, when developing the concept of national identity and collective psychological commitment (belonging) it is advisable to take into account traditional socio-political concepts – liberalism, conservatism.

The conceptualization of the study of political processes about the collective sense of ownership (belonging, involvement) and national identity determines cases of “deviation” from the given standard of democracy. The countries managed to invent their own way of resolving the conflict. It was found that the concept of collective psychological ownership (belonging, involvement) is largely ignored, although psychological ownership manifests itself not only at the personal level, but also at the collective level (“our”).

CHAPTER 2.

IMPACT OF INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL POLITICAL FACTORS ON THE DYNAMICS OF THE GREEK-TURKISH CONFLICT

Internal and external factors influencing the formation of international political conflict in the foreign policy of Greece and Turkey affect the dynamics of the Greek-Turkish conflict. Political forces generally demonstrate consensus on the need to preserve sovereignty over island territories and maritime zones. A tough stance on Turkey often becomes part of election rhetoric; national identity and collective historical memory: Greek society relies on historical symbols of the Hellenic-Ottoman confrontation, the cult of independence, and the legal tradition of the EU, which shapes public opinion; economic stability, energy interests, as Greece focuses on exploiting its unique geostrategic position as the EU energy hub and maritime trading nation, which enhances its desire to control maritime corridors [34, p. 35];

After laying the theoretical and methodological foundations of this research, we will dilate more into the crux of the matter through specific means in politics such as, transformation of the occupied territory, political revanchism, violence, rights violations, revisionism of historical science, revision of the policy of national memory, glorification, support of the loyalty of the occupied population, populism, leveling of the strategy of globalized integration, excessive negative actualization of the collective psychological sense of ownership (belonging, involvement), manipulation of the rhetoric of ownership in political discourse [75, p. 24].

Within the framework of the study of the international political conflict between Greece and Turkey, we will consider the following internal factors. Internal factors include historical memory, national identity, and political socialization. Both countries have strong narratives of historical trauma: Greece focuses on Asia Minor in 1922, the fall of Constantinople, and

Ottoman rule. Turkey is forming its identity against the backdrop of Ataturk's national liberation movement and the loss of imperial territories. These narratives feed a high level of distrust, make compromise solutions harder, and stir up voters with calls for "national justice".

Internal factors include political competition and populism. In Greece, politicians often use their stance on Turkey as an indicator of "patriotism" during elections. In Turkey, the presidential system that came into being after 2018 has created incentives for militarized nationalism, which helps consolidate the electorate around a strong leader. Both sides are unwilling to make concessions in order not to lose the support of nationalist movements [241].

Military-strategic doctrine is one of the internal factors. Greece relies on the concept of deterrence: strengthening the air defense, navy, placing garrisons on the islands, expanding defense alliances (France, Israel, USA). Turkey is developing the concept of "Blue Homeland" (Mavi Vatan) – an ambitious doctrine that expands its claims in the Eastern Mediterranean. Both doctrines have high domestic political ratings and are therefore unlikely to be revised [5].

Internal factors include economic and energy needs. Greece has positioned itself as a transit hub for energy resources in the Eastern Mediterranean. Turkey seeks to reduce its dependence on energy imports and control potential gas reserves. Resource competition exacerbates conflicting positions [309].

Internal factors include demographic and security issues. Turkey has a significantly larger army and population, which pushes Greece toward extraordinary "defensive investments." The problems of illegal migration and Turkey's role as a "gateway to Europe" considering flooding Europe with immigrants rhetoric have an impact on Greece's domestic policy [120].

An external factor is the legal regime of the Aegean and Mediterranean Seas (UNCLOS). Greece is a party to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Turkey has not

signed UNCLOS and believes that Greece's interpretations are unfair, even though almost all NATO countries have signed the Legal Framework and have exercised their rights within their EEZ. Different approaches to defining territorial waters, the continental shelf, and EEZs are a major source of external political tension.

An external factor is the role of the great powers. The United States seeks to prevent escalation between the two NATO members, but often balances between partners. France actively supports Greece, sells it weapons and acts as a counterbalance to Turkey. Russia in some cases is interested in a split within NATO and uses the conflict as a point of influence, despite Turkey's involvement in the Black Sea region. The EU has limited tools to influence Ankara, but is a key political partner of Greece [5].

An external factor influencing the conflict dynamics is regional energy alliances. The EastMed Gas Forum (EMGF), where Greece is a member, is creating a coalition of states (Egypt, Israel, Cyprus) to restrain Turkey. Turkey responds through agreements with Libya (2019) on maritime delimitation, creating a geopolitical triangle of confrontation.

The Cyprus issue is an external factor that affects the dynamics of the conflict. The division of the island into the Republic of Cyprus (the EU) and Northern Cyprus (recognized only by Turkey) has been a longstanding cause for foreign policy confrontation. Greece is the guarantor of the Greek Cypriots, and Turkey is the guarantor of the Turkish Cypriots. Any escalation in Cyprus instantly changes the balance of power in the whole region.

An external factor that affects the dynamics of the conflict is migration diplomacy. Turkey uses a large number of refugees as a tool of influence in its relations with the EU, which directly affects Greece, as the first point of entry into the union. The EU assigns Greece the function of a "border shield" that exerts external pressure on Athens [75, p. 25].

An external factor that affects the dynamics of the conflict is the influence of NATO and allied commitments. Both countries are members of NATO, which forces them to keep the conflict manageable. At the same time, the actual non-existence of a mechanism for

resolving internal disputes between the allies creates a vacuum that each side interprets in accordance with its own interests [101].

An external factor that influences the dynamics of the conflict is international energy and transportation routes. Potential LNG and pipeline routes, as well as air and sea corridors, make the region more geostrategically important. Greece and Turkey both strive to become indispensable transportation hubs.

Thus, internal and external factors interact. The political conflict between Greece and Turkey is a system where domestic nationalism is based on foreign geopolitics: historical narratives fuel aggressive foreign policy. Turkey's "Blue Homeland" doctrine is overlapping with Greece's energy ambitions. The external pressure of the great powers sometimes makes the situation stabilize, but at the same time creates new lines of competition. Cyprus serves as a point where all internal and external factors intersect. The conflict is structural, not temporary. It is shaped by strong nation-building myths, populist expectations of the electorate, large-scale energy and geopolitical interests, weakness of international institutions in resolving disputes between allies, and the complexity of the Cyprus issue. Therefore, any negotiations need a long-term, multi-level approach and inclusiveness of international actors [247].

The core element of the conflict between Greece and Turkey is the information war between the two countries, which is one of the key fronts of their long-running geopolitical confrontation. It covers diplomatic statements, media campaigns, the Internet, historical narratives, and work with international audiences and the diaspora. This component of the conflict is of strategic importance, as it affects external support, coalition development, legal interpretation of territorial claims, and mobilization of the domestic population [92].

Historical narratives are the basis of information war. Within the Greek historical framework, the emphasis is on the legacy of Hellenic civilization, the connection to ancient tradition, and anchoring to European values. They position themselves as an outpost of the West, of the Christian democratic world, against the Ottoman legacy. The Ottoman Empire

is condemned, emphasizing centuries under its rule, massacres, expulsions and demographic losses. The Cyprus narrative is used to portray Cyprus as a victim of the 1974 Turkish aggression [258].

The Turkish historical framework includes challenging Greek historical claims, interpreting the Ottoman Empire as a civilizational legacy, not as an occupation, emphasizing its role in regional security and centuries of presence in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean, the narrative of the unfairness of the Treaty of Lausanne, which, according to Ankara, restricted Turkey's maritime rights, the promotion of the idea of the "Blue Homeland" (Mavi Vatan) – an information doctrine that forms a new national perception of maritime space [289].

Political science defines strategies of information influence. For example, in state-owned media and official communication. Both countries use state institutions to: quickly inform international partners; create their own narrative about events in the Aegean Sea or Cyprus; and legitimize military and diplomatic actions. For example, Greece is oriented toward the EU, NATO, and the United States, portraying itself as a country that suffers from Turkey's revisionism, and actively uses English-language resources (Ekathimerini, Kathimerini English, ANA-MPA). In contrast, Turkey uses TRT World as a global platform of influence, presenting the conflict as a struggle for a fair distribution of resources and respect for Turkish sovereignty, emphasizing the "systemic discrimination" against Turkey within NATO and the EU [258].

The information war is being waged in the Aegean Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean region. Manipulations are emerging in relation to maritime incidents. When there are incidents between warships or aircraft: Greece points to airspace violations and "aggressiveness" of Turkish pilots. Turkey describes the same events as "defense of national sovereignty" and "Athens' provocations." Overestimated data on border crossings, low-quality video, and comments of officers taken out of the context are often used [258].

After the discovery of potential oil and gas fields, the energy factor became the cornerstone of the information war. Turkey has been promoting the justifications for geological exploration in the media, including maps with blurred borders, in order to make its actions appear legitimate. Greece publishes legal documents and refers to UNCLOS in its attempts to strengthen its position with international norms. The result is an active struggle for the sympathy of the legal community and international analytical centers [315].

In scientific research, the Cyprus issue is considered as the main testing ground for information operations. The Greek strategy is to portray Turkey as the “occupier of Northern Cyprus”. Numerous UN resolutions have been emphasized. Work with the Cypriot diaspora in the United States and Britain. An emphasis is placed on human rights violations in the Turkish Cypriot part of the island. The researchers identify Turkish instruments as promoting the idea of “two sovereign states” on the island, promoting the thesis of “isolation of Turkish Cypriots”, which was caused by Greece and the Republic of Cyprus, and their own version of the events of the year 1974: “peace operation”, not invasion [99].

Information war is being waged on social media. For example, in the coordination of botnets. Bot activity in support of Mavi Vatan slogans, campaigns against Greek diplomacy in the EU, and fake accounts associated with the Turkish “cyber army” SADAT or structures closely related to the government were detected.

On the other hand, Greek activists, analysts, and journalists spread materials focusing on “Turkish neo-Ottomanism” and its danger to Europe.

Moreover, information attacks are launched at times of escalation. When Turkey sends research vessels or holds exercises, Twitter/X floods with maps, satellite images, and statements made by politicians.

The international arena is a key theater of information operations. For example, Greece invests in the production of high-quality English-language materials when working with international journalists. Turkey focuses on the Muslim world and countries

dissatisfied with Western policies. Crisis moments are exploited. Both countries use waves of migrants, earthquakes, political elections, conflicts with third countries to strengthen their own arguments or reduce the international credibility of their opponents.

Special forms of information struggle have emerged, such as the militarization of the media. Both countries are constantly demonstrating military exercises, distributing intercept videos, and commenting on each other via Twitter/X accounts of their defense ministries. Symbolic diplomacy is applied, namely, visits of politicians to the disputed islands; posting photos of warships; “patriotic” speeches for the domestic audience. These are not only informational but also psychological operations.

Therefore, the strategic consequences of information war for domestic policies are information tension, which motivates the electorate, strengthens the role of nationalism, and becomes a resource for governments during election campaigns. As for foreign policy, it shapes the international perception of the conflict. It pushes the EU, the United States, and NATO to develop their own positions. It affects investors’ readiness to work in energy zones. Each information campaign complicates the negotiation process, as it creates new red lines, enhances distrust, and forces diplomats to appeal to domestic audiences.

Thus, information war is not a secondary element but a central one in the conflict between Greece and Turkey. It dictates the way the international community interprets borders, whose law of the sea is respected, who is declared an aggressor, and what legal and political decisions are made in Brussels, Washington, and the United Nations. That is why Greece and Turkey invest significant resources in information campaigns on a daily basis, as they understand that winning the war of narratives gives them a strategic advantage for decades to come.

Causes of international conflicts: competition of states; divergence of national interests; territorial claims; social injustice; uneven distribution of natural resources in the world; globalization; negative perception of each other by the parties; personal

incompatibility of managers and others. Often, international conflicts grow out of internal (regional) political conflicts [60, p. 951–972].

The role of a sense of ownership (territorial ownership/claims consciousness) and national identity as factors of national unity and ideological strengthening in the international conflict between Greece and Turkey will be analyzed as an ideological and mobilizing force through the formation of historical and legal arguments. The sense of ownership among Greeks and Turks is based on: historical periods of domination (antiquity, Byzantium, Ottoman Empire); succession and collective trauma (the Mali disaster of 1923, the Treaty of Lausanne); symbolic heritage (the Aegean Islands as the “cradle of Hellenism”; Istanbul as the “heart of Ottoman greatness”). That is why not only legal but also “emotional law” is formed, when the territory is treated as a sacralized space that belongs to the nation not only through international law but also through a historical mandate. Domestic political legitimization emerges. The sense of ownership is used by political elites as: a tool for mobilizing the electorate; a factor in strengthening patriotic rhetoric; a means of unity during periods of internal turbulence; the thesis “nothing can be given away” becomes a moral imperative, and any compromise can be interpreted as national treason.

Moreover, national identity is seen as the psychological basis of conflict through the construction of the “other”. Greek and Turkish identities were partially formed in mutual opposition. The image of the “other” serves as a marker of separation (“we - them”); a source of historical vows (“we do not forget the past”); and a structural element of the national narrative. In Greece, the idea of the historical continuity of Hellenism and the connection with the ancient world and Byzantium is deeply rooted. In Turkey, it is a narrative of reviving greatness and regaining the status of a regional leader.

Identity is seen as an instrument of state policy. For both states, identity becomes a resource for strengthening the national spirit; for justifying geopolitical ambitions; for developing a strategic vision of the future [289].

The Mavi Vatan (“Blue Homeland”) concept dominates in Turkey, legitimizing broad maritime claims. In Greece, it is the strategy of protecting the European periphery, which enhances the sense of a civilizational mission.

These factors contribute to national unity. For example, in consolidating public opinion. Conflict built on symbolic values strengthens internal unity because it creates clear value orientations; unites people around national symbols; and activates civic identity.

It also contributes to political stability. In the context of international pressure or economic problems, the strengthening of national rhetoric serves to stabilize the government by shifting attention from internal problems to external dangers.

There is an ideological strengthening through the conflict. For example, in public narratives and education. School curricula, media discourse, and cultural practices transmit historical and heroic images that strengthen national identity.

Symbols and religions come into play. Monasteries, historical monuments, sacred sites, and folklore become instruments of ideological consolidation and shape a sense of national continuity [289].

The sense of ownership and national identity in the conflict between Greece and Turkey: are not secondary factors, but rather constitute the deep psychological basis of the conflict; serve as national cement, strengthening internal unity; fuel state ideology, creating a sense of historical mission and moral duty among citizens; exclude easy compromises, as the issue of territories and cultural symbols is encoded in the sphere of the “national sacred”. Thus, this conflict is not only geopolitical, but also civilizational and identity-based, as territory and symbols turn into fundamental markers of national existence.

For Greece, the Aegean Sea is almost an “inland sea”, heavily dotted with islands that Athens considers an integral part of its national territory and statehood. For Turkey, the dense “ring” of Greek islands near its coast is perceived as a spatial blockade and a threat to national security. National identity defines history as a resource for politics. Let’s take a

look at the Greek narrative. For Greece, the Aegean Sea and the islands are the cradle of ancient civilization; the space where the Greek ethnicity and culture were formed; the symbolic “heart” of the Greek world.

Researchers identify the specific features of external factors. For example, Western allies and international organizations.

NATO as an actor: The impact is evidence of a paradox: both countries are allies, but their conflict threatens the unity of the Alliance. The EU as an actor acts as a guarantor of the interests of Greece and Cyprus; a policy of conditionality towards Turkey. The United States as an actor is interested in the stability of NATO’s flank, especially due to its proximity to the Middle East. The UN as an actor and the International Maritime Tribunal Platforms used for the legal settlement of maritime disputes [101].

According to Turkish media, the factor is the security risks associated with the militarization of the Dodecanese islands, the active use of the Air Defense and Navy, and the parallel use of “gray areas” of international law, while the presence of large military units in the Turkish west coast or the frequent aggressive rhetoric by the Turkish officials is not mentioned as a factor for the island militarization.

Researchers identify diplomatic channels and negotiation tools. For example, formal mechanisms include bilateral diplomatic commissions and technical consultations – demarcation of maritime borders, airspace, search for compromise models, the International Court of Justice and UNCLOS; Greece – in favor of the legal path; Turkey stands critical and has not ratified UNCLOS [316], trilateral and multilateral formats - EastMed Gas Forum (Greece, Cyprus, Israel, Egypt, France) [315].

Informal and soft diplomacy is used. Back-channel diplomacy (contacts through intelligence services and naval commands), public diplomacy, and media strategies that develop domestic support, economic and humanitarian cooperation, including tourism and cultural projects.

Negotiation dynamics and barriers to compromise.

Factor	Characteristics
Legal vs. geopolitical approach	Greece – legal priority; Turkey – mixed priority, force elements.
Cyprus status issue	It remains the fundamental final brake.
Symbolic political value	No state wants to appear as an inferior.

In political science, researchers outline expected scenarios for the development of international political conflict. For example, first, strategic management of the conflict without escalation (the most likely), second, legalization of the conflict through an international tribunal, third, local escalation using naval resources, and fourth, energy integration as a factor of de-escalation (EastMed corridors). The mechanism of Greek and Turkish policy-making is based on a combination of domestic political legitimacy, geopolitical competition, historical memory, and energy strategy. The negotiation process is still asymmetrically competitive, and diplomacy is multilevel, involving both international arbitration and informal channels.

Let us determine the role of Greece's national identity in developing its position and behavior in the context of the conflict in Cyprus. Greece's national identity is one of the fundamental factors that have influenced and continue to influence its policy toward Cyprus. The Greek perception of Cyprus as part of the wider Hellenistic world, a historically, culturally, and religiously close space, turned the Cyprus issue into an ethno-national, civilizational, and ideological priority of Greek foreign policy.

In the historical and cultural dimension, Cyprus is seen as a "Hellenic space". The Greek national identity is based on several key narratives: the heritage of the ancient civilization where Cyprus was geographically and culturally part of; the Orthodox religious community, which creates a sense of spiritual unity between mainland and Cypriot Greeks;

the linguistic community, which emphasizes the belonging of Greek Cypriots to the broader Greek nation [158].

In the minds of Greek society and political elites, Cyprus has never been perceived as a remote or peripheral territory. In contrast, it was seen as a part of “Hellenism” that needed protection and political support. This historical narrative shaped an emotionally charged politics, where the issue of Cyprus became not only a diplomatic one, but also an identity one.

The idea of “protecting the national community”. The Greek state believed that it was responsible for the Greek population of the island, i.e., as a moral obligation and an element of national self-perception. Consequently, Greek policy: supported the Greek Cypriot majority in its confrontation with the Turkish minority and Ankara; actively advocated for international attention to the violations of the rights of the Greek Cypriot community after the 1974 Turkish intervention; and treated any compromise that came close to legitimizing Turkish control in the north as a threat to its own historical identity. This led to a situation where diplomatic decisions were closely intertwined with issues of collective honor and protection of “our people” [180].

The Enosis factor: the idea of national reunification. In the 19th and 20th centuries, the concept of Enosis, the unification of all ethnic Greeks within one state, had a significant impact on Greek national opinion. Although this idea eventually lost its political feasibility, it made a deep mark on the collective consciousness. Enosis made Cyprus an important element of Greek state policy even before its independence in 1960; contributed to the formation of a strong Greek position in opposition to any model of Cyprus settlement that does not guarantee the dominant role of the Greek community; and reinforced the belief that Cyprus should be as close to Greece as possible both politically and culturally. Thus, even after the rejection of Enosis as a state doctrine, its symbolic existence still affects Greek political thought.

In the context of the national trauma of 1974, the Turkish intervention turned the Cyprus problem from an ideological issue into a traumatic element of national memory. As for Greece, it became a symbol of illegal border shifts in the region; a tragedy for the Greek community on the island; a moral argument against recognizing Northern Cyprus or making concessions to Turkey. The national memory of the events of 1974 has become a structural element of Greek foreign policy, shaping Athens' tough stance in negotiations [180].

Greek identity is seen as European because of the influence of EU membership. Greece also associates its identity with European civilization, being one of the founders of Western political culture.

It has two key implications: first, Athens insists that the Cyprus problem is a European problem, not just a bilateral Greek-Turkish dispute. Greece's position is largely based on the ideas of the supremacy of law, protection of human rights, and inviolability of territorial integrity. Thus, the Greek identity is integrated into the European political discourse, which makes its behavior tougher and more legitimate in the international arena [81, p. 46].

Identity is seen as a mobilization resource within Greece. The Cyprus issue has extremely high support in Greek society, regardless of the political differences between the parties. This means that politicians are forced to take into account the high emotional expectations of the population, can rarely afford a compromise that looks like a “national concession,” and use the Cyprus issue as part of domestic political mobilization (especially in times of tension with Turkey in the Aegean Sea). National identity here is a factor that limits the possibility of political compromise. Thus, Greece's national identity is a multidimensional force that deeply influences the formation of its position in the Cyprus conflict. It embraces historical memory, cultural affinity, religious community, and European values. Such identity prevents Athens from treating Cyprus as a foreign policy issue only; for Greece, it is part of its own history, morality, and identity. As a result, the Greek strategy for conflict resolution is shaped not only by pragmatic interests but also by

deeply rooted identity motives, which results in a consistently tough and principled position [101].

Conflict resolution took place through the negotiation process of 2015-2017. President of the Republic of Cyprus Nicos Anastasiades and President of TRNC Mustafa Akinci met for the first time and resumed peace process negotiations on May 12, 2015. On July 7, 2017, the UN-led negotiations, which had been held in the Swiss Alps for the previous 10 days, were suspended after being interrupted. Negotiations over Cyprus in Crans-Montana ended with no peace and reunification agreement.

On October 1, 2017, former British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw put an end to the dispute between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots, stating that only division could help. On October 2, Turkish Cypriot Foreign Affairs Minister Tahsin Ertugruloglu said that a federation on the island was impossible.

At the end of 2017, Business Monitor International agency revised its estimation of the probability of a new Cyprus unification agreement from “weak” to “extremely unlikely”.

Let us identify the characteristic features of the conflict resolution through the negotiation process between 2018 and the present. In June 2018, in an attempt to give a boost to the negotiations, UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres appointed Jane Lute as his new Cyprus adviser. Her mission was to consult with the two leaders of Cyprus, Nicos Anastasiades and Mustafa Akinci, and the three guarantor parties (Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom) to find out whether the conditions were favorable for the resumption of negotiations under UN auspices. Lute held the first round of consultations in September 2018, the second round – in October 2018, the third round – in January 2019, and the fourth and final round – on April 7, 2019, and found out that both parties had become more distanced from each other.

On November 12, 2018, the Deryneia checkpoint on the east coast of the island and the Lefka-Aplikli checkpoint 52 km west of Nicosia were launched, raising the total number of border crossing points along the island's 180-kilometer buffer zone to nine.

On February 5, 2019, Greece and Turkey stated that they would like to defuse tensions between them through dialogue, in particular, with regard to the Cyprus dispute. However, another dispute over oil and gas exploration in the waters of the Cyprus economic zone between opposing parties is holding them back from resuming negotiations [312].

On November 25, 2019, Guterres, Anastasiades, and Akinci met at an informal dinner in Berlin to discuss the next steps on the Cyprus issue. However, the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots failed to agree on the "terms of conduct" for the resumption of phased, substantive, and results-oriented negotiations on Cyprus [81, p. 45].

On January 20, 2020, the UN special envoy on Cyprus said that "there is growing skepticism about whether reunification is possible" as negotiations are at a standstill.

In February 2020, the President of TRNC stated in an interview with *The Guardian* that if efforts to reunify Cyprus fail, TRNC will become more and more dependent on Turkey and could eventually be taken over as a de facto Turkish province, and added that the prospect of a "Crimea-style" annexation could not be possible. Turkish officials criticized him. Turkish Vice President Fuat Oktay said: "I condemn the statements directed against the Republic of Turkey, which supports the TRNC under any circumstances and protects its rights and interests." Communications Director Fahrettin Altun said that Akinci does not deserve to be president, adding that many Turkish Cypriots and Turkish soldiers died (for Cyprus) and that Turkey has no plans for the territory of any country. Justice Minister Abdulhamit Gul criticized Akinci's statements, which, according to him, insulted their ancestors and martyrs. Moreover, the Turkish Cypriot Prime Minister criticized Akinci [202, p. 346].

