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І. О. АЛЄКСЄЄВА
О. В. КАПТЮРОВА

ЛІНГВІСТИЧНІ ДОСЛІДЖЕННЯ КУЛЬТУРНИХ ТА СОЦІАЛЬНИХ АСПЕКТІВ АНГЛОМОВНОЇ КОМУНІКАЦІЇ (ПРАКТИКУМ)

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РЕЦЕНЗЕНТИ доктор філол. наук, професор Ільченко О.М.
кандидат філол. наук, доцент Сандига Л.О.

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CONTENTS

Міжкультурні контакти є характерною рисою сьогодення, тому одним з провідних напрямів сучасних лінгвістичних досліджень є вивчення процесу міжкультурного спілкування. Низка лекційно-практичних курсів англійської мови, що викладаються на 1-му та 2-му роках підготовки за освітньо-кваліфікаційним рівнем "магістр" за спеціальністю 035 "Філологія", призначені ознайомити студентів з основними положеннями теорії комунікації та надати їм знання, необхідні для формування комунікативної компетенції.

Метою практикуму «Лінгвістичні дослідження культурних та соціальних аспектів англомовної комунікаці» є моделювання у студентів цілісної моделі міжкультурної взаємодії, під час якої учасники діють, виходячи з культурно-специфічних уявлень про передумови, функцію, перебіг та результативність спілкування. Матеріали практикуму «Лінгвістичні дослідження культурних та соціальних аспектів англомовної комунікаці» допомагають студентам розвинути міжкультурну компетенцію, оскільки послідовно висвітлюють роль культури в спілкуванні, вплив міжкультурних контактів та мову, а також лінгвістичні аспекти культурно-специфічних явищ, які є комунікативно важливими, але часто не усвідомлюються комунікантами.

Курс складається з лекційних та практичних занять. Лекційні заняття спрямовані на формування у студентів цілісного та логічного уявлення про міжкультурну комунікацію як феномен з визначеною структурою, на комунікацію як процес, в якому поведінка учасників визначається, поміж інших факторів, їх належністю до певної лінгвокультури.

Практичні заняття надають студентам можливість застосовувати на практиці поняття, викладені під час лекцій, та аналізувати ситуації міжкультурної взаємодії. Іншим видом роботи на практичних заняттях є обговорення наукових робіт сучасних спеціалістів у галузі міжкультурної комунікації, що сприяє розвиткові критичного мислення та заохочує до самостійних розвідок.

Мета самостійної роботи – заохотити студентів самостійно опрацьовувати як теоретичні роботи сучасних спеціалістів у галузі міжкультурної комунікації, так і здійснювати та представляти для дискусій власний аналіз текстів різного типу, створених під час міжкультурних контактів.

Практикум «Лінгвістичні дослідження культурних та соціальних аспектів англомовної комунікаці» поділяється на три змістові частини: (1) культура та комунікація (теорія соціальної атрибуції, акультурація, культурна грамотність, етнічні стереотипи та міжкультурні конфлікти); (2) міжкультрні контакти та мова (носій мови та білінгвізм, мовні контакти та перемикання кодів); (3) лінгвістичні аспекти культурно значущих явищ (мова та комунікативна важливість релігії та ритуалу, мовний аспект соціальної нерівності, мультикультуралізм).

Після проходження курсу студенти повинні

1) знати:

- основні завдання теорії міжкультурної комунікації; усвідомлювати їх інтеграційний характер та практичну спрямованість;
- мету, цілі, основні положення теорії міжкультурної комунікації, структуру та різновиди міжкультурної комунікативної взаємодії;
- принципи розмежування культурно специфічних особливостей комунікативної поведінки;
- принципи та методи проведення лінгвістичного дослідження текстів різних жанрів та видів спілкування;

2) вміти:

- користуватися термінологією теорії міжкультурної комунікації, дискурсивної лінгвістики, медіа лінгвістики, лінгвістичної антропології та лінгвокультурології, способами та прийомами ведення дослідницької роботи у відповідних галузях;
- аналізувати поведінку учасників різних типів комунікативних ситуацій, а також свідомо обирати власні стратегії та тактики під час спілкування;

3) володіти:

- навичками ведення дискусій під час обговорення тем з теорії комунікації, дискурсивної лінгвістики, медіа лінгвістики, лінгвістичної антропології та лінгвокультурології.

Матеріали практикуму доцільно використовувати для курсів "Сучасні дослідження комунікації" ОП "Сучасна англомовна комунікація та переклад і дві західноєвропейські мови / English Communication Studies and Translation and Two Western European Languages" (викладання іноземними мовами), "Англійська мова (професійний рівень)" ОП "Міжкультурна германістика (німецька та англійська мови)" та "Германська філологія і переклад (шведська мова та англійська мова)", "Комунікативні стратегії", "Сучасний культурний простір (за мовним спрямуванням)", що викладаються для студентів-магістрів ОП "Культурна антропологія з фаховим вивченням іноземної мови", "Фольклористика, міжкультурна комунікація, іноземна мова".

Part I

Culture and Communication

Seminar 1

The Theory of Social Attribution. Attribution errors

1. Explain the concept of attribution and its role in cross-cultural communication (CCC).

- Why is attribution important in interpreting human behavior, particularly in cross-cultural contexts?
- How understanding attribution can improve cross-cultural interactions in contexts such as international business, education, and diplomacy

2. Define attribution and its types: personal (internal) and situational (external) attribution.

3. Comment on Theories of Attribution:

- Explain Heider's distinction between personal and situational attribution. Discuss how individuals assign responsibility for actions based on intentions, skills, and external difficulties.
- Present Kelly's three key factors in attribution: concord, stability, and differentiation, and explain how they influence the attribution process in CCC.



https://helpfulprofessor.com/dispositional-attribution-examples/

4. Watch the episodes from Russell Peters'[1] shows (e.g., https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vmI4LP-9a8o; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z4KhEj0ai5E; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=78cDjLJDRgA). Apply the terms of the course to comment on the phenomena the actor talks about. Use the following prompts to structure your answers:

https://www.imdb.com/title/tt5946232/

1) What physical or linguistic traits are attributed to specific ethnic groups?
2) Explore how Peters' attributions reflect common perceptions or stereotypes.
3) Analyze Peters' use of language and physical features in attributing ethnic identities, and whether this serves as a critique or a reflection of societal norms.
4) What societal perceptions are attributed to accents?
5) What does Peters' attribution of accents reveal about language and identity?

5. Get ready to talk of your own attribution preferences. How much are you inclined to interpret other people's behavior on the basis of your own assumptions? Can you recall a situation where you attributed someone's behavior incorrectly based on your cultural understanding? Give examples.

6. Mistakes in attribution are quite frequent in cross-cultural communication. For example, the same action may be treated as offensive and benevolent by representatives of different cultures. Thus, for a Malay, to help an old lady to carry her heavy bag is a sign of respect. For an American old lady, the same action may be interpreted as humiliating: first of all, it is intrusion into her privacy and, secondly, such help is a hint at her inability to cope with her life, which is offensive.

Think of other examples that may illustrate attribution mistakes.

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[1] Russell Dominic Peters is a Canadian stand-up comedian, actor, and producer. By 2013, Peters ranked third on Forbes' list of the world's highest-paid comedians and became the first comedian to have a Netflix stand-up special. His stand-up routines focus on observational comedy, often using humor to address racial, ethnic, class, and cultural stereotypes. Drawing from his personal experiences growing up in an Anglo-Indian family, Peters frequently imitates accents from various ethnic groups to highlight and humorously critique these stereotypes. Peters emphasizes that his goal is not to demean or insult different races or cultures but rather to "uplift them through humor."

7. Analyse a cross-cultural interaction (e.g., a business meeting between a Western and Eastern company) and identify how attributional errors could affect the interaction. Present a real-life scenario where attribution errors caused miscommunication between people from different cultural backgrounds (e.g., a Western manager misunderstanding an Asian employee's behavior).

8. Watch the video ***Fundamental Attribution Error*** on Psychology & MORE YouTube channel (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1EnieKBca8k) and answer the questions:

1) What is the fundamental attribution error?
2) How does it manifest when we interpret situations for ourselves versus others?
3) What is self-serving bias, and how does it relate to the fundamental attribution error?
4) How does the fundamental attribution error influence our judgment in social situations?
5) What are some positive and negative situations in which we might apply the fundamental attribution error?
6) How does the fundamental attribution error contribute to conflict in social groups?
7) Why do people support their own group more favorably than others?
8) How can recognizing the fundamental attribution error help reduce biased thinking?
9) What are some strategies for minimizing the influence of the fundamental attribution error in daily life?

https://sketchplanations.com/attribution-bias

9. Discuss Attribution Biases:

- Ingroup Bias: The tendency to view behaviors of ingroup members more favorably compared to outgroup members.
- Outgroup Homogeneity Effect: The tendency to see members of an outgroup as very similar to one another.

Role-play situation where participants are divided into "ingroup" and "outgroup" teams, belonging to different (sub)cultures. Each team will attribute behaviors to their own group and the opposing group, followed by a discussion on the biases observed.

10. Comment on the following questions:

- How do ingroup and outgroup biases affect cross-cultural communication and understanding?
- How can a deeper understanding of attribution models and biases lead to better cross-cultural communication and avoid misinterpretations?

11. Read the article ***Attribution theories: How people make sense of behavior*** by Bertram F. Malle (Reader p. 53), sum up the main points and answer the questions:

1) How does Heider's theory of object perception relate to his theory of person perception in attribution processes?
2) What is the difference between personal causality and impersonal
3) causality in Heider's attribution model?
4) How do attributions differ when explaining intentional versus unintentional behavior?
5) What role does intentionality play in the attribution process, and why is it considered central to social perception?
6) What are the basic differences between Kelley's covariation model of attribution Heider's models?
7) How do people use reason explanations, causal history explanations, and enabling factor explanations in making attributions for intentional behavior?
8) What is the distinction between belief reasons and desire reasons in folk-conceptual theory, and how do these influence behavior explanations?
9) How does the actor-observer asymmetry in attributions manifest differently when applying traditional attribution theory versus folk-conceptual theory?
10) What psychological determinants influence the choices people make when explaining behavior, and how do these relate to judgments of intentionality?
11) How do pragmatic goals influence the way people provide explanations for behavior, especially in the context of impression management and audience design?
12) How do conversational processes influence the way people provide causal explanations for behavior, and why is this significant?

Seminar 2

Perception
Stereotypes: definition functions and ways of formation
Linguistic means of expressing stereotypes

1. Comment on perception and its role in behaviour formation.

2. Watch the presentation ***Mind the Gap between Perception and Reality*** by Sean Tiffee[1] (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8BL9uRJpTqY) Sum up the main points the speaker makes and answer the following questions:

1) What is GAP in the speech? What are the spheres where the GAP is experienced?
2) What are master narratives and their role in perception? Think of any examples.
3) What does the speaker mean by "embracing the absurd"?
4) Why mining the GAP is important in communication?

3. Watch the presentation ***Riding the Waves of Culture*** by Fons Trompenaars[2] (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hmyfjKjcbm0). Explain how this presentation is related to the previous one (*Mind the Gap between Perception and Reality* by Sean Tiffee). Sum up the main points the speaker makes and answer the questions:

1) How does cultural background influence the perception of authority in different societies?
2) In the context of multicultural teams, how do different cultures perceive the concept of objectivity?
3) How does the dilemma of lying for a friend reflect



https://www.amazon.com/Riding-Waves-Culture-Fourth-Understanding/dp/126046864X

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[1] Sean Tiffee is a Professor of Speech at Lone Star College, Houston, Texas, Ted Talks speaker.
[2] Fons Trompenaars is a Dutch organizational theorist, management consultant, and author, recognized for his contributions in the field of ethics. He is best known for developing Trompenaars' model of national cultural differences (a framework designed for cross-cultural communication, specifically in business and management, identifying seven dimensions of national cultural differences) and Dilemma Theory (providing a framework for understanding and managing cultural differences within organizations, which posits that cultural diversity often leads to dilemmas or tensions between conflicting cultural values manifested in areas such as communication, decision-making, leadership, and teamwork).

different cultural attributions of loyalty and truthfulness?

4) What role does cultural attribution play in the interpretation of integrity?
5) What is the consequence of different cultural perceptions of logic?

Do you support the opinions the speakers express? Back up your point of view with arguments and examples of your own.

4. Look at the pictures a-c. What are people in these pictures doing?

(a) *(b)* *(c)*

Now read how these pictures are interpreted by Australians and Lao and answer the questions that follow:

In picture *(a)* there is a cultural meaning in which a specific posture signifies submission to authority, as seen in school or military settings. The phrase 'stand straight', is often used by Lao speakers to describe this posture. For Lao individuals, the symbolism of the posture is clear, and the act of 'standing to attention' is familiar in modern contexts like school. However, Australian observers typically do not describe picture *(a)* with the equivalent term "standing to attention," likely because this concept has more specific connotations in Australia. For instance, Australians might expect the feet to be closer together and the person to be in a uniform.

On the contrary, pictures *(b)* and *(c)* do not strongly align with familiar cultural representations for many Lao speakers. The responses to picture *(b)* varied significantly. Some individuals were unfamiliar with the traditional depiction of the setting or rising sun, or the conventional perspective showing distant fields and hills. Instead, a few guessed that the person was starting a fire, while others suggested they were 'watching over their fields' or 'appreciating nature.' While Lao people certainly appreciate the beauty of a sunset or sunrise, there is no distinct cultural practice tied to watching these events, unlike in English-speaking cultures where 'watching the sunset/sunrise' is more commonly recognized as a meaningful activity.

Similarly, picture *(c)* prompted mixed and unusual responses from Lao speakers due to the absence of a clear cultural reference. The artist was asked to depict 'people standing, waiting for a bus'. The illustration aligns with a bus-stop scenario typical in countries like Australia, where bus stops are marked along streets, and people wait for buses. In Laos, however, bus stops are rarely signposted, and people usually wait at known spots where they flag down passing buses. While some described picture *(c)* as 'people waiting for a bus,' others interpreted it as 'people waiting to cross the road' or even 'people getting their height measured.' The last interpretation highlights how cultural representations serve as a basis for interpreting scenes. One elderly rural woman saw the pole in the image as a measuring stick rather than recognizing it as part of a bus-stop setting, likely due to her own experience at a health center. For her, this personal experience provided the most relevant solution to interpreting the illustration, as the concept of a modern bus stop was unfamiliar.

This reliance on salient cultural representations influences how syntactic constructions are produced and understood.

Cultural representations are used as a basis for reasoning and explaining events, as well as attributing intentions to others. For instance, a Lao person and an Australian would interpret a diner drinking water at the end of a meal differently. For a Lao individual, this would be a clear sign that the meal is finished, often prompting them to clear the plates or encourage the guest to eat more. This interpretation is based on a Lao cultural 'script' where water is typically consumed only after the meal. Although some Lao people do drink water during a meal, this is considered an exception. In contrast, Australians do not have such a cultural script concerning the timing of water consumption with meals.

Another example involves communal eating practices in Laos, where food is shared from central plates and bowls rather than serving individual portions. Some foreigners find this 'impractical.' For example, an Australian once questioned why Lao people don’t use individual bowls for soup, as carrying hot soup in a spoon can result in spills. To the Australian, this suggestion seemed 'logical.' However, for Lao people, the communal setup emphasizes social closeness, camaraderie, and family bonding. Individual bowls would introduce social distance, which conflicts with the cultural values of proximity and sharing. Therefore, the communal dining arrangement has symbolic significance, reflecting important cultural priorities. (Adapted from Enfield, N. (2010). Cultural Logic and Syntactic Productivity: Associated posture Constructions in Lao. *Ethnosyntax: Explorations in culture and grammar*, 231-258 (2002). 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199266500.003.0010).

- How cultural representations influence perception in cross-cultural communication.
- In what ways can differing cultural representations lead to misunderstandings or conflicts in communication between people from different cultures?
- How can shared cultural representations within a group affect the way messages are conveyed and received in multicultural teams or organizations?
- How do cultural representations of concepts like "respect" or "politeness" influence communication styles across different cultures?

5. Define the notions of “stereotype” and “prejudice”. Comment on their roots and functions. Read the following abstracts and compare stereotypes maintained by Ukrainians with those, described in the abstracts. Do you find any contradicting stereotypes? Think if you can add anything to the list.

https://www.strategian.com/2020/06/07/ the-psychological-origins-of-prejudice-discrimination-and-racism/

Members of one culture cherish stereotypical views of members of other cultures. The Dutch look upon the English as typically trustworthy, friendly, approachable people; they are almost like the Dutch themselves in many respects. The reputation of the Germans on the other hand is terrible: they are harsh, overbearing loudmouths who insist upon occupying their particular spot on the beach and everything that goes with it. The French are too far away to have much of a reputation, apart from a Latin-lover type of fame, but if they do have one, it is one of arrogance (…) French cuisine and French wine enjoy a high reputation in the Netherlands, even among those who have never even seen a four-star restaurant from the outside. French is still the language of upper-class culture in many respects. [De Jong, W. (1996). Open Frontiers. Teaching English in an intercultural context. Oxford: Heinemann, 1996. p.16]

…Daniel has gone to New York. He will clearly by now have got off with thin American cool person called Winona who puts out, carries a gun and is everything I am not. [Fielding, H. (1996). Bridget Jones's Diary. London: Picador, 1996. p.39]

The Americans are an extremely interesting people. They are absolutely reasonable. I think that is their distinguishing characteristic. Yes, Mr. Erskine, an absolutely reasonable people. I assure you there is no nonsense about the Americans. [Wilde, O. (1994). The picture of Dorian Gray. London: Penguin Books, 1994. p.49]

“Kids are important. They’re the only people that matter. If I had kids, I’d lay down my life for them. I’d be squeezing their chubby chops all the time saying haven’t you grown, like my grandma does with me,” said Frank, giggling.
“Don’t be so Jewish.” [Srivastava, A. (2000). Looking for Maya. London: Quartet Books, 2000. p.157]

6. Ethnic groups are not the only object of stereotypization: stereotypes may be based on professions, sex, age and other characteristics. Look at the following abstract and think what other professional stereotypes are maintained in Ukrainian culture:



https://scienceandapologetics.com/article/yak-goditsya-abo-povedinkovi-stereotipi/

It goes two ways when talking to bar and waiting staff in the USA and part of the fun is you never know which one it will be. They will either act as though you are their long-lost sibling, who has been tragically separated at birth, and they then warmly rush to fill you in on their life story. Or, they will treat you like something smelly that they've stepped in by accident. [Parks, A. (2005). Husbands (is one ever enough?). London: Penguin Books, 2005. p.303]

7. Look at the lists of traits and think representatives of which cultures they may describe:

1) reckless, generous, lazy, irresponsible, good-natured, thoughtless, like drinking, unorganized;
2) polite, reserved, pedantic, cold-blooded, conservative, meticulous, diligent, exquisite;
3) elegant, gallant, talkative, cunning, charming, dissipated, thrifty, light-minded, adventurous;
4) accurate, pedantic, good executives, economical, uninteresting, reserved, persistent, industrious.

https://vcresearch.berkeley.edu/news/stereotypes-measurably-influence-how-we-treat-each-other

Think how a stay in a new culture or communication with its representatives influence one's stereotypes.

8. Read the article ***How stereotypes are shared through language: a review and introduction of the social categories and stereotypes communication (SCSC) framework*** by Camiel J. Beukeboom and Christian Burgers (Reader p. 74), sum up the main points and answer the questions:

1) How do social categorization and stereotypes influence our perception of individuals in complex social environments?

2) What is the difference between stereotypes and prejudice?
3) What role do language and communication play in the formation and maintenance of social stereotypes?
4) How does linguistic bias reinforce shared social stereotypes within specific cultural groups?
5) How does the Social Categories and Stereotypes Communication (SCSC) framework explain the relationship between biased language use and stereotype maintenance?
6) What cognitive processes are involved in stereotyping, and how do these processes manifest in communication?
7) In what ways does the media contribute to the dissemination and reinforcement of societal stereotypes, particularly in representations of race, gender, and social groups?
8) How does the use of different linguistic forms influence the perception of a social category?
9) How do biases in communication content and linguistic form contribute to the formation and maintenance of stereotypes?
10) How can the impact of biased language and stereotypes in communication be reduced?
11) What role does stereotype content play in shaping attitudes and behaviors toward members of specific social groups?

9. Some standup comedians such as Russell Peters, Maz Jobrani[1], Dean Obeidallah[2] claim that their performances are aimed at doing away with ethnic stereotypes. Watch the shows, e.g. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GEVAE3EYoOg or https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g3FjYN_rS1E, or https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b0Hiqx1r6jg.

Comment on the sources of stereotypes and the mechanisms of their formation that the actors mention. Identify strategies and tactics used by the performers to prove stereotypes wrong.

[1] Maz Jobrani is an American comedian and actor. He has made appearances in various films and TV shows and has performed on radio and in comedy clubs. Jobrani's comedy often revolves around themes of race and the misperceptions of Middle Eastern people in the United States, as well as humorous insights into his family life.

[2] Dean Obeidallah is an American lawyer, comedian, and journalist. Born in New Jersey, Obeidallah is of Palestinian and Italian heritage. He uses comedy as a way to challenge negative stereotypes about Arabs, incorporating humor about topics like racial profiling, terrorism, and the Arab revolution into his act, aiming to promote understanding through laughter.

Seminar 3

Cross-cultural conflicts

1. Review the different approaches to conflict and try to categorize your personal orientation to conflict along with a justification for why you tend to behave in this way.

2. Comment on roots of cross-cultural conflicts:

1) Discuss how cultural values and worldviews differ across subcultures and how this diversity can lead to conflict.
2) Compare the perspectives of social Darwinism with modern research on the social nature of prejudice and hostility.
3) Examine the role of sense-making patterns in cross-cultural conflicts (Danish cartoon controversy and Charlie Hebdo attack as case studies to explore how differing worldviews can create conflict).
4) Explore examples of ethnic, religious, and linguistic conflicts, and discuss how these conflicts emerge in both personal and professional settings.
5) Analyze how understanding cultural norms can help avoid or manage conflicts.
6) Reflect on how individual personality traits, interpersonal dynamics, and organizational structures can exacerbate or reduce cross-cultural tensions.

3. Watch ***The Middle East*** by Russell Peters (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2tbqV8AtI8I&t=245s). Comment on the way cross-cultural contacts are described in standup comedies.

https://www.flickr.com/photos/globalintegration/5277134900

4. Watch the video ***Funny, But True: Cultural Differences*** (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2xJ_hbD4TQA) and comment on critical incidents (communication situations in which the participants consider behaviour to be problematic, confusing or even amusing) which can potentially lead to conflicts. What spheres of communication do they belong to?

5. Read a chapter from online UNESCO ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEMS (EOLSS) ***Cross-cultural conflict*** by Kevin Avruch https://www.eolss.net/Sample-Chapters/C14/E1-40-01-03.pdf (Reader p. 115) and answer the questions:

1) How is conflict defined in the context of cross-cultural interaction?
2) What role does perception play in conflicts?
3) How does culture influence individuals' understanding of conflict and its resolution?
4) What is the difference between the "realist" and "constructivist" views of conflict?
5) What is the importance of communication and perception in cross-cultural conflicts?
6) What are the key differences between "high context" and "low context" communication styles, and how do these influence cross-cultural conflict resolution?
7) How can cultural miscommunication intensify conflicts (e.g. Israeli-Egyptian conflict)?
8) How do different cultural worldviews impact the negotiation process?
9) How does culture link individual identity to collective identity, particularly in conflict situations?
10) What are "chosen traumas," and how do they contribute to the escalation of cross-cultural conflicts?
11) How are culture and ethnicity differentiated in the context of conflict?
12) How does culture adapt in conflict situations?
13) How can conflict resolution in cross-cultural settings be improved?
14) What is it important to consider cultural differences in conflict resolution?
15) How do conflicts within the same culture highlight cultural misunderstandings?

6. Watch the video ***How to manage cross-cultural conflict*** produced by Dr. Linda Wagener, Senior Consulting Psychologist of Headington Institute (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x1UCLuuSX1U), and answer the questions:

1) Why do people often avoid conflict, and why is this a mistake?

2) What are the two key strategies for improving conflict management?
3) What are the two critical questions you need to ask yourself when managing conflict?
4) How can understanding both the task and the relationship help in conflict management?
5) Why is it important to "know the other" when managing conflict in a different culture?
6) What is culture in relation to conflict management, and why is it challenging?
7) What is the first step for getting better at managing conflict in a new culture?
8) How can asking key informants help in cross-cultural conflict management?
9) What promotes understanding conflict management in a different culture?
10) Why is it important to observe the reaction of others during disagreements?
11) Why improving conflict management skills is important in cross-cultural settings?

Comment on the most resultative, in your opinion, tools of preventing and managing intercultural conflicts.

7. Speak on the types of CC conflict and conflict management strategies. Watch the ***Cultural Differences in Negotiations and Conflicts*** (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rSDntIn6ekE) and answer the questions:

1) How does culture influence an individual's negotiation style, particularly when comparing long-term relationships versus one-time deals?
2) In what ways do different cultures view and interpret the negotiation process, and how does this affect outcomes?
3) What are the cultural implications of different communication styles in negotiations?
4) How does the formality of a culture influence the negotiation process?
5) What role does emotional expression play in negotiations?
6) How do different cultures approach decision-making in negotiations, specifically the difference between group consensus and leader-driven decisions?
7) Why might group decision-making in some cultures lead to misunderstandings in negotiations with cultures that prefer individual decision-making?
8) What is necessary to become a more effective negotiator in a globalized world?

Do you agree that there are culture-specific ways to perceive and resolve conflicts? Consider how Ukrainian culture as a group responds to conflict. You may cite any international or intergroup events involving conflict to support your point of view.

8. Read the article ***Face and Identity in Intercultural Conflict Management*** by Min Hou (Reader p. 125). Sum up the main points of the article and answer the questions on cross-cultural conflicts:

1) What are the primary causes of conflict identified in the article?
2) How does the article define conflict management and its significance in organizational settings?
3) What are the most common strategies for conflict resolution mentioned in the article?
4) What role does communication play in the conflict management process?
5) What are the challenges associated with conflict management in multicultural teams?
6) How can conflicts in remote or virtual teams be handled?
7) What is the impact of emotional intelligence on conflict management?
8) What are the key steps for preventing conflicts in the workplace?
9) What types of conflicts (e.g., task, relationship, or process conflicts) are highlighted in the article, and how are they best addressed?
10) How can leaders mediate conflicts effectively?
11) What are the potential benefits of conflict in an organization?
12) What is the role of feedback in conflict resolution?
13) What is the difference between constructive and destructive conflict?
14) What are the long-term effects of unresolved conflict on team dynamics?

9. The Dutch have a saying *I buy in my language and I sell in yours*. It is a part of the Dutch ethos to be aware of the need to be able to communicate in other languages. What factors, in your opinion, make an ethos flexible as to readiness to speak foreign languages? What conflict management strategies would you expect from such peoples?

Seminar 4

Acculturation, Its Stages and Strategies

1. Comment on the notion of acculturation in cross-cultural communication, its strategies and stages, using the following propmpts:



https://oneworldbeyondborders.com/en/integration-of-migrants-acculturation-strategies/

1. What are the defining characteristics of Assimilation, Separation, Marginalization, and Integration acculturation strategies?
2. What are the benefits and challenges of these strategy in a multicultural setting?
3. Can you provide real-life examples where these strategesеs might be most applicable?
4. How do different individuals, such as immigrants or refugees, experience each strategy differently?

2. Present a case study based on the experiences of immigrants, refugees, or students adjusting to a new cultural environment. An example can be a refugee family relocating to a new country and facing challenges in balancing their own cultural identity with the need to adapt to the new culture or a student studying abroad struggling to adapt to social norms in their new environment.

- Analyse the case study by applying the concepts of acculturation.
- Discuss how the individuals in the case might experience psychological and socio-cultural adaptation.
- Explore how language acquisition and communication challenges impact their acculturation process.
- Discuss the following questions:
  1) What cultural elements would create the most stress during adaptation?
  2) How does the perception of cultural distance impact the duration and intensity of acculturation stress?
  3) What strategies could be used to reduce acculturation stress in a new cultural environment?
  4) What role does communication play in overcoming cultural differences?

3. Comment on the notion of culture shock/acculturation stress and anomie.

1) How do personal traits (e.g., open-mindedness, tolerance) influence one’s ability to adapt to a new culture?
2) What factors (internal and external) are most important in successful acculturation?

3) How can people balance maintaining their own cultural identity while integrating into a new society?

4. Watch the video ***What is Anomie?*** (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dQ7OIt_ZfI8&rco=1) and answer the questions:



https://www.thoughtco.com/anomie-definition-3026052

1) How does Durkheim consider the concept of anomie?
2) What is the transition phase that leads to anomie in society?
3) What feelings are associated with anomie, and when do they affect individuals?
4) Why do individuals feel disconnected from society during periods of anomie?
5) What can the feeling of disconnection and lack of purpose during anomie lead to?
6) How is the concept of anomie associated with the study of suicide?
7) What does Durkheim mean by the term "anomic division of labor"?
8) How did the industrialization of European societies contribute to anomie?
9) What is the difference between "mechanical solidarity" and "organic solidarity"?
10) How does organic solidarity prevent the exclusion of individuals?
11) What prevents anomie in complex societies?
12) What is the clash between traditional and modern societies in the context of solidarity?

5. Comment on the role of language in acculturation:

1) What role does language acquisition play in helping individuals adapt to a new culture?
2) In what ways can language barriers hinder the acculturation process for immigrants and expatriates?
3) How does bilingualism or multilingualism impact the experience of acculturation in a new cultural environment?
4) What challenges do individuals face when trying to learn and use a new language in the process of acculturation?
5) How does language influence the development of social relationships and networks in the acculturation process?
6) In what ways can proficiency in the host culture's language affect an individual's socio-cultural adaptation?
7) How can language shape identity during the acculturation process, particularly in terms of maintaining one's original cultural identity?

8) What role does language play in understanding and integrating into the host culture’s norms, values, and communication styles?
9) How can language serve as a bridge between the immigrant's original culture and the new culture during acculturation?
10) How does code-switching or code-mixing reflect an individual’s journey through acculturation?
11) In what ways can the lack of language support in institutions (such as schools or workplaces) affect the acculturation experience?
12) How does language proficiency correlate with psychological and emotional well-being in the acculturation process?
13) How does language influence the generational differences in acculturation, particularly between parents and children in immigrant families?

4. Read the abstract and answer the questions:

What makes a language that particular language is as much a social as a linguistic question, strikingly so in the case of accents and dialects. Expressions may serve to carry their users’ messages, but they also carry social values.

Learning the first language is a cognitive problem which involves the acquisition of a cognitive system. The resulting abstract representation of the basic categories of language, the acquired conceptual system, and ability to analyse and categorise, are all already available in learning a second language, a process which (…) is confined to learning the linguistic details of the new language. …the new language may be used by the learner to communicate ideas which are typically different from those available to native speakers of that language. [Language and Understanding // Ed. By G.Brown, K.Malmkjar, A.Pollitt, J.Williams. – Oxford University Press, 1995, p.3]

● Give any examples that prove that expressions “carry social values”.
● Do you agree with the statement that learners of a second language may come up with ideas, different from those typical of native speakers? Give your arguments and examples (in case you support the statement).