In 2020, there was no progress in the Cyprus unity negotiations. Nicos Rolandis (Minister of Foreign Affairs of Cyprus in 1978-1983 and Minister of Trade in 1998-2003)

said that a political settlement of the Cyprus dispute is almost impossible at the moment. The Prime Minister, who supports the two-state solution, wins the presidential election in TRNC.

After the election of Ersin Tatar, Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots insist that the only solution is the establishment of two states. Greece, Cyprus, the EU, and the United Nations support a federation as the only viable solution, which has led to a freeze in negotiations since 2020 [83].

On January 30, 2022, Tatar clarified that the sovereign equality and equal international status of the Turkish Cypriots are not subject to negotiation.

On 11 November 2022, TRNC became a non-member observer state in the Organization of Turkic States under the official name “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus”. The Cypriot government condemned these actions. The European Union also condemned them and “expressed strong support for the principle of territorial integrity” and the UN Charter.

On April 29, 2023, TRNC was admitted as an observer member of the Parliamentary Assembly of Turkic States with the official name “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus”.

On July 5, 2024, the mandate of the Envoy of the UN Secretary-General, Maria Olguin, expired, as she failed to find a common ground for resolving the Cyprus issue. In her final letter, Olguin called on Cypriots to “think differently” in order to find a solution to the Cyprus problem.

On October 15, 2024, UN Secretary-General Guterres announced that there was no common ground for negotiation between the Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots.

Peace experts have suggested that a solution to the Cyprus conflict can only be found through broad public engagement, as political elites treat the conflict as a source of power and resources.

The international group of legal experts proposed “the establishment of a Constitutional Convention under the auspices of the European Union and on the basis of

the 1960 Constitution of Cyprus to bring together the parties directly concerned with the conflict in order to reach agreement in line with the Basic Principles.”

In an official White House statement on June 8, 2016, the US Vice President and the Turkish Prime Minister expressed strong support for “an agreement that will reunite the island as a bi-zonal, bicomunal federation”. After the failure of the Crans-Montana summit in 2017, the Turkish Cypriot leadership and Turkey changed their policy from a bi-zonal, bicomunal federation to a two-state solution.

The report of the research agency identified support for the decision to unite the two states in 2019. Turkey has often demonstrated its support for a two-state solution, including the Turkish President during his visit to TRNC in 2020. Some observers believe that division is the best solution [87].

In April 2009, an opinion poll for the CyBC showed that the majority of Greek Cypriots support division.

An opinion poll in 2010 showed that 84% of Greek Cypriots and 70% of Turkish Cypriots suggested that: “the other side will never accept the real compromises and concessions that are essential for a just and viable conflict resolution”.

According to a poll by Gezici in January 2020, the level of support was 81.3%.

A public opinion poll conducted by the Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation CyBC in May 2021 showed that 36% of Greek Cypriots believe that the best solution to the Cyprus problem is a bi-zonal bicomunal federation, 19% preferred a unitary state and 4% preferred two separate states [81, p. 45].

Tom Nies, Borkha Martynovych, Michael Verkuyten, Konstantin Sedikides developed the conceptualization of the term, carried out data processing, formal analysis, research, the methodology of the problem “Collective psychological ownership and exclusive right of determination”.

Psychological ownership implies a subjective feeling of control and power over things. It is an attachment to an object, place, or idea that is perceived as one's own, even if one does not legally own something [144]. The sense of ownership has its foundations in the psychology of ownership [277], which develops very early in life, and has roots in evolutionary history, illustrated by the territorial instinct found in many species [161]. Two-year-olds understand that something is “mine” and not “yours” [282, p. 341-356; 283, p. 219-227], and three-year-olds recognize a person who controls the use of an object as owner [248, c. 873-876; 292, p. 1383-1403].

People feel both the personal and collective psychological ownership, but can also perceive something as the ownership of their group. When people have a sense of “ours”, they may also have a sense of “us”, called CPO (collective psychological ownership, belonging). Organizational scholars argue that team members in an organization may perceive their team as having collective ownership of their work, their workspace, and their work outcomes [266]. These perceptions relate to the question of “what do we control”, which is different from the questions of group identity (“who are we”) and group resources (“what do we need”) [250, p. 1-25]. It is important to note that people can also perceive collective ownership of the country [75, p. 24-45]. Although legal norms relating to historical rights of sovereignty are often the basis of such ownership claims [134, p. 58-79], perceptions of “our” country can exist independently of legal norms. These perceptions are expected to be relatively stable individual dispositions because some people have stronger general tendencies toward ownership than others [265].

Given that the rhetoric of ownership is often used by right-wing populist politicians, CPO (collective psychological ownership, belonging) may help explain the appeal of the right-wing populist messages. Right-wing populism is an ideology defined, firstly, by the vertical distinction of “us-them” between “clean people” and “corrupt elites” [241]; and secondly, the horizontal us-them distinction, in which “Pure People” are distinguished from immigrant and ethnic minority groups, sometimes referred to as “dangerous others” [32;

49]. Right-wing populism presented these differences as the basis of morality, but also as the basis of rights. “People” differ from “corrupt elites” or “dangerous others” not only because they are morally good, but also because they have the right to be the “masters in their own houses”[32].

Borkha Martynovych, Tom Nies, Michael Verkuyten, Konstantin Sedikides argued that the Collective Psychological Ownership (belonging) could legitimize the populist difference of “us and them” because it implies specific rights. Ownership confers rights and privileges on what is owned, and thereby defines the rights of owners vis-à-vis non-owners. Philosophers argued that the right of ownership is accompanied by the right to use one’s property, transfer it to others and exclude the possibility of its use by others [297, p. 200-206]. The latter is considered a defining feature of ownership and therefore we focus on it [237, p. 730-755]. Populism is based on the idea that “the people” have the exclusive right to determine the fate of the nation [30]. This right gives a sense of power and control, which is part of the psychology of ownership and the main motive behind the support of CPO (collective psychological ownership, belonging) [277; 324, p. 1021-1039]. Right-wing populist politicians often directly refer to CPO (collective psychological ownership) and the exclusive right to determine, uniting their opposition to two key issues: immigration and European integration [221]. This point is illustrated by a quote from a speech by the leader of the Dutch Freedom Party: “By leaving the EU and the Eurozone, we will once again be responsible for our own rules, for example about who enters our country, immigration, our rules, and our own currency” (Wilders, 2012). Given that CPO (collective psychological ownership, belonging) is often based on arguments of autochthony (“we were here first”) and investment (“we built this country”) [325, p. 868-882], right-wing populism may not view newcomers as legal owners of their countries [250, p. 1-25]. Thus, this ideology may view the exclusion of immigrant minorities as unjust or discriminatory, but rather as a self-evident right that accompanies CPO (collective psychological ownership) [237, p. 730-755; 324, p. 1021-1039]. CPO can be used to define

group hierarchies without raising moral issues because property rights presuppose an agreed understanding of how to define rights [108, p. 1-24]. Common beliefs about both personal and group rights are associated with more negative attitudes toward outgroups because they imply acceptable differences between individuals and groups [33, p. 1-12]. Thus, right-wing populists can use the rhetoric of the CPO and its exclusive right to determine as a basis for opposing immigrants [250, p. 1-25].

Collective psychological ownership (belonging) may also be linked to opposition to European integration. The EU's involvement in issues perceived as national can be seen as the interference of the international elite in the exclusive right to make decisions about their own country, which corresponds to the vertical demarcation of the "people-elite" of right-wing populism [131]. European integration has led to common policies in a number of areas, such as security (Europol) and monetary, all of which can be seen as examples of EU elite "meddling" that does not listen to the people. In particular, from the point of view of "our" country, it is considered incompatible with "our" right to make decisions about the entry of new arrivals [250, p. 1-25].

A key element of ownership is the creation, transfer and maintenance of what is owned [69, p. 577-594]. To do this, it is necessary to exclude others and take measures when the exclusivity of one's rights is not guaranteed.

The Brexit referendum was a political event that may have been influenced by ownership issues. On June 23, 2016, 51.9% of the British electorate voted to leave the EU. Many voters and politicians perceived the referendum as an opportunity to regain control over what is "ours" [36]. Control over national laws and borders was the most pressing issue among Brexit supporters, and the UK Independence Party campaigned for "leave" with the distinctive slogan "Take back control of our country" [36].

Konstantin Sedikides, Tom Nies, Borha Martynovych, Michael Verkuyten argued that it is possible that the CPO (collective psychological ownership) is used to justify pre-existing negative attitudes towards immigrants and voting in the EU or Brexit, we argue

that the CPO (collective psychological ownership) could affect this attitude and voting behavior.

The authors also concluded that although a large part of the electorate may agree with the slogans of populist politicians that the country is “ours” and, therefore, “we” have an exclusionary definition, not all people agree with exceptional attitudes and behavior. Such agreement can be found primarily among representatives of right-wing views. According to the model of motivated social cognition [179, p. 881-919], left- and right-wing individuals differ in terms of their relationship to two areas: tradition and equality. Right-wing Politicians support traditionalism and conformism, while justifying inequality between individuals and groups. In contrast, a left orientation is associated with openness to experience, as well as a preference for greater equality and less group dominance [178]. Given that right-wingers typically have less of a problem with inequality and value the status quo, they are more likely to translate the endorsement of ownership into an exclusionary response [241].

Both Greece and Turkey have a glorious and remarkable past in which they ruled over parts of the Eastern Mediterranean militarily, socio-politically and culturally, first the Greeks from antiquity until the fall of the Byzantine Empire, and then the Turks during the Ottoman Empire [173, p. 115-135]. Although Greeks and Turks neither entirely created the Byzantine empire nor the Ottoman empire, their political godfathers and senior administrators were majorly derived from Greek and Turkish roots. Therefore, this connection to their ancient roots significantly shaped their sense of national identity and sense of ownership. Greece's invasion in the 5th and 7th centuries by the Goths, Huns, and Slaves had devastating effects on the Greeks' urban lifestyle and it signaled the end of civilization [173, p. 115-135]. Furthermore, Greece was later invaded in the eleventh century by the Normans from Sicily. The Byzantine Empire's continuous concessions meant that Greeks were eventually relying on Western support or by the partial support of Venice and Genoa. Until the Ottoman expansion experienced in the fifteenth century, this

domination ensued, which effectively placed the former Byzantine Empire under the Ottoman rule for the next four hundred years. It illustrates how the Greeks were already discontented by numerous incoming powers that led to a defense mechanism phrase, “Greeks should rule Greeks”. This psychological construct signified the Greeks painful experiences of the antiquity. Therefore, the demise of the Greek holy city and capital of the Byzantine Empire, Constantinople, attributed to the Turks highlighted the Greek-Turkish feud's initial ignition. Moreover, the Ottomans exerted their pressure on Constantinople on Tuesday – a day regarded as the week's unpropitious time – and it remains a blank point in the Greek history [173, p. 115-135].

Sultan Mehmed the Second had instructed that the Greek Orthodox Church would have its privileges regarding religious practices. Also, he instructed the Patriarch of Constantinople to be the leaders of the whole Orthodox millet (Muslim community) residing in the Ottoman Empire since Sharia tenets could not apply to non-Muslims [155]. Therefore, the Greek Orthodox Church was able to act as preserver for Greek language, culture, politics, and land or people within the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, the Greeks were able to slowly establish their local autonomy from the church's privileges ordained. It made the Greeks more determined to acquire their own Independence to preserve their culture, people, land, among other aspects, to keep their memories alive [155].

The uprising of the French Revolution in the XIX century also served as a foundation to the Turkey-Greece antagonism. According to Işiksal (2002), the disintegration and decline of the Ottoman Empire due to the French Revolution sparked a revolutionary spirit for the Greek War of Independence [173, p. 115-135]. The notion of freedom and values sparked the Greeks to be ready for a change, primarily through increased trading activities with the Europeans. Another baseline for physiological antagonism between these two nations was Greece's adoption of the capitalist mode of production in the aftermath of their Independence. It can be attributed to disapproval of the Turks disdainful feelings and actions towards commerce activities due to their religious and cultural traits. Moreover, the

significant industrialization and capitalization processes of Britain experienced in the eighteenth century impacted the formation of the newly born Greek state. Greece continuous support from trading partners and high-quality commerce processes improved their socio-economic lifestyle and established their proud culture. The sense of national identity and belonging to their social group and the land they owned distinguished the Greeks from the Turks, whom the Greeks saw as “imperialists” and “uncivilized” [173, p. 115-135].

Therefore, since the substantial loss of the Christian Balkans to the Ottomans in the early 15th Century, Greeks and Turks have remained opponents, outright enemies, and mostly at war. In most instances, Turkey is often quick to observe that from the late 15th century to the early 19th century, the majority of the Greece lands and the Aegean Islands were under the Ottoman Empire, as an action to generate conflict with Greece. On the other side, the Greeks dispute this declaration by suggesting that Istanbul (Constantinople) was the capital of Christendom for centuries and the vast Byzantine Empire’s major center, where Greeks have its ancient roots. Today, under the President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s leadership, Turkey has advanced to increasingly integrate the Islamic religion and be more provocative on the global stage. Istanbul is also more probable than Athens to use force to advance its oil and gas priorities, as means of acquiring power to shift the power dynamics with Greece towards themselves [154]. Turkish leaders and political leaders have been “weaponized” their people’s sense of ownership and sense of national identity by accusing Greece of acting against them in virtually every area of Turkish concern. Some of their concerns include Cyprus, the Aegean, and Kurdish separatism [43, p. 457-494].

On the other hand, Greek leaders and political leaders have “weaponized” their people’s sense of ownership and sense of national identity by essentially utilizing Turkey’s aggressive political rhetoric of settling for a more aggressive approach towards Greece such as making bold territorial claims in the Aegean and consolidating the division of Cyprus. Greek political leaders often regarded the Turks as backwards, barbarians, and at

risk of advancing atrocities to the Greeks in an attempt to dismantle their self-image and identity. The following section outlines remarkable or unforgettable events that served to exacerbate the Greek-Turkey conflicts [158].

Political tensions between Greece and Turkey significantly erupted in 1821 when Greece was a segment of the Ottoman Empire for more than 400 years [180]. The Greek Revolution spanned from 1821 to 1830, with Greeks accorded help by Britain, Russia, and France. The prolonged war to attain Independence from the Ottoman Empire finally led to the formation of contemporary Greece. After Ottomans started to rule the Byzantine Empire in the 15th century, numerous Greek uprisings were determined to distinguish the Ottoman reign. For instance, Woodhouse (1999) [335] records the rise of Filiki Eteria (a society of Friends) movement in 1814 aimed to liberate Greece. The organization planned to start its revolt action in 1821, especially in Peloponnese, Danubian Principalities, and Athens. However, the Ottomans become aware of their plans, inducing the revolt actions to start earlier than planned. Initially, Filiki Eteria started a revolt in Peloponnese, although they were unsuccessful. However, their efforts were noticed by other Greeks, who also started their own revolutionary activities. In 1827, the European fleets supporting the Greeks intercepted the Ottoman-Egyptian fleet to turn the revolutionary efforts on course. After the Egyptian army withdrew from supporting the Ottomans, the Greek revolutionaries reclaimed central Greece.

Moreover, the Russians forced the Ottoman Empire to observe Greek autonomy. After more years of wars, Greece attained Independence and integrated into the London Protocol in 1830. More diplomatic talks ensured the creation of the Treaty of Constantinople, which led to establishing eventual borders of new states and instilled Prince Otto as first Greece king [340].

However, what exacerbated the tensions between the two states were the first established borders. Greece obtained its first borders running in mainland south Greece from Arta to Volos through Euboea and Cyclades, parts of Aegean Sea. However, some

areas inhabited by Greeks such as Cyprus, other parts of Aegean Islands, Crete, and Macedonia remained under the Ottoman Empire's grip. The Greek Politicians, by utilizing the people's sense of national identity and sense of ownership, started to advance their concerns to expand its territories in alignment with the ancient Byzantine structure and instilling Istanbul (Constantinople) as its significant capital. This act was famously known as the Great Idea. The Ottomans fiercely disregarded these advances to expand the Greek state.

Even before the revolution started, both the Ottoman authorities and the Greek revolutionaries were accountable for the significant atrocities rate. Both Greece and Turkey are aware and have a detailed knowledge concerning acts of arsons, cruelty, atrocities, inhumanity, and renegeing ensued in the course of the Greek revolution by both sides [158]. Both sides often cite the inhumane acts as a foundation for more rivalry in contemporary society. The revolutionary Greeks often attributed the atrocious events and onslaught of the Ottomans to the 400 years of internal slavery and dudgeon. According to St Clair (2008), over twenty thousand individuals lost their lives within a couple of months in 1821 in Peloponnese and Moldavia [300]. Prince Ypsilantis asserted to his Greek followers of the significance of neutralizing the ruling Ottomans to preserve the Greek culture [158]. These acts set the tone for the events where Ottoman parties ruling Greece would be targeted. For instance, the Greeks organized an operation on Yalova Peninsula that was inhibited by Turks and Hellenic Army. The operation resulted in thousands of deaths, as illustrated in *Table 1* below.

Village	Number of Houses	Destroyed
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1. Reshadie	400	400
2. Ghajyk	100	50
3. Derekeui	40-60	100
4. Sultanie	10 (variant 40)	All

5.	Karakilisse	40	40
6.	Yortan	40-60	All
7.	Kirazly	60	60
8.	Syghyrjyk	80	80
9.	Pashakeui	80-90	All
10.	Kurdkeui	100	100
11.	Uvez Punar	50-60	All
12.	Gokche Dere	30-40	All
13.	Orta Burun	40	All
14.	Gulluk	50-60	All
15.	Chalyjakeui	40-50	All

Table 1: List of all Villages Burnt in the Yalova District by Greeks in 1921 [295]

On the other hand, the Turkish were responsible for the killings of high-ranking officials in the Greek ranks such as Patriarch Gregorios V. In 1822, on the island of Chios and in 1824, on the island of Psara, massacres took place, despite the fact that some of the residents were innocent and had nothing to do with the Greek uprising. The Turks often “justified” their brutal onslaught on the unlawful uprising of the Greeks. The despicable acts of massacre, looting, and vandalism by the regular army of the yet-to-be-born Turkish state in Smyrna/Izmir, as well as the army's permission to burn the Greek and Armenian parts of the city, are still imprinted in the memory, and Greeks often use these memories to fuel the confrontation between the two nations.

The Greek Revolution in 1821 had long-lasting consequences that served to fuel the animosity between the Greeks and the Turks. In the aftermath of the revolution, Greek residents in Greece were about 800,000, with more Greeks residing in the Ottoman Empire. This induced the Greeks to fight more to liberate the “unredeemed” Greeks residing within the Ottoman Empire rule to unite as a country. This made the Ottoman authorities and Muslims treat the Greeks living in Anatolia as traitors. The Greeks of Anatolia with connections to trade were treated as suspects and coerced to assume their special, ranking status. For example, Greek merchants who used to trade in Constantinople and much of

the Ottoman Empire were substituted with Armenian and Jewish merchants [175]. The mistrust served to exacerbate the conflict between the Greeks and the Turks.

Greeks have inhabited the parts of Asia Minor since the ancient times, and before the onset of World War I, at least 2.5 million Greeks resided in the Ottoman Empire. Various reasons have been advanced about why the Ottoman Empire decided to enter World War I. According to Bostanci (2014), the Ottoman Empire's entry into the war was due to complex secret alliances spanning between European powers [64]. The Ottoman Empire had strong ties with Germany, eventual losers of World War I, as they feared dismemberment. As a result, the Turks suffered a significant loss during the First World War, which affected the normal functioning of the Empire. Significant parts of the Ottoman Empire, such as the Arabian Peninsula and the Middle East, were heavily affected [64].

During the war, the Ottoman army comprised of Turkish, Kurdish, Arabs, and other sympathizers fought with the Great Britain army in various locations such as Persia, Arabia, Mesopotamia, and Palestine. However, Britain's defeat inflicted on the Ottomans at Gallipoli had a significant impact on the Turks. About 800,000 militants were killed, with more non-combatants Ottomans becoming casualty [64]. On April 25, 1915, at Gallipoli, Lieutenant Colonel Mustafa Kemal told his warriors, "I do not expect you to attack, I command you to die. In the period which passes until we die, other fleets and commanders can advance and assume our places" [118].

Greece joined World War I in 1917 intending to reclaim Constantinople and Smyrna from the Ottomans' grips. Greece was also motivated and promised alliance with the British and the French states, such as enosis with Cyprus in future. Moreover, the prevailing genocide and mistreatment of the Pontic Greeks under the Ottomans' reign also fueled the Greeks to enter the First World War. Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos observed that even if Germany and its allies proclaimed Central Europe, Britain would emerge victorious in Near East where Greece priorities lay. Although the Turks and the Greeks minimally faced each other on the battlefield, the Greeks hastened to claim the lands the Brits and

French had promised them in 1918. For instance, in 1920, the Ottoman government was induced to sign the Treaty of Sevres to surrender Eastern Thrace and Western Anatolia land to the Greeks, although the treaty never matured [118].

After the war, Greece felt that the Ottoman Empire was much weakened and could capitalize on the prevailing situations to expand its sovereignty in Asia Minor. In 1919, the Greek army disembarked in Smyrna and decided to claim the hinterland, spanning through the base of Anatolia. However, the Ottomans rejected these advances by sending its army and eventually driving the Greek forces outside of Anatolia in 1922 [172]. It resulted in an armistice deal at Moudania, Anatolia in 1922. The Turkish-Greek accord was aimed at availing repatriation of all individuals' internees convened on either side irrespective of their number and Turks and Greeks prisoners of war. However, the Turkish-Greek conflict resulted in multiple casualties, while others decided to flee Asia Minor and Thrace. Prisoners of war were ill-treated on both sides until the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 availed their repatriation and civilian detainees [172].

Despite Greece emerging as a winner in World War I, the war was responsible for significant division within the Greek political elites leading the state into civil strife. In Greece's scenario, World War I did not start in 1914; it started in 1912, and ended in 1922, not 1918 [151]. The Greek fleet continued to pressure the Turks in Anatolia from 1919 to 1922. However, they were overpowered due to lack of allies' support and France support of the Turks, forcing them to retreat. Its retreat from Anatolia was occasioned with at least a million local Greeks, who were forced out of their cultural residents for good and bringing the *Megali Idea* to an ending. Greece involvement in the war was enforced by her geopolitical positions and ambitions for the kingdom. However, as it was the case for most of the states that engaged in the war, the proceeds of the war significantly resulted in new and highlighted internal disputes [151].

However, the political elites' ambitions and influence on the Greeks was the one to stimulate more conflicts with the Turkish. Even before the war started, King Constantine

1 and his prime minister, Venizelos, were often torn between mutual ideas, which led to the decline of the Greek Kingdom. The dynamism and sense of national identity that had characterized early Venizelos reign resulted in rancor in the Greeks' political life before and after the war [151]. While the King advocated for neutrality and avoidance in engaging in war due to his involvement with German interests, the prime minister saw the war and the ongoing Pontic Greek Genocide in Anatolia as an opportunity for a triple Entente to advance unsolved Greece's irredentist aspirations. According to Greece's prime minister, failure in the war presented an opportunity to acquire more lands. The internal struggles within the Greece army gave time for the Turkish to engage in their fight for Independence. Constantine 1 and Venizelos breach become irrevocable in 1916 when the latter resigned and later formed a rival government in Thessaloniki [151].