5. Read the following abstracts and answer questions:

(1) The discovery that anomie could also occur in the foreign language classroom is fairly recent. To a certain extent learning another language does imply adopting other cultural norms and values in settings where the new language is “dominant”. In the early 1970s Canadian researchers Gardner and Lambert discovered that one of the reasons that some pupils were no longer motivated to learn English or French as a second language could be linked to the problem of having to adjust their conception of the world. [De Jong W. Open Frontiers. Teaching English in an intercultural context. – Oxford: Heinemann, 1996, p.14]

(2) …the process of developing a second language identity is that of essentially adding on another personality. There inevitably comes a time when learners

become aware of their new personas in the new language, when instead of just "acting French", for example, they start "to be French" unconsciously, at least occasionally, perhaps doing things they would never think of doing in their native auras. [Acton W.R., Walker de Felix J. Acculturaltion and Mind // Culture Bound. Bridging the cultural gap in language learning. –Cambridge University Press, 1998, p.27-28]

● While studying a foreign language, have you ever felt anomie? What can be done to minimize it? What should a teacher do to help the learner through this stage?
● Have you ever noticed your "another persona" while communicating in a foreign language? What behaviour patterns or actions of a foreign culture have you adopted?

6. Watch the presentation ***The Modern Maze of Cultural Identity*** by Mashaal Hijazi (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-1dFU4ktNfg) and comment on the acculturation process the speaker talks about, the relation between acculturation and identity and the phenomena that interfere with acculturation. Answer the questions:

1) What is the "ideal American citizen" in terms of qualities that are not physically visible?
2) What changes occurred in immigrants' cultural identity after the events of 9/11?
3) What role does racism play in identity crisis?
4) What is the importance of cultural identity in immigrants' home countries compared to the U.S.?
5) Why does racism has "deeper, longer-lasting effects" beyond just legal rights?
6) What is the power of identity?
7) What is the importance of collective identity and the influence of actions, words, and influence in defining who we are?

7. Read the articles ***Does Speaking A Foreign Language Change Your Personality?*** by Frederico Prandi (Reader p. 137) and ***Feel more fun in French? Your personality can change depending on the language you speak*** by Nicola Prentis (Reader p. 139) and answer the following questions:

● Do languages impose their "character" onto their speakers or do speakers use languages in different settings and that is why mistakenly attribute "personality shifts" to languages?
● Do the purpose, the setting (a classroom, a foreign country), the teacher matter for one's well-being and personality while speaking the language? Have you experienced any of these phenomena?

8. Summarize the relation between language acquisition, culture and personality as it is viewed by *Declan Mulkeen*, the author of the article MULTILINGUALS: YOUR PERSONALITY CHANGES WHEN YOU CHANGE LANGUAGE (Reader p. 140) and express your opinion. Give your arguments and examples. Answer the questions:

1) How might a speaker's personality change depending on the language they are speaking?
2) What are the reasons for multilinguals to have different speaking styles when switching between languages?
3) How might the structure of a language influence the likelihood of interrupting another speaker in conversation?
4) What role does culture play in influencing how a person behaves when speaking a different language?
5) What is the difference between multilingualism and multiculturalism?
6) How does growing up in a multicultural environment affect a person's emotional connection to the languages they speak?
7) What does it mean for a multilingual speaker to fully match their linguistic personality with the language they are speaking?
8) How does body language, slang, and tone contribute to a speaker being perceived as truly multilingual?

9. Read the article ***"Acculturation, Interpersonal Networks, and the Learner's Sense of Self: The Effects of Social Relationships on Second Language Learning"*** by Kathy Bluestone (Reader p. 142). Summarize key issues of acculturation, social networks, and identity in second language acquisition and answer the questions:

1) What is the indirect influence of social factors on language learning, and what are some examples of macro and micro policies that impact acculturation?
2) What are the four acculturation strategies and how do they influence language learning?
3) How does Schumann's Acculturation Model explain the role of social integration in second language learning?
4) What is social distance, how is it measured, and how does it impact second language acquisition in different groups?
5) In what ways do social networks affect language use?
6) How does identity shift impact language learners' willingness to use their second language?
7) What role does a learner's self-identity play in their motivation and investment in learning a second language?
8) How do societal and personal forces shape second language learners' identity and motivation**?**

Seminar 5

Intercultural Sensitivity. Cultural Literacy

1. Describe the adaptation model put forward by Milton Bennett:

1) What are the characteristics of each of the ethnocentric stages?
2) What examples can you think of that illustrate each of these stages in real-life cross-cultural interactions?
3) How does each of these stages hinder intercultural communication and understanding?
4) What strategies could be used to move from a lower stage to a more ethnorelative perspective?
5) What are the defining characteristics of each of the ethnorelativist stages?
6) How does each of these stages reflect a more advanced understanding of cultural differences?
7) What examples from your personal or professional life can you relate to each of these stages of adaptation?
8) How can individuals in each of these stages contribute to fostering more inclusive and culturally competent environments?
9) How does the concept of "constructive marginality" challenge traditional notions of cultural identity?
10) What are the psychological and emotional challenges of moving through Bennett's stages of adaptation?
11) In what ways can organizations promote the development of intercultural sensitivity in their members?



https://andhumanity.co/insights/the-humanity-brand-inclusion-framework-our-approach-to-inclusive-marketing/

2. Watch the episode from Russell Peters' show ***How to Become Canadian*** (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AQ9UHoKlwT4). Identify the acculturation strategies used by the characters of the story.

3. Present a case study where an individual or group transitions from an ethnocentric stage to an ethnorelativist stage. Take an example of an immigrant living in a new country who initially resists adapting to the local culture (Defense stage) but gradually learns to respect and integrate local customs (Acceptance stage).

- Analyze the case study by identifying the specific ethnocentric and ethnorelativist stages demonstrated.
- Discuss how the individual in the case could further develop intercultural sensitivity.
- Explore how empathy and understanding of cultural values played a role in the transition.

4. Read the article ***The Cultural Adaptation Process During a Short-Term Study Abroad Experience in Swaziland*** by Nathan W. Conner and T. Grady Roberts (Reader p. 156) and answer the questions:

1) What were the primary stages of cultural adaptation?
2) How did the participants' initial feelings influence their expectations of the study abroad program?
3) What unexpected cultural experiences did the participants encounter, and how did these experiences differ from their pre-trip expectations?
4) How did the participants compare the culture in Swaziland to that of the United States?
5) What role did language barriers play in the participants' cultural adaptation process, and how did they attempt to overcome these barriers?
6) How did the participants' frustration with certain cultural practices influence their overall perception of Swaziland's culture?
7) How did the participants' perceptions of cultural traditions in Swaziland change over the course of the study abroad program?
8) What recommendations were made for future study abroad programs?
9) How did the cultural learning experiences contribute to the participants' development of intercultural sensitivity as described by Bennett's Model of Intercultural Sensitivity?

5. Comment on cross-cultural competence:

1) What are the key characteristics of the linguistic, communicative, and cultural competences?
2) How do these components interact in real-life cross-cultural communication?
3) Why is it important to have a balance between these competencies for successful communication?
4) What are the challenges in developing these competencies in a foreign culture?

https://ic4ml.org/journal-article/the-critical-cultural-literacy-model/

5) How do these components work together to create cross-cultural competence?
6) How does the individual's tolerance for cultural differences promote the achievement of cross-cultural competence?
7) What steps could be taken to improve cross-cultural competence?
8) How does tolerance influence cross-cultural communication?
9) What are some of the common barriers to tolerance in intercultural interactions?
10) How can individuals develop a tolerant attitude when interacting with people from different cultures?
11) In what ways can intolerance negatively affect cross-cultural communication?
12) What is the difference between cultural literacy and cultural competence?
13) How can someone increase their cultural literacy when interacting with members of a different culture?
14) What role does cultural literacy play in reducing misunderstandings and promoting effective cross-cultural communication?

6. Read the first chapter of the book ***Learning Cultural Literacy through Creative Practices in Schools. Cultural and Multimodal Approaches to Meaning-Making*** by T. Lahdesmaki et al. - Introduction: Cultural Literacy and Creativity (Reader p. 170). Summarise the main points and answer the questions:

1) How do the authors define cultural literacy and what role does dialogue play in it?
2) How does the concept of multiliteracies expand the traditional understanding of literacy?

3) What challenges do super-diversified societies pose to the concept of literacy, and how does cultural literacy address these challenges?
4) What are the four thematic groups included in the Cultural Literacy Learning Programme curriculum, and how do they contribute to fostering cultural literacy?
5) How do multimodal communication and visual creations help children express complex ideas related to cultural literacy?
6) What were the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on the Programme?

7. Watch the presentation ***Building Identity as a Third Culture Kid*** by Erik Vyhmeister https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8RCmgMKJRy8. Sum up the points the speaker makes and answer the questions:



https://interactionintl.org/6-flawed-tck-diagrams/

1) What is a Third Culture Kid (TCK) and how does their experience differ from those who grow up in a single culture?
2) How do TCKs create their own "third culture," and why is it distinct from both their parents' culture and the host culture?
3) How did the speaker adaptat to a new culture?
4) What are some common skills that TCKs develop due to their frequent moves and exposure to different environments?
5) How does the speaker describe the challenges of maintaining relationships and saying goodbye as a TCK?
6) What difficulties do TCKs face when trying to answer the question, "Where are you from?"?
7) What impacts TCKs' sense of identity?
8) What strengths and challenges come from the ability of TCKs to adapt and reinvent themselves in new situations?
9) In what ways do TCKs break stereotypes, and how does this contribute to their uniqueness?
10) What is "a third culture"? Do you agree with the speaker that there is a 'third culture"? Give your arguments.

Part II

Language and Cross-Cultural Contacts

Seminar 6

Language contacts and contact languages. Code-switching

1. Based on the materials of the lecture comment on the following issues:

https://multiulb.com/languages-in-contact

- What are contact languages, and how do they differ from their source languages?
- What are the primary differences between pidgins and creoles?
- Discuss the various types of language contact situations. Use examples like Pitkern or Tok Pisin to explain how new languages or language varieties emerge through contact between different linguistic groups.
- How does language contact shape the languages we speak today?
- What are the potential benefits and drawbacks of code-switching in various contexts (e.g., education, workplace, home)?
- What role do you see language contact and code-switching playing in the future of globalized communication?

2. Explore English and French contact in Canada, which is officially bilingual, with both English and French as official languages. The two languages have been in contact for centuries.

- How does this bilingualism manifest in everyday life, particularly in Quebec and New Brunswick?
- How has the interaction between English and French shaped each language in Canada?
- What role does bilingualism play in Canadian identity, especially in Quebec?
- In some parts of Canada, English is becoming more dominant, even in traditionally French-speaking areas. How might language shift affect the future of French in Canada, particularly outside Quebec?

- How does the language situation in Canada accommodate the linguistic diversity brought by immigrants, especially in cities like Toronto and Vancouver?
- How does code-switching between English and French occur in bilingual regions like Montreal? What social factors influence when and why speakers switch between languages?

3. Create a map of major contact zones where new languages or mixed languages developed due to historical circumstances (e.g., colonialism, migration). Explain the factors that led to the development of specific languages in those areas.

https://prezi.com//5e_msyzh32ga/language-contact/?fallback=1

4. Prepare a presentation on a specific pidgin or creole language. Focus on its historical origins, the social factors that influenced its creation, and how it evolved into a fully functioning language. Possible examples: Haitian Creole, Papua New Guinea's Tok Pisin, or Russenorsk.

- What are the key differences between pidgins and creoles?
- How does a pidgin evolve into a creole?
- What social and historical factors contribute to the development of creoles, particularly in colonial contexts?
- Why are pidgins and creoles often viewed as "simplified" or "inferior" languages, and how can we challenge this perception?
- In today's world, are there contexts where new pidgins or creoles are developing?

5. Read the article ***Language contact research: scope, trends, and possible future directions*** by Jeroen Darquennes, Wim Vandenbussche and Joseph C. Salmons, an introduction to the book *Language Contact: An International Handbook* (Reader p. 178). Summarise the main points and answer the questions:

1) How has the field of language contact research evolved from the 19th to the 21st century?
2) What are the three main areas of focus in language contact research?
3) What new trends in the study of language contact have emerged, and how have they influenced the understanding of contact-induced change?
4) How do recent approaches to language contact integrate sociocultural and individual factors, particularly in the study of pidginization, creolization, and mixed languages?
5) What role does technology play in current language contact research?
6) How has the rise of the superdiversity paradigm influenced the study of societal aspects of language contact?
7) What is the role of new terminologies in the understanding of individual language use in multilingual contexts?
8) What future directions does the article suggest for language contact research, particularly in light of global changes such as migration and technological advancement?

6. Comment on the phenomenon of diglossia:
1) How does diglossia function in bilingual or multilingual societies? Provide examples.
2) What are some of the social and educational challenges that arise in a diglossic society, particularly for children who learn the "low" variety at home but are educated in the "high" variety?
3) How do societal attitudes towards the "high" and "low" varieties in a diglossic community shape people's perceptions of language and identity?
4) Can a diglossic situation lead to language shift, where the "low" variety or dialect is gradually replaced by the "high" variety, or vice versa? What conditions could trigger such a shift?

7. Watch the ***What is diglossia?*** video [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KL9ku7c7UTs]. What makes diglossia and bilingualism different? Are they similar in any way?

8. Comment on the phenomenon of language shift:
1) How would you define language shift, and what distinguishes it from other language contact phenomena like borrowings or code-switching?
2) What are some of the key social, political, and economic factors that lead to language shift? How do power dynamics between languages contribute to this process?

3) Can you provide examples of language shift from different parts of the world? What historical or social conditions led to these shifts?
4) How has colonization historically contributed to language shift, particularly in countries in Africa, Asia, and the Americas?
5) How does migration, either voluntary or forced, influence language shift in both the migrants' native communities and the host societies?
6) How does language shift affect cultural and ethnic identity? Can language loss lead to a sense of cultural loss, or are there ways to maintain identity without the language?
7) What strategies can communities and governments implement to slow down or reverse language shift? Are there any successful examples of language maintenance or revitalization efforts?
8) In multilingual societies, what factors determine whether a language survives or undergoes a shift? How do national language policies influence these outcomes?

9. What is code-switching, and what are the key distinctions between situational and metaphorical switching?

10. Read the article ***Five Reasons Why People Code-Switch*** and comment on the reasons for code-switching. Think of any reasons to add to the list (Reader p. 188).

11. Watch the video ***Switching Languages, Accents and Personalities*** (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LFjsBvYIr0A) and answer the following questions:



*https://owlcation.com/humanities/Code-Sw SEQ https://owlcation.com/humanities/Code-Sw * ARABIC 1*

- How do the speakers describe translation/interpretation processes?
- What purposes of speaking a different accent and a different language do the speakers mention?

12. Research a case of language shift or language death (e.g., Kwe´yo` l in St. Lucia or Indigenous languages in the Americas). Explain the socio-political factors that contributed to the language's decline and discuss efforts made to preserve or revitalize the language.

13. Share your own experiences with language contact. This can include learning a second language, traveling to a foreign country, or living in a multilingual community.
- Have you ever found yourself borrowing words from another language in your native language? Why did it happen?
- Have you ever witnessed or practiced code-switching? What was the context?

Seminar 7

Native speaker. Bilingualism

1. Use the lecture materials to comment on the notion of native speaker, assumptions it is grounded on and its controversial nature.

- What are Chomsky's and Hymes' contrasting views on the concept of a native speaker? How does this contradiction impact linguistic theory?
- What are the defining characteristics of a native speaker, and are they universally applicable?
- How does the native speaker concept influence language attitudes, policy, or linguistic research?
- What biases are present in the traditional view of the native speaker?
- What are the alternatives to the native speaker model?

2. Read the article ***The Native Speaker: An Achievable Model?*** by Joseph J. Lee (Reader p. 191) and answer the questions:

https://www.agrolingua.com/en/blog

1) How do Chomsky's and Bloomfield's definitions of the native speaker differ?
2) What essential features define the native speaker?
3) What are the limitations of defining the native speaker based solely on childhood language acquisition?
4) Why monolingualism can not be a determining factor in defining the native speaker?
5) What alternative terms can replace the native speaker model, and why?
6) How has globalization impacted the concept of the native speaker in language teaching?
7) What are the primary arguments against using the native speaker as the ultimate goal for language learners?
8) What are the challenges non-native speakers face in acquiring certain aspects of native-like linguistic competence, such as pronunciation or accent?
9) What concept could serve as a more realistic goal in language teaching?

10) What can shift the goals of language learning away from an unattainable native speaker model?

3. Define bilingualism by mentioning the criteria that a speaker should meet to be considered bilingual. Then watch the video ***What Does it Mean to Be Bilingual?*** (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ABcNewF69Nw). Put down features that you have not thought of to the description of a bilingual speaker, if any.

- What are the traditional criteria for bilingualism?
- What factors are necessary to consider oneself truly bilingual?
- What is the difference between fluency and bilingualism?

4. Based on the material of the lectures comment on the role bilingualism plays in the creation of new languages, and its influence on the evolution of existing languages.

1) What role does language contact between bilingual speakers play in the formation of mixed languages (e.g., Michif or Media Lengua)?
2) Can we view the creation of a lingua franca (e.g., English or Swahili in certain regions) as a direct result of widespread bilingualism?
3) What linguistic features tend to develop or simplify when a language serves as a bridge between different language communities?
4) To what extent can bilingualism lead to language convergence, where two languages gradually merge over time? What are some historical examples where bilingualism led to significant language convergence?
5) How does bilingualism accelerate language change within existing languages?
6) In what ways does bilingualism contribute to language shift?
7) Can consistent code-switching in bilingual communities lead to structural changes in one or both of the languages involved?
8) Can bilingualism lead to dialect formation or the divergence of regional varieties within a language?
9) To what extent does bilingualism challenge traditional models of language evolution that focus on monolingual speakers?
10) How might current trends in global bilingualism influence the future evolution of major world languages?

5. Comment on your personal experiences with bilingualism or multilingualism. Discuss how language contact has shaped your communication in different settings, drawing parallels to the concepts in the lecture.

- How does being bilingual shape one's identity?
- What are the cognitive and social benefits of bilingualism?
- How does bilingualism impact communication in multicultural settings?

https://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/18 SEQ https://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/18

5. Read the article ***Do Bilinguals Have Two Personalities? A Special Case of Cultural Frame Switching*** by Nairan Ramirez-Esparza et al. (Reader p. 197) and answer the questions highlighting how bilingualism and culture interact to influence personality:

1) What is Cultural Frame Switching (CFS) and how does it apply to bilingual individuals?
2) How was the Big Five Personality Inventory (BFI) used to measure differences in bilinguals' personalities across languages?
3) What were the key personality differences identified between Spanish-speaking Mexicans and English-speaking Americans?
4) Which personality traits showed the most significant shifts when bilinguals switched from Spanish to English, and why?
5) Why did the personality shifts observed in bilinguals occur?
6) What are some potential implications of Cultural Frame Switching for bilinguals in professional or social settings?
7) Why were Spanish-English bilinguals chosen for the studies?
8) What are the future directions for research on CFS and bilingualism?

Part III

Linguistic Aspects of Cultural Phenomena

Seminar 8

Multiculturalism

1. Comment on the phenomenon of multiculturalism:

   1) How do we define multiculturalism, and how does it manifest in different societies?
   2) How has multiculturalism evolved over time (e.g. Ottoman Empire, post-WWII migration, or modern-day Canada)?
   3) What are the similarities and differences between historical and modern approaches to multiculturalism?
   4) How does multiculturalism impact individual and group identity?
   5) Can people fully integrate into a multicultural society without losing their cultural heritage?
   6) What is the difference between multiculturalism and assimilation, and which is more beneficial for a diverse society?
   7) How do multicultural societies manage the balance between preserving minority cultures and fostering a sense of national unity?
   8) What are the challenges faced by individuals with hybrid identities in multicultural societies?
   9) How does multiculturalism influence education, language policy, and integration efforts?
   10) How has globalization contributed to the rise of multiculturalism?

2. Watch the speech ***Building a New Cultural Metaphor*** delivered by Wendi Adair[1] (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xb4BousMeZM).

List the metaphors for multicultural societies suggested by the speaker and comment on the meanings implied by each of them.

https://cornerstonealliance.com. austral is-neither-a-melting-pot-nor-a-salad-bowl-it-is-a-mosaic/

[1] Wendi L. Adair is a professor of organizational psychology, University of Waterloo, Canada.

3. Listen to the podcast ***Multiculturalism: A solution to the problems of diversity?*** by Tom Wilkinson published on October 16, 2020 (https://thinkinginenglish.blog/2020/10/16/8-multiculturalism-a-solution-to-the-problems-of-diversity/) and answer the questions:

https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/ multiculturalism-experience-everyone-deserves-teams-fred-rtn-/

1) What is naturalisation, and why might it not be possible or desirable for many people?
2) What challenges do countries face when trying to integrate immigrants into their societies?
3) How do exclusionary systems approach immigration?
4) What rights are often denied to immigrants in countries with exclusionary systems?
5) How does an assimilationary system differ from an exclusionary one in terms of immigrant integration?
6) What sacrifices are immigrants often required to make in assimilationary systems?
7) How can assimilation affect religious beliefs in certain countries?
8) How does multiculturalism provide an alternative to exclusionary and assimilationary systems?
9) What benefits does multiculturalism offer to both immigrants and the broader national community?
10) What are the examples of policies that support multiculturalism in diverse societies?
11) What are the perspectives of multiculturalism in the future?
12) What do you think is the best system for managing immigration, and why?

4. Read the article ***Multiculturalism and interculturalism: redefining nationhood and solidarity*** by Riva Kastoryano (Reader p. 214). Sum up the main points of the article and answer the questions:

1) What are the main theoretical differences between multiculturalism and interculturalism?

2) How does transnationalism challenge both multiculturalism and interculturalism in terms of cultural integration?



https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/ multiculturalism-interculturalism-policies-work-lynda-ford-gaicd/

3) What role does interculturalism play in redefining national identity, especially in contrast to multiculturalism?
4) How do transnational communities affect the concept of national citizenship and belonging?
5) In what ways has the concept of multiculturalism evolved in European countries?
6) What are the key criticisms of multiculturalism?
7) What is diaspora politics influence on multiculturalism and transnational identity?
8) What is the difference between multiculturalism and interculturalism policies in Europe?
9) What is the role of religion in multicultural and intercultural debates?
10) What are the implications of transnationalism for state sovereignty and the management of diversity?

5. Read the transcript of the lecture ***'What is Wrong with Multiculturalism? A European Perpective'*** delivered by Kenan Malik[1] (Reader p. 224) and answer the questions that follow:

1) What are the two different meanings of multiculturalism?
2) What is the difference between diversity as a "lived experience" and multiculturalism as a political process?
3) What are the three myths about immigration and multiculturalism?

[1] Kenan Malik is a British writer, lecturer, and broadcaster with a background in neurobiology and the history of science. As an academic, he focuses on the philosophy of biology and contemporary discussions around multiculturalism, pluralism, and race. Malik is a strong advocate for the values of the 18th-century Enlightenment, which he believes have been misinterpreted and distorted in modern political and scientific discourse. Throughout his career, Malik has consistently championed equal rights, freedom of speech, and a secular society, while defending rationalism and humanism against what he describes as "a growing culture of irrationalism, mysticism, and misanthropy."

4) Why is the perception of European nations becoming plural historically inaccurate?
5) How did European elites historically view their own working-class populations?
6) What is the real reason for the rise of multicultural policies in Europe?
7) What are the examples of failure of multicultural policies?
8) What does the term “plural monoculturalism” refer to?
9) What is the difference in attitude to migrants in Europe before and after the Second World War?
10) How does the "clash of civilizations" theory relate to multiculturalism?

6. Watch the video ***Multiculturalism has failed*** (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EDM0WJ0089o). Give the definition of multiculturalism. Using the video and the materials of the course, list the reasons for its alleged failure and answer the questions:

1) How does Canada’s multicultural policy differ from the melting pot?
2) Why multiculturalism as an ideology has failed in Canada?
3) What are some of the negative effects of cultural enclaves?
4) What is Canadian media response to the challenges of multiculturalism?
5) Why unassimilated multiculturalism has led to social tension and conflict in Canada?
6) What is Canada’s national identity perspective in the context of increasing cultural diversity?
7) Why, according to the speaker, the phrase “diversity is our strength” is insufficient for addressing future challenges in Canada?

https://www.canada.ca/en/canadian heritage/corporate/publications/plans-reports/annual-report-canadian-multiculturalism-act-2015-2016.html

Think if modern social policies to regulate cross-cultural relations are appropriate or have to be changed.

Seminar 9

Language and inequality. Ideology

1. Get ready to comment on discourses and communicative situations that are associated with inequality. Specify each of them. Highlight the following issues:

- In what ways do dominant groups control discourse?
- What role does language play in reinforcing inequality?
- In what ways do institutional communications perpetuate unequal power relations?
- How does socioeconomic status influence the way people communicate in social interactions?
- How do global economic and political discourses shape the way inequality is communicated between countries?

2. Watch the video Pierre Bourdieu on ***Language and Power*** by Dr Alfonso Del Percio[1] (https://massolit.io/courses/language-inequality-and-power) and aswer the questions:

https://massolit.io/courses/language- -inequality-and-power

1) According to Bourdieu, what is language rather than just a tool for communication or knowledge?
2) Why is it important to focus on the listener, rather than just the speaker, when analysing language in society?
3) How does the relationship between speaker and listener involve power, and how does it reflect societal hierarchies?
4) What role does social position play in how language is received and valued?

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[1] Alfonso Del Percio is an Associate Professor of Applied Linguistics at the UCL Institute of Education (IOE). His research interests include ethnographic and discourse analysis, particularly at the intersection of language and political economy. He focuses on topics such as language, migration, governance, and the relationship between language, work, and social inequality.

5) How does the power dynamic differ when a white man speaks to another white man compared to when a racialised person speaks to a white man?
6) What distinction is made between the language use of artists and migrants, and what does this reveal about societal perceptions of language?
7) Why is the value of a sentence or text always linked to the person who produces it?
8) How might the theory of language and power apply to real-world situations involving social inequality?

3. Read the two news reports ***Row over 'sexist' German national anthem*** by Justin Huggler (Reader p. 236). and ***Justin Trudeau interrupts a woman to mansplain 'peoplekind'*** by Andrew Buncombe (Reader p. 237). Get ready to comment on and give your own examples of the phenomenon and its verbalization.

4. Watch the ***Modern Educayshun*** (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iKcWu0tsiZM), analyse the interaction from the point of view of language and non-verbal means used by the speakers to exercise power over each other and answer the questions that follow:

1) How is the concept of "equality" in an educational setting depicted? What specific classroom rules or practices are portrayed as methods to "enforce equality"?
2) What are different concepts of equality?
3) What is the concept of "fairness", and how does it relate to the broader theme of inequality?
4) How does the teacher's authority contribute to the "enforcement of equality"?
5) What language and behavior rules and social consequences could appear when struggle for equality is drawn to the extreme?

5. Watch ***#Equality*** (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XM-HJT8_esM). Express your opinion of the message the video delivers and answer the questions:

1) What aspects of inequality are highlighted in comparison with the previous video?
2) What are the potential pitfalls of enforcing strict equality?
3) What examples or scenarios are used to show the consequences of treating everyone exactly the same?
4) How are the characters or situations in the video impacted by the pursuit of equality?
5) How is the balance between recognizing individual differences and striving for equal treatment portrayed?
6) How does the video address the idea of societal norms and their impact on equality?

6. How is language related to ideology? Comment on linguistic human rights:

1) What are linguistic human rights, and how are they defined within the context of international law?
2) How do linguistic human rights relate to other human rights, such as the right to education, freedom of expression, and cultural identity?
3) What role do linguistic human rights play in the protection and preservation of minority and indigenous languages?
4) How do international organizations like UNESCO and the United Nations support linguistic human rights for minority language speakers?



https://www.slideshare.net/slideshow/ cre-2015-powerpoint/49659892

5) How does the denial of linguistic human rights contribute to social and economic inequality, particularly in multilingual societies?
6) In what ways does linguistic discrimination manifest in workplaces, legal systems, and other public institutions?
7) What are some successful examples of government policies that promote linguistic human rights while fostering social cohesion?
8) How does globalization affect linguistic human rights, particularly in the face of the dominance of languages like English, French, or Spanish?
9) How do modern technologies (e.g., AI, social media, language learning apps) support or challenge the protection of linguistic human rights?

7. Read the article ***The Politics of the Irish Language Under the English and British Governments*** by Sean Cahill (Reader p. 238) and sum up the main points.

8. Watch ***Is the Irish language important?*** (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ownuljxqCHM). Comment on the statement that “There can be no greater delusion than to imagine that a language can be kept alive alone by teaching” (Eoin MacNeill, 1900).

Compare the video with what you will see in ***Can Irish People Speak Irish?*** (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PXhDlYREJyo). Answer the question put in the title.

Compare the linguistic situation with Irish to the situation in any other country you know well enough. Express your opinion on its causes and (possible) consequences.

9. Read the ***article Icelandic language battles threat of 'digital extinction'*** by Jon Henley (Reader p. 246) and get ready

- to sum up the article
- to comment on the role of the Internet in shaping language use.

Watch the speech by Teresa Lynn ***How social media breathes life into the Irish language*** (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LM3ISST2eg8) and get ready

- to sum up the article
- to compare Lynn and Henley's points of view.

10. Get ready to present information on official language policies in the EU and Ukraine.

11. Watch the speech by Patricia Ryan ***Don't insist on English*** (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sCTI5tcnEok). What is the role English plays in the world? Is this role related to ideology? Give your arguments

12. Comment on the connection between language, ideology and identity. Watch the speech by Robyn Giffen ***Identifying Oneself Through Language*** (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mr68goQ1d0s), express your opinion of the points she makes and answer the following questions:

1) How does linguistic identity manifest?
2) How can the development of a writing system for a language strengthen cultural identity?
3) What role does language play in establishing similarities or differences between people from different countries or regions?
4) How does the imposition of a language through colonization reflect broader ideological forces?
5) How does the way we speak or write, including the use of specific accents or spelling, influence the perception of our identity by others?
6) In what ways does a language or writing system serve as a form of resistance or affirmation of a group's unique identity?
7) Why do people care deeply about how their identity is linked to language, as illustrated by the speaker's reaction to being mistaken for an American?

Seminar 10

Religion and Ritual: Communicative characteristics Common features of religious discourse

1. Look up definitions for religion and ritual and work out a definition that matches your idea of both.

https://www.twinkl.co.uk/resources/planit-religious-education-primary-teaching-resources/planit-religious-education-primary-teaching-resources-year-one/planit-religious-education-primary-teaching-resources-year-one-religion-and-rituals

1) How do religion and ritual correlate?
2) What role do rituals play in reinforcing religious beliefs?
3) Are rituals essential for religious experience, or can religion exist without them?
4) Could a belief system be classified as a religion without formal rituals?
5) How do rituals vary across different religions, and what do these variations tell us about the cultural and historical contexts of each religion?
6) What are the common elements of rituals across different faiths, and why might they be universal?
7) How do rituals shape religious identity within a community?
8) In what ways do religious rituals distinguish one group from another and foster a sense of belonging?
9) What is the psychological impact of religious rituals on practitioners?
10) How do rituals function to transmit religious traditions across generations?
11) Can religious rituals evolve over time without losing their significance?
12) What are some examples of rituals that have changed due to modernity, but still hold spiritual value for practitioners?
13) What is the role of symbolic acts in religious rituals, and how do they convey meaning to participants?
14) How do symbols like bread and wine in Christian Communion or fire in Hindu ceremonies function within the ritual framework?
15) How do rituals impact moral and ethical behavior in religious communities?
16) What is the relationship between ritual purity and religious practices across various traditions?

2. Watch the video ***Religion Is A Language*** (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kyliqqbxOlo), based on the interview with Reza Aslan[1], and answer the questions that follow:

1) Comment on religion from the point of view of semiotics using terminology discussed in the course.
2) What is the role of codes in understanding signs? What cultural or linguistic codes are necessary to interpret the signs correctly?
3) What contradictions arise from the Aslan's view on religion?
4) How does the video highlight the role of language in shaping religious identity?
5) What role does language play in the religious rituals or practices?
6) How does the video illustrate the use of language as a tool for conveying religious beliefs and practices? Provide specific examples from the video.
7) How does the video address the use of language in different social contexts?

3. Comment on the correlation of religion and language. Discuss the following points:

1) How the structure and style of sacred language differ from ordinary language.
2) Why are certain languages (e.g., Classical Arabic, Latin, Sanskrit) considered sacred?
3) How do translations affect the meaning and interpretation of religious texts?
4) What was the linguistic impact of translating the Bible into vernacular languages during the Protestant Reformation.
5) How rituals function as performative utterances (based on Austin's Speech Act Theory).
6) The linguistic function of prayers, chants, and mantras in ritual settings.
7) Who has the authority to speak in rituals, and what are the linguistic implications of this?
8) The role of formulaic language in creating sacred space and time during rituals.
9) Can rituals exist without language, or is language an inherent component of ritual?
10) How language encodes and communicates symbolic meanings during rituals.
11) How does language make the invisible (e.g., spiritual beliefs) visible in rituals?
12) How do rituals, through language and symbols, create a sense of sacredness or transcendence?
13) How religious language constructs individual and communal identities.

[1] Reza Aslan is an Iranian-American scholar, author, and television host. Originally raised in Shia Islam, he converted to evangelical Christianity during his youth, but later returned to Islam while continuing to write extensively about Christianity. Aslan has authored four books on religion. In addition to his writing, Aslan has worked in television, hosting the CNN documentary series Believer, which explores global religions. He is a member of both the American Academy of Religion and the International Qur'anic Studies Association.

14) How rituals help to pass sacred languages across generations (e.g., learning liturgical Hebrew, Arabic, or Latin).
15) How religious language practices adapt to cultural shifts (e.g., vernacularization of Latin Mass, contemporary Christian worship songs).
16) How does language change in a religious context challenge or preserve the original message?

4. Read the article ***Language and Religion*** by Webb Keane. (Reader p. 248). Sum up the main points of the article and answer the questions:

1) Why should "religious language" be studied from an anthropological perspective?
2) How do religious language practices differ from everyday language practices?
3) What are the peculiarities of ritual speech, and how do they contribute to the power of rituals?
4) What role do metapragmatic icons perform in a ritual?
5) How does the process of "entextualization" influence the perception and use of religious language across different contexts?
6) What are the implications of decontextualized religious language for the relationship between text and context?
7) What are the participant roles? How do they manifest in religious rituals?
8) How does the shifting of these roles during a religious performance impact the perception of agency and authority?
9) How do religious language practices reflect or challenge language ideologies related to intentionality and agency?
10) How do different religious traditions manipulate linguistic forms to convey divine inspiration or authority?
11) How does the text explain the relationship between religious doctrines and their linguistic expression through social practices?
12) What are the key factors that influence the interpretation and transformation of religious language in different social contexts?

5. Read the concluding chapter in Stephen Pihlaja (ed.), *Analysing Religious Discourse* by David Crystal (Reader p. 262) and answer the questions:

1) What is the significance of pragmatics in religious discourse?
2) What is the role of gesture in the context of pragmatics and religious rituals?
3) What is the challenge in translating religious language?
4) How is inter-religious dialogue addressed from a pragmatics perspective?
5) How does pragmatics apply to religious language?

6) How did the study of religious discourse evolve from the 1960s to the later decades?
7) Why is the dominance of English a concern in the study of religious texts?
8) What role does the study of corpora play in understanding religious discourse?
9) How does online communication impact the study of religious language, and what is the "new normal"?
10) What is the the role of the Internet in relation to religious discourse?
11) How do digital religious communities differ from non-digital ones in terms of language and identity?
12) What is the impact of digital platforms on the interpretation of sacred texts?
13) What impact does the widespread use of mobile phones have on liturgical practices?
14) Why is it becoming difficult to distinguish between online and offline religious practices?
15) What shift is identified in religious experiences due to the move from communal to individual practices?
16) What has accelerated the integration of digital technology into religious practices?
17) What challenges are introduced by online religious services?
18) What specific issues arise in nonverbal communication during online religious services?
19) How does the material world still mediate religious practices even in an online environment?
20) What privacy concerns are associated with studying everyday religious interaction through digital platforms?

6. Watch Mr Bean as a ***Nervous Priest*** episode (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dKkT8_RGDYg&t=90s). Get ready to comment on elements of the communicative situation and the participants' behaviours that make the episode funny.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M1TKzrvntDI

7. Find on the Internet videos of religious rituals and analyse them from the point of view of the participants' verbal and non-verbal behaviours. Get ready to present your observartions and findings.

TESTS

Module Test

Card 1

1. Comment on the notion of native speaker.
2. Follow the link (https://www.ted.com/talks/anna_rosling_ronnlund_see_how_the_rest_of_the_world_lives_organized_by_income) and watch the speech by Anna Rosling Rönnlund. Comment on:

- The message of the speech
- Give the concepts of the course that are relevant to use when analysing the speech. Support your opinion with arguments.

3. Apply the terms discussed in the course to analyse the information in the text below:

The tourism invasion was over now. The shop that made its living through sales of pink lilos and cheap bikinis from Taiwan was now shut until spring, its windows firmly boarded up. Roadside tables now groaned beneath mountains of grapes, and olives steadily ripened, ready for harvesting in December. The passing of summer brought new fruits, welcome rain and, for local people, this was the loveliest of seasons. They were alone again and the clear, sweet air allowed them to breathe.

The real machinery of this Cretan village continued to run well beyond the departure of foreigners. The *zacharoplasteion* still baked its daily quantities of sweet pastries and the best of the tavernas remained open even though the owners of the others had now gone to their winter homes. The priest conducted his services in the tiny chapel on the water's edge.

Life resumed its quiet, ordered ways. Widows in black dresses, their fabric as densely ebony as the day they had begun to mourn, sat on their doorsteps, away from the men, who entertained themselves with backgammon. Dice gently tick-tacked against the side of the board as the players whiled away the hours, moving counter from one triangular space to the next. Counters clicked together in conversation, more talkative than the men themselves.

Their knowledge of each other's lives went so far back into earliest memory that these septuagenarians had little to say to one another. They almost breathed in unison. They would discuss some piece of local news, perhaps the election of a new deputy mayor or a birth or death, but the wider events of the world at large, a crisis in the money markets or an earthquake in Peru, did not touch them even for a moment. Their universe was this small seaside village, this square, the same one where their fathers and grandfathers had sat before them.

Only the elderly lived here now. Most young people had long since deserted, escaping to the bright lights of the island's capital or Athens and only returning with the tourists for a week or two during August to remind themselves of where their ancestors had once lived.

Even now, with night falling, the men carried on playing and drinking their raki. There was a stillness in this moment. [Hislop, Victoria. One Cretan Evening //The Last Dance and Other Stories. – Headline Review, 2012. – P.85-86]

Card 2

1. Comment on language and inequality.

2. Follow the link (https://www.ted.com/talks/devdutt_pattanaik_east_vs_west_the_myths_that_mystify) and watch the speech by Devdutt Pattanaik. Comment on:

- The message of the speech
- Give the concepts of the course that are relevant to use when analysing the speech content. Support your opinion with arguments.

3. Apply the terms discussed in the course to analyse the information in the texts below:

a) Heathrow was, well… Heathrow was, well… it was busy. That's one way of putting it.

It was totally crazy.

I couldn't believe that there were so many people. It was like a renaissance painting of the Day of Judgement come to life.

Or like the opening ceremony at the Olympics.

People of all nationalities, with all manner of exotic outfits, rushed past me, speaking every language under the sun.

Why was everyone in such a *hurry?*

And the noise was deafening. Announcements over the tannoy. Small boys lost. Crown men lost. Expensive luggage lost. Patience lost. Tempers lost. Marbles lost. You name it and there was a good chance that it was lost.

Forgotten that London was like this. There was a time when I would operate at this kind of speed with the greatest of ease. But I was now on Dublin tempo so I had slowed down and kicked back and chilled out. I stood in the arrivals hall, terrified, looking a hick from the sticks, feeling overwhelmed by the number of people, feebly apologizing as people bumped into me and talked loudly to me.

(…) I bought myself a tube ticket and boarded a train for central London. (…) The train was full and every nation on earth had a representative on it.

I don't need to go to an Emergency Council meeting of the United Nations. I've already been there. [Keyes, Marian. Watermelon. – Croydon: Arrow Books, 2006. – P.445-447. – 520p.]

b) In leisurely fashion, pour milk over Crunchy Nut Cornflakes. Breakfast in Knockavoy takes average of forty-three minutes – astonishing length of time. In Dublin, would spend nine seconds cramming slice of toast into mouth while simultaneously applying concealer, watching *Ireland AM* and looking for lost things. [Keyes, Marian. This Charming Man. – L.: Penguin Books, 2009. – 885p. – P.319]

c) DHL man turned box down to read it. "Shoes, is it?"

In Dublin would stare at him coldly for his nosiness. But in Knockavoy can do no such thing. Am obliged to lean shoulder against door-jamb in attitude indicating have all time in world for in-depth chinwag. [Keyes, Marian. This Charming Man. – L.: Penguin Books, 2009. – 885p. – P.324]

Card 3

1. Comment on language and ideology.

2. Follow the link (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rGF7lgDPl1U) and watch the speech by Huda Al-Marashi. Comment on:

- The message of the speech
- Give the concepts of the course that are relevant to use when analysing the speech content. Support your opinion with arguments.

3. Apply the terms discussed in the course to analyse the text below:

…in India it is considered a given that you need a teacher for your Yoga. Unless you were born one of those rare shimmering saints who come into life already fully actualized, you're going to need some guidance along your journey toward enlightenment. If you're lucky enough, you will find a living Guru. This is what pilgrims have been coming to India to seek for ages. Alexander the Great sent an ambassador to India in the fourth century BC, with a request to find one of these famous Yogis and return with him to court. (The ambassador did report finding a Yogi, but couldn't convince the gentleman to travel.) In the first century AD, Apollonius of Tyrana, another Greek ambassador, wrote of his journey through India: "I saw Indian Brahmans living upon the earth and yet not on it, and fortified without fortifications, and possessing nothing, yet having the richness of all men." Gandhi himself always wanted to study with a Guru, but never, to his regret, had the time or opportunity to find one. 'I think there is a great deal of truth,' he wrote, 'in the doctrine that true knowledge is impossible without a Guru.'

A great Yogi is anyone who has achieved the permanent state of enlightened bliss. A Guru is a great Yogi who can actually pass that state on to others. The word *Guru* is composed of two Sanskrit syllables. The first means "darkness", the second means "light". Out of the darkness and into the light. What passes from the master into the disciple is something called *mantravirya:* "the potency of the enlightened consciousness". You come to your Guru, then, not only to receive lessons, as from any teacher, but to actually receive the Guru's state of grace. (…) And this is why you come to a Guru: with the hope that the merits of your master will reveal to you your own hidden greatness.

The classical Indian sages wrote that there are three factors which indicate whether a soul has been blessed with the highest and most auspicious luck in the universe:

1. To have been born a human being, capable of conscious inquiry.
2. To have been born with – or to have developed – a yearning to understand the nature of the universe.
3. To have found a living spiritual master.

There is a theory that if you yearn sincerely enough for a Guru, you will find one. The universe will shift, destiny's molecules will get themselves organized and your path will soon intersect with the path of the master you need. (…) As a general rule, Westerners aren't comfortable with that word [*Guru*]. We have a kind of sketchy recent history with it. In the 70s a number of wealthy, eager, susceptible young Western seekers collided with a handful of charismatic but dubious Indian Gurus. Most of the chaos has settled down now, but the echoes of mistrust still resonate. Even for me, even after all this time, I still find myself sometimes balking at the word *Guru*. This is not a problem for my friends in India; they grew up with the Guru principle, they're relaxed with it. As one young Indian girl told me, "Everybody in India almost has a Guru!" I know what she meant to say (that *almost* everyone in India has a Guru) but I related more to her unintentional statement, because that's how I feel sometimes – like I *almost* have a Guru. Sometimes I just can't seem to admit it because, as a good New Englander, skepticism and pragmatism are my intellectual heritage. [Gilbert E. Eat. Pray. Love. – Penguin Books, 2007. – 445p. – P.162-165]

Final Test

1. Cognitive anthropology views culture as

A everyday practices of an ethnic group
B knowledge shared by members of an ethnic group
C symbolic actions performed by members of an ethnic group on significant occasions

2. The condition in which society provides little moral guidance to individuals, which may evolve from conflict of belief systems and causes breakdown of social bonds between an individual and the community is called

A culture bump
B culture shock
C anomie

3. Language systems, relationships, social representation and norms in the form of attitudes, values, beliefs, and practices are included in the concept of

A language community
B ethnic group
C speech community

4. Diglossia is

A a phenomenon of speaking and understanding two languages
B a situation in which two dialects or languages are used by a single language community, with one of them being vernacular language variety and a second being a highly codified variety used in formal settings
C a disability to recognize and comprehend written words

5. According to Milton Bennett, Ethnocentric stages of intercultural sensitivity do NOT include

A minimization
B defense
C acceptance

6. A judgement of the relative morality of certain actions is involved in

A relationship conflict
B object conflict
C priority conflict

7. External factors of attractiveness in communication include

A partner’s physical attractiveness
B partner’s emotional state
C cognitive similarity between communicants

8. Linguicism can be defined as

A the use of two dialects or languages in a single language community
B sharing a set of linguistic norms and expectations regarding the use of language
C unfair treatment based on the use of language and characteristics of speech

9. A process of interpretation that helps the individual to ascribe certain reasons to events or actions is

A attribution
B stereotypization
C perception

10. A situation when an individual from one culture finds himself or herself in a different, strange, or uncomfortable situation when interacting with persons of a different culture is called

A acculturation stress
B culture bump
C culture shock

READER

Seminar 1

Malle, B. F. (2011). Attribution theories: How people make sense of behavior. In Chadee, D. (Ed.), Theories in social psychology (pp. 72-95). Wiley-Blaclewell. (https://research.clps.brown.edu/SocCogSci/Publications/Pubs/Malle_(2011)_Chadee_chap_precorr.pdf

Attribution theories: How people make sense of behavior

Bertram F. Malle

In social psychology, the term attribution has two primary meanings. The first refers to explanations of behavior (i.e., answers to why questions); the second refers to inferences or ascriptions (e.g., inferring traits from behavior, ascribing blame to a person). What the two meanings have in common is a process of assigning: in attribution as explanation, a behavior is assigned to its cause; in attribution as inference, a quality or attribute is assigned to the agent on the basis of an observed behavior. Despite the connection between these phenomena, they have distinct psychological characteristics (Hamilton, 1998; Hilton, Smith, & Kin, 1995; Malle, in press). This chapter will focus on attribution as behavior explanation because it is a far-reaching cognitive and social phenomenon that is embedded in the larger human search for meaning (Malle, 2004).[1]

The discussion will begin with the undisputed founder of attribution work, Fritz Heider, then briefly visit Jones and Davis's contribution, and move on to Harold Kelley's theoretical model. Because many excellent reviews of the standard views on these theories are available (see note 1), I will spend relatively little time recounting them. My goal is rather to point out aspects of classic attribution theories that are not generally emphasized, highlight historical misunderstandings, and bring to light theoretical difficulties that have not been adequately addressed. In the second half of the chapter I then introduce an alternative theory of behavior explanations that builds on previous theories but tries to overcome their major difficulties.

Heider's Theory of Attribution

Fritz Heider developed models of attribution for both object perception and person perception. His theory of object perception (first described in Heider, 1920, his dissertation) is rarely cited today, but it serves as the foundation for his later theory of person perception.

Heider attempted to solve one of the core philosophical problems of phenomenology: the relation between sensory information and real objects. That is, he asked how it was possible that humans perceive qualities of objects in the world even though all they have are sensations in the mind. Heider argued that real objects shape "media" such as air pressure, light reflections, and sense organs. These media have a considerable degree of variance (for one thing, they reflect many real objects), but the perceptual apparatus reconstructs real objects from their characteristic effects on the media. Heider labeled this reconstruction attribution - a process that generates inferences of the relatively invariant qualities of things from the characteristic variance patterns they cause in their media. Perceivers faced with sensory information thus experience perceptual objects as "out there" because they attribute the sensory data to their underlying cause in the world (Heider, 1920)[2].

After his early work on object perception, Heider turned to the domain of social interactions, wondering how people perceive each other in interaction and especially how they make sense of each other's behavior. Heider proposed that a process of attribution is involved in person perception as well, but he recognized that person perception is more complex than object perception - due to the manifold observational data available and the various causes (e.g., beliefs, desires, emotions, traits) to which these data can be attributed. In addition, it was clear to Heider that persons are very different targets of perception than inanimate objects. Persons are "perceived as action centers and as such can do something to us. They can benefit or harm us intentionally, and we can benefit or harm them. Persons have abilities, wishes and sentiments; they can act purposefully, and can perceive or watch us" (Heider, 1958, p. 21). Note that Heider repeatedly refers to the intentionality of persons, which he considered a core assumption in the conceptual framework that underlies social perception. With the help of such concepts as intentionality and the inference of wishes, purposes, sentiments, and other mental states, Heider argued, perceivers bring order and meaning to the massive stream of behavioral data.

Even though in one sense person perception is like object perception - a process of extracting invariance out of variance - Heider emphasized two distinct features of person perception. The first is that in the social domain, *variance* refers to the agent's stream of ongoing behavior and *invariance* refers to the inferred perceptions, intentions, motives, traits, and sentiments. Heider (1958) sometimes used the term *disposition* to refer to these invariances, and even though he occasionally referred to traits and abilities when talking about dispositions (e.g., pp. 30, 80), he considered "motives, intentions, sentiments ... the core processes which manifest themselves in overt behavior" (p. 34). It was the agent's motives that occupied a special role in Heider's model: "The underlying causes of events, *especially the motives of other persons*, are the invariances of the environment that are relevant to [the perceiver]; they give meaning to what he experiences" (Heider, 1958, p. 81; emphasis added). In social perception, then, Heider's terms *disposition* and *invariance* referred primarily to mental states.

The second distinct feature of person perception is that when people perform a causal (i.e., attributional) analysis of human behavior, their judgments of causality follow one of two conceptual models (Heider, 1958, chap. 4). The first is a model of *impersonal causality,* applied to unintentional human behaviors (such as sneezing or feeling sad) and physical events (such as waves splashing or leaves falling). The second is a model of *personal causality,* which is invoked whenever a human agent performs an intentional action (such as cleaning the kitchen or inviting someone to dinner). "Personal causality," Heider wrote, "refers to instances in which *p* causes *x* intentionally. That is to say, the action is purposive" (Heider, 1958, p. 100).

Unfortunately, subsequent attribution research misrepresented both of these crucial features of person perception. First, even though mental states make up the majority of what Heider subsumed under dispositional properties (Heider, 1958, pp. 31-34, chap. 4, *passim),* most scholars portrayed Heider's notion of *disposition* as referring to stable personality factors (i.e., traits, attitudes, or abilities). For example: "Heider began by assuming that just as objects have enduring qualities that determine their appearances, so people have *stable* psychological characteristics that determine their behavior" (Gilbert, 1998, p. 94; emphasis added). This interpretation of dispositions as necessarily stable can be traced to two early sources. The first is Kelley's (1960) review of Heider's (1958) book, according to which "Heider's central theme is that perception leaps over the raw data presented and enables the person to understand the stable, dispositional properties ... that account for them" (p. 2). The second is Jones and Davis's (1965) influential paper "From acts to dispositions," in which they used the term disposition to refer to character traits and attitudes only. Hence research on *dispositional attribution* became research on trait inferences.

The second misunderstanding was that many scholars mistook Heider's distinction between personal and impersonal causality - the terms he used to characterize intentional versus unintentional behavior (Heider, 1958, pp. 100-101) - for a distinction between person causes and situation causes. Kelley (1967) famously posited that in all explanations, "the choice is between external attribution and internal ... attribution" (p. 194). Attribution research applied this person-situation dichotomy to all behaviors alike, whether intentional or unintentional, and thereby eliminated Heider's central concepts of intention, purpose, and motive from later models of social perception.

Ironically, Heider was credited for - and indeed identified with - "discovering" the simple person-situation dichotomy himself:

> How do we search for the causal structure of interpersonal events? According to Heider, we do so by reliance upon attributions to the environment (external factors) or to something about the other person (internal factors). (Weary, Edwards, & Riley, 1994, p. 292)

> Central to Heider's entire theoretical position is the proposition that man perceives behavior as being caused, and that the causal locus can be either in the perceiver or in the environment. (Hastorf, Schneider, & Polefka, 1970, p. 63)

But why the perception that Heider proposed a person-situation dichotomy in attribution? One small section of his book appears to have spawned this claim (Heider, 1958, pp. 82-84). There Heider characterizes any "action outcome" (the result of an action, not the action itself) as "dependent upon a combination of effective personal force and effective environmental force" (p. 82). In elaborations of this claim (pp. 83-87), Heider offered a complex picture. He argued that for an action outcome to occur, there needs to be a concomitance of two elements: the agent's attempt to perform the action *(trying)* and supporting factors (*can*) that lie in the agent (effort, ability) or in the environment (e.g., opportunity, luck, favorable conditions). *Trying* is the execution of an intention, so Heider stayed true to his analysis of action in terms of intentionality (personal causality). Only for the *can* forces did Heider apply the distinction between person factors and environmental factors, and these *can* forces play a very circumscribed role: they are the necessary elements for an intentional action to be *successful*, the elements that enable the desired outcome to occur (Heider, 1958, p. 109). Such *enabling factor explanations* (Malle, 1999) answer the specific explanatory question of how it was possible that the action outcome was attained (Malle, Knobe, O'Laughlin, Pearce, & Nelson, 2000; McClure & Hilton, 1997), and only for this explanation mode did Heider introduce the distinction between internal and external causal factors. There is no indication in the text that Heider thought people use the internal-external distinction when explaining behavior in general. On the contrary, Heider stated that people explain *why* a person is trying to do something by referring to the "reasons behind the intention" (Heider, 1958, p. 110; see also pp. 125-129).

The contrast between the two types of explanations - why the action was chosen and what enabled it to succeed - can be illustrated with the following passage from Gilbert (1998, p. 96):

> If a pitcher who wishes to retire a batter (motivation) throws a burning fastball (action) directly into the wind (environmental influence), then the observer should conclude that the pitcher has a particularly strong arm (ability). If a batter tries to hit that ball (motivation) but fails (action), then the observer should conclude that the batter lacked coordination (ability) or was blinded by the sun (environmental influence).

The observer's reasoning here is entirely focused on accounting for successful or failed outcomes; the question of *why* the batter and the pitcher acted as they did is not answered by reference to either arm, wind, or sun. This *why* question is already answered by mentioning the pitcher's obvious desire to retire the batter and the batter's obvious desire to hit the ball and get a run. Talking about the arm, wind, and sun, by contrast, answers the question of how the *outcome was attained* (Malle et al., 2000).

In an interview with Bill Ickes (1976, p. 14), Heider explicitly distinguished between these two questions and hence between two types of explanation:

1. the attribution of *outcomes* to causal factors (i.e., enabling factor explanations);
2. the attribution of *intentional actions* to the actor's motives (i.e., reasons for acting).

Heider himself never developed a model of motive attributions or reason explanations, and he felt that these explanations had not been adequately treated by contemporary attribution work (Ickes, 1976, p. 14). By contrast, Heider felt that outcome attributions (e.g., what made a student fail or succeed on a test) were well developed in Weiner's work (e.g., Weiner et al., 1972; Weiner, 1986).

The misperception that Heider proposed the external-internal dichotomy as the fundamental dimension of explanation may thus stem from a confounding of outcomes (explained by enabling factors) and actions (explained by motives or reasons). The following passages from Hastorf et al. (1970) illustrates this confusion:

> Presumably the outcomes of action are caused by some combination of personal characteristics and environmental forces [outcome attribution]. The person may have done something because he had to do it ... or because he wanted to do it [action explanation]. (p. 64)
>
> When we infer that the combination of ability and effort was stronger than the external forces, we infer that internal causality was present [outcome attribution]. Only then do we say such things as "he did it because he wanted to" [action explanation]. (p. 89)

In both of these passages, the authors treat two different explanatory questions as if they were one and the same. The judgment whether "he did it because he wanted to" or "because he had to do it" clarifies the agent's reasons for an action. These reasons can be given even before the agent tries to perform the action because reasons explain the intention, whether or not the intention gets fulfilled. By contrast, the judgments about ability, effort, or external forces clarify how it was possible that the action outcome was attained (an enabling factor explanation). This explanation can only be given after the agent tried to perform the action - if he succeeded - whereas reason explanations track the motivation for the action in the first place.

Thus, whereas Heider has been consistently credited with introducing the person-situation dichotomy in attribution theory, Heider's actual theory was predicated on the distinction between *personal causality* (which accounts for intentional events) and *impersonal causality* (which accounts for unintentional events) - later recognized as a central element in social cognition (Malle, Moses, & Baldwin, 2001; Zelazo, Astington, & Olson, 1999). Heider's analy-sis of personal causality revealed a complex set of mental states centered on intention, and people, when trying to make sense of intentional behavior, attempt to infer those states (such as beliefs, wishes, and sentiments), which were the reasons that guided the actor's behavior.

Jones and Davis's Abandoned Theory of Explanation

Jones and Davis (1965) were the first to introduce a theory of dispositional inference, specifying conditions under which a perceiver infers a stable disposition (personality trait or attitude) from an agent's behavior. But before they introduced this theory, the first few pages of their famous chapter appeared to go in a different direction. They targeted just the issue that Heider had left open: exactly how people explain intentional action by means of motives or reasons. In this short section, entitled "The Naive Explanation of Human Action:

Explanation by Attributing Intentions," the authors attempted to account for "a perceiver's inferences about what an actor was trying to achieve by a particular action" (p. 222) and the process of finding "sufficient reason why the person acted" (p. 220), because "the perceiver's explanation comes to a stop when an intention or motive is assigned that has the quality of being reason enough" (p. 220). Despite an apparent plan to present a theory of action explanation by reasons, this was the last that Jones and Davis wrote about action explanations.[3] They immediately turned to the conditions under which perceivers infer traits (e.g., arrogance or dominance; see p. 223) from single behavioral events. This theory was refined by Deborah Conliffe in several models of dispositional attribution (e.g., Gilbert, Pelham, & Krull, 1988; Quattrone, 1982), and it inspired research on stereotypes (e.g., Gilbert & Hixon, 1991; Yzerbyt, Rogier, & Fiske, 1998), judgment biases (e.g., Ross, 1977), and impression formation (e.g., Reeder, 1997; Trope, 1986). However, Jones and Davis (1965) wholly left behind the social perceiver's attempt to find the agent's reasons for acting,[4] and it was up to the next attribution theorists to tackle this question.

Kelley's Theory of Attribution as Causal Judgment

Kelley's (1967) paper on attribution theory in social psychology is generally considered the first systematic and general treatment of lay causal explanations. Kelley's self-ascribed goal in the paper was "to highlight some of the central ideas contained in Heider's theory" (Kelley, 1967, p. 192). Specifically, the two central ideas on which Kelley focused were:

1. In the attribution process "the choice is between external attribution and internal ... attribution" (Kelley, 1967, p. 194).
2. The procedure of arriving at these external or internal attributions is analogous to experimental methodology.[5]

Two questions must be considered here, one historical, one substantive. First, were these two ideas really central to Heider's theory, as Kelley claimed? Second, do the two ideas together provide a strong foundation for a theory of behavior explanation?

As argued earlier, Heider applied the external-internal dichotomy to action outcomes that either succeeded or failed. Explanations of intentional action, by contrast, involve the agent's reasons, and for Heider an external-internal distinction was not useful in this domain. Nonetheless, to support the notion that Heider considered the process of explaining as analogous to experimental methodology (what Kelley termed the covariation principle), Kelley quoted a passage from the very end of Heider's book (Heider, 1958, p. 297), which is itself largely based on the section "Attribution of Desire and Pleasure" (Heider, 1958, pp. 146-160). In this section, however, Heider focused entirely on the attribution of impersonal or unintentional events such as enjoyment. Heider never claimed that all behavioral events are explained by means of covariation. Historically, then, Heider provided at best partial backing for Kelley's two postulates.

Whether Kelley correctly represented Heider or not, the question remains whether Kelley's theory generally accounts for folk explanations of behavior - and not merely for unintentional events. As a starting point, consider the following example that Kelley offers to illustrate the attribution process:

> Am I to take my enjoyment of a movie as a basis for an attribution to the movie (that it is intrinsically enjoyable) or for an attribution to myself (that I have a specific kind of desire relevant to movies)? The inference as to where to locate the dispositional properties responsible for the effect is made by interpreting the raw data (the enjoyment) in the context of subsidiary information from experiment-like variations of conditions. (Kelley, 1967, p. 194)

This example features an actor's attempt to explain enjoyment - an unintentional event. Indeed, throughout his chapter Kelley applies this attribution analysis to *"effects* such as experiences, sensations, or responses" (p. 196) and "impressions" (p. 197), as well as arousal states and evaluative reactions (pp. 231-232). All of these events are unintentional. Kelley occasionally claimed that his model also extended to the case of "inferring a person's intentions from knowledge of the consequences of his actions" (p. 196, see also p. 193). However, no theory, empirical data, or examples clarified how this process might work.

Of course, the absence of such clarification is not yet proof that Kelley's model fails to account for intentional actions. But difficulties emerge quickly when one applies either the person-situation dichotomy or covariation reasoning to intentional actions.

Consider the following scenario:

> Having just arrived in the department as a new Assistant Professor, Pauline finds in her mailbox a note that says "Let's have lunch tomorrow. Faculty club at 12:30? - Fred." Pauline is a bit surprised. She met Fred W. during her interview, but she wouldn't have expected him to ask her out for lunch.

Pauline now tries to explain Fred's (by assumption intentional) action of leaving the note in her mailbox. Kelley's attribution model would suggest that Pauline's choice is between a person attribution (something about Fred caused the action) and a situation attribution (something about the circumstances caused the action). But right away, this is a confusing choice. Surely something about Fred must have been present in order for him to put the note in her mailbox: motives, an intention, a fairly controlled movement - all inescapable implications of Fred's action being intentional. In some basic sense, intentional actions are always caused by the person (D'Andrade, 1987; Heider, 1958; Kruglanski, 1975; Malle & Knobe, 1997). At the same time, the situation had to play some role in Fred's choice as well - but the situation as *subjectively represented* by Fred. He wouldn't have put this note in Pauline's mailbox if he hadn't *expected* her to check her mailbox and if he hadn't *thought* about a good time and place for the lunch and had not *hoped* her response to the invitation to be positive. If Pauline knew Fred's deliberations, she would at once understand and be able to explain why he wrote the note. By contrast, she would not be able to explain it with the obvious conclusion that "something about Fred caused the action" or the vague insight that "something about the situation caused the action."

Is there a sense in which the "experimental methodology" Kelley has in mind could prove useful? If Pauline engaged in covariation reasoning, she would have to ask the three famous questions about consensus, distinctiveness, and consistency to arrive at a plausible explanation of Fred's action. If we play it by the books, however, this will generate few answers. Assume that no other faculty member has so far, on Pauline's first day on the job, left a note in her mailbox (low consensus). What can she conclude from that? Fred may have wanted to welcome her, or go out on a date with her, or discuss some common research ideas with her - there are just too many possibilities. All of these explanations might be labeled "person attributions," because they are possible goals/desires Fred had when leaving the note. But making a sheer person attribution is uninformative in this case. Pauline does not doubt that Fred had some goal; she rather wonders what goal Fred had.