Venizelos' efforts to "weaponize" the Greeks' sense of ownership and sense of national identity into the war on the Entente's side came in the opposite side of the King Constantine 1 aspirations to join sides with the Germans. Greece assembled its troops and decided to descend on Izmir (Smyrna), the pivotal city in Asia Minor, inhabited by most Greeks. On the other hand, the Turkish, headed by Mustafa Kemal, incited his citizens to disregard Sevres's Treaty to combat the incoming Greeks. In 1920, Venizelos was surprisingly defeated in the next elections, leading to the restoration of King Constantine 1. It was a displeasing moment for the Brits and the French nationals [151]. It led to the weakening of the army fleet in Asia Minor as the Turkish became more offensive. The majority of Smyrna was destroyed, with the unforgettable massacre of the Armenians and the Greeks. Tens of thousands of Greek survivors fled to Greece. In 1922, a new government claimed power and charged King Constantine 1 and other royalists with the accusation of treason. They were tried and charged for treason due to the lost battles of Anatolia, although no substantial evidence was advanced. It led to interwar politics and much animosity towards the Turks, who were accused of bringing the nuisance to the

Ancient Greece [151]. The peace conference in Lausanne attempted to bring peace between Greek and Turkey, but it was not a long-lasting solution as it will be observed in later years.

According to Kinley (2019), the truce enforced in 1918 is credited to the First World War conclusion [190]. However, the Armistice of Mudros, signed between Allied Powers and the declining Ottoman Empire induced the latter to partition its lands among its Allies. As part of the pact, Greece was to benefit from claiming the territory around the city of Smyrna. Smyrna was regarded as the wealthiest city inhabited mainly by minorities within the Ottoman Empire. The primary inhabitants of Smyrna were the Greeks, Jews, and Armenians.

According to Pentzopoulos (2002), figures agree on the statistics of the minority who occupied Asiatic Turkey. The Greek Patriarchate census approximated more than 5,000 more Greeks, 2,000 more Jews, and 14,000 more Armenians who occupied than the Ottoman Empire compared to the Turkish statistics [262]. However, the Turks claimed there were more than 1,000,000 Turks in their census reports. According to Polybius, the figures were exaggerated so that the Turks would continue to significant occupy seats in the Ottoman Parliament [262]. However, this did not alter Smyrna's population, which Greeks, Jews, and Armenians mostly inhabiting the region.

For Greece, Smyrna symbolized more than just a winning price for engagement in World War I. Smyrna validated the Greek international policy aim of claiming Constantinople and reawakening the sleeping Byzantine Empire, or "Greater Greece" [190]. Moreover, the name Smyrna was believed to originate from the ancient phrase "myrrh", which symbolized its importance as the chief city for trading activities in antiquity. Moreover, it was located at a strategic and favorable point on the Aegean coast of Eastern Anatolia [65, p.124]. Therefore, the prime minister of Greece, Venizelos, sought to advance conflict by utilizing the Greeks' sense of national identity and sense of ownership for the heritage and identity of the city of Smyrna. According to Kampouris (2019), political motivations within Greek hierarchy and competing interests among Allied

Powers, alongside to rapid rise of nationalism concept and onset of the First World War, contributed to determining the eventual fate and decline of Smyrna and its citizens for the rest of the 20th century and beyond [182].

After the Greco-Turkish War, the Greeks went to Smyrna in 1919. It signaled another fresh war with the Turks, with the local ethnic Greeks and Armenians joining forces with the incoming Greek fleets. Reports quickly circulated the Greeks' mistreatment of the Muslims residing in Smyrna and its neighborhoods [190]. These reports irked Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and induced him to prepare his troops to counter the incoming war. Initially, the Greeks wanted only to conquer all parts of neighboring Smyrna zone. However, political changes in Greece induced the Greek army to target Ankara and conquer the heart of Anatolia, much to the displeasure of the Turks. The British were comfortable with Greek's entry into Turkish lands as they wanted to dismantle Kemal's revolutionary actions. By 1920, the Greek troops successfully claimed major parts of Northwestern Anatolia [190].

However, the Turks, used guerilla warfare tactics to slow down the Greeks' entry into their lands. In reprisal efforts to the landing of the Greeks in Anatolia, the Turkish revolutionary militants brutally massacred the Greek Orthodox villagers and induced many minorities to flee west to the Greek occupation zone. The continued war caused great panic among the Greek public and the international community. In a short time, the Greek desertions multiplied, while the remaining troops' morale declined significantly. The British, sensing defeat, withdrew their support to the Greeks. On the other hand, the Turks were aided by the Soviet Union, who wanted to check Western expansion [190].

By 1921, the Greek had been overpowered, especially in the Battle of Sakarya. However, the political leaders of Greece were not ready to accept defeat. Instead, insisting conceding defeat would imply forfeiting any ancestral claims to Smyrna. This declaration would prove catastrophic due to politicians' motive for conflicts [190]. Smyrna's great fire that started on September 13, 1922 by the Turkish Army and communities marked the end

of Greeks efforts in Asia Minor. The fire that lasted for nine days was disastrous to the entire Greek, and Armenian population, with significant city areas, completely wiped out of the geographic map [182]. Thousands of Greeks, Armenians and Jews fled in despair, jumping into the seas to minimize the flames. The city suffered significant damage to infrastructure and land, and people were burned to ashes. However, for Kemal and his Turkish loyalties, the victory marked the fresh start of the Turkish Republic and end of Greece's conquest in Asia Minor. The Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 was established to prevent any catalyst to future war between these two nations. However, like many other previous treaties and agreements, Turkey and Greece conflicts were not over, primarily due to animosity in the concept of religious homogeneity [190].

Mustafa Kemal was aware of the opportunity to defeat the Greek Forces and Greek population at Smyrna, and the Greek-Turkish war end presented the setting stone for the establishment of a Turkish Republic. According to Dural (2012), Mustafa Kemal had spread word to some of his friends in France, England, and Italy that the Great War had depressed the Allied Powers' powers, and they were in no position to participate the Anatolian adventure [112]. The Allied Powers limited the number of soldiers sent to help Greece suppress Turkey with its ambitions to become a free and independent state. Mustafa Kemal successfully thwarting Greece and other Allied Powers measures, declared the Treaty of Sevres null and void [112]. Kemal made his intentions of abolishing the sultanate clear, which was a success in 1922 and signaled the Ottoman Empire's end.

Napoleon, the famous Emperor of France, once said, "If the earth were one state, Constantinople would remain its capital" [227]. Constantinople is not only strategically located in a critical area, but it has a beautiful landscape. In the 7th century, the Greeks inhabited the area and created the Constantinople city (modern-day Istanbul). It was initially known as the Byzantium Empire before it was changed to become the Roman Empire's capital [115]. The Greeks inhabiting Constantinople which constituted the significant Greek populace in the entire Eastern Mediterranean. In the late antiquity

periods, Constantinople rapidly rose to become the largest city in the Western bloc and acted as the Byzantine Empire's capital. Therefore, modern Istanbul would not be imagined or explained without the Greek input [115].

It explains why 7th Ottoman Sultan, Mehmed II fiercely fought to claim Constantinople from the Byzantine Empire that was majorly occupied by the Greeks [173, p. 115-135]. Mehmed used advanced military techniques of antiquity such as rapid cooling cannon and gaining intelligence concerning the city.

According to İşiksal (2002), the causes of tension between Turkey and Greece has been embedded in the “self-other” image through exhibiting and demeaning the “other” to a lower cultural space [173, p. 115-135]. Both states have portrayed the “other” as an inferior moral space, elevating themselves to the level of higher morality. Consequently, while the Greeks significantly attempt to establish the moral and cultural supremacy for national unity and inhibit the inherent socio-economic and other political challenges of the current established Republic, the Turkish Republic often flirts with the idea of nationalism in the form of an Islamic ideologically infused republic, the seeds of rivalry for the next generations continue to germinate inhibiting any meaningful relationship between the two countries. In the contemporary society, the tension between Turkish “other” and Greek “self” (and vice versa) emerges due to the fundamental contrast between “European” identity to non-democratic Turkish identity ready to utilize their military force at any instance [173, p. 115-135].

However, political leaders have been at the center stage in reigniting tensions between these two countries. For instance, on November 27, 2019, the current Turkish President Erdogan signed an illegal pact with Libya to start a maritime boundary between the Turkish Republic and one of the Libyan governments in the Mediterranean Sea and share exclusive rights to exploit the area for its untapped oil and gas reserves consultations, completely disregarding any Greek sovereignty in the area, considering that the deal disregards any Greek waters and islands. Greece's Foreign Minister, Nikos Dendias, hit back by asserting

the pact “assumes something that is obvious, which is that between those two nations, there is significant geographical areas of Crete” and should be regarded absurd [331]. According to Hacaoglu and Tugwell (2020), Turkey and Greece, both affiliated with The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), have reignited old conflicts by mobilizing their navies and warplanes to oppose each other, especially on matters concerning the Mediterranean Sea [150].

Turkey’s Politicians create tensions by raising issues concerning natural gas off Cyprus’s Island and in the Greek Aegean waters, which Greece considers to be under their sovereignty. The Mediterranean Island was portioned into Greek and Turkish Cypriots in 1963. However, in 1974, Turkey invaded Cyprus and occupied most of the Northern part of the Island. Even today, the Republic of Cyprus is unable to govern the Northern part which the Turks claimed and occupied with military forces. Unifications by other global leaders and nations such as the US has stalled, and often create tensions between Greece and Turkey. Moreover, Eastern Mediterranean parts have often been used to spark an old rivalry between Greece, Cyprus, and Turkey.

The Aegean dispute has also been advanced in recent times to reignite tensions between the two nations. In 1987, the two nations almost went to war in a test of wills over the privileges to drill for oil. Tensions were reignited again in 1996 over the right of the uninhabited islet of Imia. Turkey and Greece often claim the Island’s territorial waters cover six nautical miles from their coasts and the Dodecanese Islands. Greece’s move to rightfully expand its airspace over its islands to ten nautical miles has been construed by the Turkish official so that it can be used to create conflicts, as Turkey makes the claim it should be only six miles wide.

For centuries, Greece and Turkey’s relationship has been tumultuous since Greece attained freedom from the Ottoman Empire in 1830. Although Greece and Turkey have enjoyed periods of peace, the two states have experienced more alternating periods of conflict in their affairs [228]. Despite a period of mutual harmony between the Greeks and

Turks from the late 1920s to the 1950s, the last centuries have been marred by anger, political fights, war threats, wars, injustices, and a significant number of massacres. Memories of this “adversarial dyad” and “prolonged conflict”, in addition to the sense of ownership and sense of national identity factors, have significantly acted as an impairment to immediate resolution, attain nationalism, and ensure good border relations [157]. Therefore, due to historical memories and reasons of wrongs – actual or fantasied – have induced each state to conceive the “other” as a potential “threat” and as an embargo to one’s “national identity”.

Işiksal (2002) asserts that the causes of contemporary tensions between Turkey and Greece have been embedded in the “self-other” image through exhibiting and demeaning the “other” to a lower cultural space [173, p. 115-135]. According to Papadimitriou (2020), although both Greece and Turkey bore a remarkable resemblance in their culture, such as music, cuisine, humor, and some sense of “Weltschmerz” it is the politicians who persist in stoking tensions between these two countries [259].

It is important to analyze how the past conflicts can transcend into the present in the form of either a nostalgic pain or in the form of reaching the highs of a long-lost glory, to advance conflict between Greece and Turkey by abusing the sense of ownership and the sense of national identity. Thus, before presenting the approaches to address the “classic” Greek-Turkish conflict, a historical and modern analysis of Greece and Turkey’s alterations is essential. In this chapter I will emphasize how the points of Constantinople, Muslim Greeks (Ethnic Turkic minority) of Western Thrace, and Maritime disputes have exacerbated the Greek-Turkish conflicting points and could be used as tools to advance political or military conflict. Lastly, I will attempt to discuss how political leaders and other prominent influencers from both sides have reignited tensions. The focus will be on how the idea of national identity, the sense of ownership and the politicians’ motive to create and fuel conflict has extended the rivalry.

As Ekinci (2015) narrates, the conquest of Constantinople by the Ottoman Empire on May 29, 1453, is more than just the usual fall of a megalopolis [115]. The conquest signified the historical turning point in Turkish, Islamic, and Greek history and the world's history. Initially, it was regarded as the Roman Empire's capital before it was transformed into the Byzantine Empire's capital for more than 1,100 years. It explains why both the Greek and Turkey senior politicians have referred to Constantinople city as their ancestral home to create further tensions in contemporary society.

The prominence of Constantinople in antiquity explains why the 7th Ottoman Sultan, Mehmed II, fiercely fought to claim it from the Byzantine Empire that was significantly inhabited by the Greeks [173, p. 115-135]. Mehmed II motivated his military to claim ownership of the city and become its rulers, which ultimately will result in the Ottomans regarding Constantinople as "their" city, albeit with time, the Ottoman national identity will be connected with the city of Constantinople, ultimately leading to the ignition of a political and military conflict with the Greeks residing in the Byzantine Empire. Even though not military prepared, the Orthodox Greeks arose to defend their city from the incoming Ottoman Empire Troops.

However, subsequent governments from both sides have been the catalysts for conflict by using Constantinople as a reference. The Greeks have always associated Constantinople as their ancestral home, claiming its ownership and embodying their national identity. The Greeks and its political leaders often point out that Constantinople was once a robust and reliable defense for Orthodox Christians before the Ottomans invaded them. However, the Turks are often too quick to point out that they had extended their control over virtually every part of Eastern Europe, including the Balkans and Anatolia, and without its dominance, Constantinople would have perished. Therefore, the fall of Greeks' holy city and capital (Constantinople/Istanbul) to the Turks could be identified as the primary reason for historical antagonism that contemporary leaders use to ignite conflicts between the two nations. Even today, most cable news stations and political

leaders in Greece and the Republic of Cyprus often use the phrase of Constantinople in favor of Istanbul [173, p. 115-135].

On May 29, 2019, the current Turkish President Erdogan delivered a municipal election campaign speech that “coincided” with the Fall of Constantinople’s anniversary. In his speech, he said, “Istanbul will never be called “Constantinople” again”. Surprisingly, the Ottomans had referred to Constantinople as Istanbul for decades, but the official name alteration was only observed in 1930 in the aftermath of Turkish independence. But for Greece’s President Katerina Sakellariopoulou, other senior government officials such as the foreign minister, Nikos Dendias, and all Greeks, Constantinople would remain Constantinople [259]. The Greeks’ refusal to accept the term “Istanbul” in place of the beloved Polis is that since the 1900s, the modern Turkish state has been an adversary of Hellenism and Greece. While the Turks, including Erdogan, continue to call Istanbul their capital, the Greeks consider Istanbul their “lost homeland” that houses Hagia Sophia and it was the center of the Byzantine Empire [86].

Western Thrace (or Thrace as commonly known in Greek) is a historical and spatial area in Greece, neighboring Turkey and Bulgaria, and Europe and Asia. Western Thrace has long remained a home for small but politically essential minority communities comprised of over 100,000 Greek Muslims with Turkic roots. Following subsequent periods under Greeks and Romans, the Ottomans conquered this area and remained under their reign until the First Balkan War of 1912. (*Table 1* below illustrates the Western Thrace population's general distribution from 1912 to 1920 before the First Balkan War).

Bulgaria obtained the privilege of ruling this area, but not long before the second Balkan war re-emerged. In 1913, the Bulgarians were defeated but remained the rules of the land due to the after-war treaty. However, the emergence of World War I forced Bulgaria to surrender the Western Thrace to the Allied Powers before the land was transferred to the Greeks in 1920 through the Treaty of Sèvres [323].

According to Borou (2009), the subsequent signing of the Treaty of Lausanne, the primary pact for safeguarding the Greek and Muslim minorities, signaled the bilateral conflict between Greece and Turkey [62, p. 5-26]. There are population estimates in Western Thrace that the Greeks presented to the committee in Lausanne, recorded after the relocation of Asia Minor refugees after the Second Balkan War and World War I.

Coupled with addressing Aegean and Cyprus's concerns, the issue about the Muslim minority residing in Western Thrace in Greece has significantly impeded the resolution of Greek-Turkish antagonism in the past. According to the state of affairs for the Muslim Greeks in the Western Thrace has been regarded as a too delicate matter within the political spectrum [62, p. 5-26].

Greece, up to this day, has not acknowledged Turkey's claim of a Turkish minority existence, as Greece observes that the minority is the Muslim Greeks minority residing in Western Thrace [323]. Although the treaty asserted a wide array of benefits and rights to both minorities residing in Greece and Turkey, both these nations have not been keen on observing the treaty's tenets to equal levels. Moreover, despite a wide range of protestations declared by both domestic and international law, the Greek government has often assumed them. Verhás (2019) asserts that the challenges facing the Muslim minority have significantly increased in recent periods, primarily through the ill-motives of politicians drawn from both countries. For instance, the Muslim Greeks are afforded restrictions concerning their ability to form associations and implement their religious values, especially when it comes to the religious expression as influences from Turkey have been apparent. These hurdles include rules in electing Muftis, leading to establishing a state-elected leadership model in parallel to the officials preferred by the immediate community, and exploiting financial and legal standards about Muslim charitable projects [323].

Minority rights persist in being regulated by a framework proposed almost a century ago, much to Turkish political leaders and other international observers' annoyance. For instance, Turkish leaders have criticized the Greek president and other leaders for

continually referring to the Muslim minority living in the Thrace as “Greek Muslim minority.” Greece has been adamant about recognizing the minority as an associate of the European Union (EU) and being a member of various international human rights organizations and treaties [323].

For various alternating periods, President Erdogan and other Turkish leaders, in an attempt to abuse the sense of national identity and sense of ownership accredited to the Muslim minorities in Western Thrace, have called out Greece while exaggerating on the facts for exhibiting discriminatory actions towards ethnic Turkish citizens [150]. Turkey has also accused Greece’s leadership of closing several schools where the Turkish language was taught through an assimilation campaign. In 2007 when President Erdogan made a visit to Greece, he instructed a revision of the Treaty of Lausanne to supposedly protect and safeguard Muslim Greeks’ rights and address sovereignty conflicts in the Aegean, a revision which in reality adhered to the Turkish political interests.

However, Greece has denied discriminatory practices towards the Muslim minorities, which only fuels the Turkish side to invest more into the Greek-Turkish conflict. The Greek leaders rightfully state that President Erdogan is not in a position to advise other countries on how to handle such matters since Turkey oversaw the closure of a Greek Orthodox theological school in 1971 under a policy that observes religious and military training to be within state directive. The Greeks leaders also blame Erdogan for recently turning Constantinople’s (Istanbul) Hagia Sophia, established for the Byzantine Empire as a holy cathedral and operating as a national museum in the past a mosque [150]. Therefore, the Muslim Greeks’ issue in Western Greece has continuously been used by both Greek and Turkish leaders to advance conflict by stating and exploiting the sense of ownership and the sense of national identity to gain more power and shift the citizens’ opinion in favor of the politician.

In 1995, in response to the ratification of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, the Turkish Grand National Assembly unilaterally adopted a resolution, according to which

the expansion of the Greek territorial waters to 12 nautical miles would reflect a cause of war (*casus belli*). For many decades, Greece and Turkey have been in contention over the maritime areas earmarked in the Aegean Sea. According to Ortolland (2009), the transformation of the Law of the Sea, which allows states new spaces of sovereignty and jurisdiction locations without declaring their delimitation, has been a source of the maritime dispute between Greece and Turkey in the Aegean Sea [255]. The Territorial split occasioned by the Treaty of Lausanne and the subsequent Treaty of Paris in 1947 brought some stability. Greece was allocated most of the Aegean Sea Islands because Greeks populated it since antiquity. However, international law's evolution due to the Second World War has significantly impacted the status quo between these two nations. As a result, the Greek islands are distributed all over the Aegean Sea, touching the coast of Turkey such as Lesbos and Kos, which can be visualized better as a flower thorn to the eyes of Turkish leadership. This situation has exacerbated the antagonism between these two nations [255].

The past decades have been marred with negotiations between these two nations. According to Gavouneli (2020), Greece has often asserted that the primary point be discussed in such negotiation is a maritime delimitation pact for the continental shelf and a potential Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the Aegean and entire Eastern Mediterranean [136]. On the other hand, Turkey and Greece have often presented an increasing number of "unresolved concerns" such as sovereignty over particular islets, demilitarization of other islands and Turkey's constant violation of Greek airspace, the delimitation of Greek and Turkish territorial waters and the management of the air movement in the Aegean Sea [136]. Turkish leaders do not seem interested to discuss the concern that islands do obtain maritime zones by ignoring the UN Convention on Law of the Sea, as the agreement doesn't align with the Turkish geopolitical interests in the region. However, Turkish leaders seem to have specific ideas concerning their effect on the two states' final delimitation line [136].

Hacaoglu and Tugwell (2020) narrate various maritime disputes that both Turkey and Greece have used to advance conflict by abusing the sense of ownership and the sense of national identity. The East Mediterranean, Cyprus disputes, and the Aegean disputes have significantly contributed to the Greek-Turkey conflict. For instance, tensions arose in 2020 when Turkey actively searched for oil and gas proceeds in the Eastern Mediterranean's Greece's and Cyprus' EEZ. The tensions are due to conflicting examination of maritime borders and concern of sovereignty in Cyprus. Turkish leaders posit they do not acknowledge Greece's affirmation that its territorial rights are guided by the location of its numerous islands. Instead, they unilaterally claim that a country's continental shelf should be estimated only from its coasts [150].

According to the UN Convention on the Law of Sea, coastal states can establish an EEZ up to 200 nautical miles from their mainland where they are at liberty to conduct economic activities. Where two regions converge, the countries are at liberty to establish an agreement. However, Turkey and its leaders have not ratified the convention. President Erdogan believes island regions such as Cyprus are only eligible for rights within their official water areas, expanding to a limit of 12 nautical miles. Also, Aegean disputes almost led to war between Greece and Turkey in 1987 regarding drilling oil disputes. Also, in 1996, tensions arose concerning the sovereignty of the unsettled islet of Imia.

The Dodecanese Islands that were ceded to Greece by Italy after World War II with an arrangement for their demilitarization has also been a concern for Greece and Turkey. Recently, images showing Greek soldiers entering Kastellorizo (part of the Dodecanes) in response to the Turkish reimagined aggression in the Aegean and illegal drillings in the East Mediterranean reignited tensions with Turkey. Turkey warned Greece against any plans of assuming force limits on stipulated islands, while Greece reiterated by asserting it was only doing a regular rotation of troops.

The country's media plays a crucial role in spreading specific political propaganda messages. The relations between Turkey and Greece, which is the EU member, have been

unstable partly as a consequence of long-lasting mind-shaping propaganda. Each country's media has been crucial in affecting their respective citizen's national identity and sense of ownership to the degree of becoming the driving force behind strategic aspirations. Turkey's geopolitical positioning and internal politics have resulted in a long, tumultuous relationship with the European Union (EU) including Greece. Turkey has unsuccessfully tried to join the EU several times, falling behind in domains considered crucial by the EU. Economic, social, and political factors further exacerbate the situation. The disputes and sour relations have most recently manifested themselves in a reemergence of the Aegean dispute in the Eastern Mediterranean region. The maritime dispute is further complicated due to politicians' selfish motives which deliberately affect the people's national identity, sense of ownership among Greeks and Turks.

The long-running sour relations between Turkey and the EU are largely due to the region's unique geographical circumstances. Turkey shares a land border with Greece and Bulgaria, which are EU members. However, the maritime boundaries between Greece and Turkey cause most of the conflict since the two countries border the Mediterranean Sea. The broad access to the Mediterranean should give any country that controls these waters a significant economic and territorial advantage. However, Greece's geographic composition tempers this potential advantage that Turkey wants to claim.