Similar problems arise with the other covariation questions: has Fred performed this kind of action before? Pauline won't know, but assuming she finds out that this is the first time Fred did it (low consistency), she learns only that his action has something to do with her or with this particular point in time, while still not knowing *why* he did it. Finally, consider that Fred has left this kind of note with other people as well (low distinctiveness). In this case, Pauline may conclude that Fred shows some habit, which is also of limited use. She would want to know specifically whether his habit is to invite all new faculty members, or only women, or members of her research area, etc. Systematic collection of such covariation information (if available) may sometimes prove helpful by ruling out some possible explanations of the action in question. For example, if Pauline somehow learns that Fred doesn't act this way with others and that others don't act this way, it can't just be a habit or department culture. But there are still critical steps to go, and in those steps the explainer will not try to choose between "person" and "situation" but rather infer specific goals, beliefs, and the like, that were - in the explainer's assessment - the reasons for the agent's action.

Over the years, Kelley's covariation model or refinements of it have been tested empirically and appeared to receive reasonable support (e.g., Forsterling, 1992; McArthur, 1972; Sutton &McClure, 2001). However, these studies suffered from a pair of heavy demands. First, they used person/situation ratings as dependent measures; people were not actually asked to provide natural explanations. Second, the experimenter always presented covariation information to the participants, and unsurprisingly they made use of it. There is no evidence that people spontaneously search for covariation information when trying to explain behavior.

Lalljee, Lamb, Furnham, and Jaspars (1984) asked their participants to write down the kind of information they would like to have in order to explain various events, and covariation information was in low demand under these conditions. Similarly, Ahn, Kalish, Medin, and Gelman (1995) allowed people to choose between receiving covariation information or some other information, and explainers were less interested in covariation information than in information about generative forces or mechanisms. Nonetheless, we can safely assume that people occasionally seek out covariation information for such unintentional events as headaches or moods and such outcomes as success or failure. These events occur repeatedly, in different contexts, and for many people, thus making covariation information more readily available. However, as we have seen, covariation reasoning about person and situation causes is ineffectual in the case of explaining intentional actions (Knobe & Malle, 2002).

To summarize, Kelley's (1967) model of attribution contains two core propositions: (a) that attribution is a choice between external and internal causes and (b) that the cognitive procedure by which people arrive at this choice is covariation assessment. Both propositions are problematic. First, the internal-external dimension may be a relevant distinction in explanations of unintentional events, but it does not capture people's explanations of intentional action. Second, covariation assessment is used far less than has been commonly assumed, and it is not at all useful as a method to generate explanations of intentional actions.

Other Attribution Research

The three classic works by Heider, Jones and Davis, and Kelley were not the only important contributions to the study of attribution. In particular, Weiner made seminal contributions to our knowledge of outcome attribution (Weiner, 1986; Weiner et al., 1972). In the domain of achievements, he analyzed the emotions and evaluations people have of others who succeed or fail. He highlighted the causal dimension of stability as complementing externality-internality and showed that people who failed because of lack of effort (unstable internal) were evaluated more negatively than those who failed because of inability (stable internal). Later Weiner also analyzed other outcomes that happen to people, such as sickness or stigma, and he focused on the dimension of controllability to account for social perceivers' responses to such outcomes (Weiner, 1995). For example, people are more angry at agents who suffer negative outcomes brought about by controllable causes (e.g., illness because of risky behavior) than agents who suffer negative outcomes brought about by uncontrollable causes (e.g., illness because of a genetic precondition).

An overlooked aspect of Weiner’s (1986, 1995) work is that it provides considerable evidence against Kelley’s theory, because two additional attribution dimensions are needed besides external-internal to account for people’s emotional and moral responses to outcomes, and Weiner’s predictions were developed without reference to covariation reasoning.

However, like models of dispositional attribution and covariation reasoning, Weiner’s models of outcome attribution do not speak to Heider’s demands for a theory of action attribution. Folk explanations of intentional action remain to be accounted for.

More in Heider’s spirit, Buss (1978) argued that ordinary people do not explain all behavior with causes (as Kelley had suggested) but rather use reasons to explain intentional behavior. Reasons and causes are fundamentally different types of explanation, so Buss, and attribution theory confounded the two. Buss’s (1978) article drew rather negative responses (e.g., Kruglanski, 1979; Harvey & Tucker, 1979), and mainstream attribution theory remained unaffected by his critique. Over the next decade, other scholars launched similar critiques, arguing that reasons are an autonomous form of explanation (Locke & Pennington, 1982) and that attribution theories must incorporate reasons and goals into their conceptual repertoire (Lalljee & Abelson, 1983; Read, 1987; for a review see McClure, 2002). However, such an integration proved difficult, in part because it was not made sufficiently clear why reasons are used to explain intentional behavior in the first place. What makes intentional behaviors so special that they require a unique mode of explanation?

An important contribution to attribution theory emerged in a series of papers on the conversational nature of explanations (Hilton, 1990; Kidd & Amabile, 1981; Turnbull, 1986), which characterized explanations as answers to *why* questions. Such question-answer pairs sometimes occur in people’s own heads, but more often they occur as an actual conversational exchange between a questioner and an explainer. This conversational analysis comes with the important implication that, in answering a *why* question, explainers must take into consideration (a) exactly what the questioner finds puzzling (Hilton & Slugoski, 1986; Turnbull, 1986) and (b) what information the questioner already has available (Slugoski, Lalljee, Lamb, & Ginsburg, 1993). In a sense, the explainer anticipates what kinds of possible answers the questioner had in mind when asking the question (Bromberger, 1965).

The insight that explanations are subject to conversational processes was a minor revolution, because it pulled attributions out of their cognitive rabbit hole and highlighted the fundamentally social nature of explanations. However, research into the conversational features of explanations still did not challenge the conceptual apparatus of person-situation causes inherited from Kelley (Norenzayan & Schwarz, 1999).



Figure 3.1 A model of the folk concept of intentionality.

Adapted from “The folk concept of intentionality,” by B. F. Malle and J. Knobe, 1997, *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 33, 101–121. © Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc., with permission.

The preceding overview has pointed to a number of shortcomings in classic and contemporary attribution theories. First, after Heider, the conceptual framework underlying people’s explanations was grossly simplified, ignoring such important concepts as intention, goal, and reason. As a result, no adequate accounts of intentional action were offered.

Second, covariation analysis was the only psychological process postulated to drive people’s construction of explanations, but because it is used much less than was previously assumed, other processes need to be explored. Third, the conversational aspects of explanations, though clearly important, must be integrated with their conceptual and cognitive aspects.

To resolve these problems, we need to first locate behavior explanations in their proper folk-conceptual framework - the network of concepts that people use to make sense of human behavior. Second, we need to specify the psychological processes that enable people to construct explanations. And third, we need to track the communicative and linguistic manifestations of explanations because they are clearly used for a variety of social-interactive goals, and language is the tool that accomplishes these goals. The folk-conceptual theory of behavior explanation (Malle, 1999, 2004) tries to meet all three of these objectives.

The Folk-Conceptual Theory of Behavior Explanation

Folk concepts of mind and behavior

Past attribution theories ascribed to laypeople a simple framework of "effects" (behaviors, outcomes, or events) and "causes," with the latter falling into personal (dispositional or internal) and situational (external) causes. This framework is incompatible with what we know about children's emerging theory of mind and behavior - the conceptual network that 4-5-year-olds rely on when interpreting human behavior (Perner, 1991; Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997; Wellman, 1990). In children's theory of mind, we see the importance of a concept of intentionality, of the mind contrasted with observable behaviors, and of specific mental states, such as beliefs and desires, that are used to explain intentional behavior (Bartsch & Wellman, 1995). It is rather unlikely that when they grow up people forget these concepts and distinctions and suddenly begin to explain behavior using a person-situation dichotomy.

Instead, the adult's folk conception of mind and behavior is continuous with the child's framework, with more numerous and more subtle distinctions but essentially the same two-part structure. First, people have perceptual and cognitive systems that filter, group, and integrate certain stimulus inputs into such concepts or categories as *agent, intention, belief,* and *reason* (D'Andrade, 1987; Kashima, McIntyre, & Clifford, 1998; Leslie, 1995; Malle, 2004; Malle & Knobe, 1997). Second, people make assumptions about these categories and their relationships (Fodor, 1992; Morton, 1996). For example, coordinated movements of agents are classified into the category *intentional action* (Wellman & Phillips, 2001; Woodward, Sommerville, & Guajardo, 2001), and the concept of intentional action relies on the interplay of multiple mental state categories, including *belief* and *desire* (Malle & Knobe, 1997). Intentionality is arguably the core of this framework (Malle et al., 2001). It directly connects behavior with mind by classifying a behavior as intentional when it is characteristically generated by certain mental states (such as belief, intention, and awareness). This centrality of intentionality was already postulated by Heider (1958), but using the different term "personal causality." This postulate had the least impact on subsequent attribution research, and the greatest weakness of past attribution theories has therefore been the treatment of intentional action. The folk-conceptual theory of explanation tries to address this weakness.

Intentionality. When explaining behavior, people distinguish sharply between intentional and unintentional events (Malle, 1999, 2004, 2007). Social perceivers show a high level of agreement in their intentionality judgments (Malle & Knobe, 1997), and they do so by relying on a shared folk concept of intentionality (Figure 3.1). This concept includes five requirements for an action to be judged as intentional: the action must be based on a desire for an outcome, beliefs about the action's relationship with this outcome, a resulting intention to perform the action, and skill and awareness when actually performing it (Malle & Knobe, 1997, Studies 2-4). Subsequent studies showed that the core concept of intention is seen as a choice and commitment to act that flows from a reasoning process, in which the agent weighs a number of beliefs and desires and settles on a course of action (Malle & Knobe, 2001; Monroe & Malle, 2010).

Modes of explanation. Unintentional events are explained by referring to "mechanical" causal factors (e.g., physical objects and events, but also traits or others' behaviors), and we may label them *cause explanations* (top of Figure 3.2). That is because people presume no other link mediates between behavior and explanation besides causality (i.e., no components of intentionality such as awareness or intention). Consider the following examples, extracted from original transcripts:

I almost failed my exams. - Why? - Oh, 'cuz I didn't really prepare for them.

My dad got mad with me because something was wrong with my computer and he did notknow how to fix it.

A friend cried on the phone. - Why? - She felt that no one loved her.

In contrast, explanations of intentional behavior are far more complex because the folk conception of intentional action is far more complex. As a result, explanations of intentional action break down into three modes (bottom of Figure 3.2): reason explanations, causal history of reason explanations, and enabling factor explanations.

Reason explanations. Reason explanations are the most frequently used mode, comprising about three-quarters of all action explanations (Malle, 2004; Malle, Knobe, & Nelson, 2007). They link directly to the heart of the intentionality concept - the reasoning process leading up to an intention. The concept of intentionality specifies two paradigmatic types of reasons that precede the formation of an intention: the agent's desire for an outcome and a belief that the intended action leads to that outcome. For example, a student explained why she chose psychology as her major by saying, "I want to go to graduate school in counseling psychology [desire]; I think psychology is the right major to have as background for counseling psychology [belief]." In many naturally occurring explanations, other reasons are mentioned in addition to or instead of the paradigmatic reasons, such as desires for avoiding alternative outcomes, beliefs about the context, beliefs about consequences, and expressions of valuing the action itself.



Figure 3.2 Four modes of explanation for unintentional and intentional behavior.

Adapted from "How people explain behavior: A new theoretical framework," by B. F. Malle, 1999, *Personality and Social Psychology Review,* 3, 23-48. © Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.

Reasons have two defining features: subjectivity and rationality. Subjectivity refers to the fact that reason explanations are designed to capture the agent's subjective reasons for acting. That is, social perceivers normally try to reconstruct the considerations the agent underwent when forming an intention, and they thus take the agent's subjective viewpoint when explaining the action. For example, the explanation "She thought she was late for her class" in response to the question "Why did she rush off?" illustrates the subjectivity assumption, because the explainer subtly distances himself from the agent's belief and implies that, in reality, she probably was not late. But it was that subjective belief, not objective reality, that guided the agent's action and thus explains it.

Rationality, the second defining feature of reason explanations, refers to the fact that the contents of mental states that are cited as reasons have to hang together so as to offer support for the “reasonableness” of the intention and action they brought about. For an intentional action to be adequately explained by reasons, the action must fulfill the agent’s predominant desire in light of her beliefs. Philosophers often speak of a “practical reasoning argument,” in which reasons are the premises and the decision to act is its conclusion. Consider the following explanation: “Why did you go running?” - “Because I wanted to get in better shape, and ... I figured that I can do that by going running.” Schematically:

X wanted O [to get in better shape].

X believed that A [going running] leads to O [getting in better shape].

Therefore, X decided to A [go running].

In everyday conversation, the logic of rationality will be somewhat cursory and the premises will not always be made explicit. In the earlier example of an agent rushing off, the action was rationally supported by her belief that she was late for class and the unmentioned but implied desire to be on time for class. The action would not have been rationally supported if the agent had thought there was plenty of time left or if she had had no desire to be on time. Social perceivers would consider it irrational to rush off in this case, or they would assume that some other reason can explain the action in a rational way.

Causal history of reason explanations. Even though people explain most intentional behaviors by reference to the agent’s reasons, they explain some of them by pointing to factors that lay in the background of those reasons. These factors can be subsumed under the label *causal history of reasons* (CHR) and include such forces as the agent’s unconscious mental states, personality, upbringing, culture, and the immediate context (Malle, 1994, 1999; Malle et al., 2000; O’Laughlin & Malle, 2002). Whereas reason explanations try to capture what the agent herself considered and weighed when deciding to act, causal history explanations take a step back and try to capture what *led up to* the agent’s reasons in the first place. For example, when clarifying why Kim didn’t vote, an explainer might say “She is lazy” or “Her whole family is apolitical.” These statements provide explanations of an intentional action, but they do not pick out Kim’s subjective reasons for not voting. Causal history of reason explanations help explain an intentional action by citing causal antecedents to the agent’s reasoning and her decision to act, but there is no assumption that the agent actively considered those antecedents in her reasoning process. Hence, when an explainer states that “Kim didn’t vote because she is lazy,” he does not imply that Kim reasoned: “I am lazy; therefore I shouldn’t vote.”

Thus, even though CHR explanations help explain intentional actions, they are not subject to the constraints of subjectivity and rationality as reason explanations are (Malle et al.,2000. The agent need not have considered or even been aware of the causal history factors cited in the explanation, nor do CHR factors provide rational support for an explained action. Offering CHR explanations is therefore not an act of perspective taking but rather takes attention away from the element of choice and intention and locates the agent’s action in a broader causal nexus.

Enabling factor explanations. The third, and relatively rare, mode of explaining intentional action refers to factors that enabled the action to come about as it was intended. These enabling factor explanations refer to the agent’s skill, effort, opportunities, facilitating circumstances, and the like. Whereas reason explanations and CHR explanations focus on clarifying what *motivated* the agent’s intention and action, enabling factor explanations take it as a given that the agent had motives and attempt to clarify how it was possible that the action was successfully performed. For example, “She hit her free throws because she had practiced all week.” This is not a motivational account of why the agent decided to hit the free throws; rather, the agent’s practicing is identified as the critical factor that allowed her to perform the action the way she had intended. Consequently, enabling factor explanations are offered primarily for difficult actions.

The folk-conceptual framework for explaining behavior thus contains four modes of explanation: people explain unintentional behavior with causes, and they explain intentional behavior by either referring to the agent's reasons, citing causal factors that lay in the history of those reasons, or clarifying what factors allowed an agent to successfully perform an intended action. Before we move on to the psychological processes that guide people's choices among these modes, we need to briefly examine reason explanations more closely, for they have two further features that have shown to have psychological significance: explainers can offer either belief reasons or desire reasons, and they can mark those reasons with appropriate mental state verbs (such as "thought," "wanted") or leave them unmarked.

Belief and desire reasons. In people's folk concept of intentionality, both beliefs and desires serve as necessary conditions of an intention to act (Malle & Knobe, 1997), and both are frequently cited in explanations of intentional action. For example, when explaining why Ian has been working so much lately, one might cite a desire such as "He wants that promotion" or a belief such as "He realizes the project is due in a week." At times it may not matter whether the explainer mentions a belief reason or a desire reasons because one implies the other ("He thinks hard work will get him the promotion" "He wants that promotion").

But at other times it matters quite a bit. For one thing, belief reasons, more than desire reasons, provide idiosyncratic details about the agent's decision-making process, such as rejected options, specific plans of action initiation, and considered long-term consequences.

For another, belief reasons refer to the agent's thinking and knowledge, drawing attention to the agent's rational, deliberative side, whereas desire reasons highlight what the agent wants, needs, hence lacks (Malle et al., 2000).

Mental state markers. A reason explanation can be linguistically expressed in two different ways. The explainer may use a mental state verb to mark the type of reason cited (i.e., a belief or desire), or the explainer may omit such a verb and directly report the content of that reason. Suppose our explainer is faced with the question "Why did she go to the Italian cafe?" If he chose to cite a desire reason, he could use the marked form:

She went to the cafe because <u>she wants</u> to have an authentic cappuccino.

Or he could use the unmarked form:

She went to the cafe [___] to have an authentic cappuccino.

Likewise, if the explainer chose to cite a belief reason, he could use the marked belief reason:

She went to the cafe because <u>she thinks</u> they have the best cappuccino.

Or he could use the unmarked belief reason:

She went to the cafe because [___] they have the best cappuccino.

Marked or unmarked reasons do not express two different hypotheses about why the action was performed; rather, they express the same hypothesis in two different ways. This difference is not trivial, however. Citing or omitting mental state markers can serve significant social functions, both for self-presentation and for conveying one's attitude toward the agent (Malle, 1999; Malle et al., 2000).

In the context of several examples of CHR explanations and reason explanations, Table 3. 1 shows both types of reasons, marked and unmarked. (More examples of all modes and types can be found in Malle, 2004). Note that causal history factors can refer to the person, the situation, other people, traits, mental states, or interactions among them. In principle, this choice of "causal locus" could have psychological significance, but in our studies we have found no interesting correlates - neither for CHR explanations nor for cause explanations (e.g., Malle et al., 2007; O'Laughlin & Malle, 2002).

Table 3.1 Reason explanations and Causal History of Reason (CHR) explanations for three behaviors.

Behavior	*Reason explanation*	*CHR explanation*
Kim chose not to vote in the last election.	She thought none of the candidates was trustworthy. *[marked belief reason]* She didn't want to support the system. *[marked desire reason]*	She doesn't realize that every vote counts. She is lazy.
Brian used heavy drugs last Sunday at the party.	He was curious what it would feel like. *[marked desire reason]* He thought it would be cool. *[marked belief reason]*	A bunch of others used them. He grew up in a drug-dealing home.

Note. The terms *marked* and *unmarked* refer to reason explanations that are expressed either with or without a mental state marker ("he thought," "she wanted"). Adapted from "How people explain behavior: A new theoretical framework," by B. F. Malle, 1999, *Personality and Social Psychology Review, 3,* 23-48. © Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc., with permission.

Interlude: measurement concerns

Previously offered alternatives to attribution theory were not able to unseat the traditional theory. This may be in part because those alternatives were not comprehensive enough - focusing, for example, only on goals or only on conversational structures. But another obstacle was researchers' deeply ingrained habit of using only rating scales to assess attributions. Participants were typically asked to express their explanations on predefined person/situation scales rather than in the more natural form of verbal utterances. As a result, people had to transform their complex explanatory hypotheses into simple ratings, and the fact that they were willing and able to do so was mistaken for evidence that they actually thought in those simple terms.

A few studies analyzed free-response explanations, but the coding was again limited to person-situation categories. This person-situation coding reflects the linguistic surface of explanations, such as the use of mental state markers (McGill, 1989; Nisbett, Caputo, Legant, & Marecek, 1973; for evidence and discussion, see Malle, 1999, Study 4, and Malle et al., 2000, Study 4). Predictable distortions result from treating intentional action explanations within the person-situation frame, illustrated by the following example (cf. Antaki, 1994):

Why are you going Iceland for your holidays? - Because it's cool there.

The standard attribution treatment of such an explanation would be to call it a "situation cause." However, the cool weather in Iceland can hardly cause the agent from afar to go there; rather, the agent *thinks* that it is pleasantly cool in Iceland, and that is her (belief) reason for going there. (It would still be her belief reason even if it were in fact warm in Iceland.) Instead of trying to diagnose the locus of some "cause" in the vague space between person and situation, we have to recognize that most folk explanations of intentional behavior refer to the agent's reasons in light of which and on the grounds of which she acted.

Once the proper folk-conceptual categories (of reasons, causal histories, etc.) are applied to naturally uttered explanations, they can be reliably classified and analyzed (Malle, 1998/2009);[6] and these classifications show more sensitivity to important psychological variables than either person-situation codings or person-situation ratings (e.g., Malle et al., 2007; O'Laughlin & Malle, 2002). The researcher does the theoretical work here, and participants simply do what they do in everyday life - express explanations of behavior in their own words.

The lesson should be clear: if theoretical progress is to be made in the attribution domain, both theory and measurement must reflect the multifacetedness of people's explanations. Multiple modes, types, and linguistic forms have to be described, conceptually analyzed, and adequately measured.

Psychological processes underlying behavior explanations

The conceptual layer of the folk-conceptual theory of explanation showed that explainers have a number of choices to make when explaining behavior (Figure 3.3): they need to determine whether the behavior in question is intentional or not; if intentional, whether to explain it with reasons, causal history factors, or enabling factors; and if a reason is chosen, whether to cite the agent's beliefs or desires and whether to use a mental state marker or not.[7]

Adding a process layer now to the theory, a first important question is what psychological processes determine the explainer's choices among these various explanatory tools. A fair amount of research is available to answer this question, and I will discuss it below. A second process question is how the explainer goes about selecting a specific explanatory content (e.g., the belief reason, "because she thought the door was locked"). No theory of behavior explanation will be able to predict specific contents of explanations, but the psychological processes people rely on when searching for those contents may be identifiable. Currently, very little research is available on this issue, in part because the process of covariation reasoning has been so dominant in the research literature. It is evident, however, that many more processes guide people's search for specific explanation contents - among them knowledge structures, projection, simulation, explicit perspective-taking, and contrast analysis (Ames, 2004; Hilton, 2007; Lalljee & Abelson, 1983; Malle, 2004, 2008). All of these processes deserve greater attention in future research.[8]



Figure 3.3 Selected choice points in constructing a behavior explanation.

Adapted from B. F. Malle, 2004, *How the mind explains behavior: Folk explanations, meaning, and social interaction.* Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

What do we know about the psychological determinants of people's explanatory choices? At least three such determinants must be considered:

1. Judgments of behavior attributes
2. Pragmatic goals
3. Information resources

Judgments of behavior attributes. Before offering an explanation, social perceivers make several (often implicit) judgments about the behavior to be explained. One such judgment obviously concerns the *intentionality* of the behavior. If considered unintentional, explanations will refer to a cause; if considered intentional, explanations will cite a reason, causal history, or enabling factor (Malle, 1999).

Among intentional behaviors, a second judgment concerns the *difficulty* of the action. If the action is considered difficult to produce, the explainer will often choose enabling factors; otherwise, he is likely to choose reasons or causal histories (Malle et al., 2000; McClure & Hilton, 1997).

A third judgment determines whether the to-be-explained behavior is singular or represents a trend (across time or across multiple agents). If the behavior is judged to be a trend, the rate of CHR explanations increases (O'Laughlin & Malle, 2002), primarily because multiple instances (or agents) can have multiple reasons, and a CHR explanation can sometimes tie these reasons together by citing an antecedent for all of them (e.g., "Why did you go shopping so many times this week?" - "Because I have three children").

Pragmatic goals. Pragmatic goals refer to the social projects that explainers try to accomplish with their explanations, such as lessen another person's confusion, managing their own status in the interaction, or fending off blame. Two groups of goals can be distinguished by their primary beneficiary: *audience design*, which chiefly benefits the conversation partner, and *impression management*, which chiefly benefits the explainer.

Audience design consists in tailoring an explanation so the audience can learn what it wants to know. The clearest case of such design is when the explainer matches an explanation mode to the type of question asked (Malle et al., 2000; McClure & Hilton, 1998). This question can inquire either about the agent's immediate motivation ("What for?", which triggers *reasons*), the background of that motivation ("How come?", which triggers *causal histories of reasons*), or about the factors that enabled successful action performance ("How was this possible?", which triggers *enabling factors*). More subtle adjustments include offering a belief reason when it can be assumed that the audience already knows the desire reason, or offering a CHR explanation when the reasons for the action are obvious.

Whereas audience design falls under the conversational maxim of relevance (Grice, 1975; Sperber & Wilson, 1986), impression management does not merely try to optimize communication but rather is an act of social influence. Its impact on explanatory choices can be found at several levels of analysis (Malle et al., 2000). People increase their use of reasons, and especially belief reasons, when trying to appear rational; and they explicitly add a mental state marker to their belief reasons when they want to distance themselves from the agent (e.g., "Why is he looking at apartments?" - "He thinks I am moving in with him").

Information resources. Deficits in relevant information about the agent, the behavior, or the context can limit the explainer's ability to accomplish his goals, and such deficits often require adjustments of one's choices among explanatory tools. This can be seen, for example, in the choice of belief reasons vs. desire reasons. We find that observers, compared to actors, offer more desire reasons than belief reasons (Malle et al., 2007). That is because desire reasons are easier to infer from contextual and cultural knowledge, whereas belief reasons are more idiosyncratic and sometimes accessible only to the actor. However, when observers know the agent well or were present when the action took place, their rate of belief reasons increases to resemble that of actors (Malle et al., 2007).

A somewhat more complex case is the role of information access in the choice between reasons and causal history explanations (Malle et al., 2007; O'Laughlin & Malle, 2002).

In short, when explaining their own intentional behaviors (as actors), people are in the best position to have every kind of information available and predominantly (in 80% of cases) offer reasons. When explaining other people's behaviors (as observers), people lack various kinds of information and will try to infer or construct reasons, but this construction reaches a limit, resulting in an average reduction to 65% reasons. Interestingly, this lower rate of reasons persists even when observers are present at the time of action and when observers know the agent well (Malle et al., 2007). This suggests that the actor-observer asymmetry is due not to general knowledge differences but to access differences at a more fundamental level. That is, because actors typically consider their reasons for acting before they decide to act, they have the ability to directly recall their own reasons. Observers, by contrast, must guess those reasons or infer them from observable information.

We can systematically relate the discussed psychological determinants to the range of explanatory choices displayed in Figure 3.2, forming linear equations that connect a particular explanatory choice to a set of psychological determinants (Table 3.2). These equations have received some empirical support (Malle, 1999; Malle et al., 2000; Malle et al., 2007), but more precise relations should emerge from future research.

This theoretical approach of linking the choice of explanatory tools to a limited set of psychological determinants has been successfully applied to predicting strategies of impression management in explanation (Malle et al., 2000), differences between explanations of group and individual behaviors (O'Laughlin & Malle, 2002), and a variety of actor-observer asymmetries in explanations of behavior (Malle et al., 2007). Other domains are open to investigation as well, such as close relationships, negotiation, psychopathology, and cross- cultural comparisons (see Malle, 2004). To illustrate one application, I describe the death and rebirth of the well-known actor-observer asymmetry in attribution.

Table 3.2 Linking selected explanatory choices to their psychological determinants.

(1) REA/CHR/EF VS. CAU = b_1 (behavior intentionality)
(2) EF VS. REA/CHR = b_1 (behavior difficulty) + b_2 (explanatory question) +
b_3 (difficulty x question)
(3) CHR VS. REA = b_1 (behavior trend) + b_2 (information) + b_3 (impression management)
(4) belief REA vs. desire REA = b_1 (information) + b_2 (impression management)
(5) marked belief vs. unmarked belief = b_1 (impression management)

Note. REA = Reason explanation. CHR = Causal history of reason explanation. EF = Enabling factor explanation.

Application: actor–observer asymmetries

Few hypotheses have been as widely accepted in the social-psychological literature as Jones and Nisbett's (1972) classic hypothesis of an actor-observer asymmetry in explanations: "There is a pervasive tendency for actors to attribute their actions to situational requirements, whereas observers tend to attribute the same actions to stable personal dispositions" (p. 80). Surprisingly, a meta-analysis of 173 published studies testing this hypothesis showed that the average effect size for the difference between actor and observer attributions was zero (Malle, 2006). That is, when explanations are analyzed in terms of traditional attribution concepts - referring to either person (or disposition) vs. situation causes - no difference exists between actors' and observers' explanations of behavior.

But do people really explain their own behavior the same way as they explain other people's behavior? They do not. But to see this, we need to adopt a different theory. When explanations are analyzed within the terms of the folk-conceptual theory, strong and reliable actor-observer differences emerge (Malle et al., 2007). In particular, consideration of the choices people make when explaining intentional behavior and the psychological determinants of these choices leads to three actor-observer hypotheses (for more detail, see Malle et al., 2007, pp. 495-496).[9]

First, actors are predicted to use relatively more reason explanations (and fewer CHR explanations) than observers do. That is because actors have better access to their reasons (often through direct recall) and engage in stronger impression management to portray themselves in a positive light (which reasons accomplish better than CHR explanations).

Second, actors are predicted to use relatively more belief reasons (and fewer desire reasons) than observers do. That is because actors' advantage in information access is especially pronounced for the more idiosyncratic and context-specific belief reasons.

Third, actors are predicted to use relatively fewer mental state markers for belief reasons than observers do. That is because actors directly represent the content of their beliefs (e.g., "The plants are dry"), not their own mental state of believing ("I believe: the plants are dry"; Moore, 1993; Rosenthal, 2005). Actors will therefore typically leave their belief reasons unmarked: "Why did you turn the sprinkler on?" - "Because the plants were dry." Observers, by contrast, represent the actor as *having beliefs* and will therefore typically mark those beliefs (especially when they don't share them): "Why did she turn the sprinkler on?" - "Because she thought the plants were dry."

Tests of these predictions across nine studies provided consistent results: Effect sizes for the three novel asymmetries averaged between $d = 0.40$ and $d = 0.69$, whereas effect sizes for the classic asymmetry averaged between $d = -0.08$ and $d = 0.10$. Thus, actors and observers differ in how they explain behavior; but these differences are revealed only once we give up the traditional person-situation framework and instead assess behavior explanations as part of people's folk theory of mind and behavior - centered on the concept of intentionality and giving rise to multiple modes and types of explanation.

Conclusion

Heider's (1958) deep insights into the social perception of human action assured attribution phenomena a central position in social psychology. The fundamental assumption that humans spontaneously explain behavioral and social events has led to many insights in the domains of social influence, self-regulation, relationships, and health. However, after 50 years we must acknowledge that traditional formulations of attribution theory either focused too narrowly on inferences of stable traits (following Jones & Davis, 1965) or oversimplified the complex nature of behavior explanations (following Kelley, 1967). Once we identify the conceptual framework within which people actually perceive, interpret, and evaluate behavior, a folk-conceptual theory of behavior explanations emerges that describes and predicts various explanatory phenomena that had previously been overlooked (e.g., reasons, causal history of reasons) or misrepresented (e.g., the actor-observer asymmetry). According to this folk- conceptual theory, people's explanations of behavior cannot be properly understood when categorized as "person" or "situation" causes. Rather, they fall into multiple distinct modes (causes for unintentional behaviors and reasons, causal histories, and enabling factors for intentional behaviors) and, within modes, into specific types (e.g., belief vs. desire reasons). These are the distinctions that matter when people construct and respond to explanations; and these are the distinctions that must be part of an accurate theory of explanation.

Notes

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[1] For previous reviews of attribution work that gave more weight to trait attributions, see Fiske and Taylor (1991), Gilbert (1998), Hastorf, Schneider, and Polefka (1970), and Ross and Fletcher (1985). For recent integrations of trait attributions within a larger attributional context, see Reeder (2009) and Uleman, Adil Saribay, and Gonzalez (2008).
[2] Philosophically, this theory may leave much to be desired, but psychologically it was a remarkable model that successfully combined constructivism with causal realism.
[3] But see Davis (2009), coauthor of the famous Jones and Davis paper, who recently discussed the folk-conceptual theory of explanation.
[4] In Malle (2004, chap. 1), I discuss Gilbert's (1998) attempt to find an account of reason explanations in Jones and Davis's (1965) theory. He pushes such an account as far as one can, but in the best case it captures goal explanations of limited-option choices and more often it captures only *what* the person was doing, not *why* she was doing it (as Jones and Davis, 1965, themselves point out; p. 222).
[5] More precisely, "experiment-like variations of conditions [that are] a naive version of J. S. Mill's method of difference" (p. 194).
[6] For applications by other researchers, see Kiesler, Lee, and Kramer (2006); Knight and Reese (2008); and Levi and Haslam (2005).
[7] There is another layer of choices, which stems from the classic attribution distinctions of person vs. situation and trait vs. nontrait. Causes, enabling factors, and CHR factors can all be classified into those subtypes. However, our research has not identified any psychological determinants or consequences of these subtypes (e.g., Malle et al., 2007; O'Laughlin & Malle, 2002).
[8] For illustrations of these processes in naturally occurring explanations, see Malle (2004, pp. 126-145).
[9] In the explanation of unintentional behavior no asymmetries emerged. Thus, even in the domain in which classic attribution theory is theoretically most applicable (because one can reasonably classify causes into person, situation, and related categories), the predicted asymmetry failed to show.

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Seminar 2

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How stereotypes are shared through language: a review and introduction of the social categories and stereotypes communication (SCSC) framework

Camiel J. Beukeboom
Christian Burgers

Introduction

An abundance of research has demonstrated the pervasive and fundamental role of social categorization and stereotypes in social perception, judgment, and interaction (Allport, 1954; Mackie, Hamilton, Susskind, & Rosselli, 1996; Moskowitz, 2005; Dovidio, Hewstone, Glick, & Esses, 2010). Social categories and their associated stereotypes are generally considered to be highly functional for people as they allow us to quickly and efficiently make sense of our complex social environment. Simultaneously, however, reliance on social-category stereotypes may promote prejudice, discrimination and intergroup conflict when people pre-judge categorized individuals on the basis of generalized (negative) stereotypic beliefs (Fiske, 1998; Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000). As such, stereotypes play a fundamental role in many pressing societal problems relating to racism, sexism, ageism and intergroup tensions.

Stereotypes are particularly consequential because they are socially shared across large groups of people. That is, people in the same context (i.e., within the same [sub-] cultures) appear to hold similar beliefs and expectancies about social categories (Hogg & Reid, 2006; Oakes, Haslam, & Turner, 1993). The question of how stereotypes become shared knowledge, however, received relatively little research attention, as most of the stereotyping literature has focused on cognitive and individual-level processes (Haslam, Turner, Oakes, McGarty, & Reynolds, 1997; Klein, Tindale, & Brauer, 2008). Except for the assertion that the sharing of stereotypes is usually assumed to somehow occur through communication, research on the exact means, and the general underlying principles is relatively scarce and scattered across various subfields in the literature. Focusing on these dynamics, however, is crucial to understand how stereotypes evolve, are maintained, and how they can possibly change (Collins & Clément, 2012; Mackie et al., 1996).

In this article, we argue that, to understand how stereotypes become shared knowledge, it is crucial to focus closely on language use in communications about socially categorized people. Language reflects which groups are singled out as targets for stereotyping, and is the main carrier of stereotypic information we come to associate with these groups. In often quite subtle ways, our language reflects, constructs and maintains beliefs about social categories. By studying language use, we can thus gain important insight in the occurrence and development of social category stereotypes within cultural groups. Current research on this topic has so far mainly focused on specified stereotype-maintaining linguistic biases in experimental settings, mostly by manipulating artificial sentences in isolation. This research provided valuable insights into the link between categorization, stereotypic expectancies and both the production and inferential consequences of specific linguistic features. Yet, for a complete understanding of these mechanisms and their real-life impact, the required next step is to focus on natural language in which various biases may occur in combination. Such an approach is even more interesting in light of current developments in computational linguistics that provide more and more opportunities for automated analysis of natural language (Caliskan, Bryson, & Narayanan, 2017; Pennebaker, Mehl, & Niederhoffer, 2003; Fokkens, Ruigrok, Beukeboom, Gagestein, & Van Atteveldt, 2018). To enable this type of research, a theoretical integration of the ways through which social-category knowledge is shared through language is much needed.

Goals and Approach

In this article, we integrate the major strands of literature on stereotyping and biased language use into one framework: The Social Categories and Stereotypes Communication (SCSC) framework. The SCSC framework shows how communication about categorized individuals determines the formation, dissemination, and maintenance of social-category stereotypes within cultural groups. The framework distinguishes different types of communicative biases (focusing on content and linguistic form of category labels and behavior descriptions), which have hitherto been studied in largely independent fields. Within each bias type, we focus on a number of (often implicit) linguistic means through which people share their social-category stereotypes. The SCSC framework specifies how these bias types feed and maintain three fundamental cognitive variables in (shared) social-category cognition: perceived category entitativity, stereotype content, and perceived essentialism of associated characteristics and traits. Integrating both the linguistic means and the cognitive antecedents and consequences within one comprehensive framework creates a number of important insights. An integrated understanding of the role of language use in the formation and use of stereotypes allows one to monitor their occurrence and evolvement and can be translated into interventions to change stereotypic views. The theoretical and practical contributions will be explored in the general discussion.

The different sub-fields of (psychological) research on stereotype bias in language use we integrate exist quite independently with little cross-reference, even though they are in fact closely related. Based on their focus, we distinguish these sub-fields as (1) biases in linguistic labeling and (2) biases in describing behaviors and characteristics of categorized individuals. Both sub-fields in turn are further specified in terms of (a) content (i.e., meaning of labels, what is communicated) and (b) linguistic form (i.e., word classes, formulations).

With the terms "linguistic bias", or "biased language use", we refer to instances in which language use reflects (shared) social-category cognition[1]. Thereby, we define a linguistic bias as a systematic asymmetry in language choice that reflects the social-category cognitions that are applied to (a) described category(ies) or individual category member(s) (adapted from Beukeboom, 2014). This means that language choice, in referring to and describing a target, varies as a function of the social category in which this target is categorized, or to whether the target's characteristics and behaviors fit with an activated stereotype or not. Furthermore, the word 'systematic' indicates that these differences in language choice are general patterns, as opposed to anomalies by individual speakers. As noted, the different bias types manifest this systematic asymmetry in different ways, through language content (e.g., word meaning, topic choice) and/or linguistic forms (e.g., nouns vs. adjectives, negations vs. affirmations, etc.).

A number of the reviewed linguistic bias types were previously linked to perceived category entitativity, stereotype content and perceived essentialism, mainly in the inferential consequences of biased formulations in recipients (Beukeboom, 2014; Carnaghi et al., 2008). Perceived category entitativity and essentialism are regarded as two fundamental variables in category perception and stereotyping, yet in the literature the terms are often conflated and vary in meaning (McGarty, Yzerbyt & Spears, 2002; Prentice & Miller, 2007).

Based on a literature review, we present an integrative framework on the formation and maintenance of social-category knowledge that explains how specific, observable linguistic aspects relate to these fundamental cognitive variables of perceived category entitativity, stereotype content and essentialism as both antecedents and consequences. Our specific focus on language use and its connections to these three cognitive variables provides a unique contribution that complements previous attempts to elucidate the mechanisms through which stereotype consensuality is achieved (e.g., Bigler & Liben, 2006; Haslam et al., 1997; Kashima, Klein, & Clark, 2007).

For our review, we searched for studies within the literature on social and developmental psychology and communication studies – focusing on social categories or stereotypes that included linguistic variables (i.e., language content or form) as independent or dependent variables. Rather than aiming to include all studies about a limited number of biases, we aimed to maximize the variety of linguistic means in available research. As most of the work on category entitativity and essentialism is not explicitly linked to linguistic variables, we independently searched for literature on these topics. Before we turn to reviewing the literature as the basis for the SCSC framework, we provide a foundational context and definitions.

Foundational Considerations and Definitions

Grouping individuals into categories is a fundamental human tendency. Social categories and their associated stereotypes help people to make sense of the social world and to gain

[1] We use the term "(shared) social category cognition" to refer to the social categories that are considered meaningful (i.e., perceived entitativity of social categories), their associated stereotypes and perceived essentialism, which are organized in a category taxonomy, and which may or may not (yet) be shared between communication partners.

some predictability (Allport, 1954). The term stereotype refers to the cognitive representation people hold about a social category, consisting of beliefs and expectancies about probable behaviors, features and traits (Dovidio et al., 2010). This cognitive component can be distinguished from an affective or evaluative response towards a social category (Amodio & Devine, 2006). The term 'prejudice' usually refers to negative affective evaluations of a social category and its members. These cognitive and affective associations may (in concert or independently) induce discriminatory behaviors (Amodio & Devine, 2006).

Identifying a new individual as a member of a category allows one to draw on knowledge and experiences with similar individuals from that category and thus provide us with inferred properties that go "beyond the information given" (Allport, 1954). Yet, the simplification this brings has serious downsides. First, when relying on categories, perceivers both exaggerate similarities between individuals within categories (i.e., they are seen as all alike) and differences between categories (Allport, 1954; Brewer & Harasty, 1996; Taylor, Fiske, Etcoff, & Ruderman, 1978). Second, while judging a categorized person based on stereotypic expectancies associated with the category provides information gain (i.e., stored category cognition is applied to this individual), it also involves information loss, because the individuality and situational constraints of category members are ignored (Mackie et al., 1996). Discrimination occurs when individuals or groups are treated, described and/or judged based on generic social category associations, rather than on available individuating information.

Stereotypes have mostly been defined (and studied) as intrapersonal phenomena, as belief systems that are the product of mental processes in the mind of individuals. This focus has neglected the fact that stereotypes are in essence products of collections of individuals, as they become consensually shared across large numbers of people within (sub) cultures (Haslam et al 1996; Haslam et al., 1997; Holtgraves & Kashima, 2007; Kashima et al., 2010; Semin, 2008). Learning which social categories are meaningful and learning the shared expectancies with these social categories is part of an enculturation process in which we acquire the norms, values and appropriate behaviors of the culture we are immersed in. Creating and maintaining shared social categories and associated expectancies is thus rooted in our cultural upbringing and in childrens' development. When growing up, we learn to categorize objects (e.g., animal types, toys) and people (e.g., based on professions or gender), and we learn what is expected of objects and individuals belonging to such categories (Bigler & Liben, 2006).

Likewise, when joining a new subgroup or (sub)culture, the socialization process involves internalizing the norms and social-category stereotypes that prevail within this subculture (Crandall, Eshleman, & O'Brien, 2002). This is illustrated by research that shows powerful effects of perceived consensus on this internalization process. Learning that stereotypic beliefs are consensually shared within an ingroup bolsters one's stereotypic views (Haslam et al., 1997; Haslam et al., 1996), increases the expression of prejudice and discrimination (Crandall et al., 2002) and even increases stereotype accessibility (Sechrist & Stangor, 2001). Together, these processes ensure that members of subcultures internalize shared stereotypes and thereby create a shared social reality (Kashima, 2004; Thompson & Fine, 1999; Semin, 2008).

Communication plays a crucial role in the emergence, maintenance and change of consensually shared category stereotypes within (sub)cultures (Brauer, Judd, & Thompson, 2004; Haslam et al., 1997; Schaller & Latené, 1996; Klein et al., 2008). Category representations are shared and maintained through mass media (e.g., Ramasubramanian 2011; Schemer, 2012; Saleem, Prot, Anderson, & Lemieux, 2017) and in interpersonal conversation

(Barr & Kronmüller, 2006; Bigler & Liben, 2006; Bratanova & Kashima, 2014; Ruscher & Hammer, 2006). Although stereotypes may be acquired from other sources than linguistic communication (e.g., direct interaction or observations of others' interactions with category members, visual depictions of groups in the media, or perceived segregation of groups within a society), even these factors likely co-occur with linguistic categorization in communication. When observable social groups are labeled and discussed in communication, they are more likely to become the target of stereotyping than social groups that are not (Bigler & Liben, 2006). Communication can thus function as a carrier, confirmer, as well as an accelerator in stereotype formation and maintenance.

Research by Thompson, Judd, and Park (2000) showed how the mere act of communicating category impressions can increase stereotypicality. That is, after category impressions had been discussed in several triads along a serial communication chain, participants endorsed a more extreme stereotype content; they ascribed many stereotype-consistent traits, and few inconsistent traits to the group as a whole, and category members were seen as more alike. Moreover, consensus about these impressions between participants in triads became greater in later triads, and was also greater compared to groups who did not discuss their impressions (Thompson et al., 2000). This study illustrates how communication is front and center in the formation and consensualization of stereotypes.

In our integrative review, we focus specifically on the role of language in the consensualization of social category stereotypes. Language reflects and maintains which categories are considered as meaningful distinctive entities (i.e., category entitativity) and consequently become relevant dimensions for comparison. Second, language use in communications about categorized individuals reflects and feeds which stereotypic characteristics are associated with a given category (i.e., stereotype content), and the extent to which these associated characteristics are perceived to be essential for a given category (i.e., category essentialism).

The Social Categories and Stereotypes Communication (SCSC) Framework

The Social Categories and Stereotypes Communication framework (SCSC framework, see Figure 1) integrates the linguistic means through which social-category cognition is communicated and maintained. The framework presents language use as the main vehicle through which shared social-category cognition is transmitted and maintained (cf. Beukeboom, 2014; Collins & Clément, 2012; Maass, 1999; Wigboldus & Douglas, 2007). When communicating about other people and their behavior, our language echoes the (shared) cognitive representations of any activated social categories associated with these people. Stereotypic beliefs surface in (often subtle and largely implicit) linguistic biases that reflect the existing stereotypic expectancies we have with discussed categorized individuals (Fig. 1, Arrow A). Moreover, linguistic biases feed shared social-category cognition by sharing and confirming these existing stereotypic views (Fig. 1, Arrow B). These forces create a self-perpetuating cycle in which social-category cognition is continuously shared and maintained.

As argued in the previous section, intrapersonal and interpersonal processes go hand in hand during this process. The reflection of social-category cognition in biased language use is usually regarded as a product of an intrapersonal process in a speaker/sender (Fig. 1, Arrow A). This reflection in language has immediate interpersonal consequences when recipients draw (stereotypic) inferences from biased descriptions. Moreover, in an interactive communicative situation, speaker and recipient continuously switch roles, and biased communication patterns become interpersonal as well. One person may introduce stereotypic bias in an interaction, in which the other joins. One person's utterances may activate social-category cognitions in the other person and subsequently induce biased language use in this person, and so on. Also, biased utterances by speakers may not only induce cognitive inferences in recipients, but also in the speakers themselves (Fig. 1, Arrow B). That is, people's cognitive representations can be shaped by how they verbally describe them, for instance when they tailor their descriptions to assumed beliefs of their audience (Higgins & Rholes, 1978; McCann & Higgins, 1990; Marsh, 2007).

Figure 1. *The Social Categories and Stereotypes Communication (SCSC) model.*



The SCSC framework (Fig. 1) explains the consensualization of social-category cognition through biased communication about categorized targets. It consists of three main parts: (I) Target's situation: Information about discussed target's features and behavior (II) (Shared) social-category cognition (perceived category entitativity, stereotype content, perceived essentialism), and (III) The different types of biases in language use. These different bias types in communications about categorized individuals both reflect and feed shared social-category cognition (hence the bidirectional arrows 4 and 5). These are:

(1) Biases in the type of *linguistic labels* used to denote and distinguish categories, in which we distinguish biases in:

a) label content (i.e., meaning of the used terms)

b) linguistic form of labels

(2) *Biases in describing behaviors and characteristics* of categorized individuals, in which we distinguish biases in

a) communication content (i.e., *what* information about categorized individuals is communicated (i.e., topic prominence).

b) linguistic form of descriptions (i.e., *how* is information about categorized individuals formulated (e.g., grammar, predicate types). The different biases used in communication about categorized targets are always embedded in a communicative context. The inclusion of the communicative context in the framework acknowledges that biased language use may differ as a function of factors in the social context in which the (biased) communication takes place. These factors include, first, constraints and affordances of the communicative situation like, for instance, interactivity between communication partners: Is a recipient present, can s/he respond immediately to a speaker (e.g., face-to-face; online chat) or with a delay (e.g., email)? A second important factor relates to the relationship between communication partners. We argue (see above and following sections) that the consensualization of stereotypes through biased language use is most likely within (sub)cultures, or specifically, when sender and recipient are ingroup members or share a social identity. More specific related factors therein are the presence of shared social category knowledge, and norms and conventions about how to communicate about discussed targets. A third important factor concerns the relation of communication partners (i.e., speaker and recipient) to the discussed target. In much of the research reviewed below, the discussed target is an absent (member of a) social category to which speaker or recipient do not belong. Research on intergroup communication, however, shows that the social identity of the communication partners vis a vis the category of a discussed target (i.e., ingroup, outgroup, minority?) brings an additional factor that may influence language use. We will relate the SCSC framework to the intergroup perspective in the general discussion.

In the following sections, we further explain the different building blocks of the SCSC framework and their mutual relationships. Before we get into linguistic variables, we discuss how communication and language use relate to both the described target's perceived situations in reality and relevant social-category cognition. After all, when communicating about other people, our language alludes both to situations in reality and social-category cognition.

Input About Target's Situations

Social-category stereotypes are generalized impressions, which implies that features and characteristics associated with a particular social category are –depending on perceived category entitativity, stereotype content, and essentialism, as we will discuss– expected to apply to all individual category members and to be stable across situations. Communication plays a crucial role in the formation of such generalized impressions. To understand how this works, it is important to note that the extent to which communication about categorized people refers to specified people acting in particular situations (depicted in the 'Target's situation' box in Figure 1), or instead generalizes across individuals and across situations, can vary.

Beike and Sherman (1994) distinguished three levels of social information. These are usually discussed as cognitive levels, but we will argue they are also reflected in language use. The lowest, most specific, level of information refers to the situational behaviors of specified individual(s) or category member(s) (e.g., This girl helped her mother yesterday). Here, a clear link to a specific person(s) acting in a specified situation is drawn. Note that this information can either be self-observed (currently or retrieved from memory), or it may be learned second-hand through communication. At the intermediate level of information, personality characteristics (i.e., traits) of individuals (e.g., This girl is helpful) are mentioned. Such information still refers to specified individual(s), but is more abstracted in that it generalizes behavioral characteristics across situations and is therefore not observable in a single actual situation. At the highest level of information (Beike and Sherman, 1994), one refers to qualities and characteristics of social categories (e.g., Girls are helpful). At this high level of generalization, the information is separated from both specified persons and behavioral situations. It refers both to a general category of unspecified individuals and to characteristics in generic abstracted terms that generalize across situations. Communication can thus generalize along two dimensions: in referring to a target (from specified individual[s] to a generic social category) and in describing behaviors (from specified situational behavior to enduring characteristics and traits of categorized individuals).

Importantly, information at one level can lead to inferences at another level. Beike and Sherman (1994) propose that there are three directions of inferences. First, Beike and Sherman (1994) refer to the process of using information from lower levels to draw inferences at a higher level of information as 'induction.' The inductive process of drawing inferences from the situational behaviors (lowest level) or traits (intermediate level) of individual category members to form generalized expectancies about social categories (highest level) corresponds to stereotype formation[2] . Second, the process of using higher-level information to draw inferences about specified individuals (lower levels) is called ‘deduction’ (Beike & Sherman, 1994). Deduction occurs when information at the highest level (i.e., a category stereotype) is applied to draw conclusions about individual category members (i.e., usually called stereotyping). In Figure 1, these processes are visualized in arrow 1. Thirdly, Beike and Sherman (1994) refer to the process of using information at any level to draw inferences at the same level as ‘analogy’. This occurs, for instance, when information about a category’s characteristics leads to the inference of the existence of associated characteristics (e.g., they are helpful, so they must be nice).

These inferences are usually considered as cognitive processes, but they are reflected in, and mediated by, communication and language use. In Figure 1, this is visualized in the path from arrow C to arrow B. For instance, an observer of a specified target situation (e.g., a policeman beating a person) may communicate her perception to others in different ways. She may directly communicate the observed information (i.e., verbalize the low-level target behaviors; e.g., This policeman was beating a man) and/ or verbalize the high level cognitive inference she made (e.g., Policemen are aggressive). In turn, recipients of the communicated information may draw their own inferences from the communicated information they receive, but, we will argue, this inference process is influenced by the ways in which information is verbalized. When information is formulated at a low level, recipients can draw their own inductive inferences or refrain from doing so. When information is formulated at a high level (e.g., Policemen are aggressive), the stereotypic inference is readily presented, while the actual situation on which an inference was based is not. Thus, the route from actual target situations to social-category cognition is often mediated by communication and language use, but the input of information from target’s situations (Fig. 1, arrow C) may vary in weight (hence the dashed visualization of arrow C).

It should be noted that, in natural language, descriptions of a target’s situational behavior and generic statements about a category as a whole can go back and forth. A single utterance may contain information at different levels of social information. Descriptions of the situational behavior of an individual category member, for instance, can be used as evidence or illustration for inferences about a generic social category (e.g., Lucy helped her mother yesterday; girls are really helpful). Individual category exemplars and their behavior may thus be invoked as evidence for the stereotypic characteristics of a social category (Ruscher, 1998). Depending on the communicative context, these dynamics can become interactive. In dyadic conversation, a speaker’s utterances at one level can induce cognitive inferences and linguistic utterances at another level in a conversation partner (Ruscher & Hammer, 2006).

Conversations or stories may develop from discussing situational behaviors of one or a few categorized individuals to generalizations about the category as a whole, which, in turn, can induce inferences about (future) behavior of individual category members. Importantly, communication can also occur at the highest level without any link to actual target situations. That is, people may often communicate generic category impressions without any reference to specified persons or situations (e.g., the Japanese are really industrious). We will argue that such high-level (versus low-level) communications are most likely used to convey existing (shared) social-category stereotypes, which in turn contributes to their consensualization and

[2] Drawing inferences from the lowest to intermediate level corresponds to impression formation of persons (e.g., spontaneous trait inferences).

maintenance. In the next sections, we get into more detail about the specific linguistic variables that relate to the different levels of information, and the ways through which they reflect and induce social-category cognition of senders and recipients.

(Shared) Social-Category Cognition: Perceived Category Entitativity, Stereotype Content, and Perceived Essentialism

Before turning to biases in language use, we discuss how (shared) social-category cognition is structured. We distinguish three fundamental variables in social-category cognition: (a) perceived category entitativity (Campbell, 1958; McGarty, Haslam, Hutchinson, & Grace, 1995) (b) stereotype content, and (c) perceived category essentialism (Medin, 1989; Medin & Ortony, 1989). In general, there is consensus that perceived category entitativity and essentialism play a fundamental and crucial role in the formation and use of social category stereotypes (i.e., induction and deduction), yet simultaneously there are different views on the definitions of and relations between the constructs (see Haslam, Rotschild, & Ernst, 2000; McGarty et al., 2002; Prentice & Miller, 2007; Yzerbyt, Corneille, & Estrada, 2001; Yzerbyt, Judd, & Corneille, 2004), which we explain below.

Perceived category entitativity.

Perceived category entitativity (Campbell, 1958; McGarty et al., 1995) refers to the extent to which a social category is perceived as a coherent, unified and meaningful entity, and as "having real existence." In other words, it refers to the perceived "groupness" or "unity" of a group or category, or how closely tied together its members seem to be (Hamilton & Sherman, 1996; Moskowitz, 2005). On the one hand, perceived entitativity may arise from the perceptual features of the category members that are observed in actual target's situations. That is, Campbell (1958) originally argued that perceived category entitativity is derived from perceptual Gestalt principles similarity (e.g., in group members' appearance like skin color or physique), physical proximity, collective movement, and common fate among category members. Later research confirmed that such perceptual cues indeed determine the perception of category entitativity (Abelson, Dasgupta, Park, & Banaji, 1998; Hamilton & Sherman, 1996).

On the other hand, more recent broader definitions, state that perceived category entitativity may also, in addition to observable perceptual features of group members, arise from assumed commonality in unobservable aspects of group members (Brewer, Hong & Li, 2004). This could include a common origin or history (e.g. ancestry, cultural socialization), shared experiences or life events, common goals and coordinated collective action, and also common attributes like innate, internal dispositions (i.e. genetics, traits, personality disorders; Brewer et al., 2004; Yzerbyt et al., 2004; Kashima, 2004; Rothbart & Park, 2004). Thus, even when there are no perceptual features that call for grouping, a group of individuals may be perceived to be high in entitativity. Based on this, we use the following operational definition: *Perceived category entitativity is the extent in which a category is perceived as a meaningful, unified and coherent group, as opposed to a loose set of individuals.*

Cognitive stereotype content.

Our operational definition of *cognitive stereotype content, as noted above, is: the content of the cognitive representation people hold about a social category, consisting of beliefs and expectancies about probable behaviors, features, and traits* (Dovidio et al., 2010). This cognitive representation may include observable, perceptual features of the category members (e.g., skin color, clothing). However, much of the work on the consequences of stereotypes has focused on the influence of trait attributes (e.g., emotional, reckless, competent) that are part of a stereotype, which corresponds to high-level social information that generalizes across individuals and situations.

Notably, stereotypes are often argued to contain more complex knowledge beyond simple beliefs about the presence or absence of attributes or characteristics. That is, stereotypes can include a causal structure that links various attributes to each other and to other knowledge about the world. For instance, stereotypes about minorities may include assumptions regarding underlying causes about attributes like ‘poor’ or ‘uneducated’. A stereotype can thus become ‘theory-laden’ in that it includes rich and complex information about the interconnectedness and causal relationships among both observable and unobservable characteristics of category members (Gelman, Coley, Rosengren, Hartman, & Pappas, 1998; Medin, 1989). Some have argued that perceived essentialism about a category can serve as an underlying explanation for the attributes and characteristics that are associated with it (Yzerbyt, Rocher & Schadron, 1997).

Perceived category essentialism.

Perceived category essentialism (Medin, 1989; Medin & Ortony, 1989) has been defined and measured in various ways. A common view of essentialism (Rothbart & Taylor, 1992) is that some social categories, such as race and gender, are perceived to possess a deeper, underlying biological essence or nature, that gives rise to their surface appearances and behaviors, and causal connections among them. Such an assumed essence may be perceived to cause category members to be fundamentally similar to one another, and to behave consistently across situations (Gelman, 2003; Haslam et al., 2000). Rothbart and Taylor (1992) argued that such beliefs arise because people treat social categories like race and gender as if they were natural kinds rather than social constructs. Hence, the characteristics people assign to a particular social category can be perceived as if they were genetically inherited or so entrenched that they are almost impossible to change (Rothbart & Taylor, 1992; Kashima, 2004).

However, social categories that do not share an obvious genetic core – like plumbers or hipsters – can also be endowed with perceptions of essentialism. Essentialism has often been studied with respect to perceptions about specific characteristics associated with social categories (e.g., emotional, artistic, likes to draw paintings; e.g., Wigboldus, Semin, & Spears, 2000; Beukeboom, Finkenauer, & Wigboldus, 2010; Carnaghi et al. 2008). Higher perceived essentialism then relates to beliefs that these specified characteristics are stable, unchangeable, and dispositional, and have a high repetition likelihood across category members and situations (see Beukeboom, 2014 for an overview).

Although different in focus, the different approaches have in common that essentialism relates to beliefs that category members have stable characteristics in common, that they are, to some extent, basically the same (Haslam et al., 2000). This means that higher levels of perceived essentialism permit richer inferences about category members. That is, high perceived essentialism means that the properties and characteristics that are associated with a category are perceived to have a high degree of immutability (Kashima, 2004). One believes that category members possess a set of internal, dispositional and immutable characteristics that are stable across individual members and situations. Categorizing a person to a highly essentialized category thereby provides a rich source of inferences (i.e., much “information gain”) as it allows one to understand and predict a categorized target person’s behavior across situations.

For the purpose of the present article, we are interested in how perceived essentialism of a set of characteristics and traits that one associates with a category comes about. Rather than looking at whether one believes in an innate underlying essential core (e.g., as in a genetic make-up of natural kinds, cf. Rothbart & Taylor, 1992) that explains commonalities among category members, we are interested in the perceived content of the perceived commonalities (i.e., perceived stereotype content), and the extent in which these commonalities are perceived to be immutable (perceived essentialism). We, thus, relate perceived category essentialism to the perceived immutability of the stereotypic characteristics and traits associated with a given category (i.e., stereotype content). This approach aligns well with how essentialism has been conceptualized within the literature on language and stereotyping (see Beukeboom, 2014). Our operational definition is: *Perceived category essentialism refers to the extent in which an associated set of characteristics is perceived to be immutable to its members, and stable across time and situations.*

Mutual relationships among the three variables.

As can be derived from the above definitions, perceived category entitativity, stereotype content, and essentialism are closely related to each other. First, all three variables are usually considered to positively relate to perceived homogeneity of category members. Perceived group entitativity increases with perceived homogeneity, and decreasing diversity or variability, in one or more visible or non-visible aspects among group members (Brewer et al., 2004; McGarty et al. 1995; Yzerbyt et al., 2004). Likewise, stereotype content by definition includes generalizations across individual members, and this perception increases to the extent that perceivers assume that the set of associated characteristics are essential (immutable) to the group as a whole.

Although there are quite different views on the definitions of, and relations between these constructs[3], in general scholars agree that it is valuable to consider entitativity and essentialism as distinct constructs (Yzerbyt et al., 1997, 2004). That is, social categories may independently vary in the extent to which they are perceived to have entitativity, the stereotype content they become associated with, and the extent in which associated stereotypic characteristics are perceived to be essential (Haslam et al., 2000; Prentice & Miller, 2007). Simultaneously, the constructs are closely and causally related to each other, in a reciprocal manner (Fig. 1, arrow 3). On the one hand, a minimal level of perceived entitativity is needed before a category can acquire a stereotypic impression and essentialism. The more a collection of individuals is perceived to have high (as compared to low) entitativity, the more perceivers tend towards an inductive process to find the stereotypic characteristics considered to be essential to its members (Hamilton & Sherman, 1996; Spencer-Rodgers, Hamilton & Sherman, 2007; Yzerbyt et al., 1997). On the other hand, high essentialism may also induce higher perceived entitativity. That is, believing that a set of essential, shared characteristics exists for a category may, in turn, be taken as evidence to believe in the categories unity and real existence (i.e., its entitativity; Kashima 2004; Yzerbyt et al., 2004).

Treating entitativity and essentialism as distinct constructs also helps to explain their crucial role in the formation and use of social category stereotypes. For instance, using a savings-in-relearning paradigm, Crawford, Sherman, and Hamilton (2002) showed that for

[3] In the literature, social category entitativity and essentialism have been defined in quite different ways and the terms are sometimes used interchangeably (Yzerbyt et al., 2004; Haslam et al., 2000; 2004). Depending on how broad the constructs are defined, they can either be considered to share a nested, hierarchical, or overlapping structure (Yzerbyt et al., 2004). Note that when entitativity is defined according to the mentioned broad definition (i.e., as arising from assumed unobservable common attributes; Brewer et al., 2004) entitativity begins to overlap with essentialism. Assumed shared essential traits among a group of individuals (e.g., extraverts) could induce perceived entitativity (i.e., they are seen as a coherent group).

groups high (compared to low) in entitativity, trait inferences drawn from individual group members' behaviors (i.e., induction) were more likely to be generalized to other group members and the group as a whole. In other words, for categories high in entitativity, participants draw a general essentialistic impression about the group a whole, and seize to view members as individuals (i.e., high-level inference; Beike & Sherman, 1994). Once this generic group impression is formed, it is applied (i.e., deduction) to all other individual group members (Crawford et al., 2002). In contrast, information about members of low entitative groups (i.e., aggregates of individuals) must be processed and learned individually. Here, members are treated as unique individuals, and information related to specific individuals is stored separately in memory. Once a behavior–trait association is made for one individual, no further generalizations, to other individuals or to the group as a whole, are made (Crawford et al., 2002). Thus, with low entitativity, information remains at a low or intermediate level (Beike & Sherman, 1994) and is processed in an individuated piecemeal manner (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990).