Statements highlighting that Turkey has the longest mainland coastline are often an inducement to adopt political views. A long coast is economically beneficial since a country has more territorial waters, which gives it a larger exclusive economic zone (EEZ), as long as no other country's EEZ legitimately interferes. The EEZ is adjacent to a coastal state's territorial sea and extends 200 nautical miles off a nation's coast [316]. Coastal states whose EEZ doesn't meet any other nation's EEZ, have sovereign rights to explore and exploit natural resources such as oil and gas in this zone. Focusing on the mainland shoreline points the UN suggests are the core of the argumentative facts that the Turkish side "cherry-picks" among all other UN stipulations to go after the Turkish government's

interests and consequently, reiterating Turkey's coastline argument evokes political discourse since Greece's legal expansion of its territorial waters from the current six nautical miles would significantly reduce Turkey's desired EEZ. The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs claims that such Greek action would effectively turn the Aegean Sea into a Greek lake, thus negating military or economic advantages that it could derive from a long coastline.

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea has been vital to defining each country's maritime borders and rights. The law states that "Every State has the right to establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles" (United Nations, 1982) [316]. A coastal state has jurisdiction and sovereignty over its territorial waters, which start when one leaves the waters "on the landward side of the baseline of the territorial sea" (United Nations, 1982). A nation's territorial rights encompass the sea's surface, seabed, subsoil, and the airspace vertically above the region. Therefore, Greece and Turkey should ideally have 12 nautical miles of territorial waters. However, the region's unique geography makes this impossible. Turkey could not have 12 nautical miles of territorial waters since it would be infringing on Greece's territorial waters. Similarly, should Greece in the future decide to exercise its rights in expanding its territorial waters according to the UNCLOS to 12 nautical miles, Greece has to also consider collaborating with the Turkish side in defining exactly the territorial water limits to avoid going into Turkish waters and vice versa.

Greece and Turkey have adapted to their maritime geography by reducing their respective territorial boundaries from twelve to six nautical miles in the Aegean Sea (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.) [311]. The compromise protects each country's territorial rights on the usage of the sea surface, its bed, and subsoil. These aspects are crucial to commercial interests, such as shipping lanes and exploration and utilization of any country's resources under the seafloor. Coastal states have wide powers over their territorial waters. However, other nations' ships have the right to innocent passage through

the territorial sea [316]. Therefore, Greek and Turkish ships can pass through each other's waters.

Naturally, each country would want to expand its territory for valid economic or political reasons. Such expansion is often only possible through rhetoric and discourse among its citizens or between the states in conflict. Condor et al. (2013) describe political rhetoric as the strategies that a person may use to create and advance persuasive arguments in a political debate and disputes [90]. Turkey has increasingly adopted aggressive rhetoric. For instance, in 2018, the Turkish Prime Minister Binali Yildirim warned Greece and Cyprus that "Turkey will never tolerate certain circles which violate Turkey's sovereignty in the Mediterranean and Aegean" [198]. He further hinted at potential deadly military consequences by referencing the Turkish military's reoccupation of Izmir in 1922 [198]. The aggressive rhetoric continuously fuels verbal attacks between Greece and Turkey, which further raises tensions in the eastern Mediterranean.

The political rhetoric complements Turkey's assertive foreign policy [313, p. 3]. It has manifested itself in how the country approaches the Aegean conflict directly with Greece and, more broadly, with the EU. The shift has been mainly due to President Erdogan's push to position Turkey as the significant political and military power in the Middle East and eastern Mediterranean [125]. Turkey has historical and long-term aspirations, such as reducing its reliance on oil and gas imports. Erdogan has supported the new political direction by centralizing political power around himself and bolstering the country's defense industry [125]. Turkey has repeatedly violated Greece's airspace above the Aegean Sea. For instance, Greek defense ministry officials reported that Turkish planes had violated Greek airspace 138 times in 2017 [276]. Furthermore, President Erdogan explicitly mentioned that "Turkey has attained the power to carry out with active military support its political and economic policies on the ground... Those accustomed to speaking to us with an imperious tone now negotiate with us on equal terms" [336]. Such aggressive

political tones, foreign policy, and military provocations are dangerous since they can escalate rapidly with disastrous consequences.

The matter is more complicated since the Greece-Turkey conflict feeds into each country's national identity and sense of ownership. For instance, the countries have some islands they both lay claim to, such as islands that Greece calls Imia and Turkey calls Kardak. The islands and territorial waters are prizes in themselves and also due to the resulting benefits from the EEZ. Consequently, the Greek government is adamant about its sovereign rights over the islands and does not entertain Turkish challenges on islands in the Aegean Sea [136]. Further, oil and gas reserves in the eastern Mediterranean became contentious since Turkey pursuing its geopolitical interests started claiming areas of the Greek EEZ, thus both countries argue that they have the right to explore and exploit resources in the zone. The dispute led to a minor incident in August 2020 as a Turkish warship collided with a Greek ship as they were following a Turkish research ship conducting a drilling survey [73]. Although the collision did not lead to escalations, it shows how easily each country's belief in its ownership and right over resources can lead to potentially violent altercations.

Each country's media has been vital in nullifying each other's views on the eastern Mediterranean conflict. Greek media has actively contributed to the conflict by alienating Turks and portraying them as the "other", promoting a nationalist attitude in the Greek public [207]. Greece and Turkey share a common history since they both achieved nation-state status through a violent struggle against the Ottoman Empire. However, their respective media has supported ethnocentric nationalistic views. Each country sees the other as a threat and national enemy [34, p. 15-40]. Greek media pushes ethnocentric discourses that frame Turkey's expansionism as a threat to its national identity and sense of ownership over the Greek islands [207]. Therefore, the Turkish aggression and unfounded claims on the Aegean Continental Shelf west of the Greek islands up to the middle of the Aegean appears to the Greeks as a significant threat.

The language a nation's press uses can set the tone for political discourse and sentiment among citizens. Journalists use language that can further the country's propaganda by emphasizing a state's values, strengths, power, and demonizing the "enemy" [200, p. 23-32]. Turkish media has been guilty of such approaches by portraying the country's relationship with Greece confrontationally. An example is the Imia/Kardak crisis in 1996, where the two countries almost fought over islands which they both claimed to be their territory, in a similar scenario. Greek media worsened the conflict by using language and reporting the increased tensions and conflict [200, p. 23-32]. Greek media portrayed the conflict's end as a military loss rather than a peaceful de-escalation, with one paper calling for the prime minister's resignation [52, p. 242-257]. Such language implicitly nullified any views about Turkey's rights over the islands.

Human rights bodies have increasingly faulted Turkey for the gradual erosion of media freedom [169]. The organizations have lamented the state capture of media and the independence of regulatory institutions has reduced. Erdogan and his government abuse the domestic press to his advantage and advance anti-Greek sentiment among the Turkish citizens. Therefore, one can conclude that the Turkish media's language portrays the government's position on its conflict with Greece and the EU. Some sources have observed numerous times and called out the Turkish media of having "nationalist euphoria" in the conflict's coverage [66]. The subjective reporting is reminiscent of the Imia/Kardak crisis where Turkish journalists used language that glorified Turkish actions while labeling the Greek forces as "enemies" and "pirates" [52, p. 242-257]. Such journalistic stances aim to nullify Greek concerns about their islands by encouraging Turkish citizens to view Greek action in the eastern Mediterranean as illegitimate and provocative.

The media also promotes and maintains negative stereotypes against the "enemy". Greek and Turkish journalists know their views may be in direct opposition. However, they do not accept that their opinions and reporting are inherently nationally biased and subjective [261]. Further, in an increasingly competitive world, journalists may use any

means to attract an audience. They may explicitly push partial views or sensationalized stories that attract consumers while stoking diplomatic disputes.

Further, the media can influence how countries view each other depending on the kind of prevailing journalism. Ciftcioglu & Shaw (2020) argue that there are two kinds of journalism during a conflict. A war journalism media approach favors reporting conflicts and wars like a dramatic event where the parties can only lose or win [87]. On the other hand, peace journalism focuses on peaceful resolutions to conflicts, where both parties win [225]. If a country's media focuses on war journalism, it creates a zero-sum atmosphere where the nation has to defeat the enemy or risk significant losses. It also focuses on official sources that are inherently skewed against the other country [87]. For instance, the Greek media relying on the country's official sources might advance the government's propaganda against Turkey's motives in the eastern Mediterranean. Similarly, under heavy government control, the Turkish media is more likely to delegitimize any Greek concerns and paint Greece as the enemy, by at the same time advance a nationalistic agenda.

The Turkey-Greece conflict reporting has evolved over several decades. Paksoy (2020) points out that the 1990s did not have peace journalism. Each country skewed the other's motives through accusations, exaggerations, and conspiracy theories, which fed into the tense political relations during the period [258]. The 2000s saw a general improvement as both sides started including more reporting that mentioned the possibility of peace [258]. However, the current situation has deteriorated, and the media is partly responsible.

An example of this is visible in an analysis of Turkish Cypriot media sources versus Greek Cypriots. The conflict in Cyprus in 1974 led to Turkey invading Cyprus and declaring the island's northern occupied side as a new vessel state called by Turkey the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). No other country on the planet acknowledges this state except Turkey [87]. The rest of the island is still under Greek Cypriot administration, which is internationally recognized. Ciftcioglu & Shaw (2020)

show that Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot both use war journalism more frequently than peace journalism. Therefore, each country's population sees the other nation's views on the eastern Mediterranean's conflict as aggressive. Cyprus's situation is a snapshot of the more significant problem between Greece, the EU and Turkey

Both sides have a stake in how the conflict develops. Greece and Cyprus, which are EU members, have sovereignty rights in the zones of energy potential, which Turkish expansion can threaten. For instance, it has promising oil reserves, which are 150 miles off Cyprus's shore. Greek-Cypriot oil and gas exploration started in 2011 despite the Turkish side expressing their omission and reported ungrounded warnings [56, p. 95-106]. Further, the threat of losing islands or territorial waters would also be a political blow to any Greek leader since it would be a national loss. Similarly, Turkey has a vested interest in the eastern Mediterranean and Aegean conflict. Erdogan's popularity can hinge on his handling of the Turkey-Greece conflict due to its importance to Turkish citizens. If he were to back down or accept a compromise that disproportionately favored Greece, it would taint his legacy and reduce his popularity. Despite his efforts at consolidating power around himself, the attempted coup against him in 2016 showed the slippery slope resulting from citizens' dissatisfaction and dwindling popularity.

Turkey-Greece tension in the eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean is part of the long-standing conflict. Each state's media has been vital to creating and fostering national identities and a sense of ownership over land and resources. They have been core to claims on territorial waters and the contentious EEZ. Other elements, such as the countries' and politicians' interests, further complicate the conflict.

According to Volkan (1998), it is paradoxical that the foundations of many group rivalry are bloodlines that build a kind of border in periods of crisis that cannot be crossed. Two sects who have been neighbors for years may suddenly be turned into relentless enemies, and the unimaginable may become a horrifying reality [328]. Although Greece

and Turkey have experienced times of peace, the two states have faced more alternating periods of conflict in their affairs [228].

Identity as a dynamic social aspect unfolds and survives on the premise that it connects with other identities. The initial establishment of this aspect requires the existence of a scenario where “the self” is in an activity of continuous makeup with “the other”. What is more, the discernment of self and others is the activity that constructs identity as a kind of recognition. This recognition has a double sword impact on identity, as one disassociates the other as an outsider and restricts oneself, which is not the other [116]. In this section of the dissertation, I’ll be discussing how the formation of Turkish national identity and the pivotal role of the Greek “other” has impacted the relations between these two nations. It is crucial to note that the phrase “other” does not imply hatred at all; instead, it is an approach of recognizing “the self” while assuming the “other” as the reference end.

Political and historical rivalry between Greece and Turkey, past conflicts have become an integral part of their identity (or national identity), and I will explore how national identity, a sense of ownership largely centered on land and people, and the motivation of politicians to create and exacerbate conflict have contributed to the confrontation lasting with surprising persistence.

Both Turkey and Greece have a glorious and astonishing past. They ruled the Eastern Mediterranean section militarily, socially, politically, and culturally, initially by Greeks in the Byzantine Empire and the Turkish by the Ottoman Empire [173, p. 115-135]. Although neither the Greeks nor the Turks entirely established the Byzantine and Ottoman Empire, their political figures and leaders were primarily derived from Greek and Turkish ancestry. Therefore, their ancestry relations and perception significantly established their sense of national identity and ownership. From the 5th century to the 14th century, the Greeks, via the Byzantine Empire, ruled the Eastern Mediterranean, although they faced various rivalries such as the Normans from Sicily, Venice, and Genoa. In the 15th century, the

Ottoman conquest, which led to the Greeks ceding under the Ottoman rule for the next four hundred years, changed all living experiences [173, p. 115-135].

The uprising of the French Revolution in the nineteenth century only served to fuel the Turkey-Greece rivalry. The fall of the Ottoman Empire sparked the revolutionary spirit and acted as a foundation for the Greek War of Independence. Moreover, the Greeks venture into commerce, and the capitalist method at the expense of strict adherence to the Turks' religious and cultural aspects caused more conflicts. However, the first modern tangible Greek-Turkish rivalry erupted after the Second World War due to the Cyprus problem in the 1950s. The second cause of rivalry has been over the maritime areas, such as the Aegean dispute. Minorities residing on both sides of the borders, especially in the Western Thrace of Greek, have often been a reference point of friction with concerns over the Patriarchate in Istanbul [158].

Turkey has been quick to point out that from the 15th century to the 19th century, most of the Greeks' lands and the Aegean Islands were ruled by the Ottomans. The Greeks often dispute this claim by asserting that Constantinople was Christendom's capital for centuries and the primary Byzantine Empire's trading center.

The Greeks often regard the Turks as backward, barbarian, and ready to commit atrocities and this is one of the Greek self-image aspects [158]. This notion was prevalent in antiquity to expunge any co-existence plans and any harmony between the Ottoman Muslims and Greeks (Rum). Even now, any historical evidence to suggest otherwise often simulate an uproar in Greece, for it is regarded as sabotaging the *raison d'être* of the Greek War for Independence and statehood [157].

The need to advance the Turks as the antipode of civilization is directly supportive of the Greeks' claim of natural origin from the "classics" (the Ancient Greeks) of the contemporary Greeks who become the "cradle for civilization" and through the Greek origins a part of European civilization and culture. Therefore, the "Turkish innate barbarism" is regarded as an impasse to civilization, as Turks were for Europe the initial

“other”. The Greeks regard themselves as the “vanguard of European civilization opposing the barbarism rule”. Besides, the barbaric, undemocratic, and backwardness’ concept of the Turks and their bloodline is pivotal to advancing the Greeks as the opposite; contemporary, progressive, democratic, and actual heirs of their forefathers who adopted democracy [158].

According to Heraclides (2011), Greeks explain themselves as the quintessential nation of “civilization and history” [158]. Greeks choose to associate themselves with the venerable Ancient Greeks and primary European giants such as British, France, and Italians to being associated with people and areas similar to their sizes, such as the Danes or the Bulgarians. However, as Nicos Mouzelis sarcastically asserts, “the Greeks are outright shocked when other states settle for foreign policy purposed for their own national interests rather than settling for foreign policy based on the Greek national interests”. The Turks also regard the Greeks as “favorite child of Americans and other European states,” a concept which does not sit well with the Greeks [158].

Concerning the Aegean region, predominantly Cyprus, the Greeks regard them as part and parcel of their national identity. As discussed later in this chapter, the Greeks often regard these areas as Greek territories since time immemorial and have remained so since the fall of the Byzantine Empire. The Turks also maintain their stance in these regions, much to the Greeks’ provocation. [158]

Concerning the Greek declaration associating the Turks with barbarity and backwardness, the Turks often claim the Greeks to have participated in an array of disastrous events and atrocities that affected the Ottomans, as the Greek revolutionaries had shaken the foundation of a collapsing Ottoman Empire’s collapse. The Turks regard the Greeks as ultra-nationalist and only suffer from deep-rooted neurosis or having a sense of “pathological enmity” towards the Turks. The Turks consider that Greece is ruled by a “backward Greek Church” and obscurantist leaders. The Turks force themselves to

remember the acts committed by the Greeks from antiquity and blame the Europeans for “saving” them in their “illegal rebellions” [158].

The primary Turkish concern that yields more insecurity and impacts the Turkish self-identity is having a firm grip on their perceived territories and sovereignty concerns. The Turks often complain of a majority of their lands being annexed to Greece by international Treaties. The Turks often commemorate the conquest of Constantinople with much fanfare as it perceives the start of their national identity, which in a form of analogy can be described as a castle build in sand [158]. However, according to Gürsoy (2009), the Turks tend to be insecure compared to Greeks at their national identity as their sense of national identity evolved behind schedule on top of an established civilization that was decaying. Initially, the Turks were a nation in search of its nation and that perception remains to this day as politicians often abuse their power to “weaponize” the Turkish people sense of ownership to serve their own interests [148].

The Turks often regard the Greeks and their sympathizers as having a concealed agenda after the Treaty of Sèvres and they regard the Greeks as primary actors leading to the Ottoman Empire’s fall and annexing their territorial lands. The Turks also regard the Greeks to have “established conspiracy theories painting a world ganging up on them” to have more supporters in their malicious acts. Just as in the time of Renaissance and Enlightenment, the Turks feel they are the “hated other” for Europe, and the Greeks were only reinvented to wipe them off the map.

Greek-Turkish political relations are denoted by a series of ups and downs or, as many like to point out, a “never ending Cold War”. For centuries now, the tentative relationship between Greece and Turkey has been a significant issue among political and military leaders both on a regional and international stage [201, p. 81-100]. However, until now, very little has been attained from these efforts and infrequent shows of goodwill, even though both parties are committed to an eventual settlement and reconciliation [158].

The Greek-Turkish conflict is often attributed to borders' disputes, especially the Aegean disputes and national identity concerns with the highest order's political wills [158]. It illustrates the path to eventual rapprochement is far-fetched but a definite opportunity worth pursuing. The Greek-Turkish conflict continues drifting on with exceptional abandon despite being ordained by geography to be mutual co-existing neighbors. As Richard Clogg observes, "Greeks and Turks are sentenced by antiquity to be a nemesis, and where antiquity and geography converge, history repeatedly emerges a victor" [157].

In this dissertation, I'll discuss how the prolonged conflict between Turkey and Greece could lead to dismemberment of NATO, financial and political destruction, the risk of the EU engaging in the conflict, or partly engaging in the conflict or not participating at all, the involvement of other nations such as China, the Russian Federation, and Arab countries and the impact to the global power shift.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) primary and enduring role is safeguarding all its members' freedom and security through political, military, and other acceptable social components. Collective defense is the Alliance's foundation, and it establishes the spirit of solidarity and cohesion in its member states [246]. According to Carpenter (2020), the North Atlantic Treaty's heart is based on Article 5, which asserts that an attack or approach on any member states of the Alliance will be regarded as an attack on all other member states [79]. The primary assumption is that any move towards a member state would necessitate a collective response to repel and dismantle the aggressor. However, that assumption would not hold if two NATO members clashed against each other. Firstly, establishing which state or country was the aggressor and which one was attacked could prove quite problematic to understand [79]. Since the onset of NATO, the significant risk of an intra-alliance dispute has often encompassed the Greece-Turkey disputes.

When Greece and Turkey both became NATO's members in 1952, they did so on the premise of the alliance members' assumption that the two nations' signatory of the Treaty would pacify their aggressive behavior towards each other [101]. However, their admission into the Alliance did not erase the centuries of animosity between these two nations. According to Carpenter (2020), Ankara (Turkey's capital) and Athens (Greece's capital) had almost come to war on multiple instances, such as when Turkey invaded majority-Greek Cyprus in 1974 and advanced to rule over 40% of the island while expelling the Greek Cypriots from the island. The Turks' occupation and the rule on the island continue to this day, much to the annoyance of both political leaders from both sides as it threatens their national identity [79].

NATO finds itself in an awkward situation where two of its members are automatic allies. They are in constant suspicion of each other, and war is not always far from the surface. Dempsey (2020) posits an interesting question, "how to broker the two nations without inclining to a side?" which drives NATO to near dismemberment or to paralysis processing the probable answer. NATO's primary aim as an organization is to ensure its members' collective defense on the prerequisite of its founding Washington Treaty - safeguarding the territorial integrity of its member states against encroachment from other countries and non-state actors. Any action of superior members such as the US, France, Germany, and likes to take sides on this issue threatens more to dampen NATO's existence or superiority. It is essential to note that the Washington Treaty was not established to adjudicate conflicts between its members. Therefore, it is no surprise that NATO nears dismemberment over the prolonged Greece-Turkey conflict [101].

In 1974 when Greece and Turkey almost entered into a war over Cyprus, it was not NATO that acted to prevent the hostilities from imminent war, but it was one of its influential member involvement, the United States of America. During this possible war, the U.S. inclined heavily on the contenders to assume confrontation and induce a ceasefire on Turkish forces entering Cyprus. In 2020, the Eastern Mediterranean's escalating issues

that encompass many local and external actors posed a threat to NATO dismemberment [101]. France has decided to choose sides (joining Greece's naval exercises), while Germany has opted to guide the diplomatic efforts (D.W., 2020) with clear, trustworthy, and unbiased American support [113]. The U.S. has opted for a lower profile than the one they adopted in 1974, putting more pressure on NATO's future. Therefore, Turkey's exploration of the Mediterranean Sea for natural resources outside of Turkey's EEZ threatens to disturb peace in the region and blur NATO's future. It illustrates the restrictions of the Alliance as a moderator of strategic national concerns and identity. Lack of clear leadership in NATO and Turkey's aggressive approach, such as purchasing the Russian S-400 missile defense systems, continues to cause havoc within NATO.

Multiple lesser but still desperate incidents have been observed over the years. For instance, Turkish military planes persistently abuse Greek airspace, with Athens sending its fighter jets to intercept and neutralize the Turks' planes. Although nothing concrete has happened so far, the rapidly rising tensions between these two nations, mostly due to maritime disputes over oil and other natural resources, could bring the nightmare to the surface. As Germany's Foreign Minister Heiko Maas once said, "Fire is being played with, and any slight spark could initiate a catastrophe". The Cyprus situation also implies what Washington's response would be to the outbreak of another Greco-Turkish war. With crucial allies such as Italy and France not being happy with President Erdogan's unorthodox governance, any chance of war poses a danger to NATO dismemberment [79]. Although NATO established a military de-confliction mechanism between these two nations later last year, it includes establishing a hotline between Greece and Turkey to ensure de-confliction at sea or in the air; the rising tensions imply a possible NATO's dismemberment [247].

According to Gürsoy (2018), Greece and Turkey have never been in an actual war since the 1920s. It is expected the hostilities and war of words would persist for some period but short of a real war. Both nations are aware that any form of encroachment on

the mainland of the enemy would yield significant impact and other socio-economic effects with the probable involvement of NATO allies. A catastrophe of this magnitude would have dire consequences to the financial and political structure in both Greece, Turkey, and the rest of the world [151].

In the past decades, the “globalization” aspect has become the most prevalent term when describing the global village’s economic, political, and social factors. The conventional established realm of diplomacy, limited to exchanges between state officials, is now increasingly paving the way to modern, new complicated kinds of interaction whereby economic actors and political leaders vie to influence to advance their motives. The quest for economic development, especially on the financial front, has recently been a defining feature for Greece and Turkey’s economies. For instance, the post-1949 stable financial environment availed Greece’s right conditions, leading to rapid development. However, the 1974 cold war led to the oil crisis and inflation, deteriorating balance of payments, decrease in foreign currency inflow, and unemployment. However, Greece’s membership in the European Union has seen the adoption of more advanced economic reforms to start redeveloping. On the other side, the Turks have adopted the etatism principle for their economic policymaking. Following financial globalization, the Turkish economy had expanded rapidly in the early 2000’s as capital accounts had been liberalized due to the massive inflow of foreign direct investments.

Moreover, bilateral trade between Greece and Turkey has yielded a positive financial correlation for the past decades. At the onset of 2008, around 80 Greek companies were operating in the Turkish market through direct investments and synergies with Turkish investors mainly from Qatar, especially after acquiring Turkey's fifth-largest bank, Finansbank, by the National Bank of Greece [310, p. 39-57].

However, the possible war between these nations would imply the loss of all these trade proceeds, which can significantly hamper their economies. Moreover, the Eastern Mediterranean's natural resources such as oil and hydrocarbons have a significant financial

impact on Greece and Turkey trading partners and NATO allies. A scenario of a possible war would imply similar financial consequences to these partners and NATO allies.

Political destruction is also on the cards regarding a continued and possible conflict between Turkey and Greece. According to Rodríguez (2020), the drums of new diplomatic and political conflict sound louder across Eastern Mediterranean. Both Greece and Turkey will suffer politically, as well as other international actors will suffer. Continued conflict over massive natural-gas deposits in Aegean and Cyprus is becoming highly militarized and poses leadership challenges for the EU and NATO. Periodic shifts of allies in both the EU and NATO may affect the political structure of Europe as different Allies compete for superiority [276].

An article posted in the New York Times on August 27, 2020, by Steven Erlanger, titled “Rising Tensions between Turkey and Greece Divide E.U. Leaders” significantly illustrate the EU’s position in the Greece and Turkey conflict. Given the U.S. current stance and absence in lead negotiations, the deep involvement of the three EU member states – Greece, Cyprus, and France – would be induced to a crisis within Europe in case of a conflict. The Greece and Turkey rivalry is unfolding against a significant backdrop of the EU. The peace period between Athens and Ankara between the 1990s to 2000s was due to the outcome and need of Turkey’s EU accession vision. It was the primary idea behind the Turkish government inclination for the United Nations (U.N.) blueprint to advance a referendum in Cyprus in 2004 on the island's unification. Despite this, Turkey’s EU accession plan has long come to an embargo, which continues to affect Turkish relations with Greece and Cyprus [97].

As Germany attempts to mediate with soft hands on Turkey due to the countries’ strong financial partnership, other EU members – France, Greece and Cyprus – assert the EU’s position with military support on Cyprus by encompassing ships and planes off the Cypriot coast. While France, Greece, and Cyprus want a strict line drawn, Germany, Spain, and Italy prioritized a conciliatory approach. Therefore, if the EU risks participating in the

Greece-Turkey conflict, it risks disunity among its leaders even if it would curtail the rivalry. If the EU enters the conflict, the move could dampen Turkey's accession into the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum to bring about other future conflicts. If the EU decides not to enter the negotiation process, war could be on the horizon, which will undoubtedly impact its allies' members and the Alliance itself. Partial involvement of the EU would induce Turkey to materialize the threat of releasing about four million refugees and migrants it houses to Europe and pursue the "Blue Homeland" nationalistic idea. According to Erlanger (2020), due to Turkey's inclination to aggressive and nationalist approach, many observers observe that the EU would differently approach the EU relationship with the nation that remains a strategic NATO ally that threatens the sovereignty of another NATO member, a trading associate that blackmails the EU with opening up the borders to the migrants to enter Europe and an on-paper candidate to join the EU.

According to Dalay (2021), a thwarting and frozen dispute always provide an opportunity for other actors and enthusiast nations such as China, Russia, and Arabian countries to step in and gain more influence in the European backyard [97]. Pierini (2020) posits that since the establishment of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, new actors such as China, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey have taken significant steps, directly or through associates, to present their interest in the Eastern Mediterranean Basin [267]. Despite the EU and its most affected states by the geopolitical developments in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea – Greece, Cyprus, France, and Italy – remaining optimistic of a resolution, as are the U.S. and NATO from a security dimension, new power struggles are set to be advanced in Europe and the rest of the world, especially in the Middle East.

In the years, China and Russia have forged solid relationships, especially at the U.N. Security Council. Although Moscow and Ankara do not converge on many policies, a Greece-Turkey conflict can ignite a relationship that would serve strategic short-term aspirations. Both Russia and Turkey continue to boost their military presence, being

“friends” in a conflict and “foes” in another. For instance, Russia has established the Hmeimim airbase and Tartus naval center in Syria, while Turkey is trying to establish the Al-Watiya air force base and Misurata port [267]. Also, America and Europe’s unwillingness to act as enforcers and leaders of global issues in the Middle East could exacerbate power shifts. The U.S. uses proactive diplomacy to address Middle Eastern issues. According to Heistein et al. (2021), Washington’s primary aim in the Middle East has been to restrict Chinese and Russian impact [156]. It explains why the U.S. has in the past sided with Turkey to help drift away from Russia and realize its dream of becoming a Mediterranean energy spot [156].

On the other hand, China targets territorial and maritime claims through its Belt and Road Initiative approach to attain sustainable growth. China is a primary player in the Mediterranean business, virtually through an interest in ports like Piraeus in Greece. With China and Russia relationship improving, while the latter is trying to improve its authority in the Middle East, a possible Greece-Turkey conflict can play to their favor to advance their interest. Arab countries, especially the United Arab Emirates, stand up to gain over oil proceeds in the Greece-Turkey conflict and obtain more power in Europe and the Middle East [156].

Turkey’s politicians of the Republican People’s Party (CHP) frequently issue a threat to seize “18 Greek islands in the Aegean Sea” if they secure a seat in the Turkish parliament while Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has persisted with his aggressive rhetoric like imposing his military in Syria, against NATO and the EU allies. It’s entirely possible that these instances could trigger a third World War. President Erdogan has the urge to revive the Ottoman Empire’s glory days and regain the “lost” lands due to the Treaty of Sèvres and Treaty of Lausanne [77]. With the rising military confrontation along the territorial boards accompanied by global power shifts, there is a chance of a World War brewing under the surface.

East Mediterranean disputes and fight for the Middle East, the nervy EU and NATO leadership, can stir a World War III. France, the U.S., and Germany had initially decided to calm the tensions. Still, with Germany providing war supplies and military technology to Turkey who threatens the EU members with that, and in response Greece investing to acquire modern equipment to defend their territory, that has sparked controversy with Turkey and its sympathizers. Turkey has often threatened to shoot down any UAE fighter jets that are partnering with Greece. Greece, backed up by the majority of EU member states, Egypt, and UAE, has continued to boost its defense capabilities. This conflict encompasses various NATO nations who will inevitably decide to takes sides. Although many signs of war are still not there, it is not unthinkable.

Chapter 2 Conclusions.

Political forces generally demonstrate consensus on the need to maintain sovereignty over island territories and maritime zones. A tough stance on Turkey often becomes part of election rhetoric; national identity and collective historical memory: Greek society relies on historical symbols of the Hellenic-Ottoman confrontation, the cult of independence, and the legal tradition of the EU, which shapes public opinion; economic stability, energy interests, as Greece focuses on exploiting its unique geostrategic position as an EU energy hub and maritime trading nation, which enhances its desire to control maritime corridors

External factors involve geo-energy issues, as new gas fields in the Eastern Mediterranean (Leviathan, Aphrodite, etc.) stimulate resource mercantilism. The sea shelf issue has become economically motivated, not just historically and politically. The external factor is the security risks associated with the militarization of the Dodecanese islands, the active use of the Air Defense and Navy, and the parallel use of “gray areas” of international law. External factors lead to the paradox: both countries are allies, but their conflict threatens the unity of the Alliance; the EU acts as a guarantor of the interests of Greece and Cyprus; a policy of conditionality towards Turkey; the United States is interested in the stability of NATO’s flank, especially due to its proximity to the Middle East; the UN and

the International Maritime Tribunal Platforms are used for the legal settlement of maritime disputes.

Turkey's internal factors are shaped by its position of a strong regional power ("Middle Power Strategy"), and Turkey is striving for regional leadership and expansion of influence in the Eastern Mediterranean, Middle East, North Africa and the Black Sea; the concept of "Mavi Vatan" (Blue Homeland) is defined as a doctrine that expands claims to maritime zones and defines the activities of the fleet as a strategic tool for securing sovereign rights; nationalistic mobilization and presidential leadership; Erdogan's domestic policy enhances the national discourse, making foreign policy issues part of the state's prestige.

Conflict built on symbolic values strengthens internal unity because it creates clear value orientations, unites people around national symbols, and activates civic identity. The conflict also contributes to political stability. In the context of international pressure or economic problems, the strengthening of national rhetoric serves to stabilize the government by shifting attention from internal problems to external dangers.

Through conflict, ideology is strengthened, as it is defined in common narratives and education. School curricula, media discourse, and cultural practices transmit historical and heroic images that strengthen national identity. Ideological consolidation can be achieved through the use of symbols and religion, as monasteries, historical monuments, sacred sites, and folklore become instruments of ideological consolidation and shape a sense of national continuity.

Collective sense of ownership (belonging) and national identity influence the process of reducing tension in the context of escalating confrontation of national interests through the transformation of the occupied territory, development of legislative conditions, rule-making, development of political decisions, integrity of society, development of self-awareness of a responsible citizen, political culture of society, formation of civic identity,

formation of a conscious citizen, responsible citizen, and biased attitude towards other people.

It is suggested that the Turkey-Greece rivalry roams on at a low ebb despite its adverse economic and political effects on both sides, such as armaments, expensive border flights, and the militarization of border boundaries and rearmament of Izmir, costly diplomatic and foreign intermediation process, and capital utilization that could have been utilized for productivity outcomes. The primary factor exploited to advance the conflict between these two great states is through abusing the sense of ownership and the sense of national unity, primarily by politicians from both sides.

Collective Sense of Ownership and National Identity are influenced during conflicts between nations in the context of the aggravation of the confrontation of national interests through the transformation of the occupied territory, the creation of legislative conditions, rule-making, the development of political decisions, the integrity of society, development of self-awareness of a responsible citizen, formation of civic identity and biased attitude towards other people. This is the task of politicians and civil servants, state governments, and civil society as factors development of a democratic society.

CHAPTER 3.

WAYS AND MEANS OF SETTLING THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL CONFLICT BETWEEN GREECE AND TURKEY

Among the ways and means of settling the international political conflict are diplomatic channels and negotiation instruments through formal mechanisms, such as bilateral diplomatic commissions and technical negotiations, such as demarcation of maritime borders, airspace, and search for compromise models; through the International Court of Justice and UNCLOS, Greece is a fan of the legal path; Turkey is critical and has not ratified UNCLOS; through trilateral and multilateral formats – EastMed Gas Forum (Greece, Cyprus, Israel, Egypt, France); through informal and “soft” diplomacy, such as Back-channel diplomacy (contacts through intelligence services and naval commands), public diplomacy and media strategies that develop domestic support; economic and humanitarian ties, including tourism and cultural projects [316].

Structured approach to possible ways of settling the political conflict between Greece and Turkey over the Cyprus issue, taking into account modern diplomatic practice, international law and geopolitical logic of the Eastern Mediterranean, will be considered through a framework understanding of the conflict. The Cyprus issue is simultaneously a territorial conflict (the division of the island between the Republic of Cyprus and the so-called “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus”); a security conflict (the role of the 1960 guarantor states: Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom); an ethnopolitical conflict (the rights of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities); and a geopolitical conflict (Turkey’s status in relation to the EU, Mediterranean energy resources, and the military involvement of the great powers). Therefore, a settlement is possible only through a multi-level approach that combines diplomacy, security guarantees, energy management, and trust mechanisms.

We will identify diplomatic ways of settling the conflict. Resumption of negotiations under the auspices of the UN as the only legitimate negotiation format – UN, the Secretary General’s Good Offices Group, including: further development of the Annan Plan and the Crans-Montana Conference (2017); transition to the “bi-zonal, bi-communal federation” model, which is still the official UN line. We believe that the elements of progress could include an agreed constitutional framework; a clear division of powers between the federal and cantonal levels; and mechanisms for collective decision-making at the federal level (to avoid blocking).

It is possible to return to the 5+1 format. The formula: Greece - Turkey - the two Cypriot communities - the UK + the UN may serve as a basis for solving the problems of guarantees and security again.

The EU as a mediator can help to resolve the issue. The EU’s presence in the negotiations enhances the confidence of the Greek Cypriot side; gives incentives to Turkey in the context of the Customs Union agreement and visa liberalization; and makes it possible to integrate the future settlement into the European regulatory framework.

One of the ways to resolve the conflict is to harmonize the interests of the parties through energy cooperation, through joint development of energy resources in the Eastern Mediterranean. The Leviathan, Aphrodite, Calypso and other energy fields became a catalyst for escalation. The possible formula for conflict resolution is the creation of a Single Energy Consortium of Cyprus with equal rights for the two communities; joint investments in gas production and exports; Turkey's participation in transportation projects, including gas pipeline through its territory, supported by political guarantees.

The conflict resolution will be accelerated by the policy of integration into the EastMed Gas Forum. The Forum brings together Egypt, Israel, Cyprus, Greece, Italy, France, and Palestine. Involving Turkey would reduce its isolation risks and create a platform for stable technical cooperation.

Conflict resolution will be accelerated by a policy of ensuring security ways of settlement based on the example of the 1960 Treaty on Guarantee: reduction or complete withdrawal of Turkish troops from Cyprus; transition from Turkey's "unilateral right of intervention" to a multilateral security mechanism; new guarantees from the EU, UN and OSCE.

It is possible to create a joint commission for the demilitarization of the island. Possible model: establishment of security zones with a gradual reduction of military presence; transition to the "island without heavy weapons" model; strengthening the UNFICYP mission as a monitoring and guarantee instrument.

The resolution of the conflict will be facilitated by a policy of building trust between the communities through economic integration: opening joint industrial and tourist zones; liberalizing the internal movement of people and goods; and moving from parallel economies to complementary ones.

A policy of protecting property rights will boost the resolution of the conflict. One of the most difficult issues is the property of displaced persons. Possible solutions: restitution, where possible; compensation fund with the participation of the EU; agreed transitional mechanisms.

The resolution of the conflict will be accelerated by a policy of expanding joint institutions: mixed committees on education, culture, and the environment; mechanisms for cooperative efforts to combat cyber threats, crime, and human trafficking.

The role of great powers and international organizations could help resolve the conflict. For example, the United States could mediate in energy projects; deter Turkish unilateral steps; and support the modernization of the Cyprus security agreement.

For example, the United Kingdom, as a guarantor state, retains influence; it can offer a new model of guarantees or upgrade its bases.

NATO, for example. Since the two parties are allies, NATO could: develop a mechanism to prevent incidents; ensure the separation of military activities in the air and at sea.

The conflict resolution will be accelerated by the policy of a long-term settlement formula. From the point of view of modern diplomacy, the most realistic model looks as follows: Bi-zonal, Bi-communal Federation (BBF) + International Security Assurances + Energy Consortium + Greece-Turkey Normalization Package. It makes it possible to take into account the interests of both communities; address the issue of military guarantees; integrate energy resources into a common economic interest; reduce the level of confrontation between Athens and Ankara; and bring Turkey closer to European standards.

Resolution of the conflict is possible in today's environment, as evidenced by geopolitical triggers. For example, Turkey is interested in "unfreezing" the dialogue with the EU. The Customs Union, investments, and visa regime are incentives to soften positions. For example, Greece is moving out of a period of stability and can afford a strategic compromise. Athens has a strong international position in the EU and NATO. The energy situation stimulates the search for solutions, as there is a global need for secure gas supplies, which opens a window of opportunity. The U.S. and the United Kingdom are ready for new guarantees in the context of competition with Russia in the Mediterranean.

Thus, settling the Cyprus issue requires a comprehensive approach: from security guarantees and constitutional arrangements to energy partnership and public relations. The most realistic way is a modernized model under the auspices of the United Nations, complemented by a new architecture of trust, economic mutual benefit, and international guarantees.

In one of his famous public speeches "Politics as a Vocation" in 1919, Max Weber asked: "what is the actual sense of political action in the context of a whole manner of life?" [218]. More explicitly, he asked using the phrase *Lebensführung*: what is the sense of political action in respect to the entire approach of life. Weber was interested in

advancing the essence of what is political concerning political action and what is the place of “the politicians” in the proceeding way of social life. His speech raised concerns concerning the function of political institutions, processes, and politicians in contemporary society [218]. Since antiquity, the place of political control and politicians’ actors, or power and authority, has been a vital segment of society. However, politicians’ inner motives and conflicts of interest amongst political leaders and public officials have always sparked animosity between countries or social groups. Politicians have been quick to weaponize citizens’ sense of ownership and sense of national identity to advance conflict with another social group (country) with the ulterior objective of gaining more authority over their people or improving the politicians’ public image

In political science, it is important to identify such features of the conflict as the actions of citizens who feel that politicians are using their sense of ownership and national identity against them or for other hidden motives. In recent years, among other illustrations, we have observed how citizens, in retaliation of politicians’ abuse of national identity and sense of ownership, started the Arab Springs in Tunisia, Libya, and other Arabian nations [218]. The public’s collective response action saw the demolition of long-lasting authoritarian regimes of Ben Ali, Gadhafi, and Mubarak. Therefore, the public has often settled for revolutionary attempts, similar to civil rights movements and revolutions against Jim Crow laws, the American Revolution in 1776, French Revolution in 1789, the Russian revolution in 1917, and the Chinese revolution in 1949. Little and McGivern (2012) posits that (especially with the events leading to the Arab Spring) the public acts started a radicalization in the citizens’ sense of national identity and power: their inner feelings of dignity, pride, rights, and liberties and their ability to act on them.

This thesis aims to outline how the public, through revolution and other methods, adopts when they feel sense their respective politicians are weaponizing their sense of ownership or national identity. I will also explain how to gain insight into situations where politicians are exploiting the sense of ownership of their people and the sense of national

identity to fuel conflict with another social group (or country) with the ulterior motive to gain control over their people or safeguard the politician's public image.

In the formulation of ideas, I'll also address the following points in alignment to this purpose: countries turning authoritarian and what that means for the political leader (e.g., Turkey, China, etc.), what can a person do when they realize that a politician is psychologically abusing them to act, what can a group of people (or a country) do when they know that a politician is psychologically using them to pursue his goals, and what roles can the allies of the country that a politician is leading play. Addressed points also concern examples of modern politicians who are abusing their countries' sense of national identity to their favor, what is the point of return (when a political leader controls a country) for the democratic nations, and what can a nation that is at the receiving end of that aggression do.

Lankester (2007) observes that a handful of Western Europe and other nations have democratized, and their respective governments are held accountable to the public [206]. The people (sovereign) demanded via a ballot box that all elected politicians and any other public officials should act in the public's interest instead of advancing their interest or conflict. In most nations, expectations as to accurate roles of politicians and other public officials have changed over the decades in the inclination of substantial transparency and outlined division between their public roles and private aims. However, most countries within the Western Balkans have started to experience periods of democratic backsliding [208]. The significant backslide has coincided with a rapid surge in far-right populism, authoritarianism, and oppressor politics globally, leading to the dramatic rise of the entire cottage industry. Various literature supports the emergence of autocratic and populist politicians worldwide, from Philippines to the United States, leading to considerable power from seemingly consolidated democracies to hybrid governments or regimes [208].

Ironically, countries that were considered consolidated democracies by scholars and policymakers, essentially derived from Central, Eastern, and Western Europe, such

as Hungary, Czech Republic, and Slovakia, have experienced significant democratic decline under the watch of the European Union (EU) [208]. According to Gienger (2019), authoritarianism has been experienced on the global stage like never before [139]. Du et al. (2020) define authoritarian leadership as a form of ruling that focuses on personal dominance, strong centralized power, and management over subordinates or citizens with unquestioning loyalty or questions [109, p. 3076]. In Brazil, the newly elected President who has always been affiliated to far-right stands, Jair Bolsonaro, deployed about 300 members of the National Police Force to mount violence in a Northeastern state [161].

According to NPR Politics Podcast (2017), Stanford University Professor Larry Diamond laments that it is not only Turkey and China that have observed erosion of democratic government ideals but other various nations across the world [254].

According to Guriev and Treisman (2020), autocrats have often resorted to instilling fear and terrorizing citizens as a primary pillar of support [147]. This practice was rampant even in antiquity, and totalitarians such as Adolf Hitler and Joseph Stalin inclined to advance fear as the direct way to rule. However, recent decades have observed the rise of authoritarians who make pain seem unthreatening. Hungary's Victor Orbán has often presented himself as a typical democratic politician at the expense of consolidating power. In most cases, when these politicians succeed in securing popularity, they do not incline to violence. As Guriev and Treisman (2020) reports, mass repression – when examined – tend to undercut politicians' reputation for public-spirited management [147].

Repression serves to spark citizens' outrage and fear. Where state violence tends to be rampant, few individuals will risk speaking publicly, even in anonymous polls and talks. According to Guriev and Treisman (2020), many natives authentically but incorrectly think the politician is capable and big-hearted in established autocracies [147]. In case such an administration mistakenly advances its repressive ways, indignation may precede fear. Some individuals might regard violent actions such as aberrations and initiate conflict with opposers without thinking about themselves. In other circumstances, citizens may take the

politician's shamming to respect freedom of expression. Guriev and Treisman (2020) report, the net impact of repression on acceptance and reticence is equal to zero in autocracies or even harmful if resentment exceeds fear [147].

Approval and praise of the autocrats often vary depending on the perceived performance. Since governments are universally mandated to advance prosperity, many politicians actively engage in advertising and reassuring their constituents of their economic accomplishments. Generally, performance legitimacy is considered pivotal when procedural legitimacy is absent [147].

All autocracies often have electioneering periods to elect their new leaders. However, politicians often use elections to spread propaganda and enhance clientelistic handouts activity to entice the electorates. Citizens are often unaware of covert tampering hazards and take elections seriously [147].

The Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's win in 2018 meant more new and formidable authority after the constitutional changes implemented in a controversial referendum in 2017. The prime minister spot was abolished, and all powers conferred to the President's office. Moreover, Erdogan ensured the state of emergency advanced after a failed military coup two years earlier was in play to advance his purging political opponents' motives within the administration and society [139]. War and ongoing political abuse of power are significantly associated with substantial levels of trauma and psychological stress [162, p. 9]. According to Hobfoll et al. (2012), psychological abuse of an individual by a politician occurs when the person in authority subjects the citizen to a behavior or action likely to yield psychological trauma such as anxiety and severe depression. Psychological abuse is often perpetrated by politicians who thrive in conducting torture, violence, advancing human rights abuse through legal redress, and spreading propaganda information. However, an individual in this situation often takes some steps when they realize a politician is psychologically abusing them to act, as discussed in the section below [162, p. 9].

According to Gienger (2019), while authoritarian administrations continue to rise, it has periodically been met with some form of “individual agency” in some parts of the world, leading to civic activism and protests [139]. When an individual realizes a politician is using or exploiting a sense of ownership or sense of national identity to attain their ulterior motives – whether actual or perceived – they start to “tighten”. According to Gelfand (2020), in layman’s language, an individual tense their muscles prepared to defend themselves in case of any form of social life disruption. An individual urges and strives for security and order in the immediate community that is nearing disintegration. On the other hand, the politicians satiate this situation by promising fast and simple solutions. Above all, this kind of politician often asserts their commitment to return to the state of normalcy and tighter social order of yesterday [137].

In some nations such as China and Turkey, an individual’s attachment to their country and leader is likely to be a primary factor in determining their psychological abuse response. Gruffydd-Jones (2019), through the social identity theory, explains this reaction is due to some consciousness of an individual’s self-concept, which comes from their membership or affiliation to some social group or politician [146, p. 579-612]. According to the theory, individuals are likely to maintain their leader’s positive image despite being aware they are psychologically being exploited to preserve their self-esteem.

According to Little and McGivern (2012), the primary way a group of people or a country can react to manipulative politicians or administration is by organizing a revolution or a coup d’état [218]. Through collective action of the group of people and countries in the 1960s and 1970s, more than half of all autocrats’ politicians lost their power grip, primarily through a coup. Since antiquity, revolutions have been considered monumental, foundational political actions that happen for the greater good.