In sum, with increasing perceived entitativity, it is more likely that a generalized stereotypic impression consisting of a set of associated essential characteristics is formed. This stereotype is then associated with all individual members of the group, which allows perceivers to generalize beyond the characteristics of the individual members. However, this information gain comes with a loss; recollection of specific information about individual members becomes more difficult. It is more difficult to remember which of the members of the group performed a behavior that initially induced the inference of the trait, as all of the group members are associated with the trait implied by the behavior. Several other studies confirm these ideas (e.g., Yzerbyt et al. 2001; Yzerbyt, Rogier & Fiske, 1998).

In this article, we argue that specific aspects of language use relate in a predictable way to the formation and maintenance of perceived category entitativity, stereotype content and essentialism. In the following section, we review and integrate research from various fields to elaborate and support these ideas.

Biased Language Use

Based on our integrative review, we argue that socialcategory cognition (i.e., the perceived entitativity, stereotype content, and essentialism of social categories) is both reflected in, and maintained by, language use, specifically by (1) biases in linguistic labeling, and (2) biases in describing the behaviors and characteristics of categorized individuals. Thereby, language use plays a crucial role in the consensualization of social category cognition within cultural groups. In Figure 1, these bias types are embedded in a 'Communicative context' box. This acknowledges that biased language use may differ as a function of factors related to the social context and relationships between communication partners and the target. We will elaborate on this in the following sections and the general discussion.

(1) Biases in linguistic labeling.

The first bias type deals with the category labels used to refer to individuals or groups. Different label types (in content and linguistic form) will be used depending on existing social-category cognition that may or may not (yet) be shared within a given subculture. Specifically, we will argue that label use both results from perceived category entitativity, stereotype content, and essentialism in speakers, and also feeds and maintains this in message recipients, and arguably also in speakers (Figure 1, arrows 4).

A first indication for the link between category labeling and perceived category entitativity comes from research on category perception. Several studies (e.g., Corneille & Judd, 1999; McGarty & Turner, 1992) have shown that the use of even a trivial category label in referring to judged objects or individuals induces perceivers to exaggerate similarities within categories (i.e., assimilation) and to accentuate the differences between categories (i.e., contrast). For instance, Foroni and Rothbart (2011, 2013) showed that the presence of a label (compared to no label) with silhouette drawings of body types (e.g., anorexic, normal, obese) reduced perceived differences between members of the same category (i.e., they are judged as more alike), while the perceived differences between members of different labeled categories increased. Labels thus play an important role in conveying category boundaries (Rothbart, Davis-Stitt & Hill, 1997). It appears that once a (observable) group is linguistically labeled, it is explicitly defined and distinguished from other groups, and it thereby gains in its apparent reality and perceived entitativity (McGarty et al., 1995).

More direct evidence comes from research in child development. Linkages between linguistic labels and category perception and formation already emerge early in language acquisition (Waxman & Markow, 1995). Simply introducing a label in conjunction with a number of individual items facilitates pre-school children to form categories, as shown in a better performance in a sorting task compared to children who hear no labels. These effects occur both for familiar English labels (e.g., animals, clothing, food) as well as for foreign Japanese words (e.g., dobutzus, kimonos, gohans; Waxman & Gelman, 1986). Once a linguistic label is used to refer to a group of objects or individuals, this group is perceived as a more unified and coherent whole that is distinguished from other categories within a conceptual hierarchical taxonomy. Labeling thus appears to be related to higher perceived category entitativity. Other research also suggests relationships of category labeling with stereotype content and perceived essentialism. These linkages become more apparent when we specifically focus on two aspects of labels; (a) their content (i.e., label meaning) and (b) their linguistic form.

(a) Biases in label content.

As noted above, a label functions to refer to a category of people that exists in reality. The label content thus communicates which category of people is referred to, and thereby conveys category boundaries and the category's position in a hierarchical social-category taxonomy. Labels vary in how broad or narrow they are (Anderson, 1991; Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson, & Boyes-Braem, 1976). They can range from superordinate broad levels (e.g., gender, age groups, racial and ethnic groups), to more narrow subordinate levels of aggregation (e.g., specific and specialized professions; Richards & Hewstone, 2001).

Aside from referring to a given category and conveying category boundaries, a label functions to convey meaning about a category and its members. First, conveying meaning (cf. information gain) occurs because labels become associated with a set of stereotypic characteristics. When a group of individuals is repeatedly referred to with a given linguistic label (e.g., immigrants), it will gain in entitativity, which in turn facilitates stereotype formation (cf. Crawford et al., 2002). Hearing or reading a given linguistic category label can, in turn, activate (i.e., prime) the stereotype content that has become associated with this label (Dijksterhuis & Van Knippenberg, 1996). Linguistic labels thus function as verbal tags for social stereotypes (Mullen, 2001).

Second, the semantic meaning or conceptual content of the used linguistic term may bring an additional meaning. Often, different labels can be used to refer to the same social category. For instance, to refer to soccer spectators one can use various labels, like 'fans,' 'supporters' or 'hooligans.' To refer to 'immigrants,' one can use negative labels like 'fortune-seekers,' 'aliens,' 'outsiders,' or highly negative metaphorical terms like 'parasites' (Musolff, 2014). Some labels will be used mainly as a descriptive term, to refer to and identify individuals or groups in an affectively neutral manner (e.g., spectators, plumbers). Other labels, however, have a stronger positive or negative connotation. Derogatory labels and social slurs, are more likely used when one intends to convey negative prejudice, and to qualify categories or category members in a disparaging manner (Croom, 2013; Fasoli, Carnaghi, & Paladino, 2015).

Different labels for the same category may thus be associated to a different cognitive representation (i.e., stereotype content) and may convey different affective evaluations (i.e., prejudice; see the distinction between cognitive complexity and valence of ethnophaulisms; Mullen, 2001; Mullen and Johnson, 1993). Derogatory group labels or stigma are obviously associated with a different more negative stereotype content and associated affective response than neutral labels (Carnaghi & Maass, 2007; Dovidio, Major, & Crocker, 2000; Maass, Suitner, & Merkel, 2014; Smith, 2007). Sexist derogatory slurs (e.g., "bitch," "whore"; see Fasoli et al., 2015), for instance, derogate women by conveying hostile stereotypic expectancies about women (i.e., promiscuity, sexual looseness, low morality), while simultaneously conveying negative affect (e.g., contempt and disgust).

In a text or conversation about a category and its members, various terms may be used. After identifying a category using a (more or less neutral) descriptive label (e.g., immigrants) one may introduce additional labels (e.g., parasites, fortune-seekers) to qualify the category or specified members. By means of metaphorical (e.g., parasite) and non-metaphorical label-terms (e.g., outsider), speakers can convey a semantic meaning that is applied to (members of) the category. Such negatively or positively connotated terms may, in turn, induce new stereotypic associations with the category immigrants.

The fact that linguistic labels both bring a semantic meaning, and over time become associated with a stereotype content, is demonstrated by cases in which group labels with an offensive connotation are substituted by politically correct labels (Maass et al., 2014). Such politically correct substitute terms usually have a euphemistic connotation, but tend to lose their positive meaning over time when the label becomes associated with the same negative stereotypic associations, thus creating the need for repeated replacements. Examples for this process, known as a "euphemism treadmill", can be found in labels for mental disability (moron, mentally retarded, mentally challenged, learning difficulties, special needs) or race (from the use of the N-word as a derogatory group label to the use of the label 'people of color'; Maass et al., 2014).

In sum, the label content functions to identify a given category of people, and thereby conveys category boundaries and a position in a hierarchical taxonomy. We argue that referring to a category using different label types goes hand in hand with perceived category entitativity. When a category is conventionally labeled within a subculture, it gains in perceived entitativity, and vice versa.

Second, the label content plays a role in communicating the content of the set of stereotypic characteristics associated with a given category. As noted, this relationship is two-directional. On the one hand, the use of linguistic category labels can activate (i.e., prime) the stereotype content that has become associated with this label, or bring an additional semantic meaning that eventually becomes part of the (shared) category representation. On the other hand, existing stereotype content can induce the use of associated linguistic category labels. That is, people who hold negative stereotype views are expected to be more likely to use derogatory labels. Importantly, however, the choice to use such labels depends on social norms and whether it is considered appropriate in the communicative context (Crandall et al., 2002; Croom, 2013). In social groups in which negative stereotypes prevail, the use of derogatory labels or slurs will be relatively acceptable (Crandall et al., 2002; Croom, 2013; Fasoli et al., 2015), and this, in turn, can contribute to the consensualization of such negative stereotypic views.

(b) Biases in the linguistic form of labels.

A second aspect of linguistic labels lies in their linguistic form. Interestingly, different linguistic forms of labels are related to different cognitive inferences about categories. Around preschool age, children become sensitive to the grammatical form of words (nouns, verbs, adjectives) and assign particular types of meanings to them (Brown, 1957). When children hear nouns, they take these as referring to entities. That is, they see common nouns (e.g., mothers, teachers) either as a reference to the category to which persons, locations or objects belong (Waxman, 1990; Waxman & Markow, 1995) or as a reference to unique individual objects, locations or persons (i.e., proper nouns; Lucy, London). Nouns thus function to denote taxonomic relations and distinctions among classes or categories in a conceptual hierarchy with various levels of abstraction (Waxman, 1990).

In contrast, other linguistic forms like adjectives serve other purposes. Children soon learn that, while nouns refer to categories, adjectives refer to properties of objects and to subordinate level distinctions (Hall, Waxman & Hurwitz, 1993; Markman & Hutchinson, 1984; Waxman & Gelman, 1986). Indeed, nouns can be used to refer to entities (individuals or categories) in the function of sentence subject or object, while single adjectives[4] cannot. Adjectives typically function to denote one of many qualities that a person or category may possess (Carnaghi et al., 2008). Nevertheless, even though, in most situation, single adjectives strictly are not used as referring labels, the comparison between nouns and adjectives is interesting, because in person descriptions nouns and adjectives can be used in an exceedingly similar manner (e.g., she is an athlete [noun] vs. she is athletic [adjective]). In such descriptions, nouns and adjectives induce different inferences that relate to both category entitativity, stereotype content, and essentialism (Carnaghi et al., 2008).

First, noun labels activate the stereotype content that is associated with the labeled category, while adjectives do not. That is, when a target person is labeled using a noun (vs. adjective), this more strongly induces stereotype-congruent inferences about the target, while simultaneously inhibiting counter-stereotypical inferences. For instance, when a target person is described as “a Jew,” recipients tend to more strongly expect other typically Jewish habits compared to when he or she is described as “Jewish” (Carnaghi et al., 2008).

Second, nouns have an either-or quality (e.g., one either is or is not an *athlete*) while adjectives can vary in degree (e.g., one can be a little or very athletic). Consequently, once a person is classified using a noun (e.g., an athlete) they are less likely categorized into alternative categories (e.g., an artist). By contrast, adjectival descriptions (e.g., athletic) more easily allow alternatives (i.e., somebody can be both *athletic* and *artistic*; Carnaghi et al., 2008; see also Waxman, 1990). Nouns thus function as stronger category labels, and, compared to adjectives, can be expected to relate to higher perceived category entitativity.

Moreover, nouns induce stronger inferences regarding the perceived essentialism or immutability of associated stereotypic characteristics. When persons are described with a noun (e.g., Kevin is a traditionalist), compared to a corresponding adjective (e.g., Kevin is traditional), category-congruent behavioral preferences (e.g., sends Christmas postcards) are seen as a more profound and unchangeable, to have a higher enduringness, and higher likelihood of future repetition (Carnaghi et al., 2008). Likewise, Gelman and Heyman (1999) showed that children of ages five and seven inferred that a person’s characteristics (e.g., Rose eats a lot of carrots) were more stable and enduring when they were described with a noun

[4] When adjectives are used in labels referring to individuals or categories they are usually combined with a noun, as in subtype labels (e.g., female surgeon; see below).

label (e.g., She is a carrot eater) compared to when they were presented in a descriptive phrase (e.g., She eats carrots whenever she can).

The above studies show effects of a label's linguistic form on recipients' inductive inferences (Figure 1, Arrow B). Carnaghi et al. (2008, study 6) also showed experimental effects of speakers' label use as a result of perceived category essentialism (Figure 1, Arrow A). For instance, participants who were led to believe that athletic abilities are genetically determined (high essentialism) were more likely to choose a noun label than an adjective to describe an individual target person active in athletic sports (athlete), compared to participants who believed athletic abilities are a transient characteristic and the result of training (low essentialism). Perceptions of high essentialism thus also induce the use of stronger noun labels.

Another important distinction in the linguistic form of labels lies in whether labels are formulated as generic (e.g., Germans are …), subset (e.g., these Germans are …), subtype (e.g., female Germans are …) or individual (e.g., This German is…) references. Although references can be expressed in different and quite complicated ways (Cimpian & Markman, 2008), preschool children are already sensitive to cues that indicate whether a label refers to a generic category (i.e., a kind) a specific subset of exemplars, or a specific exemplar (e.g., cats have tails, the cats have tails, the cat has a tail; Gelman & Raman, 2003). Note that such generic versus specific exemplar labels respectively correspond to the high and low levels of target references described above (Beike & Sherman, 1994).

Generic references have received particular research interest in developmental psychology, as these are considered to play a crucial role in the transmission of category knowledge (Cimpian & Markman, 2008, 2009; Gelman et al. 1998). Generic sentences combine generic labels with a characteristic and thereby express generalizations both across individual category members and situations (e.g., Boys play with trucks; Girls are sweet). These utterances thus correspond to the high level of social information as described by Beike and Sherman (1994). Generic sentences, or generics, explicitly convey that a characteristic applies to an entire category. Importantly, this type of category–characteristic mapping cannot be observed directly, nor can this information be illustrated for someone else without the use of language (Gelman, Taylor, Nguyen, Leaper, & Bigler, 2004). Generics are frequent in child-directed speech, and argued to be important in children's conceptual development (Gelman, 2003; Gelman, Ware, & Kleinberg, 2010).

In the English language (and many other languages), generic sentences can be expressed with bare plural nouns (e.g., Boys play with trucks), but also with definite singulars (e.g., The elephant is found in Africa and Asia), or indefinite singular articles (e.g., A girl wears pink), and are accompanied by present-tense verbs (Gelman et al., 2004; Rhodes, Leslie, & Tworek, 2012). Unlike utterances containing universal quantifiers such as all, every, or each, generic statements allow for exceptions. That is, while a single counterexample would disprove the generalization "All boys play with trucks", the generic statement "Boys play with trucks" remains true even after an encounter with a single boy who does not. This feature makes generic sentences ideally suited to convey characteristics that are typical for a category but that can nevertheless admit exceptions. They convey qualities that are stable (non-accidental), enduring, and persistent across time and situations (i.e., essential), and thereby also imply that a category is a coherent, stable entity (Gelman et al., 2004).

A number of studies have shown the important role of generics in forming perceptions of category entitativity and essentialism. Both Gelman et al. (2010) and Rhodes et al. (2012) conducted a series of experiments in which pre-school children and adults were introduced to a novel and fictional category labeled "Zarpies" via an illustrated picture book. The characteristics were presented on separate pages with pictures of Zarpie exemplars accompanied by either generic noun labels (e.g., Zarpies hate ice cream), individual noun labels (e.g., This Zarpie hates ice cream), or no-label (e.g., This hates ice cream; Gelman et al., 2010).

First, using various methods, these studies demonstrate that generics, compared to both individual and no-label, induced stronger category–characteristics links (i.e., stereotype content). When Zarpie characteristics were learned by means of generic sentences, respondents were likelier to mention these characteristics as explanations for behavior of Zarpie exemplars, to generalize them to novel Zarpie exemplars, and to expect that category members are alike in other unmentioned characteristics as well (Gelman et al., 2010).

Second, the studies show that generics led to stronger perceived essentialism. When characteristics were learned from generic noun labels, compared to individual noun label and no-label, they were expected to be innate and inevitable, and stable across time (Gelman et al., 2010; Rhodes et al., 2012). Moreover, after being exposed to descriptions with generics, respondents were likelier to provide dispositional, rather than situational, explanations for Zarpie behaviors (Gelman et al., 2010). The individual noun label still induced stronger category essentialism compared to no label, but the use of a generic label led to the highest level of perceived category essentialism (Gelman et al., 2010; Rhodes et al., 2012).

Interestingly, Rhodes et al. (2012) also showed that the use of generic labels is related to perceived entitativity. Parents who were first led to believe that Zarpies are a distinct kind of people with many biological and cultural differences from other social groups (i.e., high entitativity), rather than a non-distinct kind (i.e., low entitativity[5]), used more generic references when they talked about them to their child from a picture book without accompanying text (Rhodes et al., 2012, Study 3).

Section summary.

In sum, research shows clear linkages between the content and linguistic form of labels and perceived category entitativity, stereotype content, and essentialism. First, the use of any category label (compared to no label) both reflects and induces a higher level of category entitativity. Second, particular types of labels (in content and linguistic forms) reflect and induce differences in perceived category entitativity, stereotype content, and essentialism. Verbal descriptions and adjectival references imply lower entitativity and essentialism than noun labels. Noun labels, particularly in generic form, imply the highest entitativity and perceived essentialism of specified characteristics. To the extent that a category is labeled as a stronger entity, the likelier it is to acquire a set of associated characteristics, and the likelier these characteristics will be seen as essential to all members of the category[6].

The role of biased labeling in the consensualization of social category cognition.

The SCSC framework explains how label use contributes to the consensualization of social category cognition. In this section we further discuss three important aspects of this process: (a) label use reflects and shapes social category cognition; while (b) label use is

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[5] Note that Rhodes et al. (2012) use a broad definition of essentialism and use the term essentialism here to include perceptions of entitativity.

[6] Note that, in natural text or conversation, after an initial categorization using a linguistic label, other linguistic cues may further determine perceived category entitativity and essentialism. The use of pronouns, for instance can provide further verbal cues about targets' category membership (e.g., he vs. she), their position in a category hierarchy (e.g., he vs. they) and the boundaries between groups (e.g., we, they, us vs. them).

simultaneously shaped by a perceived reality (the target's situation), and (c) by processes in the communicative situation.

First, the above sections show that the use of different labels is biased by social-category knowledge, by reflecting (and inducing) perceived category entitativity, stereotype content, and essentialism. Thus, when we communicate about other people (about targets in specified target situations, but also in generalized terms), existing social-category knowledge determines which categories are applied, which in turn is reflected in the labels used. Research on the categorization process demonstrates that people are most likely to apply categories that are cognitively salient (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Mackie et al., 1996). These findings suggest that categories that are part of existing (shared) social category knowledge, particularly chronically salient categories with high perceived entitativity[7] that are regularly activated, have an advantage of being activated again, and to be linguistically labeled. By means of label use subcultures thus develop their own taxonomy of social categories that are consensually considered as distinct and meaningful "kinds" (cf. Rosch et al., 1976). Some cultures may distinguish a given category of people by conventionally labeling it, while other subcultures do not label and distinguish it.

Second, label use is simultaneously shaped by available information about the target's situation. Research on the categorization process shows that category activation also depends on fit, which is the degree of overlap between the observed or discussed features and behaviors of a target and the characteristics denoted in a given cognitive category representation (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Mackie et al., 1996). Category activation and label use are thus shaped by available information (e.g., observed or communicated) about features and behaviors of a discussed target (Fig. 1, Arrows 1 and C). People are expected to seek the strongest category with the most information gain in a given situation, in order to maximize the accuracy of predictive inference (Anderson, 1991; Hamilton & Sherman, 1996).

This cognitive search for the most fitting categorization to apply to a given target situation can be characterized as a narrowing process. When inconsistencies are perceived between a target person's features and behavior and an activated category representation (i.e., *fit* is low; e.g., a person does not behave in stereotypical ways), this will prompt a perceiver to process more deeply. First, inconsistencies may prompt perceivers to search for a more sensible or specified alternative categorization, resulting in re-categorization or subtyping, or ultimately (with enough time, resources, and motivation) a piecemeal integration of individual attributes (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Hamilton & Sherman, 1996). Thus, inconsistencies between a target's situational information and activated existing social-category cognition will prompt a tendency towards lower levels of information (cf. Beike & Sherman, 1994).

This narrowing process can be observed in various ways in the labels that are used in communications about other people, both in terms of label content (i.e., the categories position in a hierarchy), and in linguistic form. First, to refer to a target person showing behavior that fits the category stereotype, people should be inclined to readily use a chronically salient and strong (i.e., noun) category label. However, when a target person's attributes and behaviors are incongruent with the characteristics denoted in an activated category representation, or when the communicative context calls for a specification (e.g., a critical response), people typically tend to narrow down to subordinate categories. This process can result in finding an alternative subordinate category (e.g., "chemist" rather than a superordinate label "scientist").

[7] It seems reasonable to assume that perceived category entitativity and essentialism, and the use of stronger noun labels, are positively related to chronic salience. We are, however, not aware of any research that supports this hypothesis.

In this case, an alternative category with distinct entitativity is referred to with an independent noun label (i.e., an independent representation; Rothbart & Park, 2004). In finding such alternative categories, categories that are relatively high in cognitive salience should again have an advantage.

When fit is low, but re-categorization is not possible, people are likely to specify a subtype within a previously activated category (Hilton & Von Hippel 1990; Richards & Hewstone, 2001; Weber & Crocker, 1983). Subtyping is linguistically usually reflected in the use of modified noun labels like "friendly hooligan" or "tough woman" (adjective + noun) or compound nouns like "career women," "desk officer" or "math girl" (noun + noun). By creating subtypes, exceptions to the rule are placed in a subcategory that is narrower than the broad group, and this allows one to preserve the existing general stereotype (Devine & Baker, 1991; Richards & Hewstone, 2001). The main noun refers to a superordinate category, but is modified by an adjective or another noun. Such labels reflect nested representations (Rothbart & Park, 2004). Subtype references are, for instance, expected in references to females and males who function in roles or occupations that are inconsistent with gender stereotypes. In these cases, people tend to add an explicit mention of the person's sex (e.g., female surgeon, male nurse; Stahlberg, Braun, Irmen, & Sczesny, 2007; Romaine, 2001), while this is not expected when the person's sex fits the respective gender role (Beukeboom, 2014). Note that such new distinctions may at first be marked with adjectival phrases, but in time these subtypes may gain in salience and entitativity. They may then acquire a single noun label (see Waxman, 1990), gain in essentialism, and evolve in a strong category with a rich stereotype (e.g., hipsters).

In sum, the use of category labels is in various ways biased by existing social-category cognition. Chronically salient categories have an advantage, but the fit with a discussed target's features and behavior affects label choice. Stronger noun labels are likely reserved for targets showing expectancy consistent features and behavior for the applied category, i.e., the typical category member. In contrast, targets showing characteristics or behaviors that are inconsistent with activated social-category cognition are likelier referred to with more narrow category labels, with modified or compound noun labels (i.e., subtypes), adjectives, or descriptive phrases. Note that these tendencies to distinctly label inconsistent targets outside a generic category serve to maintain existing social category stereotypes.

Finally, the third aspect depicted in the SCSC framework explains that the above processes are shaped by factors in the communicative context. That is, the process of seeking the most fitting and currently relevant categorization is determined in the interaction between conversation partners, and shaped by factors like the assumed knowledge in, and perceived consensus with, message recipients. This notion aligns with research based on a well-known theory in pragmatics: Relevance Theory (Wilson & Sperber, 2004) describes how people strive to make their communications optimally relevant, both in terms of activated intrapersonal cognitions (cf., fit), interpersonal processes and contextual meaning. Narrowing utterances (i.e., lexical narrowing) is one way to achieve this relevance (Gibbs & Bryant, 2008; van der Henst, Carles, & Sperber, 2002). In formulating utterances, people strive to achieve optimal relevance while minimizing the cognitive effort needed for themselves and their addressees; a narrower utterance is thus only provided when required (Sperber & Wilson, 1995).

Another factor in the communicative context, as mentioned before, are social norms about which labels are considered appropriate to identify and qualify discussed targets. Social norms may affect the use of labels with varying content. Particularly labels with a highly negative connotation (e.g., derogatory labels, slurs, ethnophaulisms) are in many contexts regarded as offensive and socially unacceptable, and this will induce people to refrain from using them (Crandall et al., 2002; Croom, 2013; Fasoli et al., 2015). Social norms may also affect the use of labels of different linguistic form. For instance, particularly with negatively stereotyped categories, the use of strong noun labels may be perceived as inappropriate, because this fixates the individual as a typical instance of the social category (Mullen 2001). Within cultural groups, social norms, thus, determine what labels to use. This too contributes to the consensualization of social category cognition, because it induces people to communicate and internalize the social category cognition that is consensually shared.

(2) Biases in describing behaviors and characteristics of categorized individuals.

Once a category is perceived (and labeled) as a meaningful entity, perceivers can acquire, and subsequently maintain, a set of stereotypic characteristics that are held to be – to a varying extent – essential to the category as a whole. Two types of biases in communications about categorized individuals play a crucial role in the process of stereotype formation and maintenance: (a) biases in communication content (what we communicate about), and (b) biases in linguistic form (how information about categorized individuals is formulated).

(a) Biases in communication content.

What information about categorized individuals is communicated. One way through which a labeled category acquires and keeps its stereotypic associations is determined by what information is shared in communication about category members. The information that is shared may determine stereotype content if there is a general tendency for people to systematically communicate more about certain features and characteristics categories relative to others (Schaller, Conway, & Tanchuk, 2002). Numerous studies on serial reproduction and dyadic conversation have revealed a stereotype-consistency bias, showing that stereotype-consistent information tends to be shared more prominently compared to stereotype-inconsistent information in conversations about categorized individuals (Klein et al., 2008; Kashima, 2000; Ruscher, 1998; Schaller et al., 2002). Once target individuals are labeled as a member of a category (e.g., by using a label like “an alcoholic”), conversation dyads increase their focus on label-congruent information (Ruscher, 1998). Particularly when information is already part of the common ground (i.e., shared cognition) between communication partners, communication of stereotype-congruent knowledge becomes likelier (Fast, Heath, & Wu, 2009; Lyons & Kashima, 2001, 2003; Wittenbaum & Park, 2001).

In addition to interpersonal communication, mass media are a powerful transmitter of stereotypic characteristics associated with categories (Arendt, 2013; Ramasubramanian, 2011; Ramasubramanian & Oliver, 2007). For instance, television announcers covering professional football and basketball have been shown to subtly induce associations by more frequently emphasizing athleticism of African-American players, while emphasizing intellectual abilities and character traits of White players (Billings, 2004; Eastman & Billings, 2001; Rada, 1996; Rada & Wulfemeyer, 2005). These and other types of biased representations in media content of different categories have an effect on recipients. For instance, Arendt and Northup (2015) found that increased exposure to local television news, in which African Americans are overrepresented as criminals, is related to more negative implicit and explicit attitudes about African Americans. Likewise, negative news portrayals of immigrants have been shown to increase negative stereotypic attitudes in an audience, while exposure to positive news reduced the activation of negative attitudes about immigrants (Schemer, 2012).

The consequence of this bias in communication content is that members of (sub)cultures will be exposed relatively more to congruent information of shared stereotypes, which leads to a continuous confirmation of existing stereotypic associations. Frequent exposure to a category label in combination with certain characteristics strengthens these associations. These strenghtened associations, in turn, increases accessibility and likelihood of the link being activated and shared again in subsequent communications. By repeatedly retelling a certain category-trait association, it can thus become a widely shared, cultural belief amongst members of a subculture (Bratanova & Kashima, 2014). Hence, the stereotype consistency bias shows that communications about characteristics and behavior reflects and shapes stereotype content and possibly also perceived essentialism (Figure 1, dashed arrows 5).

Like label use, the communication of stereotype congruent information is shaped by factors in the communicative context. One explanation put forward for the tendency to predominantly communicate existing stereotype-consistent information, in addition to its increased accessibility, is that it is relationally beneficial. People prefer to communicate information they believe resonates with their audiences because it allows them to develop common ground and it facilitates perceptions of similarity, liking, and agreeableness (Bratanova & Kashima, 2014, Clark & Kashima, 2007; Higgins, 1992). Also, conveying shared stereotype-consistent (vs. inconsistent) information to a conversation partner likely allows for a smooth interaction; it usually requires fewer processing resources (in communication time, number and length of utterances), because conversation partners can easily reconcile this information with existing assumptions, and it less likely leads to misunderstanding or disagreement (Klein et al., 2008).

The stereotype-consistency bias can thus follow from a motivation to reach consensus and agreement with a conversation partner (Ruscher, 1998). When these social goals prevail, the message constructed for an audience need not even reflect communicators' own beliefs about a social target. Transmitting a stereotypic target-group description to a recipient who is likely to endorse it may follow from communicators' proclivity to form or affirm a social relationship and to show in-group solidarity (Bratanova & Kashima, 2014; Clark & Kashima, 2007; Ruscher, Cralley, & O'Farrell, 2005).

The communicative context may also induce factors that prevent or even reverse the stereotype-consistency bias. In some contexts, stereotype-inconsistent information becomes more relevant and therefore features in communications. For instance, when a sender is motivated to inform an audience (rather than to create and maintain a social relationship), stereotype-inconsistent information is considered more useful (Clark & Kashima, 2007). Likewise, when speakers are motivated to develop an accurate individuated representation of a target, they tend to devote more communication time to stereotype-inconsistent information (Ruscher, Hammer, & Hammer, 1996; Karasawa, Asai, & Tanabe, 2007). Sharing of stereotype-inconsistent information also increases among groups of communicators who each have unique target information, as this increases their sense of accountability and desire to be accurate and complete (Brauer, Judd, & Jacquelin, 2001; Ruscher & Duval, 1998). These factors thus induce a motivation towards lower and individuated levels of information that mimics the narrowing process described above (cf. Fiske & Neuberg, 1990).

Another moderator of the stereotype-consistency bias relates to the social acceptability of verbally expressing certain stereotypic views (Ruscher et al., 2005). As discussed above, social norms often dictate that it is socially unacceptable to express prejudiced stereotypic beliefs about social categories to which the speaker does not belong (e.g., Crandall et al., 2002; Croom, 2013). In such cases, an interaction may develop towards increased sharing of counter-stereotypic attributes, in order to convey non-prejudiced impressions.

One should realize, however, that sharing stereotypeinconsistent information is not necessarily always stereotype disconfirming. First, attempts to plea in favor of a negatively stereotyped group may increase category entitativity, because the group is explicitly labeled (see above). Second, subtle variations in linguistic form in communications about stereotype-inconsistent (compared to consistent) information may adversely have stereotype confirming effects (see next section).

Section summary.

In sum, research shows that more time is allocated to communicating stereotype-consistent information compared to stereotype-inconsistent information. This facilitates the formation and maintenance of a set of (more or less) immutable stereotypic associations with (labeled) categories (stereotype content and perceived category essentialism). This bias likely has the strongest inductive effect on stereotype formation when category entitativity is high; i.e., when the discussed category is labeled with a noun, and particularly with a generic noun and sentence, as explained in the previous sections. Repeated exposure to a category label along with certain characteristics creates or reinforces cognitive linkages between the category and characteristics (stereotype content), and these characteristics may also increasingly be perceived as essential for the category. When such linkages exist, it, in turn, becomes more likely that the characteristics are introduced again in communications about relevant categorized persons.

Nevertheless, stereotype-inconsistent information is – although less frequently – mentioned in communication. Without considering how stereotype-inconsistent information is introduced in communications, one might simply assume that stereotype-inconsistent information is always stereotype disconfirming. The next section about how stereotype information is introduced in communications and its relation to stereotype content and perceived essentialism will argue that this assumption is not warranted.

(b) Biases in linguistic form of communications about categorized individuals.