The second way a group of people is likely to react to autocrats is through social media. According to Kendall-Taylor, and Frantz (2014), the rise of social media since 2000 has been pivotal in holding politicians accountable [185, p. 35-47]. Since revolts and coups

that could lead to the ouster of a leader are problematic to organize, social media, especially Twitter, remain the best way to express discontent with the government. Social media campaigns are more comfortable organizing through hashtags and creating discussions to tear apart the regime publicly. Even though some dictators are likely to use the social media platforms to their advantage, group of people and the country often find a way to make their discontent available to the public, improving the odds others can join in for their cause to ouster the autocrat [185, p. 35-47].

According to Gruffydd-Jones (2019), a group of people or citizens' attachment to their nation significantly influences how they react to their leader's assumptions or realities of being an autocrat [146, p. 579-612].

According to Brady (2017), an ally plays a crucial role to a politician's country in the future as collaborators in great conflict [68]. Therefore, states can form a strategic partnership with other allies to receive moral and military support if any dispute occurs. This approach essentially tends to reinforce the military depot role, maximize efficacy, and avoid stringent relations resulting in conflict and revolts. For instance, Russia and China are regarded as *de facto* allies because both aim to be global powers by cooperating on contemporary matter. Together, they can address any enemy, either within their countries or outside, to remain in force.

Democratic economies have started to experience a surge in far-right populism and the strongmen governance model. According to Lavrič & Bieber (2021), there has been a distinct consolidated democracy decline in various parts of the world, even in Central and Southeastern Europe [208, p. 17-26]. The point of no return for democratic countries occurs when democratic institutions function only in form, but not in essence. It is accredited to electoral, legislative, criminal justice models, media, and any pivotal societal component being heavily associated with a politician, characterized by a significant function of informal politics that exceeds acceptable democratic institutions. Also, the point of no

return is attained when a politician ensures the success of constitutional amends, such as eliminating the presidential term limit to run for indefinite terms.

According to D. Caspersen (2015), “Conflict can be both useful and unavoidable. Destructive conflict is neither” [82]. Dana Caspersen, the author of “Changing the Conversation – The 17 Principles of Conflict Resolution”, acknowledges that conflict can be useful. Since the conclusion of the Cold War, the world has significantly transformed within a decade. The National Research Council (2000), highlights that although the old system has elapsed and made it easier to pinpoint the changes, it is not yet established that a new system has emerged. Antiquity patterns have come unstuck, and if recent changes are materializing, it is a bit earlier to define and assess them. The National Research Council (2000) acknowledges the catalog of possible epoch-making alterations that are observable by now, including the conclusion of an era coupled with bipolarity, new democracies uprising, the prevalence of globalization strengthened by information and economic power, and periodical tasks at international coordination of security reforms [246]. Also, strings of sometimes-aggressive assertions of claims to rights established on cultural identity and a revisiting and exploitation of sense of national identity and ownership towards the owned land and people’s identity by leaders to take advantage of their citizens and the world community have been observed in the new system.

Political conflicts are treated and addressed as threats to international peace and security, even when the rival nations are not at war. Whether they occur within their borders, such as violations of human rights and democratic governance, or outside their borders, such as border wars and maritime rivalry, they are treated as a threat to international peace. Perfect examples include the recent genocide in Rwanda, ethical cleansing experienced in Bosnia, coup d'état events in Haiti, in the Ottoman Empire’s collapse, through and before the Greek-Turkish war, and Ukraine-Russia conflicts [246].

The Turkish-Greek Conflict is a practical instance of a protracted conflict, which has exhibited to be notoriously repellent to resolution, despite all significant efforts that have

been advanced to solve it. Various renowned politicians, civil society organizations, international organizations, powerful allies, and notable peace-making entities have attempted to solve these two nations' conflicts for prolonged periods. The two nations, overloaded with a unique and problematic common history, were accepted to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1952 as Cold War strategic peace-making move. However, conflicts erupted almost immediately [293, p. 3-85].

In political science, it is important to suggest practical conflict resolution methods and working theories in the scenario of a possible political/military conflict between Greece and Turkey where the leaders of both countries have used the sense of ownership and national identity to advance war. Specifically, we'll aim to outline some of the conflicting situations that keep these two nations at odds, a "perfect peace" situation where both sides win, and respect to the international laws by both parties. Moreover, we will examine the theory of socio-cultural evolutionism in the context of resolving the conflict between Turkey and Greece, tools that the people of both countries could use to resolve a potential conflict situation to preserve peace and cooperation, as well as tools that the allies of both countries could use to prevent a possible conflict from escalating.

The first conflict arose from bloody and aggressive intercommunal wars in the colonial and independent sovereign state of Cyprus between the 1950s and 1960s. It prompted the establishment of a special UN-peacekeeping mission (UNFICYP) in 1964, intending to manage the "Green Line" separating the island into two sections [293, p. 3-85]. The pogrom of Istanbul Greeks minorities in 1955 and subsequent expulsion of Greeks nationals from Turkey lands in 1964 prompted the events of a drastic decrease of the Greek minorities residing in Turkey.

According to H. Shelest and M. Kapitonenko (2017), the Turkish military invasion of Cyprus as a guarantor of independence in 1974 led to Turkey's occupation of the northern part of the island, and a fake state was created in this part, which is still recognized only by Turkey [293, p. 3-85]. Turkey does not recognize the Republic of Cyprus's sovereignty

over the entire island of Cyprus, therefore conflict resolution efforts between the two parts have been stalled [150]. The rise of Aegean maritime disputes in the 1970s to 1980s regarding the Greek continental shelf's size expanded with extra dimensions in 1996 after the Imia/Kardak area has often suggested incoming conflict. It prompted the Turkey government to issue a *Casus Belli* if Greece attempts to enlarge its territorial waters to 12 nautical miles in the sea by following the UNCLOS.

Political expectations have been high concerning resolving the Cyprus crisis. However, from 2015 to 2017, the efforts turned into a sound defeat to mediators, especially the European Union (EU). The presidents of both sides have exhibited concerns to resolve their differences and amend any gaps. However, negotiations continue to stall with no imminent solution [293, p. 3-85].

The action from describing the world to prescribing for it establishes international law foundations [276, p. 65-80]. As explained in 1950 by Hersch Lauterpacht, a renowned international law scholar, the purpose of international law is to guide “to improving the stability of international peace, to protection of the right of man, and to minimize any evils and abuses of nationalism”. According to Cornell Law School (2019), international law comprises rules and principles guiding the relations and dealings of nations amongst themselves, the relationship between the states and individuals, and the relationship between international entities [92]. International law encompasses basic, classic aspects of law in national legal models, i.e., charters, property law, tort law, among others. It also contains substantive and procedural rules, due process, and remedies [214].

According to international lawyers and advocates, the establishment and implementation of universal rules of conduct for nations imply conquering double cardinal problems: how to make principles of law legitimate in the diverse community of nations and how to make them solid in the absence of anyone sovereign ruler or international enforcement method [276, p. 65-80]. The end of the Cold War signaled improvement of international law through the strengthening of international institutions, judicial bodies,

and treaties such as the UN, International Court of Justice (commonly referred to as the World Court), General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Also, it leads to the establishment of global and regional treaties and organizations such as the Convention on the Prohibition of Anti-Personnel Mines and the North American Free Trade Agreement to scrutinize states' actions concerning the objective measure [276, p. 65-80].

International law is regarded as binding, but often it lacks enforcement approaches to resolve conflicts; it has only a restrictive effect. International law is often induced in a post-conflict situation, although its instruments to attain successful resolution are relatively rare and restrictive in scope [214]. The present-day conflict between Turkey and Greece mainly hinges territorial and sovereignty disputes, especially in the Mediterranean Sea. Although no direct military attack has been advanced in the area, empty threats, military buildup, issuance of *Casus Belli*, and few dangerous events leading to casualties have been observed. The asymmetric nature of conflict has often played a role in the Turkey-Greece Conflict. The militarily stronger player is constantly defending its power and interests, while the militarily weaker player often advocates for international legal settlement and international assistance. Greece, regarded as the weaker player in a possible military standoff with Turkey in this asymmetric conflict, has often championed international law and successfully managed to create alliances, friendships and take advantage of a positive agenda in the area of diplomacy. Greece's status quo is heightened by the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the Treaty of Lausanne, which allowed it to extend its territorial waters up to 12 nautical miles. Turkey has often disputed this status quo and is one of the few countries that has never consented to membership or accession to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea [293, p. 3-85].

Dyke (2005) presents some international governing laws and treaties tried in Turkey and Greece over the years [114, p. 63-117]. For example, according to the Treaty of London dated May 17-30, 1913, the Ottoman Empire ceded Crete to Greece and agreed to allow

the major European powers to rule over the Aegean. Later on, the greater powers communicated their ruling to the Hellenic Royal Government (Greece). The Ottoman Empire of the time did not want to recognize their decision to divide the islands until the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. The Montreux Convention of 1936 that restructured the regime, guiding passage rights through the Turkish straits led to the Paris Treaty of peace in 1974 to resolve World War II. Turkey did not get involved in this treaty. The UN Law of the Sea Convention dated December 10, 1982, was ratified by 157 countries and not signed or ratified by Turkey, who thinking of their interests, detested the agreement [114, p. 63-117].

The Article 121 of the UN Conventions on the Law of the Sea defines distinctions between islands, configured to all maritime zones, and rocks configured to territorial seas and contiguous zone in case the coastal State consents. However, the actual worry for Turkey is not necessarily what configured islands have, but rather their influence in maritime delimitation. Turkey accepts the fact that islands do create maritime zones. For instance, regarding the territorial seas' delimitation, the primary law (in Article 15 of the UN Conventions on the Law of the Sea and within customary law) is the median line, unless specific situations require an adjustment. Turkey wants to benefit from this legislation interpretation and observes that islands necessitate a "specific situation" [136].

However, the "specific situation" is worsened by the mention of delimitation of the continental shelf and the EEZ, wherein void of any workable law in articles 74 and 83 of UN Conventions on the Law of the Sea, leads to other case-laws used by international courts and tribunals. Greece asserts international law is clear regarding continental shelf and the vast majority of the UNCLOS parties that attended the convention, specifically UNCLOS tenets, which Turkey disagrees with. According to Turkey, UNCLOS is not a foundation of international law and should only be regarded as a mere treaty between two nations. Turks often selectively reference other international court and arbitral rulings,

including “wrongly located UK islands” between the United Kingdom and France in the English Channel, to support their point [51].

According to Gavouneli (2020), the yardsticks established for an eventual refresh of Turkey and Greece’s preliminary talks are primarily political than legal. However, both parties agree solving their differences may require an international judicial ruling. So, how do these two nations respect international law to attain peace and stability? [136]

Respect to a well-informed international law would ensure mutual usage of the sea east of the East Greek Aegean Islands and enable passage rights that can be beneficial to all nations. Both sides could exercise navigation rights, cooperation to resource exploration, environmental safeguarding, and enjoying international trade.

Sociocultural evolutionism theory tends to explain significant changes that cultures and societies experience over time. According to Tivel (2012), sociocultural evolution focus on how the structural reorganization is impacted through time, leading to an establishment of a form or structure, which is subjectively divergent from the traditional format [308]. Through different periods, human beings tend to learn various social behaviors through social and environmental interaction. Societies are based on complicated social environments, i.e., with freely available resources and limitations, and acquaint themselves with these settings. Therefore, as sociocultural evolutionism theorists assert, change is inevitable for all societies.

According to Creanza et al. (2017), human cultural traits that include behaviors, ideologies, and technologies often learned or acquired from another person often show some signs and changes of transmission and evolution [94, p. 7782-7789]. Various models and theories have been formed under sociocultural evolutionism to foster an understanding of these changes. Enlightenment and late thinkers suggested that societies often advance through certain social and cultural stages (stadial). According to Hodacs and Persson (2019), societies usually start as primitive and progress towards an aspect we can equate to industrial Europe [163, p. 100-114].

Early authors of sociocultural evolution theories such as Adam Smith and John Miller asserted that any societies must observe four social and culture stages: hunting and gathering, pastoralism, agriculture, and engagement in trading activities. The Industrial Revolution and the rise of capitalism are accredited to continual evolutions and societal changes to cope with environmental changes. For instance, industrialization, coupled with intense political change, induced the French Revolution of 1789 and democracies' rise. However, Greece's ascendancy to capitalism and trading with Britain during the industrial revolution served to start more conflicts with the Ottomans, who were obsessed with agriculture. The Ottoman Empire observed significant economic and social decline in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, leading to its downfall.

Edward Burnett Tylor and Herbert Spencer asserted societies transform in three main stages: savagery, barbarism, and civilization. Sometimes, it could be more to distinguish a "primitive culture" and a "civilized culture". According to Spencer and Auguste Comte, a society is likened to an organism subjected to mandatory growth – from simplicity to difficulties, from disorder to order, from generalization to itemizing, and from flexibility to institutions. According to Perrin (2012), Spenser argued against government participation as he believed the society should align with individual freedom [263, p. 1339-1359]. He used two concepts of military and industrial processes to show how human beings evolve and cope with their surroundings. Military culture (primitive one) had an aim of conquest and defense, adopts a centralized method of governance, and often induces the good of a group over one person's benefit. Also, this kind of society uses force and repression, appreciates loyalty and obedience, and induces compulsion. This kind of community can be used to depict the classical Ottoman Empire [263, p. 1339-1359].

On the other hand, industrial society's primary goal is production and trade, adopts the decentralized mode of governance, links with different cultures through commerce, minimal self-restraint, manage social life through voluntary actions, and appreciates innovation, creativity, and independence. This kind of society can be used to describe early

Greek civilization. Therefore, a military transformation to an industrial society is a sociocultural evolution model [263, p. 1339-1359]. When these two societies collide, conflicts and tensions are bound to arise as each struggle for survival and weeding out those who do not keep up. However, globalization and technology have significantly influenced social and cultural change in modern societies.

However, the most relevant section of sociocultural evolution theory to our topic is the role of war in developing states and societies. In his article “A theory of the origin of the state” Robert Carneiro suggests that modern societies are likely to compete against each other given the scarce availability of resources [78, p. 733-738]. The losing group is expected to resort to moving out of the locality conquered by the victor or be killed. Therefore, as societies expand more, the threat and possibility of extinction become even more a reality. It induces the community to strengthen its internal organization to remain decisive and manage its population while scaring its enemies [78, p. 733-738].

Carneiro’s thoughts can be induced in understanding the role of war in aspects of political, social, or cultural evolution between Greece and Turkey. Both Greece and Turkey have strived to develop and expand more to provide stability to their citizens and borders and survive conflicts. Since war significantly induces nations to adapt in a step-wise process, various military technological development requires comparable growth and development in their politics and society. Turkey and Greece have constantly flexed their military weapons and technologies, especially over the Aegean Sea, to prove their capabilities to protect their citizens and win over “disputed lands”. According to Diamond (1997), conflict and warfare are probable reasons why Europeans conquered many global states. Innovative societies often eliminated societies that failed to become creative [104].

As politicians from both Turkey and Greece sides have various constructs of the costs and benefits of specific aspects of culture, there is a conflict over culture establishment. Social elements and ideologies are advanced as general cultural levels induced by explicit processing leading to regulation and motivating behaviors based on historical contexts and

predispositions. Society ideologies are most intimately connected with other social controls but are reasonably and psychologically unconventional from social rules. Therefore, the power of explicit processing over actions, conflict theory forecasts that conflicts over culture will be fierce [104].

Caspersen (2015) posits, “you cannot change how other people act in a conflict, and mostly you cannot change your situation. However, you can change what you do” [82]. Caspersen (2015) continues by asserting any citizen can change conversations to resolve surrounding conflicts [82]. In a UN Security Council in 2019, the UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres observed, “conflict prevention and mediation are two most significant tools available to reduce and get rid of human suffering. Guterres also asserted, “when we proactively act early, and we are in unity, we can successfully address conflicts and crisis from escalating, saving lives, and minimizing suffering” [316]. At a conference held at the University of California, Irvine, to discuss the role of citizens’ peacebuilding in conflict resolution, it was observed that conflicts take decades or even centuries to resolve. From the conference, all participants affirmed that their respective politicians always take the initiative to attain peace without consulting them [135]. The National Research Council (2000) asserts unofficial efforts by citizens outside the government in a multilevel peace action are progressively becoming successful in various multilevel peace attainment processes [246].

Caspersen (2015) presents 17 principles that could ensure the success of three tools of conflict prevention and mediation [82]. Facilitating listening and speaking, changing the conversation, and looking for ways ahead are the three tools this paper would focus on regarding citizens from either side in tackling conflict scenarios. Facilitating the listening and speaking method is crucial in understanding all insights and factors associated with a potential conflict before taking any action. Technological innovations such as social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter can offer an avenue for citizens from both sides to listen and speak about the impending conflict. According to Caspersen (2015), it does not

matter if individuals dislike the other party's ideology or do not have faith in their reasoning capacity. What matters is gaining knowledge about what an effective solution might look like to change the narrative. Caspersen (2015) advises citizens should take a step to move from certainty to inquiry to find out what is happening [82].

“Do not attack. Listen for what is behind the words,” is the first principle in conflict prevention and mediation that Caspersen (2015) advocates [82]. Hearing what the other population determines is what we hear and experience and paves the way for a solution. Since politicians tend to exploit their citizens’ sense of ownership and sense of national identity, focusing on the “why” to a conflict can be crucial for both Greek and Turkish citizens avoiding a confrontation. According to Caspersen (2015), both citizens should then resist the urge to attack each other [82]. Instead, they should strive to change the conversation from the inside. Also, it will be crucial that both sides’ citizens to talk to the other person's best self. Since both Greeks and Turks are affected by what is under dispute and conflict, the conversation between them is important to understand each other perspective. Through listening and speaking, both citizens can differentiate their needs, interests, and strengths while acknowledging each other emotions and agreement.

Caspersen (2015) asserts looking for ways forward remains pivotal in preventing any conflict from enhancing peaceful co-existence and stability. Therefore, both citizens from either side should acknowledge their nations’ conflict and attempt talking to the right people such as peace-making entities and civil societies about the problem [82]. Caspersen (2015) advises both citizens should disregard undiscovered options existence and seek solutions from people of individual willing to support such as UN Security Council, EU, NATO, and peace-making commissions. Thereafter, it is pivotal to be explicit about pacts and when they change. Also, both citizens should plan for future conflict and any mitigation measures. As Caspersen (2015) asserts, conflict is a place of possibility. Therefore, we should change the conversation as citizens to avoid politicians’ exploitation of our sense of national identity and sense of ownership [82].

Over the years, powerful and influential countries such as France, Italy, UK and the majority of EU and NATO members have supported Greece. Turkey occasionally also enjoys the support of other global powers such as Russia, Iran and Pakistan. Other nations such as the US and Germany have acted in good faith to ensure a conflict does not erupt between these two endowed nations. However, in the past periods, these allies, among other countries, made various attempts to solve the Greece-Turkey conflict to no avail. However, their participation has been pivotal in preventing further conflicts and war.

For instance, in conjunction with other third-parties such as the UN, the EU, and NATO, the US has attempted to use various tools to bring these two nations to an accord. For instance, during the Imia/Kardak conflict, the US used its personnel and initiatives to address the crisis. It led to the establishment of a peacekeeping UNFICYP mission to handle any confrontations. Also, the US established hotlines, transparency of military exercises, and advancement of military building measures. The US, the UN, the EU, and NATO have also sent top-level diplomats and non-governmental organizations to disputed areas between the two nations. Other allies have primarily other peacekeeping tools over the years. For instance, the operational prevention tool ensures the establishment of standards to prevent a crisis by monitoring and surveillance to detect and address any abnormalities and use preventative diplomacy. The allies often resort to tools such as using economic sanctions and military force [228].

The National Research Council (2000) advance a “power politics” strategy that allies can use to prevent any conflict between Turkey and Greece [246]. Under power politics, various tools to maintaining peace in the area include threats of force, defensive alliances, economic sanctions, bargaining as a tradeoff of interests, and power mediation. Power politic tools have been in use since the Cold War with much success. According to National Research Council (2000), allies often prevent or address any conflict by advancing threats of armed force (deterrence, coercive diplomacy, and defensive alliances such as NATO and the EU) [246].

Also, allies often settle for economic sanctions and other tangible non-military warnings and punishments, including withdrawal of foreign aid, establishing direct military forces to guard demilitarized zones, and pronouncing ending ties with the fighting nations. Economic sanctions to the perpetrator of a conflict between Turkey and Greece will induce both to negotiate over the frame of International Law and resolve their issues [246]. The EU has already threatened to impose sanctions on Turkey if it does not halt its offshore energy in the Eastern Mediterranean Greek waters [261]. Lastly, allies can settle for power mediation tools to influence Turkey and Greece to behave in a dimension that would advance their common interests while solving their power imbalances and issues [246].

While both nations are significantly suspicious of each other, their leaders have often exhibited efforts to attain some agreement. Both countries have advanced unilateral goodwill proposals and plan to acquire peaceful resolution. For instance, both governments have subscribed to confidence-building measures such as reducing the number of military exercises, allowing direct communication medium between their chiefs of staff, continuous ports' visit, shared maneuvers, and navigation of aircraft unarmed over their lands [228].

In 1997, a bilateral meeting between Turkish President Demiral and Greek Prime Minister Simitis held in the US led to the formation of the Madrid Joint Declaration. The Declaration aimed to address their differences, organize principles and approaches by which they would attain peaceful reconciliation, and commit to respect and appreciate each other sovereignty. Between 1993 to 1995 and in 1999, both of these nations engaged in bilateral negotiations touching commerce, economic issues, tourism, environmental conservations, illegal immigration, drug trafficking, culture, and terrorism. It led to the signing of nine agreements fostering bilateral cooperation [228]. As already discussed in this chapter, between 2002 and 2016, there have been 60 meetings between Turkey and Greece, although no cooperative agreement was attained.

The political process of resolving the conflict between two rivals is “a cat and mouse game”, occasioned by proposals, retreats, cooperation, threats, stagnation, among other issues. Although both leaders have met on several occasions and pledged to solve their problems, their actions often betray their meetings. However, as Hacaoglu and Tugwell (2020) observe, Cyprus, disputed waters at the Eastern Mediterranean, Aegean Sea disputes, and minorities issues remain hurdles for attaining “perfect peace”, alongside a sense of ownership and nationalism harbored by both sides [150].

It is reasonable to propose a new approach to conflict analysis, taking into account elements of ownership and national identity, and to present conflict transformation as a strategy for resolving the conflict between Turkey and Greece. Conflict transformation can enable separation of what’s mine and what is yours between Turkey and Greece, ensure better partnerships, and induce them to respect international laws. Conflict transformation starts with the main goal: to achieve constructive change out of the energy generated by tension or conflict. It focuses on human aspects by reaffirming the parties to a conflict of the compatible nature about their needs at the expense of stating their opposing interests. Also, this method views a conflict as a potentially positive and productive process instead of being negative or destructive. Besides seeking to attain peace, conflict transformation transforms the primary causes of the conflict. It can be used to tackle a range of conflicts at micro, meso, and macro (global) levels [246].

According to the National Research Council, political conflict transformation implementation occurs through its three tools: problem-solving workshops, alternative dispute resolution, and reconciliation by truth commissions [246].

A practical problem-solving workshop is a political tool for resolving an international conflict. It is an exploratory session that helps opposing parties gain knowledge on root causes of dispute, generate ideas to solve it, reassess other views to ensure their robustness, and draw up a plan to test or implement the resolution. It is appropriate for conflicts at the macro level, as it helps to establish visions of peace before formal meetings occur, helps to

overcome problems during negotiations, and establish supportive dynamics in both nations to sustain peaceful relations once legal processes start. Therefore, the problem-solving workshop is a laboratory for conflict assessment and planning. It enables negotiators to understand each country's political needs and various needs associated with the prevailing conflict to chart a better course forward.

Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) is another political tool for resolving an international conflict that can be used to settle the Turkey-Greece conflict. However, Greece can be hesitant to accept this tool as it involves attaining resolution without litigation. Nevertheless, through mediation, arbitration, and other methods, ADR can prove practical in solving the Turkey-Greece Conflict. The EU has used ADR, especially mediation tool, under EU directive 2008/52/EC (Uysal, 2021). NGOs can also play a pivotal role in ensuring the success of this tool.

The establishment of truth commissions is one of the political tools for resolving international conflict. It was particularly effective with conflicts arising after the Cold War period. The commission often establishes a shared understanding of history that forms foundations for emotional reconciliation, tension depreciation, and setting a more cooperative political environment. According to National Research Council (2000), creating truth commissions exhibit a positive aspect of a peace accord that induces conflicting parties (or one of the players) to consent to peace. Also, this tool tends to defuse recent conflicts by enabling conflict transformation. Qualified and competent commissions can also advance unbiased reforms hinged on both international laws and both nations' laws to prevent conflict through structural prevention [246].

One of the primary approaches to conflict resolution between Greece and Turkey involves a renewed commitment to diplomacy and sustained dialogue. Diplomatic channels provide a platform for open communication, negotiation, and the exploration of mutually acceptable compromises [122]. Track II diplomacy, which involves informal channels and non-governmental actors, could complement formal negotiations by

promoting trust-building measures and facilitating discussions on contentious issues. International organizations, such as the United Nations and the European Union, may play a mediating role, encouraging dialogue and providing a neutral space for negotiations [340].

Diplomacy is a political tool for resolving international conflict. As a state-level mechanism, it remains a crucial factor in facilitating communication and negotiations between Greece and Turkey. Both countries must engage in structured diplomatic dialogue to address underlying grievances and seek common ground. Drawing inspiration from classic diplomatic principles [122], open channels of communication must be established and maintained. A commitment to diplomatic discourse enables the cultivation of mutual understanding, an essential component in mitigating the influence of heightened national identity on the conflict. Continuous engagement helps to humanize the “other” in the eyes of both Greeks and Turks, fostering empathy and gradually dismantling the divisive narratives that have long fueled the conflict [47].

A political tool for resolving the international conflict is to encourage Greece and Turkey to use diplomatic channels and negotiate, which is crucial. This process involves open and honest dialogue facilitated by neutral parties or international organizations. Encouraging the acknowledgment of shared historical narratives can help bridge gaps in understanding. Highlighting common historical elements between Greece and Turkey can create a sense of shared heritage, fostering a more cooperative mindset. Promoting cultural and educational exchanges between the two nations can enhance people-to-people connections. This can help break down stereotypes and build a sense of unity based on cultural similarities. Emphasizing shared challenges in the region, such as environmental concerns or economic opportunities, can foster a sense of collective responsibility [47]. This shared belonging can encourage collaboration rather than conflict. Supporting joint economic ventures and partnerships can create interdependence between the two nations. When economic interests are intertwined, both countries have a stake in maintaining

stability and prosperity, reducing the likelihood of conflict. Facilitating cross-border initiatives that involve citizens from both nations can strengthen connections at the grassroots level. This may include joint projects in areas like tourism, environmental conservation, or disaster response. Implementing public diplomacy campaigns can help shape public opinion in both countries. Highlighting the benefits of cooperation and dispelling misconceptions can create a supportive environment for conflict resolution efforts. Encouraging both Greece and Turkey to work together on international platforms, such as addressing global challenges or participating in peacekeeping missions, can foster a sense of shared responsibility and identity on the global stage [340].

Thus, leveraging diplomacy, dialogue, and a sense of shared responsibility and national identity can create a foundation for conflict resolution between Greece and Turkey. By addressing historical grievances, building trust through joint initiatives, and emphasizing commonalities, these methods can contribute to lasting peace and stability in the region.

A political tool for resolving an international conflict is (in addition to official diplomatic efforts) Track II diplomacy involving non-governmental actors [339]. Civil society initiatives, such as joint cultural exchange programs and collaborative projects, have the potential to reshape perceptions of ownership and national identity by promoting shared historical narratives and common cultural elements. Such initiatives provide citizens with the opportunity to challenge entrenched stereotypes, fostering a sense of collective responsibility for the peacebuilding process. Additionally, dialogues involving non-governmental actors, such as academics and civil society organizations, can complement official diplomatic efforts by providing alternative perspectives and fostering people-to-people connections [339].

Track II Diplomacy involves informal, unofficial channels of communication between non-governmental actors. Involving neutral facilitators, academics, or respected individuals from both Greece and Turkey in these dialogues can help establish trust and

foster understanding. Civil society organizations and initiatives can play a mediating role, facilitating dialogue and negotiations between citizens, academics, and representatives from both nations. Neutral platforms can provide a safe space for open discussions. Establishing cross-border networks and forums that involve non-governmental entities, such as think tanks, academic institutions, and grassroots organizations, can encourage collaboration on shared challenges and promote mutual understanding. Civil society initiatives can promote educational exchanges between Greece and Turkey. Programs that bring students, educators, and researchers together foster relationships, break down stereotypes, and build a sense of common purpose. Encouraging people-to-people diplomacy initiatives that involve citizens from both nations can help build connections at the grassroots level. This might include cultural exchanges, joint artistic projects, or sports events that promote positive interactions. Engaging the youth through programs that focus on dialogue, collaboration, and shared activities can help shape a future generation with a more positive and cooperative mindset. Youth involvement is crucial for long-term stability [340].

As a political means of resolving the international conflict, promoting cultural ties through joint cultural festivals, exhibitions, and events can highlight the common elements of Greek and Turkish heritage, fostering a sense of unity. Using media campaigns to highlight stories of cooperation, friendship, and shared history can counter negative narratives. Positive media coverage can influence public perception and contribute to a more supportive environment for conflict resolution. Implementing citizen engagement programs that involve the public in decision-making processes related to conflict resolution can foster a sense of ownership. When citizens feel engaged, they are more likely to support peace initiatives. Creating online and offline platforms for citizens to share their perspectives, concerns, and ideas on conflict resolution can empower individuals and communities. Interactive platforms can serve as a mechanism for inclusive dialogue. Supporting community-based projects that involve citizens in both nations can contribute

to a sense of shared responsibility. Projects related to environmental conservation, disaster response, or social welfare can foster collaboration. Emphasizing the importance of regional cooperation and addressing shared challenges can foster a sense of collective identity. When nations work together on regional issues, it strengthens the idea of shared ownership and responsibility [340].

Thus, Track II diplomacy, civil society initiatives, and a focus on a sense of responsibility and national identity can complement formal diplomatic efforts in preventing conflict between Greece and Turkey. These approaches emphasize dialogue, cooperation, and the building of positive connections among citizens to create a foundation for lasting peace.

A political tool is mediation by an impartial third party, which can provide a structured framework for conflict resolution [55]. International organizations, regional powers, or neutral mediators may intervene to guide negotiations and bridge the gap between conflicting national identities. The United Nations, the European Union, or other regional organizations could play a pivotal role in facilitating dialogue and offering mediation services [55]. Additionally, the utilization of experienced mediators with a deep understanding of the cultural nuances involved can enhance the effectiveness of these efforts [55]. By addressing the concerns of both parties impartially, mediators can foster compromise and help diminish the adversarial sense of ownership that often characterizes protracted conflicts [133].

Involving a neutral third party, such as an international organization, respected mediator, or a team of mediators, to facilitate diplomatic talks between Greece and Turkey can create a balanced and unbiased environment for negotiations. A mediator can propose and oversee confidence-building measures to build trust between the two nations [55]. These measures might include the withdrawal of military forces from sensitive areas, the establishment of communication channels, or joint initiatives to address common challenges. Third-party involvement can bring expertise in international law to the table,

assisting in the resolution of legal disputes and ensuring that negotiations adhere to international norms and standards. Private diplomatic channels provided by third-party involvement can allow for discreet discussions, providing the flexibility necessary for constructive dialogue without the immediate scrutiny of the public or media. Neutral third party can assist in overseeing the implementation of agreements reached during negotiations, ensuring that both Greece and Turkey fulfill their commitments and preventing potential misunderstandings. Mediation can help identify and address the core issues at the heart of the conflict, facilitating discussions on territorial disputes, historical grievances, and other sensitive topics that may be difficult for the parties to navigate directly [133].

As a political tool for resolving an international conflict, the involvement of representatives of both countries in the negotiation process guarantees that different points of view are taken into account. This inclusivity promotes a sense of belonging among citizens who feel their interests and concerns are being addressed. Communicating the progress and outcomes of the negotiation process to the public in both Greece and Turkey is crucial. A transparent and inclusive communication strategy promotes a sense of national unity and belonging to the conflict resolution efforts. Encouraging national dialogues within each country allows citizens to express their opinions, concerns, and aspirations regarding the conflict resolution process. This participatory approach enhances the sense of ownership among the public. Addressing concerns related to cultural heritage and historical identity during negotiations can contribute to a sense of ownership. Ensuring the preservation of cultural sites and recognizing their significance to both nations fosters a shared responsibility. Implementing educational initiatives that promote understanding and respect for the histories and cultures of both Greece and Turkey can contribute to a shared sense of identity [133]. Educational programs can play a role in breaking down stereotypes and promoting mutual respect. Encouraging joint collaborations on projects that benefit both nations, such as environmental conservation, tourism, or economic partnerships,

fosters a sense of shared responsibility and ownership of positive outcomes. Working collaboratively to reframe historical narratives in a way that acknowledges shared heritage and values can contribute to a positive sense of identity. This reframing helps build a foundation for future cooperation [133].

Mediation and third-party involvement, combined with efforts to enhance a sense of responsibility and national identity, constitute a political tool for resolving international conflict. These methods could make a significant contribution to preventing conflicts between Greece and Turkey. Such methods create a framework for constructive dialogue, address core issues, and promote inclusivity and transparency throughout the resolution process.

Addressing the underlying issues related to the sense of ownership and national identity requires a comprehensive approach to conflict transformation. Scholars argue for the importance of identity reconciliation, emphasizing the need for acknowledging and respecting the diverse identities present in the region [46]. Educational programs that promote a nuanced understanding of historical narratives and foster empathy can contribute to breaking down stereotypes and building bridges between communities [212].

Resolution of a political conflict involves addressing its root causes. By conducting a thorough analysis of historical, cultural, and socio-political factors contributing to tensions between Greece and Turkey, a foundation for sustainable resolution can be established. Promoting inclusive dialogue that involves representatives from diverse backgrounds, including ethnic, cultural, and religious groups, allows for a more comprehensive understanding of the identities and perspectives involved. This inclusive approach contributes to identity reconciliation. Facilitating processes that encourage both nations to envision a shared future can be instrumental in transforming the conflict. Building a common vision fosters a sense of unity and reduces the emphasis on divisive historical narratives. Encouraging cultural exchanges and collaborative projects in areas such as arts, education, and sports can create opportunities for people from Greece and Turkey to

connect on a human level. These interactions help break down stereotypes and foster a sense of shared identity [46].

As a political tool for resolving international conflict, the implementation of trauma healing programs for individuals and communities affected by past conflicts can contribute to the process of reconciling identities. Acknowledging historical traumas and addressing their impact fosters a sense of understanding and empathy [46].

A political tool for resolving an international conflict is to involve the public in the conflict resolution process through public meetings, forums, and public consultations, which helps to develop a sense of ownership. Citizens who feel they are part of the decision-making process are more likely to support and embrace the outcomes. Integrating national identity education into school curricula can help shape a more inclusive understanding of shared histories. This educational approach promotes a sense of ownership by empowering individuals to contribute positively to their nation's identity [133].

A political tool for resolving international conflict is the implementation of media and communication strategies that focus on positive narratives and shared values, and foster a sense of national identity. Responsible journalism can play a crucial role in shaping public perceptions and fostering unity [133].

A political tool for resolving an international conflict is symbolic gestures that demonstrate goodwill and a desire for reconciliation. Joint commemorative events, shared memorials, or other symbolic actions can help reshape narratives and foster a sense of shared identity.

Political leaders can play a pivotal role in fostering a sense of national identity that is inclusive and forward-looking. Messages of unity, collaboration, and shared responsibility from political figures contribute to a positive atmosphere for conflict resolution [133].

Promoting economic interdependence through joint economic ventures and trade agreements reinforces a shared interest in stability and prosperity. Economic cooperation

creates tangible benefits for both nations, encouraging a sense of collective ownership [133].

Incorporating methods of conflict transformation and identity reconciliation, as well as focusing on fostering a sense of ownership and national identity, can help make conflict prevention efforts between Greece and Turkey more comprehensive and sustainable. These approaches are aimed at addressing the root causes of the conflict, promoting unity and forming a common vision of the future.

The implementation of confidence-building measures is crucial to create an atmosphere conducive to conflict resolution. Such measures may include cultural exchanges, joint economic projects, and initiatives aimed at building trust between the Greek and Turkish populations. Confidence-building measures have the potential to alter perceptions, humanize the “other,” and contribute to the development of positive intergroup relations [159].

Fostering economic cooperation and interdependence between Greece and Turkey can be a powerful incentive for conflict resolution [91]. Joint economic ventures, trade agreements, and shared infrastructure projects contribute to a sense of shared ownership, emphasizing the mutual benefits of peaceful relations [186]. Economic interdependence can change national identity by reformatting the narrative from rivalry to cooperation. Establishing direct and open communication channels between the leadership of Greece and Turkey is essential. Regular diplomatic talks and crisis communication mechanisms can prevent misunderstandings and build confidence. Implementing transparency measures regarding military activities, such as notifying each other about planned military exercises in advance, can reduce tensions and build trust between the two nations [186].

Collaborating on joint maritime initiatives, such as search and rescue operations or environmental protection efforts in shared waters, fosters cooperation and demonstrates a commitment to shared regional interests. Developing and practicing crisis management protocols can be crucial in preventing escalation. Having agreed-upon procedures for de-

escalation and communication during crises builds confidence and minimizes the risk of unintended conflict [186].

As a political tool to resolve international conflict, launching joint environmental projects, especially in regions of environmental importance, can be a real way to build confidence. Collaborative efforts to address environmental challenges demonstrate a shared commitment to regional well-being. Facilitating cultural and educational exchanges between citizens, students, and professionals from Greece and Turkey can promote people-to-people connections. Positive interactions contribute to mutual understanding and confidence-building [186].

Ensuring that decisions related to conflict resolution involve input from diverse stakeholders, including citizens, community leaders, and representatives from various backgrounds, fosters a sense of ownership among the public.

Recognizing and acknowledging the unique national identities and historical narratives of both Greece and Turkey is essential. Constructive dialogue should emphasize shared values and mutual respect while addressing historical differences. Encouraging cross-border cooperation on economic initiatives, infrastructure projects, and regional development fosters a sense of collective responsibility. Shared projects contribute to a positive identity that transcends national boundaries. Implementing joint historical initiatives that explore shared histories, cultural heritage, and contributions to civilization can create a positive narrative. Recognizing commonalities in historical experiences contributes to a shared sense of identity. Engaging citizens in conflict resolution efforts through town hall meetings, public forums, and participatory decision-making processes fosters a sense of ownership. When citizens feel involved, they are more likely to support peaceful initiatives [186].

Engaging in symbolic gestures that emphasize unity and cooperation, such as joint ceremonies, memorials, or cultural events, contributes to a positive national identity that transcends historical tensions. Incorporating peace education into school curricula can help

shape a new generation with a mindset focused on collaboration, tolerance, and conflict resolution. Education plays a crucial role in building a positive national identity. Encouraging responsible journalism that promotes constructive narratives and avoids sensationalism contributes to a positive public discourse. Media can play a significant role in shaping perceptions and reinforcing a sense of national identity, which is beneficial for peace.

By combining confidence-building measures with a focus on a sense of ownership and national identity, conflict resolution efforts between Greece and Turkey can create a foundation for lasting stability and cooperation. Confidence-building, fostering positive interactions, and promoting shared values are key elements in preventing conflicts and promoting peaceful relations.

Addressing historical grievances is a vital component of conflict resolution [27, p. 365-383]. Encouraging a comprehensive reevaluation of historical events, acknowledging shared history, and promoting joint efforts in memorialization can contribute to the transformation of national identities [45]. A collective reinterpretation of historical narratives has the potential to redefine the sense of ownership over disputed territories and promote a more inclusive national identity.

Establishing truth and reconciliation commissions that bring together historians, scholars, and representatives from both Greece and Turkey can contribute to a comprehensive understanding of historical events. This process can help address historical grievances and promote mutual understanding. Encouraging joint historical research projects that involve scholars from both nations can facilitate a more balanced interpretation of historical events. Shared research initiatives contribute to a common understanding and help dispel misconceptions. Promoting open and structured historical dialogue initiatives allows for the respectful exchange of perspectives on historical events. These initiatives can help create a shared narrative that acknowledges different interpretations while fostering empathy. Implementing reforms in educational curricula to

present a more balanced and nuanced view of historical events can contribute to reconciliation. Education plays a crucial role in shaping perceptions, and curricular changes can promote understanding and empathy. Collaborating on the preservation of shared cultural heritage sites can be a tangible way to demonstrate a commitment to reconciliation. Joint efforts to protect and celebrate historical landmarks contribute to a shared sense of identity [45]. Official acknowledgments and apologies for historical wrongs, when deemed appropriate, can be a powerful step in the reconciliation process. Such gestures can help heal wounds and contribute to a positive atmosphere for conflict resolution.

A political tool for resolving an international conflict is the engagement of various stakeholders, including historians, educators, cultural experts, and citizens, in decision-making related to historical reassessment and reconciliation, and it fosters a sense of ownership. Inclusivity contributes to a more comprehensive and accepted resolution. Engaging the public in discussions and initiatives related to historical reevaluation and reconciliation is crucial. Town hall meetings, public forums, and participatory decision-making processes allow citizens to feel connected to the resolution efforts. Encouraging civic initiatives that promote reconciliation, such as cultural exchanges, joint events, and collaborative projects, fosters a sense of collective responsibility. Grassroots efforts contribute to building a positive national identity [45].

Encouraging responsible journalism that supports historical reevaluation and reconciliation efforts is essential. Media can play a significant role in shaping public perceptions and fostering a sense of national identity conducive to peace. Organizing shared cultural events that celebrate the historical and cultural ties between Greece and Turkey can contribute to a positive national identity. Festivals, exhibitions, and artistic collaborations promote unity and shared values. Emphasizing the interconnected histories of Greece and Turkey can contribute to a sense of shared identity. Highlighting historical periods of cooperation and coexistence fosters a narrative that transcends historical

tensions. Engaging youth in initiatives that promote historical reevaluation and reconciliation ensures that future generations are actively involved in shaping a positive national identity. Youth programs and educational projects contribute to long-term stability [45].

Political leaders can play a crucial role in fostering a sense of ownership by leading efforts toward historical reevaluation and reconciliation. Public statements, policy initiatives, and diplomatic engagements can set the tone for a positive national identity.

By incorporating reconciliation and historical reevaluation into conflict resolution efforts, along with a focus on fostering a sense of ownership and national identity, Greece and Turkey can build a foundation for lasting peace. These approaches address deep-rooted issues, promote understanding, and contribute to the creation of a shared narrative that supports conflict prevention and resolution.

Mediation is a political tool for resolving international conflict. Given the international implications of a possible Greece-Turkey conflict, engaging in third-party mediation can be instrumental in facilitating resolution efforts [55]. Neutral actors, possibly supported by the international community, could play a mediating role in negotiations, offering expertise and guidance to both parties. The involvement of a neutral mediator may assist in reframing the narrative, encouraging compromise, and ensuring a fair resolution process.

International mediation involves the engagement of a neutral third party, such as a mediator, diplomatic envoy, or an international organization, to facilitate negotiations between Greece and Turkey. A neutral mediator can help create an unbiased and fair environment for dialogue. The mediator can facilitate structured and constructive dialogues between the conflicting parties. By providing a platform for open communication, the mediator helps identify common ground, areas of disagreement, and potential solutions. The international mediator can conduct a thorough analysis of the conflict, considering historical, political, and cultural factors. This assessment informs the mediation process,

enabling the development of strategies tailored to the specific dynamics of the Greece-Turkey relationship. The mediator works to bridge differences by exploring compromises, suggesting creative solutions, and helping both parties find mutually acceptable outcomes. Through shuttle diplomacy and direct negotiations, the mediator facilitates a path toward resolution. Once an agreement is reached, the international mediator can assist in overseeing its implementation. This ensures that both Greece and Turkey adhere to the terms of the agreement and helps prevent potential breaches that could reignite tensions. International mediators can play a vital role in building trust between conflicting parties. Their impartiality and commitment to fairness contribute to the credibility of the negotiation process, fostering an environment where both sides feel heard and respected [55].

Involving representatives from Greece and Turkey in the mediation process ensures that diverse perspectives and national interests are considered. Inclusive participation fosters a sense of ownership among the involved parties. Mediators can engage in public diplomacy efforts to communicate the progress of the negotiations and the potential benefits of resolution to the citizens of both nations. This helps shape a positive narrative and garner public support for the conflict resolution process. Mediators should be culturally sensitive and aware of the national identities at play. Understanding the historical and cultural contexts of Greece and Turkey allows the mediator to navigate sensitive issues with respect, promoting a positive atmosphere for resolution. Facilitating consultations and feedback sessions with citizens, community leaders, and relevant stakeholders allows the mediator to ensure that the agreement reflects the concerns and aspirations of the people. This participatory approach enhances a sense of ownership. Addressing national narratives during the mediation process is crucial. Mediators can work with both parties to find common ground in shaping a narrative that acknowledges historical differences but emphasizes shared values and goals [55].

Involving the youth in the mediation process ensures that future generations are invested in the resolution. Special efforts can be made to engage educational institutions and youth organizations to contribute to a positive national identity. Including symbolic gestures in the agreement, such as joint celebrations, memorials, or cultural events, can contribute to a sense of unity and shared identity. These gestures help build bridges and demonstrate a commitment to mutual understanding. Leaders from both Greece and Turkey can emphasize the importance of the mediation process in shaping a positive future for their nations. Political support and commitment from leadership contribute significantly to a sense of ownership and national identity [55].

Thus, international mediation can be a valuable tool in preventing conflict between Greece and Turkey. When combined with efforts to foster a sense of ownership and national identity, mediation becomes a holistic approach that addresses both the structural aspects of the conflict and the socio-cultural dynamics that influence resolution.

A political tool for resolving an international conflict is the use of international law and arbitration mechanisms. Utilizing international law and arbitration mechanisms can provide a structured framework for resolving territorial disputes. Both Greece and Turkey are parties to various international treaties and conventions that can serve as a basis for adjudicating their differences. Engaging in binding arbitration or seeking a ruling from the International Court of Justice may provide a legal resolution to the territorial aspects of the conflict [294].

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) can provide a framework for resolving maritime disputes between Greece and Turkey. Engaging in international arbitration or legal processes under UNCLOS can help establish clear and internationally recognized maritime boundaries.

Utilizing peaceful dispute resolution mechanisms provided by international organizations such as the International Court of Justice (ICJ) or the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) can offer a legal avenue for resolving territorial and sovereignty

disputes. Encouraging the negotiation and adherence to bilateral and multilateral treaties can help prevent conflicts. Agreements on issues such as border demarcation, resource sharing, and diplomatic protocols contribute to a stable and rule-based relationship between Greece and Turkey.

Engaging in diplomatic channels guided by international law allows for the resolution of disputes in accordance with established legal norms. This can include negotiations facilitated by international organizations or mediated by third-party diplomats. Crafting binding agreements that clearly define the rights and obligations of each party can help prevent misunderstandings and conflicts. These agreements, when recognized under international law, provide a legal foundation for resolving disputes [294].

Agreements reached through international law and arbitration often come with enforcement mechanisms. This ensures that parties comply with the terms of the resolution, reducing the likelihood of a return to hostilities.

Raising public awareness about the benefits of resolving conflicts through international law and arbitration is essential. Educational programs can inform citizens about the legal processes involved and their role in supporting a peaceful resolution. Highlighting the importance of preserving national identity while adhering to international law is crucial. Emphasizing that adherence to legal norms does not undermine national identity but contributes to global stability can build public support [294]. Ensuring that the public is consulted and informed about the negotiation and arbitration processes is vital. Inclusive consultation mechanisms allow citizens to feel a sense of ownership in the resolution efforts and understand how legal processes contribute to stability.