A second way through which a labeled category acquires and keeps a set of associated essential stereotypic characteristics is determined by how information about categorized individuals formulated. When people communicate about categorized individuals, their formulations refer in various ways to what is expected for the categorized individual or applied category as a whole. Research within this field shows that information about people that is consistent with existing social-category cognition is formulated differently than information that is inconsistent with social-category cognition (Beukeboom, 2014). Several subtle variations in verbal formulation have been shown to subtly communicate what is expected (i.e., part of the stereotype content and essential) rather than unexpected for a categorized target.

The most investigated linguistic means to communicate the extent to which behavior is expected or not is language abstraction as defined by the Linguistic Category Model (Semin & Fiedler, 1988). Any behavior can be described in concrete terms, using action verbs (e.g., she kicks him) or using increasingly more abstract terms like state verbs (e.g., she hates him) or adjectives (e.g., she is aggressive). Research on the Linguistic Intergroup Bias (LIB; Maass, Milesi, Zabbini, & Stahlberg 1995; Maass, 1999) and Linguistic Expectancy Bias (LEB; Wigboldus et al., 2000) shows that language abstraction varies as a function of stereotype consistency. A target's behavior is likelier described in abstract terms when it is stereotype-consistent and the fit between the described behavior and existing stereotypic expectancies is high (e.g., adjectives; the woman is emotional), but more concretely when it is stereotype-inconsistent and fit is low (e.g., descriptive action verbs; the man is crying).

Given that abstract descriptions provide more information about the actor's stable dispositional qualities and less information about the specific situation (Semin & Fiedler, 1988), higher levels of abstraction endorse existing stereotypic beliefs. That is, abstract words used for stereotypeconsistent behaviors imply attribution to stable traits that are present across situation (i.e., high essentialism), whereas concrete words used for stereotype-inconsistent behaviors imply attribution to transient situational causes, suggesting rule exceptions (Wigboldus & Douglas, 2007). Note that this corresponds to generalizations on the behavior description dimension (Beike & Sherman, 1994), as more abstract terms generalize across situations (high-level information) while concrete terms describe specified situational behaviors (lowlevel information). Recipients are sensitive to these subtle variations and infer higher essentialism from abstract compared to concrete descriptions. Higher levels of language abstraction thus both follow from, and induce, perceptions that the described behaviors are essential for the categorized actor and are stable across situations (Wigboldus et al., 2000).

The Stereotypic Explanatory Bias (SEB) relates to a comparable linguistic variation, and proposes that speakers (and conversing dyads, Hammer & Ruscher, 1997) tend to produce more explanatory comments for stereotype-inconsistent (vs. consistent) behaviors (e.g., the man is crying, because he has a rough day; Hastie, 1984; Hamilton & Sherman, 1996; Sekaquaptewa, Espinoza, Thompson, Vargas, & von Hippel, 2003). Such explanations of stereotype-inconsistent behavior are aimed at clarifying the apparent inconsistency, which is not needed for stereotype-consistent behavior. Inconsistencies are surprising, and in order to maintain coherence in one’s existing stereotypic impression, a perceiver strives to resolve inconsistencies and attempt to explain why the inconsistency occurred (see also Hegarty & Pratto, 2001, study 3). Both concrete situational descriptions and explanations are linguistic reflections of such attempts.

When communicating about stereotype-inconsistent information, speakers can also introduce stereotype-consistent terms, for instance by using negations or irony. Research on the Negation Bias (NB; Beukeboom et al., 2010) revealed that the use of syntactic negations (e.g., not stupid, rather than smart) is more pronounced in descriptions of stereotype-inconsistent compared to stereotype-consistent behaviors. For example, if a sender’s stereotypic expectancy dictates that garbage men are stupid, but a particular garbage man violates this expectancy by showing highly intelligent behavior, the sender is likely to reveal his prior expectancy by using a negation like The garbage man was not stupid. In contrast, for stereotype-consistent behavior (e.g., The garbage man was stupid; The professor was smart), the use of negations is less likely. Negations thus allow one to introduce stereotype consistent concepts in communications about stereotypeinconsistent information, and thereby re-affirm existing associations with a category.

A similar mechanism has been shown to occur in the Irony Bias (IB, Burgers & Beukeboom, 2016). Research on the IB shows that speakers find ironic remarks particularly appropriate to comment on stereotype-violating (vs. stereotype-confirming) behaviors. An ironic remark about stereotype-inconsistent behavior (e.g., “what a neat person” about someone’s messy room) allows speakers to introduce the expectancy (the person is expected to be neat) and simultaneously signal its failure. The literal meaning of ironic comments is inappropriate for the context, and thereby (ironically) refers to some relevant information, like implicit (stereotypic) expectancies (e.g., Attardo, 2000; Utsumi, 2000; Wilson & Sperber, 2004). Like negations, ironic remarks introduce opposite terms to describe a behavioral situation. This led some scholars to consider irony as a form of “indirect negation” (Giora, 1995). Both negations and ironic comments about stereotype-inconsistent behavior can thus activate and communicate the implicit stereotypic expectancy in message recipients. Moreover, recipients infer lower essentialism from both negated behavior descriptions (compared to affirmation; Beukeboom et al., 2010) and from ironic (compared to literal) comments (Burgers & Beukeboom, 2016), showing that these biases serve to maintain expectancies about what is and what is not essential for members of a given social category.

Interestingly, various studies suggest that these biases, particularly the SEB (Hamilton & Sherman, 1996), LEB (Spencer-Rodgers, Hamilton, & Sherman, 2007), and LIB (Moscatelli & Rubini, 2011; Rubini, Moscatelli, & Palmonari, 2007) are stronger when the described target category is high (vs. low) in perceived entitativity. The higher perceived entitativity and expected consistency, the more troubled perceivers will be by perceived stereotype inconsistent behaviors, and this increases perceivers efforts to resolve these (Hamilton & Sherman, 1996). The strenghtened efforts to resolve such inconsistencies, in turn, are revealed in biased language use.

Finally, there are undoubtedly other linguistic means that allow one to indicate whether described behaviors of category member(s) are expected or not, but that have hitherto not been studied with respect to stereotypes. First, any language contains an abundance of potential signal words to indicate that behavior is typical (e.g., as always; indeed; again) or rather that it is an unexpected one-time-event (e.g., this time; once; unexpectedly). It seems plausible that speakers use such signal words to indicate whether or not a target's discussed characteristics and behavior are stereotypically expected. It has been argued, based on studies using categorizations of toys and colors, that speakers convey confidence cues (e.g., hedges and hesitations; I guess, I don't know) when they are uncertain about a categorization, and that recipients use these cues to draw inferences about category structure (Barr & Kronmüller, 2006).

Another possible linguistic means for bias relates to work by Haviland and Clark (1974). They argued that, in order to maintain common ground and understanding, communication partners adhere to a given-new contract, which dictates a conversation norm to indicate what is given information, and what is new information. Given information may be something that is shared before, but also general knowledge that is considered known. This includes social-category stereotypes that are shared between communication partners. 'New' information is not yet shared and thus requires a modification in the shape of the listener's current knowledge (MacWhinney & Bates, 1978). When information is assumed to be given, it is either omitted or referenced briefly or in general terms. When information is new, in contrast, it is likelier to be marked (Clark & Haviland, 1977). Note, that – if we consider stereotype-inconsistent information as new information – the above-described biases fit with this reasoning; i.e., when stereotype-inconsistent information is introduced it tends to be marked by using concrete terms (LEB), by adding explanations (SEB), the use of negations or irony (NB, IB), and potentially by using signal words, hedges, and hesitations.

Interestingly, research has also shown a given-new ordering (Ferreira & Yoshita, 2003; MacWhinney & Bates, 1978) in that speakers tend to produce sentences in which given information is mentioned first, and new information later. Future research may shed more light on the extent to which these –and other– linguistic variations are used to indicate stereotypic exceptions and induce difference in essentialist inferences about social categories.

Section summary and integration.

In sum, research shows that biases in the content and the linguistic form of descriptions of the behaviors and characteristics of categorized individuals reflect and maintain existing social-category cognition, specifically with respect to stereotype content and perceived category essentialism (Figure 1, dashed arrows 5). Biases in communication content show a tendency to mainly communicate about behaviors and characteristics that are in line with existing social-category stereotypes. This stereotype consistency bias reflects and strengthens associations between the target category and the content of the set of stereotypic characteristics (i.e., stereotype content); the repetition may increase perceptions that these associated characteristics are immutable and stable across situations (i.e., essentialism). Biases in linguistic form show variations as a function of whether described behaviors are consistent with existing social-category cognition or not, and also relate to perceived essentialism. When a described target's behavior is stereotype inconsistent (low fit; compared to consistent) it is likelier described in concrete terms, to contain situational explanations (cf. low-level information), and by means of negations and ironic remarks. Both negations and irony allow speakers to introduce stereotype-consistent terms in descriptions about stereotype-inconsistent information and thereby confirm existing stereotypic associations. This means that even when people are confronted with stereotype-inconsistent information, a biased formulation may induce recipients to draw stereotype-confirming inferences, both with respect to stereotype content and perceived immutability of associated traits. That is, the formulations that are used to communicate stereotype-inconsistent information (compared to consistent) imply lower levels of essentialism (Beukeboom, 2014). Again, these processes function to consensualize social category stereotypes.

General Discussion: Contributions, Implications, and Future Directions

Although social-category stereotypes have mostly been defined and studied as an intrapersonal phenomenon, they are nevertheless generally assumed to become consensually shared within (sub)cultures (Haslam et al., 1997; Holtgraves & Kashima, 2007). Our integrative literature review attempts to elucidate the mechanisms through which stereotype consensuality is achieved by specifically focusing on the role of language use. The SCSC framework integrates knowledge about various linguistic means that hitherto existed in largely independent fields, and links these to three fundamental variables in (shared) social-category cognition: perceived category entitativity, stereotype content, and essentialism. The framework consists of three interrelated parts that together explain the consensualization of social category cognition. Based on our review, we pose that (1) social category cognition is reflected in, and shaped by), biases in language use in communications about categorized individuals (Fig. 1, arrow A and B, while acknowledging that language use about categorized individuals is shaped by (2) a perceived reality (i.e., target's situations, features and behavior; Fig. 1, arrow C), and (3) by processes in the communication context which, simultaneously, play a role in the consensualization process. In the following, we first summarize these three aspects of the SCSC framework, and then continue with discussing its theoretical contributions and future directions.

First, the SCSC framework poses that perceived category entitativity, stereotype content, and essentialism are reflected in, and shaped by, biases in language use in communications about categorized individuals (Fig. 1 arrow A and B). We distinguish two linguistic bias types, each of which is further specified by focusing on linguistic content and form. The first type of biases concerns the use of category labels. Research shows that once a category of individuals is linguistically labeled, it is perceived as a unified and coherent entity that is distinguishable from other categories within a social-category taxonomy. The content of the label (i.e., meaning of label term) is important because it conveys the category's position in this taxonomy (i.e., broad, superordinate vs. more narrow, subordinate) and may prime or complement the set of stereotypic characteristics that is associated with the category (stereotype content and essentialism; Fig. 1, arrows 4).

Like label content, the linguistic form of category labels relates in predictable ways to perceived category entitativity, stereotype content, and essentialism. That is, noun labels (as compared to adjective or descriptive labels) function to denote within-group similarities, and distinctions between categories and thereby imply a relatively high perceived category entitativity. Moreover, noun labels activate the stereotype content that is associated with the labeled category, and imply a higher perceived immutability of associated characteristics (perceived essentialism). Noun labels in generic form (i.e., generics) generalize across individual category members, and imply the strongest category essentialism and entitativity. In contrast, weaker labels, like adjectives, compound subtype labels, or descriptive phrases, imply lower category entitativity and essentialism and are likelier used when referring to stereotype-violating targets that are hard to categorize. The second types of biases that have been studied concern the use of language in communications about behaviors and characteristics of categorized individuals. In terms of communication content (i.e., *what* information about categorized individuals is communicated), research shows a stereotypeconsistency bias. People tend to prefer sharing information that is already part of the stereotype content associated with (labeled) categories. In terms of linguistic form, several biases (e.g., in language abstraction, explanations, negations, irony) show subtle differences in formulating stereotypeviolating compared to stereotype-confirming information about categorized individuals. Stereotype confirming behaviors tend to be communicated using more abstract descriptions (e.g., X is aggressive; Y is helpful) that generalize across situations, and thereby convey high levels of perceived essentialism of the described characteristic. In contrast, stereotype-violating behaviors of an activated category tend to be communicated with concrete verbs that link to specified situations (LEB), by providing situated explanations (SEB), or using negations (NB) or irony (IB) that introduce stereotype consistent terms. Such formulations have been shown to imply that the described behavior is a one-time exception to the rule and thus induce lower levels of perceived essentialism. Together, these biases reflect and thereby maintain both the content of existing stereotypes as well as the perceived level of immutability of these associated stereotypic characteristics (i.e., perceived essentialism; Fig. 1, dashed arrows 5).

Second, the SCSC framework acknowledges that language use about categorized individuals is shaped by a perceived reality (i.e., the target's situation; Fig 1, arrow C). That is, communication about categorized individuals likely starts with input about the target's observable features and actual behavioral situations. However, texts or conversations may further evolve to higher levels of information (i.e., using generic labels that generalize across individuals, and abstract behavior descriptions that generalize across situations) that have no direct reference to actual people behaving in specific situations. As a consequence, communication about social category stereotypes may acquire a "life of their own" with little or no basis in reality (Brauer, Judd, & Thompson, 2004).

As noted above, from our analysis we conclude that communication at a high generalized level (cf. Beike & Sherman, 1994) is most likely when a discussed target's features and behaviors fit with existing social category cognition (i.e., typical members showing stereotype-consistent behaviors). Generic sentences convey the highest level of information as these combine a generic label with an abstract behavior description and thus generalize both across individual category members and across situations (e.g., boys are tough; immigrants are violent). Generics have been shown to quite directly induce perceptions of category entitativity and associations between labeled categories and essential characteristics (e.g., Gelman et al., 2010); when a generic utterance is accepted by a recipient, no further inductive inferences are required for stereotype formation. In contrast, when a discussed target's fit to an activated category is low (i.e., atypical individuals showing stereotype inconsistent behaviors), one may either seek an alternative more fitting category, or communicate the information at a low level (cf. Beike & Sherman, 1994). In the latter case, one thus tends to narrow to the use of more specified labels (individuals, subtypes), and concrete, situational behavior descriptions. As low-level formulations induce lower levels of category essentialism for the described behavior the result of this is that a-typical behaviors and characteristics are not essentialized.

Third, while the above processes are usually argued to result from intrapersonal processes (i.e., perceived inconsistencies between activated cognition and a perceived target), the SCSC framework acknowledges that language use about categorized individuals is shaped by interpersonal processes in the communication context. In line with others, we have argued that the consensualization of stereotypes is most likely within subcultures, or specifically, among groups of people who define themselves in terms of a shared social identity (Carnaghi & Yzerbyt, 2007; Crandall et al., 2002; Haslam et al., 1997; Haslam et al., 1996; Haslam, Oakes, Reynolds, & Turner, 1999).

On the one hand, this occurs because people are more likely to express social information (in content and form) in line with consensually shared social category stereotypes. That is, people tailor their descriptions to assumed stereotypic views of recipients (Carnaghi & Yzerbyt, 2007; Higgins & Rholes, 1978; McCann & Higgins, 1990; Marsh, 2007). Also, people are sensitive to social norms about expressing stereotypic impressions and will, for instance, refrain from expressing negative prejudice (e.g., using derogatory labels) when this is perceived as socially unacceptable (Croom, 2013; Fasoli et al., 2015; Crandall et al., 2002). Moreover, the tendency to pursue common ground in communication causes people to more prominently label known and accessible categories and discuss stereotype-consistent (compared to inconsistent) characteristics and behaviors (Fast et al., 2009; Fiedler, Bluemke, Friese, & Hofmann, 2003; Klein, Clark, & Lyons, 2010; Lyons & Kashima, 2001, 2003; Wittenbaum & Park, 2001).

On the other hand, perceived consensus is used to validate the social information people receive or discuss, and thereby determines whether people internalize the information as part of their social-category cognition. When people learn that their pre-existing stereotypic beliefs are consensually shared by in-group members (but not by out-group members), these stereotypes are bolstered (Haslam et al., 1997; Haslam et al., 1996; Wittenbrink & Henly, 1996), and increase in accessibility (Sechrist & Stangor, 2001). Moreover, sharing and discussing social information allows people to monitor and verify whether their category cognition is correct, and agreement and confirmation can provide greater certainty (Klein et al., 2008; Kashima, Klein, & Clark, 2007; Kopietz, Hellmann, Higgins, & Echterhoff, 2010; Echterhoff, Higgins, & Levine, 2009. Research by Kashima et al. (2010), for instance, showed that the mere act of communicating about characteristics of a novel social category induced stronger dispositional attributions, and stronger beliefs about the immutable essence of the category (i.e., increased perceived essentialism). Importantly, this induction occured especially when the speakers' descriptions were socially validated by the conversation partner (i.e., grounded; conversation partners mutually recognized that they had reached an understanding about a target person; H. Clark, 1996; Echterhoff, Higgins, & Groll, 2005).

Together, the above processes explain how members of (sub)cultures create a shared social reality (cf. Kashima, 2004; Thompson & Fine, 1999) about which social categories are considered meaningful (i.e., perceived category entitativity) and their associated stereotypes (i.e., specified in stereotype content and perceived essentialism). We now turn to the contributions and future research of the SCSC framework for theory on stereotypes and intergroup dynamics.

Contributions: The Role of Language Use in the Consensualization of Social-Category Stereotypes

An important contribution of the SCSC framework lies in the integration of knowledge about various linguistic-bias types. As much research has been conducted in experimental settings, often relying on manipulations of artificial sentences in isolation, our integrative framework provides a crucial contribution; it allows for a better understanding of stereotype-maintaining biases in natural language in which various biases occur in combination, and opens up various opportunities for further research focusing on natural language. A number of research areas can profit from our integrative focus on language use.

The most immediate field our integrative framework can inform is research on linguistic bias. In natural language, various linguistic biases can be combined in ways that are usually ignored in experimental studies. Biases in labeling and in behavior descriptions can co-occur, but it seems possible that the use of one bias might also compensate for the other (Fig. 1, arrow 2). For instance, when a person categorized as Muslim shows behavioral inconsistencies with the associated stereotype for Muslims (fit is low, e.g., having lunch during Ramadan), this could result in the use of a weaker adjective label (a Muslim person) or subtype label (a non-practicing Muslim) rather than a noun label (He is a Muslim; cf. Carnaghi et al., 2008). When, however, a target has already been labeled with a noun (i.e., a Muslim), the use of biases in behavior descriptions might increase; e.g., speakers might be more inclined to use negations in describing his behavior (e.g., He does not practice Ramadan; cf., negation bias; Beukeboom et al. 2010) or to make ironic remarks (e.g., Well, well, he sure is a dogmatic Muslim; Burgers & Beukeboom, 2016), in order to reconcile the inconsistency while confirming the stereotypic associations that are activated through the used category label. This fits with the notion that higher entitativity (implied by the noun label) induces stronger biases in behavior descriptions (e.g., Hamilton & Sherman, 1996; Moscatelli & Rubini, 2011; Rubini et al., 2007; Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2007). Future research may shed light on combinations between labeling and biases in behavior descriptions, and on how various linguistic biases in behavior descriptions (e.g., language abstraction, explanations, negations) interact.

The second related field that may profit from our integrative review is research on stereotype formation and use. Perceived category entitativity and essentialism are generally considered to play a crucial role in the formation (induction) and use (stereotyping) of social-category stereotypes (Abelson et al., 1998; Crawford et al., 2002; Hamilton & Sherman, 1996; Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2007; Yzerbyt et al., 2001), but research in this area suffers from a lack of consensus (e.g., Hamilton, 2007) and has focused relatively little on language use. The SCSC framework highlights the crucial role of language use in the formation and maintenance of stereotypes by explaining how category entitativity, stereotype content, and perceived essentialism are shaped by, and reflected in, language use. This approach fits with the view that social category stereotypes are, rather than merely intrapersonal phenomena, collectively created within subcultures, and formed and maintained by means of language use in socially situated interactions (Crandall et al., 2002; Semin, 2008). While categories and their associated stereotypes may be acquired from observation of features and behaviors of category members, these factors likely co-occur with language use when people communicate about them. Moreover, generic stereotypic knowledge as such is not observable, and can only be communicated through language. Hence, theory about stereotype formation and use is incomplete without considering the role of language use.

We have argued that once an aggregate of individuals is labeled using a (generic) noun label, it is likelier perceived as a meaningful, coherent group (i.e., high entitativity). An increase in category entitativity will be reflected in more frequent labeling. This, in turn, induces perceivers to cease viewing category members as individuals and generalize associated characteristics across individuals (Crawford et al., 2002), thereby facilitating the formation of a generalized stereotypic impression, consisting of a set of associated characteristics, that are perceived as more or less essential to its members. Language use thus reflects, shapes and maintains the category taxonomy that prevails within a (sub)culture (i.e., which categories are perceived as meaningful entities and become essentialized). In general, people will most likely discuss and apply conventional category labels and consequently continuously confirm and maintain the existing category taxonomy of chronically salient categories and associated stereotypes within their (sub)culture. However, new categories may evolve. For instance, people living between 140 and 150 degrees east longitude (see Kashima, 2004) or brown-eyed vs. blue-eyed people (Elliott, 1984) would conventionally not be considered as meaningful categories. When, however, such an aggregate is labeled and discussed in media and interpersonal conversation (e.g., hipsters) it will suddenly be perceived as an entitative category, acquire associations with a set of essentialist characteristics, and may become the target of prejudice and discrimination.

Social category perceptions thus emerge from the ways in which people communicate about social categories and their members. A well-known finding in this area, known as the out-group homogeneity effect (Ostrom & Sedikides, 1992), is that people tend to develop a more fine-grained and differentiated social category structure about their in-group, containing varying subordinate categories, compared to outgroups which tend to be more overgeneralized. While a number of cognitive explanations have been shown to underlie these differences (Park, Ryan & Judd, 1992; Ryan & Bogart, 1997), the SCSC framework explains how these are (simultaneously) driven by the ways people communicate about these categories. Category perceptions are reflected in language use, and will be confirmed and internalized as a result of that.

This notion is illustrated in a study by Harasty (1997) who studied language use in same-sex dyadic conversations about in- and out-groups (i.e., pairs of women or men talking about women and men). From the 5 minute conversation transcripts, the authors coded levels of generalization in labeling (i.e., self-reference, individual category member (e.g., my mom), subcategory (e.g., sorority women), generic category references (e.g., women), and two (albeit rather rough) levels of abstraction in behavior descriptions (i.e., non-traits; behavior or state like "wearing makeup" vs. traits like "assertive"). Results showed that discussions about out-groups contained higher levels of generalization. That is, out-group discussions included more generic labels (i.e., generalizing across individuals), and more abstract trait descriptions (i.e., generalizing across situations) than discussions about ingroups. Moreover, generic descriptions of the out-group were more likely negative than positive in valence. This demonstrates how out-group homogeneity and in-group favoritism are expressed and thereby maintained through communication.

Likewise, communication and language use can explain how perceptions of minority groups emerge. Research shows that stereotypes of minority groups are better known, more accessible, and perhaps even more automatized than are stereotypes of normative majority groups (Brewer, Weber, & Carini, 1995; Brewer & Harasty, 1996; McGarty et al., 1995)

This finding can be explained from studies that revealed a bias of focus in communications wherein several social categories are discussed simultaneously or compared to each other (Hegarty & Pratto, 2001; Miller, Taylor, & Buck, 1991). Building on Norm Theory (Kahneman & Miller, 1986), this work shows that explanations of inter-category differences typically focus on the atypical category (e.g., a minority within the relevant domain), which is subsequently compared to the norm category (e.g., a majority). Explanations of differences between gay and straight men, for instance, typically take gay men as the subject, particularly in a context in which straight men are considered the normative majority group (Hegarty & Pratto, 2001). The same occurs in explanations of gender differences; i.e., when explaining a gender gap in illness rates for college professors (expected to be typically male) or elementary school teachers (expected to be typically female), participants focused their explanations on the atypical category (e.g., female professors are ...; Miller et al., 1991; see also Bruckmüller, Hegarty, & Abele, 2012; Hegarty & Buechel, 2006). Such an increased relative focus in category comparisons may be reflected in language as a combination of a) placing the atypical category in sentence subject position, b) mentioning it first in a comparison with a referent (e.g., Bruckmüller & Abele, 2010), or c) simply in more frequent use of the minority (vs. majority) category label.

The SCSC framework predicts that such an increased focus on minority categories, along with other bias types, will both increase perceived entitativity and essentialism of minority categories. The minority category is more prominently labeled and, because stereotypic and essential features of this category are put forward as explanations for the intergroup differences (Hegarty & Pratto, 2001), more strongly essentialized. The resulting higher entitativity and essentialism may further increase the accessibility of the stereotype and likelihood that it is applied to judge and discuss individual category members.

Another relevant field that can profit from a focus on language use is research in the tradition of Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) and Self-Categorization Theory (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987; Hogg & Reid, 2006). Language use not only shapes and reflects the categorization of others, but also people's selfcategorizations, social identity, and the in-groups they identify with. Interestingly, research shows that higher perceived category entitativity facilitates in-group identification (Castano, Yzerbyt, & Bourguignon, 2003). The SCSC framework would predict that when people are linguistically categorized by others in a highly entitative category (i.e., by frequently being addressed or referred to with a strong noun label), this will increase their social identity and in-group identification. Likewise, increased use of such strong labels in self-descriptions (as compared to weaker labels like adjectives or descriptive phrases) likely reveals a relatively strong in-group identification.

In a broader intergroup perspective, people's social identity also affects how they communicate about in- and outgroup members. Social category memberships are an inherent aspect of people's identity, and people strive to maintain and enhance a positive social identity (Turner et al., 1987). Several studies show how motivational factors and communication goals that may arise from a speaker's social identity can induce biased language use in the types of comments speakers make about behaviors by in- and out-group members.

Research on the Linguistic Intergroup Bias (LIB), for instance, demonstrated that the use of predicates of different abstraction referring to positive and negative behaviors of in- and out-group members is driven by a motivation to protect one's social identity (Maass et al., 1995; Maass, Ceccarelli, & Rudin, 1996; Wigboldus & Douglas, 2007). It was demonstrated that the LIB was more pronounced in intergroup settings wherein the in-group was threatened (e.g., hostility between Northern and Southern Italians). This motivational effect that results from a speaker's group memberships, was shown to be independent of the expectancy mechanism by which implicit cognitive associations and expectancies are reflected in language abstraction; i.e., expectancy consistent behaviors based on stereotypes about Northern and Southern Italians are described at a higher level of abstraction than expectancy inconsistent behavior (Maass et al., 1995; Maas et al., 1996). Douglas and Sutton (2003) showed that such motivational communication goals can have a strong effect on the use of language abstraction (e.g., adopting abstract predicates to describe positive behaviors and concrete predicates to describe negative behaviors to favorably portray a person or group) that can override the cognitive expectancy mechanism (i.e., LEB). On the recipient side, research shows that speakers who exhibit in-groupserving linguistic abstraction biases in their communications about others are more appreciated as good group members than speakers whose communication deviates from such linguistic biases (Assilaméhou & Testé, 2013).

It seems plausible that similar motivational processes play a role in other linguistic bias types as well. Burgers, Beukeboom, Kelder, & Peeters (2015), for instance, showed how soccer fans can employ ironic remarks to enhance group identity. Irony about competent and incompetent behaviors of in-group and out-group team players can both be used as a linguistic tool for aggression towards out-group members, and to subtly communicate expectancies about desired ingroup and out-group behavior. Likewise, speakers making ironic utterances echoing a negative stereotype of out-group members are more appreciated among in-group members (van Mulken, Burgers, & van der Plas, 2010). We also predict differences in labeling as a result of intergroup dynamics. An individual might mainly be labeled as an in-group member when he or she shows desirable (vs. undesirable) behavior. When in-group members show misdeeds, they might be more likely labeled as an uncategorized individual, or a subcategory or out-group member. In contrast, when outgroup members show the same misdeeds, they may still be labeled under the collective out-group label.

Finally, it is interesting to study the effects of linguistic biases on the target of biased descriptions. So far, we mainly focused on communication about absent target(s). Linguistic biases, however, likely also play a role in communication with categorized targets who are also the recipient of a description. When a speaker talks to an addressee about their behavior (e.g., providing feedback in educational or professional settings), linguistic biases in labeling and behavior descriptions may reveal that the addressee is being categorized and (implicitly) associated with (negative) stereotypic characteristics. Such biases (e.g., particularly based on race, gender, sexual orientation) have been described as microaggressions. Micro-aggressions are defined as subtle insults directed toward a person that threatens and demeans the target (Sue, 2010). While the people perpetrating them are usually unaware they are causing harm and often intend no offense, targets may be sensitive to such subtle linguistic biases. Being stereotyped – albeit by means of subtle linguistic cues – may have several serious effects on targets. It may induce them to confirm expectancies as a self-fulfilling prophecy (Hummert, Garstka, Ryan, & Bonnesen, 2004), can induce impaired performance as a result of stereotype threat (Steele, 1997; Shapiro & Neuberg, 2007), can result in lower self-esteem (Bourguignon, Yzerbyt, Teixeira, & Herman, 2015) and deteriorate mental and physical health (Dovidio et al., 2000), but can also improve performance as a result of stereotype lift (Walton & Cohen, 2003). The linguistic biases we described have hardly been related to this area of research, but can provide interesting insights.

In sum, the SCSC framework opens up various new re-search directions. These research questions can be addressed by hand coding linguistic variables in natural texts generated in (dyadic conversations in) experimental studies. However, current developments in computational methods promise more and more opportunities for automated processing of natural language (e.g., Caliskan et al., 2017; Trilling & Jonkman (in press); Fokkens et al., 2018; Welbers, Van Atteveldt, & Benoit, 2017). The possibility of processing specific linguistic variables in large quantities of natural language, could provide a major leap forward in research on biased language use. It could not only bring unique knowledge to verify the validity of theoretical models of stereotyping and biased language use, it could also open up major opportunities for research in a variety of applied contexts (e.g., official forms, news, social media content). Our present contribution to integrate concrete, detectable linguistic aspects is a first step towards development of automatic processing tools to monitor and study implicit biases in natural language.

Practical implications

We have argued that the different types of biases in the SCSC framework are geared towards re-confirming existing categories and their associated stereotypes, which explains why stereotypes are hard to change (Fiske, 1998). However, awareness of the linguistic means through which such views evolve allows one to develop interventions that can help to change or prevent the formation of undesirable category stereotypes. Policies or instructions could be effective in helping people to refrain from using linguistic labels that unnecessarily categorize individuals, or from language that reveals and maintains stereotypic expectancies in official forms or texts, or (news) media. Intergroup bias and conflict can be reduced by strategically changing label use to transform perceptions of group boundaries (e.g., from “us” vs. “them” to a more inclusive “we,” Gaertner, Dovidio, Anastasio, Bachman, & Rust, 1993). We have also discussed that interpersonal responses and norms can prevent the expression of stereotypic views: Social norms can preclude the use of derogatory labels, and audiences can, by means of explicit questions or critique, push a speaker towards re-categorizing or individuating a target. When proficiently used, such relatively small interventions can play an important role in breaking the vicious cycle that maintains existing category stereotypes.

Conclusion

Social categorization and stereotyping are inextricably related to language use. Language reflects which categories are singled out as targets for stereotyping, and is one of the main carriers of stereotypic information we come to associate with these categories. Many complex societal problems result from social category stereotypes and the affective reactions and behavioral tendencies towards category members they may elicit (e.g., prejudice, discrimination, tensions, and conflict surrounding ethnic, racial, religious, gender, sexual orientation categories). The most severe forms of discrimination, prejudice and intergroup conflict and hostility occur when the members of social categories are viewed as very similar to each other, when the boundaries that differentiate the categories are sharp and fixed (i.e., high entitativity), and when they are perceived to have unchangeable and true essential characteristics (Yzerbyt et al., 2004). By explicating the linguistic means through which such views (implicitly) evolve, this paper facilitates the necessary awareness that may allow one to monitor, study, or correct undesirable forms of stereotype maintaining language use.