Encouraging civic engagement in international law processes promotes a sense of collective responsibility. Civil society organizations, academic institutions, and community leaders can play a role in ensuring that legal means of conflict resolution are used.

Political leaders can emphasize the significance of adhering to international law in their messaging to the public. Framing conflict resolution efforts within the context of legal

norms contributes to a positive national identity. Incorporating historical narratives within the framework of international law helps reconcile past grievances with legal solutions. This approach acknowledges historical context while providing a structured and accepted method for conflict resolution [294].

In conclusion, utilizing international law and arbitration as conflict resolution methods between Greece and Turkey, combined with efforts to foster a sense of ownership and national identity, creates a comprehensive approach. This approach addresses both the legal dimensions of the conflict and the socio-cultural dynamics that influence public support for peaceful resolution.

Secondly, considering the Aegean disputes, territorial issues like continental shelf can significantly induce problems when navigating a resolution path. For instance, Russia should be wary of the ongoing occupation of the Crimea and Russian de facto management of the Kerch in the Azov Sea and other coastal towns by proactively adopting a workable Turkey-Greece conflict resolution methods to avoid a crisis. Also, other global nations can deduce that confidence-building processes and conflict transformation are pivotal when solving an immediate situation at hand and tackle any escalating problems. Conclusively, as Hicks (2011) asserts, a good relationship feels good, but one in which both players appreciate and recognize each other's value feels even better [160].

Due to the systematic approach used in this research, it has been found that the objective causes of international political conflicts lie in the structural dysfunctions of the modern system of international relations in terms of realizing both common international and individual national interests. The fact that the world's states use such a conflict resolution strategy as organizing and maintaining conflict interaction to achieve their own goals and demonstrate their superiority contributes to the growth of tensions between states. Thus, current situation requires the development of new effective methods and mechanisms for managing international conflicts.

Following the Greek-Turkish experience, the following steps are critical for Ukraine: to rapidly increase defense capabilities, because only strength protects peace; to have multi-level and technical dialogue channels that are not linked to political surrender; to strengthen its position in the EU and NATO system as an international shield; to build a deterrence architecture that makes aggression unprofitable; to create incident prevention systems that reduce the risks of a major escalation; and to maintain internal unity, which determines the strength of foreign policy.

The exceptional resilience of the Turkey-Greece conflict to resolution efforts and policies assessed in this chapter drive specific lessons to other global nations, especially countries involved in competitions such as Ukraine and Russia. Even though direct lessons can be faulty at least, some options reveal to essentially constructive. First, Ukraine and Russia's possibility of attaining peaceful co-existence through international law is still a long shot, especially by Ukraine. As the Turkey-Greece relationship exhibits, the international law route could take decades to resolution, but the results about roles and parties participating in the global setting are significant, according to H. Shelest and M. Kapitonenko [293, p. 3-85].

This is manifested in a sense of home, adherence to Ukrainian family traditions, national holidays, and belonging to something bigger than the family, city, or village where you live. An important role is played here by both the family and external markers of Ukrainianness that should surround the child: national symbols, language, colors, clothing, monuments of the nation's history, blood ties, culture, music, etc. This sense of "a nation as a whole, represented by traditions, culture and language distinct from other nations" is associated with patriotism, loyalty and devotion to one's country [100].

The collective identity of the citizens of the state is very important as a foundation for its strengthening and further development. The task of forming a personal and collective Ukrainian national and civic identity among the citizens of Ukraine has become acutely

relevant in the conditions of the Russian Federation's large-scale aggression against Ukraine [16, p. 397-409].

Influencing the collective sense of ownership and national identity during the process of tension between nations can be achieved by the transformation of the occupied territory. David Lewis (professor of global politics at the University of Exeter and author of the forthcoming book "Occupation: Russian rule in southeastern Ukraine") analyzed more closely the transformation of the occupied Ukraine.

Young people growing up will not automatically inherit a national identity. We should not forget the need for socio-cultural and political reintegration of all territories of Ukraine, including those currently not under Ukraine's control. In the context of post-war political and socio-economic transformations, the diversity of socio-economic, cultural, linguistic, socio-political orientations of the population may lead to the preservation of separatist tendencies with the prospect of their development into inter-ethnic conflicts. Therefore, to address the problem, the authorities adopted the Law of Ukraine "On the Basic Principles of State Policy in the Field of Strengthening Ukrainian National and Civic Identity" (Law of Ukraine, 2023), which defines the relevant tasks primarily for the education sector.

Chapter Three Conclusions

We systematized diplomatic channels and negotiation instruments through formal mechanisms, such as bilateral diplomatic commissions and technical negotiations, such as demarcation of maritime borders, airspace, and search for compromise models; through the International Court of Justice and UNCLOS, Greece is a fan of the legal path; Turkey is critical and has not ratified UNCLOS; through trilateral and multilateral formats – EastMed Gas Forum (Greece, Cyprus, Israel, Egypt, France); through informal and "soft" diplomacy, such as Back-channel diplomacy (contacts through intelligence services and naval commands), public diplomacy and media strategies that develop domestic support; economic and humanitarian ties, including tourism and cultural projects.

The negotiating dynamics and barriers to compromise have been explained, with the following factors: legal vs. geopolitical approach (Greece – legal priority; Turkey – mixed one, with power elements), the status of Cyprus (remains a fundamental final brake), symbolic political value (no state wants to appear to be inferior).

Expected scenarios of conflict development have been identified, for example, strategic conflict management without escalation (most likely), legalization of the conflict through an international tribunal, local escalation using naval resources, energy integration as a factor of de-escalation (EastMed corridors). The mechanism of policy-making in Greece and Turkey is based on a combination of domestic political legitimacy, geopolitical competition, historical memory, and energy strategy. The negotiation process remains asymmetrically competitive, and diplomacy is multilevel, involving both international arbitration and informal channels.

The collective sense of ownership (belonging) and national identity are factors of unity, national cohesion, resilience in international confrontation, a factor of the development of a democratic society through the creation of legislative conditions, rule-making, development of democratic political decisions, integrity of society, development of self-awareness of a responsible citizen, democratic political culture of society, formation of civic identity, and conscious citizen. The actors in the process are political leaders, governments, and civil society. The goal is to harmonize national interests and achieve peace.

The effectiveness of the collective sense of ownership (belonging) and national identity affects the formation of a sense of unity among citizens and strengthens positions in international confrontation, which is actually the policy of forming patriotism. Patriotism in the context of international politics implies fostering a sincere love for one's country that goes beyond its superficial manifestations, cultivating a sense of ownership, responsibility for the progress and well-being of the nation.

Modern conflict resolution methods can be significantly enhanced by incorporating elements such as a sense of ownership and national identity. It is obvious that traditional diplomatic mechanisms often fail to take into account the emotional, historical, and cultural dynamics that fuel long-term confrontation. By fostering a stronger sense of responsibility among the affected populations and promoting mutual acceptance of each nation's identity, a more stable basis for dialogue and reconciliation can be developed. These findings suggest that solutions based on the historical narratives and socio-cultural characteristics of each nation are more likely to succeed in building confidence and cooperation.

The research demonstrates that complementing modern methods of conflict resolution with elements such as a sense of ownership and national identity is a promising approach to resolving long-running conflicts, as evidenced by the examples of Greece and Turkey. Traditional diplomatic efforts, while essential, often overlook the deep-rooted socio-cultural dynamics that shape each nation's perception of the conflict, particularly when intertwined with historical grievances and territorial disputes, such as those concerning the Aegean Sea or Cyprus. By incorporating the sense of ownership, this research emphasizes the importance of empowering local communities and stakeholders in both nations, fostering a bottom-up approach that promotes shared responsibility in the peace process. Simultaneously, acknowledging the role of national identity allows for the recognition of each nation's unique narratives and cultural heritage, reducing the risk of alienation and enhancing mutual respect. The Greek-Turkish relationship illustrates that, while geopolitical strategies are necessary, durable peace can only be achieved by bridging the gap between official diplomacy and the collective emotional and cultural component of the societies involved. Through an integrated framework that balances political interests with national identity and local ownership, this thesis contributes to a more holistic understanding of conflict resolution, offering new pathways to peace in contexts where historical tensions and national pride remain pivotal.

Political conflicts between Turkey and Greece, which are based on competing ideologies of national identity and sense of ownership, are nothing new. Their history dates as far back as the creation spells of the two states. However, as discussed in this chapter, these tensions have traditionally been observed as a frozen conflict, with few occasions of actual war. Primary conflicts that have kept these nations at odds include the disputed waters at the East Mediterranean, Aegean Sea conflict encompassing territorial water claims, airspace rights and minority issues. Because of the significant complexity, somewhat complex problems, and the persistent history of the conflict that must be assessed in a resolution, it is apparent that an inclusive solution is and will be problematic to achieve.

The method of conflict transformation as an effective and efficient way to resolve conflicts in Turkey and Greece has been analyzed. Through three conflict transformation tools (problem-solving workshops, alternative dispute resolution, and reconciliation by truth commissions), Turkey and Greece can analyze their problems with the help of a mediator and develop a plan of further action with the participation of conflict mediator experts. Despite low expectations for resolution, there are still valuable advantages from exploratory negotiations that respect international laws and ethical considerations. A dialogue set under International Law regulations would significantly prevent further tensions that may add to a potential war. Since the conflicts keep causing harm to both sides, exploratory negotiations based on a conflict transformation strategy would be a win-win scenario for both sides.

In the Greek-Turkish case, the key was to create a sustainable deterrence architecture that prevents one side from dominating militarily. Long-term deterrence and defense and diplomatic balance are being achieved.

CONCLUSIONS

The dissertation presents a comprehensive political science analysis of the characteristic features of the international political conflict between Greece and Turkey, identifies the role of internal political factors and the influence of external actors on the dynamics of protracted international political conflicts, and proposes a classification of strategies for the peaceful settlement of the Greek-Turkish conflict. The main scientific and practical results of the research are as follows:

1. Theoretical and methodological foundations of the research of the characteristic features of the international political conflict between Greece and Turkey have been analyzed. It has been substantiated that there are several approaches to creating a theoretical basis for improving modern methods of conflict resolution by considering the components of a sense of ownership and national identity, which are used by politicians as tools for promoting political conflict. The need to study international political conflicts from the standpoint of their settlement by institutional factors required the development of methodological bases for research, the formulation of basic concepts and definitions related to the topic of the work, the establishment of terminological and semantic correspondences of the main concepts that determine the content and structure of international conflict

It is proved that the political conflict between Greece and Turkey in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean is a conflict about what is considered “their own”: which seas and islands are part of the “imagined homeland” of the Greeks and Turks, which history is believed to be just, and which treaty is believed to be legitimate. As long as a sense of ownership and national identity remain the main “framework” of the conflict, any technical solution (arbitration, new treaties, joint projects) is at risk of being perceived by societies as “betrayal” or “defeat.” Therefore, the prospects for sustainable de-escalation directly depend on whether the elites of both countries will be able to offer a new narrative

of coexistence, where the sea is seen not only as “property” but as a common resource and an area of interdependence.

There are two levels of conflict analysis that need to be implemented: using intuitive methods and expert opinions, as well as objective research methods using mathematical analysis methods, in particular, quantitative analysis and game theory.

2. Methodological framework for research has been developed, and it involves analyzing the role of national identity and a sense of collective psychological ownership (of land, history, cultural heritage) in the formation of international conflicts.

It is demonstrated that the sense of ownership and political mobilization are factors of the conflict. Territory is a part of the “collective self”, since in both Greece and Turkey, maritime spaces and islands are embedded in the idea of the nation: maps in textbooks, school narratives, and media images of “our seas” create a strong emotional sense of “this is ours”; political elites acting as “guardians” of space. Domestic policies in both countries often encourage a tough stance: neither government wants to be seen as weak when it comes to sovereignty. Compromise is easily presented by opponents as “surrender of national property”; Security vs. Law, since for Greece the priority is law (references to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, treaties), for Turkey – it is security and justice in its own sense, different interpretation frameworks intensify the conflict and prevent the development of a common vision; soft power and historical memory, since both sides use historical narratives (the Greek War of Independence, the events of 1922 in Asia Minor, the Cyprus issue) to support their position. The past is becoming a resource for legitimizing territorial claims today.

The “sense of collective territorial ownership” is seen as a potentially important predictor of people’s attitudes and behavior, as well as a way to highlight the history of nations, identify possible dangers, weaknesses that can be used by political leaders to strengthen support on the way to their goals.

Historical and modern Turkish-Greek conflicts are rooted in competing ideologies of national identity and sense of ownership. Their history dates back to the establishment of both states. The countries' history dates as far back as the creation spells of the two states. The factors that historically have led to a conflict between the two countries have been singled out, to serve as data points for this research to revisit in different time points, where similar references are being made and eventually demonstrate that history rhymes, therefore identifying an aggressive action before it is conducted.

3. It was revealed how domestic policies support a “sense of ownership (belonging)” over disputed territories and construct an image of the “other”

This research proves that the key core of the dispute is the so-called “Aegean Dispute” – a set of claims regarding: the boundaries of territorial waters; airspace; continental shelf and exclusive economic zones (EEZs); and the demilitarized status of certain islands. For Greece, the Aegean Sea is almost an “inland sea”, heavily dotted with islands that Athens considers an integral part of its national territory and statehood. For Turkey, the dense “ring” of Greek islands near its coast is perceived as a spatial blockade and a threat to national security. Greece and Turkey remain formally allies in NATO, but their relations are still marked by the chronic conflict over the Aegean Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean. The debate about “whose seas and islands are” has long gone beyond the technical delimitation of maritime zones and has become a conflict of ownership and competing national narratives. The sea as “property”: from oil and gas to marine parks in the 2010s and 2020s, tensions increased due to: gas discoveries in the Eastern Mediterranean; competing maritime border plans and pipelines; mutual naval exercises and NAVTEX notifications in disputed areas. In Turkey, the concept of the “Blue Homeland” (Mavi Vatan) has gained popularity, i.e. the idea that the “Turkish home” includes not only the land but also the wide expanses of the three seas that surround it, overlapping with Greece's EEZ and islands. As a result, a sense of collective maritime “ownership” is fostered, supporting claims to wider maritime zones in the Aegean and

Mediterranean. On the other hand, Greece is actively using international maritime law, concluding delimitation agreements, developing energy projects and even marine reserve initiatives – steps that Ankara often perceives as an attempt to “quietly legalize” Greek control over disputed areas.

Due to transformation processes, the nature of international political conflict has changed; the interrelation between the parties to the conflict has increased; due to global changes, the number and geography of conflicts have expanded; the growth of internal conflicts into international ones has become a regular pattern; the secrecy of the goals and actors of conflicts has increased; the number of participants in conflicts has increased; a new category of participants in the conflict as actors in the conflict has emerged, including those who use radical methods of conflict resolution; actual interests pursued through conflict are increasingly being covered by ethnic, religious, territorial and other goals; modern methods of armed struggle are increasingly being used; the distribution of roles and levels of participation in conflict resolution between the UN and regional organizations have changed.

The research suggests that politicians have a lot of aspirations and future ambitions to get higher leadership positions, popularity or power, and hence use conflicts as the primary way of achieving these aspirations. It is plausible to convince people to engage in conflict since the leaders do this by pointing the opponents as the source of the problems and showing that a dispute will be a win for the people. The scientific basis of the study was the analysis of the term “Sense of psychological ownership (belonging)” established in the Bibliography of Psychology and its integration into the “National Identity” of the social group. This confluence, combined with historical data or political conflicts that have a similar basis, has been hypothetically a barometer of the progress of political conflicts, not only as a source of generating points of conflict, but rather as a loudspeaker to the crowd when the crowd is demagogic.

4. The research shows how external actors influence the balance between the drive for self-assertion and the need for stability;

It is concluded that national identity is analyzed as history, which is a resource for politics. The Greek narrative has been outlined. For Greece, the Aegean Sea and the islands are the cradle of ancient civilization; the space where the Greek ethnicity and culture were formed; the symbolic “heart” of the Greek world. In the public discourse of Athens, Turkey's territorial claims are often presented as part of the Ottoman threat and revisionism, and the defense of maritime borders is often presented as the protection of historical heritage and sovereignty. The Turkish narrative has been outlined. The national identity of Turkey, on the other hand, is based on the legacy of the Ottoman Empire; a sense of unfairness after the Treaty of Lausanne and other treaties; and the image of a “surrounded state” that lacks strategic depth. From this perspective, the Greek islands off the Turkish coast can be perceived as an “anomaly” that limits Turkey's natural right to access the sea and resources. The Mavi Vatan concept is becoming a symbol of “restoring just borders” and is echoed in political rhetoric, media, and popular culture.

5. Possible strategies for the peaceful resolution of the conflict have been identified, taking into account the cultural and identity differences of the parties and the role of national pride in reconciliation processes.

The sense of ownership in relation to political mobilization has been analyzed. Territory is seen a part of the “collective self”. Both for Greece and Turkey, maritime spaces and islands are embedded in the idea of the nation: maps in textbooks, school narratives, and media images of “our seas” create a strong emotional sense of “this is ours”. First, political elites acting as “guardians” of space. Domestic policies in both countries often encourage a tough stance: neither government wants to be seen as weak when it comes to sovereignty. Compromise is easily presented by opponents as “surrender of national property”. Second, Security vs. Law. For Greece the priority is law (references to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, treaties), for Turkey – it is security and

justice in its own sense. Different interpretation frameworks intensify the conflict and prevent the development of a common vision. Third, soft power and historical memory. Both sides use historical narratives (the Greek War of Independence, the events of 1922 in Asia Minor, the Cyprus issue) to support their position. The past is becoming a resource for legitimizing territorial claims today. In the current environment, current trends are analyzed through managed tensions, or the path to de-escalation. Analysts describe the situation as “managed competition”: between the periods of dramatic escalations (exercises, NAVTEX, incidents in the air and at sea), diplomatic contacts, dialogue on a “positive agenda,” economic cooperation, and joint formats in NATO and the EU take place. Greece's new defense programs, including the upgrade of its air defense and navy, are publicly motivated by threats from Turkey; Ankara keeps developing its maritime strategy and naval presence in disputed areas. This leads to a high level of mutual distrust, where any incident can quickly become symbolic of an “attack on our property” and “humiliation of national dignity.”

6. Effective tools have been identified to contribute to the transformation of historical and political conflicts into cooperation and partnership.

Diplomatic channels and negotiation tools have been analyzed. First, there are formal mechanisms: bilateral diplomatic commissions and technical consultations – demarcation of maritime borders, airspace, search for compromise models. The International Court of Justice and UNCLOS. Greece – in favor of the legal path; Turkey stands critical and has not ratified UNCLOS. Trilateral and multilateral formats – EastMed Gas Forum (Greece, Cyprus, Israel, Egypt, France). Second, informal and soft diplomacy is used in the form of Back-channel diplomacy (contacts through intelligence services and naval commands); public diplomacy, and media strategies that develop domestic support, economic and humanitarian cooperation, including tourism and cultural projects.

It is noted that the integration of elements of the sense of ownership and national identity is a factor in conflict resolution both at the individual level and at the level of social groups. Resolution of the long-standing conflict issues between Greece and Turkey requires a multifaceted approach that takes into account the complex interconnection between the sense of ownership and national identity. Diplomacy, Track II initiatives, mediation, economic partnerships, and historical reconciliation play a crucial role in shifting perceptions and developing a shared sense of responsibility for the peacebuilding process. In the process of implementing these strategies, it is important to constantly re-evaluate their effectiveness and adapt them to the ever-changing dynamics of the conflict. Only through sustained efforts and a genuine commitment to addressing the root causes of the conflict can a lasting settlement be achieved, paving the way for more stable and harmonious relations between Greece and Turkey.

It has been suggested that citizens from either side of these nations can play a pivotal role in preventing a possible conflict that could significantly hamper their stability and peace. Three tools – listening and speaking, changing the narrative, and looking for ways ahead – have been discussed extensively in the last chapter to outline the citizens' role. The Allies to these nations can also play a pivotal role through various tools and processes to ensure the applicability of the International Law, Economic Sustainability and more specifically to be able to intervene should any conflicting point escalate.

In the case of the Greek-Turkish relations and issues about matters like those of the sea borders between the two countries, as well as the aspect considering the militarization of the Greek islands across the Eastern Aegean, it is characteristic that each one of the two sides seems to follow a series of certain moves and approaches in diplomacy. According to the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the issue lies in the demarcation of the continental shelf at two specific points, that is, on the one hand, the maritime extension of the border line in Thrace and, on the other hand, the islands of the northern and eastern Aegean and the Dodecanese located near the Turkish coast.

A nation's administration may attach national interests to an interpretation of an official body's formalized regulations to advance a claim on resources or to an opportunity that more than one competing side have a rightful claim on, based on their own interpretation of the same formalized regulation. The process of attaching national interests to an opportunity, as we have seen throughout history, frequently involves the elements of psychological sense of ownership (individual or collective) and the idea of national identity.

The conflict is one of the main threats to international security. Threatening the stability of the international system and affecting the interests of its main actors, they require the intervention of the international community and the development of new settlement strategies. Attempts to solve problems by force, firstly, lead to an incredible prolongation of the conflict, because the interests of indirect participants are added to the existing contradictions of the main parties to the conflict, and secondly, they increase the level and severity of international conflict and further exacerbate the contradictions between the participants. In connection with this issue, finding the optimal ratio between the use of force and non-force methods of conflict prevention and settlement is extremely important and difficult. This issue is resolved individually for each conflict, but the following general approaches can be identified: diagnosis of the conflict and its prevention by peaceful means at an early stage of its origin; if necessary, narrow and short-term use of a force approach, which must be accompanied by appropriate non-force measures; connection with the stage of development of the conflict process. Conflict resolution methods are used at different stages of the conflict as follows: observation and forecasting at all stages – peace, disputes, confrontation, crisis, reconciliation, stability; preventive measures are applied in stages – peace, disputes; peace-building – disputes, confrontation; peacekeeping – confrontation, crisis, reconciliation; peace enforcement – at the stage of crisis; and, finally, post-conflict reconstruction – at the stages of reconciliation and stability.

Non-violent approaches to international conflict resolution have an incomparably wider range both in terms of methods and the number of stages of conflict development at which they can and should be applied. Realization in practice of the most optimal and effective ratio of force and non-force methods requires constant information monitoring and effective scientific forecasting of the possibility of the emergence of new sources of tension and the development of existing conflicts.

Given these systemic prerequisites, the author believes that a principles-based strategy for conflict management would be the most appropriate for Greece and Turkey. The level of involvement and the ways of participating in the settlement of this conflict should be clearly determined by the impact that this conflict has on the interests aimed primarily at the country's security, i.e. economic prosperity, strengthening political status, maintaining military-strategic balance, ensuring favorable information background, etc. The point is not to use force and intervention, but the potential for economic and political cooperation, which is most in line with the real financial, economic, military and political capabilities of modern Greece. Balance and flexibility of positions should be observed, which means the possibility, on the one hand, to clearly demonstrate commitment to the principles of systemic interaction based on peaceful methods (since this does not increase the level of international conflict and, accordingly, corresponds to the national security interests of Greece), and, on the other hand, not to engage in rhetorical polemics or open confrontation with opponents, cooperation with whom in any case is necessary for the realization of national interests. Implementation of such a balanced strategy is possible if it is based on multivariate prognostic analysis. Controlled internationalization (regionalization) of conflicts should be ensured regarding the participation of the international community in conflict resolution. Controllability means a key peacekeeping or mediation role for Greece, as well as the initiative to connect international structures.

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LIST OF THE APPLICANT'S PUBLICATIONS

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1. Nathanailidis, S. M. *Toponymic propaganda as an instrument for advancing conflict*. POLITICAL SCIENCE BULLETIN, 2023, No. 91, pp. 159–167. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.17721/2415-881x.2023.91.159-167>

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