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Seminar 3

Avruch, K. Cross-cultural conflict UNESCO ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEMS (EOLSS) https://www.eolss.net/Sample-Chapters/C14/E1-40-01-03.pdf

CROSS-CULTURAL CONFLICT

Kevin Avruch

Summary

Conflict is competition by groups or individuals over incompatible goals, scarce resources, or the sources of power needed to acquire them. This competition is also determined by individuals’ perceptions of goals, resources, and power, and such perceptions may differ greatly among individuals. One determinant of perception is culture, the socially inherited, shared and learned ways of living possessed by individuals in virtue of their membership in social groups. Conflict that occurs across cultural boundaries thus is also occurring across cognitive and perceptual boundaries, and is especially susceptible to problems of intercultural miscommunication and misunderstanding. These problems exacerbate the conflict, no matter what the root causes of it—including strictly material interests—may be. In this sense culture is an important factor in many sorts of conflicts that at first may appear to be exclusively about material resources or negotiable interests.

In addition to framing the contexts in which conflict is understood and pursued by individuals, culture also links individual identities to collective ones. This fact is important in understanding the basis of most ethnic or nationalist conflicts, in which selected cultural material is utilized to constitute special sorts of social groups, those based upon putative (and primordial) ties of shared kinship, history, language, or religion.

Understanding the impact of cultural difference is especially important for analysts or practitioners of conflict resolution who work in intercultural contexts, since culture affects many of the communicational or interlocutory processes that lie at the heart of most conflict resolution techniques. Finally, because of increasing transnational exchanges, the coming century will see many more encounters among individuals of all backgrounds that are intercultural in nature.

1. The Nature of Conflict

Conflict is a feature of all human societies, and potentially an aspect of all social relationships. However, ideas about the root causes of conflict differ widely, and how one conceives of conflict determines to a large degree the sorts of methods we ultimately design to manage or resolve it. One conception of conflict roots it in the material world, as competition between individuals or groups over incompatible goals or scarce resources, or over the sources of power needed to reach those goals or control these resources, including the denial of control to others. A different conception locates the basic causes of conflict not so much in material scarcity as in divergent perceptions or beliefs about the nature of the situation, the other party, or oneself. The first orientation to conflict (and the world) is sometimes called "realism," the second "constructivism." But these terms, and the dichotomous way of thinking they enjoin, in actuality mask a great deal of social and behavioral complexity, both about the nature of conflict and about the possibilities for managing or resolving it.

One key to understanding the complexity of conflict and, ultimately, conflict resolution is to be found in the insight that many conflicts do not involve parties in unbridled, all- out competition with a "winner takes all" mentality. Often conflicting parties find areas where cooperation is valued and sought after, even if it is only the cooperation inherent in keeping the basic relationship between them a continuing and viable one. Many conflicts, therefore, involve "mixed motives" (competition and cooperation). A second and equally important insight is that most conflicts are some combination of competition over goals or resources *and* the perceptions, beliefs, or values that the parties bring to the competition. For any given conflict, what matters is that parties believe or perceive themselves to be divided over goals, or believe or perceive the resources to be scarce, since parties will in the event act on the basis of their beliefs and perceptions.

According to realist conceptions, when resources are "objectively" scarce the course of conflict is limited to a few possible outcomes. An important variable in realist thinking is power. If there are significant imbalances of power between the parties, then one party yields to the other—the weaker to the stronger. This can occur following some overt test of strength (say, a war), or as the result of preemptive action—exit or surrender--by the weaker party. If the power of the two parties is more evenly balanced, however, then realist thinking expects some sort of negotiation to occur, for example compromise or distributive bargaining, such that resources are shared at some minimal level of mutual satisfaction. (Alternatively, in place of bargaining, one or both parties may seek to gain a power advantage through forming alliances with other parties.) One goal of "conflict resolution" in this mode is to encourage verbal or other symbolic bargaining to take place in lieu of a physical contest involving violence. A more advanced form of conflict resolution entails bringing the parties from purely distributive bargaining to integrative problem-solving, where the parties maximize their joint gains rather than settle for minimizing respective losses (or simply "split the difference" at some notional midpoint, as in compromise). But in any case, whether with contentious, distributive, or integrative outcomes, in its "purest" form (best modeled in some forms of game-theory), realist thinking on conflict assumes that all the parties share precisely the same metric for objectively measuring (perceiving) the main parameters of the contest, such as power, resources, and scarcity. In other words, realists assume that everyone understands these things in the same way.

By contrast, in the case where "subjectivity" of one sort or another enters the picture— where the parties' perceptions of key parameters (power, resources, scarcity) of the contest differ significantly, so that everyone does not understand the world in the same way—then while the ensuing *conflict* may look the same (resulting in physical violence or war, for example), the prescription for *conflict resolution* looks very different. Now those committed to resolution must be concerned with such problems as cognitive or perceptual distortions, failures to communicate, or other sorts of communicational, interlocutory, or interpretive dysfunction.

It is important to caution that not all (perhaps not even most) conflicts can be boiled down *simply* to failures of communication or mutually faulty interpretation. But neither should it be assumed that all conflicts are always simply about objective scarcity between parties who always share the same understanding of the world. Nor should it be assumed that even if perceptions of scarcity are shared, that communication between the parties is unproblematic or "transparent." This means that conflict analysts and those committed to conflict resolution must pay attention to any factors that potentially impede or complicate communication between parties.

It is the combination of both objective and subjective dimensions that makes social conflict complex. Analytically, the proportional "mix" of these dimensions is always an empirical question, as it varies from conflict to conflict, party to party, and occasion to occasion. With respect to the practice of conflict resolution, it is in the "space" between the objective bases of conflict and the parties' subjective (or, more precisely, "intersubjective") understandings of the conflict that a good deal of contemporary conflict resolution does its work. For it is unlikely that parties will ever get any bargaining done, distributive much less integrative if, lacking common metrics, they occupy significantly different perceptual universes.

An analytical language or discourse is necessary for talking about both sorts of conflict and conflict resolution. The wholly "objective" sort is well served by the powerful discourse derived from neoclassical economics. Here one speaks of, among other things, utility functions, optimization, and maximization; and one presumes a universal model of decision-making based on universal principles of *rational choice.* The "intersubjective" orientation to conflict and conflict resolution, stressing communication, interpretation, and the possibility of diverse metrics for decisionmaking, needs another language. Historically, one candidate is the discourse of *culture*, which stresses cultural description and analysis.

2. Culture

Partly because it has come down from the nineteenth century with very different usages and meanings, the concept of "culture" is complicated. Nevertheless, one of the things that all contemporary social scientific definitions of culture have in common is that for none of them is culture connected primarily to "high art," advanced education, superior knowledge, exalted social standing, refinement, or "taste." (This, indeed, is one of the main nineteenth century meanings of the term that has so confused contemporary usage.) For no anthropologist, certainly, is "culture" something possessed only by the upper classes. Everyone "has" culture. In fact, everyone "has" potentially *several* cultures—this is yet another reason why the concept is complicated. Very generally, culture may be defined as socially inherited, shared, and learned ways of living possessed by persons by virtue of their membership in social groups.

To this broad definition must be added the observation that culture is always manifested in two ways, sometimes called *generic* and *local.* Generic culture is an attribute of all humankind, an adaptive feature of our species on this planet for at least a million years or so. Generic culture directs attention to universal attributes of human behavior, to "human nature." In contrast, local culture refers to those complex systems of meanings (encoded in symbols, schemas, and other sorts of cognitive representations) created, shared, and transmitted (socially reproduced and inherited) by individuals in *particular* social groups, at particular points in time. Local culture directs attention to diversity and difference. Most contemporary discussions of culture stress the local sense, focusing on difference. Certainly, this is the sense in which people usually connect culture to conflict. But it is important to remember that culture also represents generic or universalistic capabilities, especially when one moves from conflict to conflict resolution. For example, all human beings, regardless of what "local" language they happen to speak, possess the universal or generic capacity of language acquisition. Some people acquire fluency in several different languages. This means that translation between languages is possible, even as locally spoken languages may separate language-communities and speakers from one another. Following the language analogy, just as individuals may attain varying degrees of fluency in a number of languages throughout their lives (multilingualism), so too is "multiculturalism" (in the sense of fluency or "competence" in a number of different local cultures) possible. And so too is "translation" across local cultural boundaries. More than possible, it is more widespread and common than many people believe. This is in fact one sense in which people may "have" several cultures. There is at least one other point about culture to be made from an analogy to language. A cursory comparison between the English of Shakespeare's time and that spoken today demonstrates that languages change through time. Similarly, the English of London's East End and Manhattan's Lower East Side, as spoken today, are not identical. No language is immutable across time and space, or insensitive to external influence— despite what many linguistic chauvinists would like to believe about "their" language. Culture, too, is dynamic, not timeless or changeless—regardless of what cultural chauvinists might like to proclaim. The implications of cultural change for conflict are varied. On the one hand, the susceptibility of culture to (sometimes rapid and deep) change can lead to social instability, and this may in turn lead to conflict. On the other hand, possibilities for change mean that cultures may prove adaptive to new situations, and that individual bearers of local cultures may use cultural resources to accommodate to change (or to bring about positive change), and respond to potential conflict in prosocial ways. History, of course, provides examples of both possibilities. Histories of social conflict, especially those steeped in violence and war, highlight the first set. Those committed to peaceful conflict resolution would like to see in the future more history reflecting the second, adaptive and prosocial, use of and response to cultural change.

3. Cross-Cultural Conflict

By definition, conflict occurring between individuals or social groups that are separated by cultural boundaries can be considered "cross-cultural conflict." But individuals, even in the same society, are potentially members of many different groups, organized in different ways by different criteria: for example, by kinship into families or clans; by language, religion, ethnicity, or nationality; by socioeconomic characteristics into social classes; by geographical region into political interest groups; and by education, occupation, or institutional memberships into professions, trade unions, organizations, industries, bureaucracies, political parties, or militaries. The more complex and differentiated the society the more numerous are potential groupings. Each of these groups is a potential "container" for culture, and thus any complex society is likely to be made up various "subcultures," that is of individuals who, by virtue of overlapping and multiple group memberships, are themselves "multicultural." This means that conflict across cultural boundaries may occur simultaneously at many different levels, not just at the higher levels of social grouping—for example, those that separate "American" from "Japanese" cultures.

As an example, consider a United Nations peacekeeping or humanitarian operation that brings together military contingents from a number of very different member nations, with international civil servants, civilian NGOs, and humanitarian aid organizations from those same nations. Add international media and the indigenous population, and one has a complex operation taking place in a complicated *multicultural* field of national, ethnic, institutional, and professional interactions. In this field, an American military officer and an American civilian aid worker may share many of the same understandings and perceptions of the world, based on shared American culture, and on many matters the ease of communication between them reflects this. However, on matters relating to security, force protection, command-and-control, or rules of engagement, the American military officer may share much more with an

Indian, Pakistani, or Nigerian military colleague; and the shared premises of a transnational "military culture" will facilitate communication between them. This is the case even in the face of strictly linguistic differences that require the services of a translator. On the other hand, within the NGO community, even the English-speaking one, conflicts may arise because of differences in the organizational culture and value systems of relief workers, focused on quick response and crisis problem solving, and those of workers on the development side of aid, who have longer-term or infrastructural concerns.

Another example from cross-cultural research is that of national delegations to international treaty conferences made up of different specialists: diplomats, lawyers, scientists and engineers. Although it might be expected that differences in "national negotiating styles" will be important elements in delegates' communication with each other, in fact for any particular issue under discussion, the scientists and engineers may more easily converse with each other "across the table" than they do with fellow nationals on their own side. What links them in this case are the shared presuppositions of their professional subculture, resulting from the commonalities of educational, occupational, or professional socialization to careers in science or engineering.

In addition to underlining the overlapping and cross-cutting character of multicultural social relationships, what these examples of cross-cultural conflict have in common is that they highlight the effects of cultural difference on communicational competence, on mutual understanding or shared "metrics" and perceptions. Note that except in the strict sense of promoting "a failure to communicate" across cultural boundaries, the mere existence of cultural difference is not necessarily the primary cause of conflict between groups. This argues against the position taken by such scholars as Samuel Huntington, who conceptualize a post-Cold War world divided into six or seven "civilizations" (Western, Confucian, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American, and possibly African), destined in some way to clash with one another by virtue of their respective essential differences. (Huntington sees Islam and the West in an especially contentious relationship in the future, but the scenario he envisions basically involves "the West against the rest.") Nevertheless, while it is important not to see cultural difference *per se* as an autonomous cause of conflict, it *is* the case that culture is almost always a refracting lens through which the perceptions according to which conflict is pursued are formed. (See the Branch Davidian example below for cultural differences functioning in both ways.)

This is because culture frames the contexts in which conflict occurs. It does so by indicating, among other things, what sorts of resources are subjects for competition or objects of dispute, often by postulating their high value or relative scarcity: honor here, purity there, capital and profits somewhere else. It does so also by stipulating rules (sometimes precise, usually less so) for how contests should be pursued, including when and how to begin, and when and how to end, them. It does so, finally, by providing individuals with cognitive, symbolic, and affective frameworks for interpreting the behavior and motives of others and themselves.

For instance, the scholar Raymond Cohen has written about how miscommunication can occur when even elite specialists—diplomats—must negotiate across cultural boundaries. One of his examples focuses on the Egyptian-Israeli conflict through the 1970s. He questions why, throughout the 1950s and 1960s, Israeli deterrence based on large-scale use of force against Egypt for terrorist attacks emanating out of Egypt against Israel, failed to actually deter attacks. A cultural analysis revealed deep differences between Israeli and Egyptian understandings relating to violence, vengeance, and vendetta. He concluded that Israel's use of massive force violated Egyptian understandings about culturally "appropriate" vengeance and retribution. In particular, Israelis misunderstood Egyptian conventions of appropriate "proportionality" in these matters. The "cultural logic" of Israeli deterrence was that the more disproportionate the punishment the greater the compliance. But Egyptians understood matters differently. What they regarded as highly disproportionate vengeance on Israel's part had the effect of shaming and humiliating them, leading to a serious loss of honor in a culture where honor is deeply valued. To erase the shame and regain the lost honor, Egypt supported further attacks against Israel. The effect Israelis hoped to achieve, Egyptian compliance in stopping cross-border attacks to avoid mounting reprisals, was not achieved. Israeli action produced the opposite effect, providing Egyptians with strong reasons to ensure their support of incursions into Israel. In this case cultural misunderstandings led to an intensification of the conflict, producing what is sometimes called a "conflict spiral." Ultimately, this cost many lives on both sides.

Another example, also costly in human life, did not involve cultural miscommunication across overtly grand "civilizational" boundaries--linguistic, national, ethnic, or religious. In this case, all the parties spoke English to one another, and almost all them were self-identified Christians. Yet, the cultural differences separating members of the American unconventional and millennial religious community calling itself Branch Davidians from the US federal law enforcement personnel who negotiated with them fruitlessly between February 28 and April 19, 1993 outside Waco, Texas, were deep and tragically fateful. It can be said in this case that the great differences in perception and understanding of the world between the Branch Davidians and the larger American community were in some measure a cause of the conflict. Branch Davidians followed a form of Christianity that held the End of Days was close at hand; they stockpiled weapons against the coming chaos of the apocalypse, and practiced unconventional gender and familial arrangements. They also harbored a deep distrust of secular institutions like the government. Their non-standard beliefs and practices troubled some in the larger American community around them, and their possession of many weapons, some thought to be illegal, brought them to the attention of police. When US federal law enforcement agents raided the settlement in force, the Davidians reacted violently, and four federal agents, among others, were killed. Thus began a 51-day siege, during which federal law enforcement tried to negotiate a nonviolent surrender, but unsuccessfully so. On April 19, after negotiations had been stalled for weeks, a forceful entry was attempted, in the course of which the complex burned and more than one hundred people, including 21 children, died. The repercussions of this tragedy have been felt ever since in America, often expressed as continuing mistrust, hostility, and even rage, by some citizens toward the federal government. On April 19, 1995, the second anniversary of the violent end of the Waco stand-off, the federal building in Oklahoma City was bombed, before September 11, 2001, killing 168 people and injured more than 500 in the deadliest act of terrorism committed on American soil before September 11, 2001. It turned out that this was conceived as an act of vengeance, linked directly to the events at Waco.

Whatever religious differences separated the Branch Davidian community from mainstream American society and culture, when these differences erupted into open social conflict, the unsuccessful "processing" of the conflict, ending in lethal violence, was shaped primarily by the communicational difficulties bedeviling the negotiation. It was more than a matter of differences in respective "negotiation styles." The scholar Jayne Docherty has analyzed transcripts of the negotiations between the parties and found that that they revealed, in her words, profound differences in the respective "worldviews" of both sides. Police negotiators brought their own perception of the situation to the negotiations, and presumed they could bargain instrumentally with the Branch Davidians. When they ran into difficulties, they assumed that the charismatic, but psychopathological, Branch Davidian leader, David Koresh, had "brainwashed" his followers, who were thus "irrational." Docherty's point is that a full understanding of Branch Davidian beliefs would lead one to see not psychopathology or irrationality but another, *alternative* rationality, a completely logical one in the world constituted by Branch Davidian culture. Rejecting this world out of hand, and bound by the realities of their own culture and experience, FBI negotiators and Branch Davidians faced each other for almost two months across the great cognitive and moral divide of different worldviews, and managed at the end only a dialogue of the deaf that ended in death.

4. Culture, Identity, and Conflict

In the last example cited it is clear that the particular version of apocalyptic, fundamentalist Christianity that structured Branch Davidian culture and worldview did not only provide cognitive and discursive frames for interpersonal communication, but also endowed individual Branch Davidians with profoundly meaningful identities. Culture is connected to identity in two main ways. First, culture makes available a reservoir of shared symbols able to constitute collective or group identity. Secondly, because many of these symbols are invested with great affect or emotion, and since membership in certain groups is emotionally binding for individuals, such collective identity anchors individual identity. Culture, in short, links individual and collective identities, at the same time defining potential boundaries between social groups.

One set of powerful symbols illustrative of this linking process and especially relevant for understanding the relationship of culture to conflict, involves what the scholar Vamik Volkan has called "chosen traumas." These refer to experiences of great hurt or victimization by others that are part of a group's historical memory. These experiences come to symbolize for group members tremendous threat, fear, pain, and feelings of hopelessness. Examples include the Nazi Holocaust for Jews, New World slavery for African Americans, and the Fourteenth century Turkish defeat of Serbs in Kosovo. For analysts of conflict, such remembered traumas tender key linkages between individual and collectivity. First, they symbolize individual and group distinctiveness in emotionally compelling ways, in the course of which they provide a potential site for political mobilization. Secondly, they provide individual members of the group (and especially the elite decision-makers among them, who are sensitive to group public opinion and support), cognitive and emotional "maps" of the nature of the world (including other groups) that surrounds them. Given common effects of trauma, that world is usually perceived as hostile, uncaring, or evil—and dangerous. The mindset constituted by identities based upon chosen trauma is ripe for conflict, since one possible response to psychological trauma is agonistic, reactive aggression towards self or others.

5. Culture, Ethnicity, and Ethnic Conflict

While so-called chosen traumas are the most extreme examples of culture's identity-constituting potential, they are not the only ones. Culture, as a source of shared symbols for making sense of the world, can constitute collective identities in more benign ways. But with whatever degree of affective intensity, culture affords symbolic resources for defining group boundaries, and within them for effecting political organization and mobilization.

When culture is "enlisted" in this way by members of social groups it most often manifests itself in the guise of *ethnicity*, and the social groups so constituted out of it are *ethnic groups*. Similarly, cross-cultural conflict is in the main perceived as ethnic conflict. But "culture" and "ethnicity," though closely related, are not the same things. Analysts of cross-cultural conflict, especially if they are oriented towards conflict resolution, must attend to the differences.

To begin with, culture refers to a much broader class of possible differences, subsuming ethnic ones. In some of the examples cited above it will be noted that soldiers, diplomats, scientists, or engineers do not necessarily need to come from different ethnic groups in order to experience intercultural communication problems with one another. Professions, institutions, or work organizations can all be sites for cultural (or subcultural) differentiation. Next, because it serves to shape peoples' basic perceptions of their world, culture appears to individuals as a totally "natural" phenomenon— indeed, often as "common sense"—and operates cognitively well below the level of individual conscious awareness. By contrast ethnicity, when it experienced by individuals (self or others'), usually invokes or accompanies highly conscious perceptions of difference and distinction. Ethnicity, at least to outside observers, often has a self-consciously "constructed" quality about it. Finally, ethnicity, as the cultural "content" of ethnic groups, is a resource usually mobilized by individuals and groups for political purposes.

Ethnicity utilizes bits of culture that have been "objectified" by political actors. These actors are sometimes referred to as "ethnic entrepreneurs." The objectified bits are then projected—often performed--onto public domains, such as festivals, rituals, remembrance days, or marches. Although ethnic groups are typically constituted out of linkages among members based upon putative ties of kinship, history, language, or religion, the actual content of the cultural bits matters less than their ability to differentiate one group from another: "We march today, *they* do not." An ethnic group is always defined by its boundaries. This is where culture comes in. Cultural differences between groups (religious, linguistic, racial) are enlisted to constitute these boundaries. But it takes very little to make of cultural difference a social boundary-marker between groups.

For example, two groups may speak virtually identical languages (so far as linguists describe them), yet use different orthographies and call their languages by different names. This is the case in the former Yugoslavia, where Serbs call the language "Serbian," Croats call "Croatian." Nowadays, in Sarajevo, the language is likely to be called "Bosnian." Another example is the supposed antiquity of certain traditions or customs that characterize ethnic groups—that is, that set them apart from other such groups. Investigating these, historians often find them to be of fairly recent origin, and sometimes outrightly invented. Nevertheless, these same traditions are believed by group members to be ancient and venerable, and partaking in them is subjectively experienced by group members as profoundly meaningful. This means that contestants typically experience ethnic conflict as cultural conflict, an important fact to remember when attempting conflict resolution. But it is equally important for analysts or practitioners not to mistake the two. Ethnic conflict may or may not be characterized by the serious communicational dissonances that characterize genuine, deep cross-cultural conflict. Serb and Croat, for example, may not experience difficulties in communication even while their conflict turns increasingly virulent. In contrast, Branch Davidian and FBI negotiators may think that they are all Americans and Christians, speaking the same language, even members of the same ethnic group, while communication breaks down in the face of profound and consequential cultural differences.

Not only is the absolute magnitude of cultural difference almost irrelevant in the formation ethnic groups, but the nature of the difference involved can change through time or circumstance. For instance, in the nineteenth century the cultural markers that separated French-speaking from English-speaking Canadians were usually conceived as a combination of religion (francophones were Roman Catholic, anglophones predominantly Protestant) and lifestyle: francophone society was overwhelmingly rural and village-based. By the time Quebecois ethnicity developed into full-blown Quebecois nationalism and separatism, religion was no longer an attractive marker to many of the separatists for ideological reasons, and Quebecois society was substantially urbanized. By the 1970s, linguistic differences alone were made the major boundary- marker between the two groups, and French-only legislation and activism in Quebec became a major area of intra-Canadian conflict. An observer who thought she understood the "true" nature of this cross-cultural conflict in 1899 would be surprised to learn its "true" nature in 1999. Summing up the relationship between ethnicity and culture, the scholar J. D. Eller has argued that ethnic groups in conflict are fighting not *about* culture, but *with* culture. This is an important distinction to keep in mind when moving from cross-cultural conflict analysis to cross-cultural conflict resolution.

6. Cross-Cultural Conflict Resolution

With respect to conflict, the discourse of culture directs attention to problems of intercultural communication, interpretation, and the possibility of diverse metrics for decision-making. It makes analysts or practitioners aware that in dealing with conflict across cultural boundaries they are dealing with more than superficial differences in "style," but with something foundational. It also makes them aware that in the most common "culture-type" conflicts—ethnic conflicts—they may be dealing with situations of *low* culture conflict no matter how politically intense the confrontation; contrariwise, some conflicts may not appear to be "cultural" at all (that is, overtly ethnic or national in nature), but in fact are deeply cultural when examined from cognitive, communicative, or worldview perspectives.

To promote better understanding of cross-cultural conflict and better conflict resolution techniques, some scholars and practitioners have sought to develop typologies for characterizing different sorts of cultures, and by extension different kinds of intercultural communication problem areas, amenable to different types of conflict resolution procedures. Most of the research on cross-cultural conflict resolution thus far has concentrated on negotiation, rather than third party processes such as mediation or facilitation, or more specialized forms such as the problem-solving workshop. A lot of this work relies on Edward T. Hall's seminal distinction between "high context" and "low context" communicational styles. Low context styles (and by extension, cultures) are based on instrumental, direct, and unembellished use of language, with little reliance on paralinguistic cues, such as facial expression, gesture, or body-language. High context styles (cultures), in contrast, are oriented around expressive, indirect, and nuanced language use, with high reliance on paralinguistic cues. These styles are often correlated with individualistic (low context) versus collectivist, interdependent, or communal (high context) cultures. Occasionally they are also correlated to different basic assumptions about the nature of the conflict resolution or negotiation process: a concern with outcome or "results," on the one hand (typical of individualistic cultures), compared to a concern with the overall "process," that is with the maintenance of valued social relationships, on the other hand. Some researchers have investigated different cultural orientations towards risk-taking or uncertainty avoidance. Hall has also done pioneering work on cultural attitudes towards time, comparing "monochronic" cultures (time is linear and nonrepetitive, and events and social action move sequentially towards some outcome) with "polychronic" ones (time here is circular or repetitive, and events and social action occur in simultaneity towards recurring or iterative ends).

The assumption underlying all of these typologies is that when individuals from polar- opposite cultures (say, low context versus high context) interact with one another in the course of some dispute—or, as negotiators, in the course of trying to resolve a dispute— the effects of the differences are powerful enough to create communicational dissonance and misunderstanding. Some of this research has been criticized for over-simplifying or reducing culture's richness and diversity, for assuming a greater degree of homogeneity in a culture than is warranted, or for focusing exclusively on very high levels of cultural organization, such as "national negotiating styles." These critiques have merit, but this research remains valuable for helping analysts to begin to understand the effects of cultural difference on conflict processes, and to sensitize practitioners of conflict resolution to pay attention to some of the broader ways in which cultural difference is manifested, as well as to become aware of their own cultural categories, assumptions and presupposition about the world, and the biases these may impose. It is not necessary to accept all the dire predictions of the "clash of civilizations" way of thinking to agree that this century will see increasing contact between individuals of different cultural orientations, in the form of higher levels of transnational interaction. For this reason it is more important than ever to understand the dynamics of cross- cultural communication so that conflicts, when they occur, can be resolved in the most effective and humane ways possible.

Glossary

Conflict:	Competition between groups or individuals over perceived incompatible goals, scarce resources, or the power needed to acquire them.
Culture:	Socially inherited, shared, and learned ways of living possessed by individuals by virtue of their membership in social groups**.**
Ethnicity:	Selected aspects of culture used to constitute ethnic groups.
Ethnic groups:	Social groups based upon members' putative ties of shared ethnicity, especially around kinship, history, language, or religion.

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Face and Identity in Intercultural Conflict Management

Min Hou

Abstract: Face negotiation theory has been an influential theory of intercultural conflict management. However, as a theory of functional approach, it has limitations in analyzing dynamic conflict management process. Using repeated episodic interviews, this paper attempts to combine this theory with Spencer-Oatey's (2007) face and identity model as well as post-structural perspectives of identity to analyze the dynamic and complicated conflict management process in two Chinese overseas students' cases. The findings reveal that face and identity are critical to spell out the dynamics and complexity of the intercultural conflict management process and examining the motives and reasons for the choice of a particular facework strategy.

Keywords: Intercultural; Face Negotiation Theory; Cultural Identity; International Students, Conflict Management, China

1.Introduction.

The intensified globalization and mobility make overseas studies much easier than ever before. In Australia, for example, the latest statistics showed that the provision of education services was worth around $37.6 billion in 2018-2019. The average proportion of international students in Australian universities was 21.9% in 2018. In some universities, this number approached 50%. Chinese students took up most portion of that (Department of Education 2019).

Intercultural conflicts are inevitable in these students' study-abroad lives. Intercultural conflict refers to an experience of emotional frustration associated with the perceived incompatibility of values, norms, face orientations, goals, processes, or outcomes between people from different cultures (Ting-Toomey & Oetzel 2001). Failure to handle intercultural conflicts may interfere with international students' academic and social life and thus hamper the achievement of their aims of studying abroad.

Face negotiation theory (Ting-Toomey 2005) has been an influential theory of intercultural conflict management. However, as a theory of functional approach, it has limitations in analyzing dynamic conflict management process. Recent research on intercultural conflicts has called for more collaborative research efforts and longitudinal qualitative studies so that the complexity and variation of the intercultural conflict process can be captured (Ting-Toomey 2017; Spencer-Oatey and Wang 2019; Riyanto, Nurmala, Agustina, & Maidari, 2023).

This paper, in line with this view, attempts to explore the complex process of intercultural conflict management in terms of face and identity concerns that happened to two Chinese overseas students in Australia because conflicts are facethreatening behaviours in nature, and face plays an essential role in Chinese people's social life as well as interpersonal relationships. In this paper, 'conflict' includes any face-threatening situation in which people have the potential to feel uncomfortable, confused, embarrassed, humiliated, angry, annoyed, stuck in a dilemma, etc. In this sense, conflict is dynamic and thus provides a fertile ground for study. Thus, the research questions of this paper are:

1. How did the two Chinese students choose their conflict management strategies?
2. What roles did face and identities play in this process?

2. Face-Negotiation Theory (FNT)

Initially, a theory focusing on conflict, face negotiation theory (FNT) integrates cultural-level dimensions and individual-level attributes to explain the cross-cultural conflict (Ting-Toomey 1988, 2005, 2017; Ting-Toomey and Kurogi 1998).

According to FNT, ‘face’ refers to “a claimed sense of desired social self-image in a relational and international setting”, and it is an identity-boundary issue (Ting- Toomey, 1988; 1994, 2005; 2007: 256). Ting-Toomey explains that the concept of face is the way in which “we want others to see us and treat us and how we actually treat others in association with their social self-conception expectations” (Ting-Toomey, 2017; (Xie & Chao, 2022)). She further argues that face is closely related to the emotional significance and individuals’ evaluation of social self-worth (both their own and others), so the face is an important identity resource in communication, which can be threatened, honoured, undermined and negotiated. She identifies five face needs: autonomy face, status face, competence face, inclusion/fellowship face, reliability face, and moral face. Face loss occurs when there is a mismatch of identity expectancy; that is, a face-threatening episode is an identity expectancy violation episode.

‘Facework’ refers to “verbal and nonverbal behaviours that protect/save self-face, other-face, mutual-face, or communal-face within a sociocultural situation” (Ting-Toomey, 2017: 1). Strategies that can be used in intercultural facework include dominating strategies (e.g., defending and aggressive behaviours), avoiding strategies (e.g., avoiding, giving in, seeking third-party help, and pretending), and integrating strategies (e.g., apologizing, compromising, considering the other, private discussion, remain calm, and talking about the problem) (Oetzel et al,. 2000). In conflict situations, these facework strategies have the functions of defusing or aggravating a conflict, repairing a damaged image and mending broken relationships (Ting-Toomey 2005, 2017). The core assumptions of FNT are as follows:

1. People in all cultures try to maintain and negotiate face in all communication situations.
2. The concept of face is especially problematic in emotionally vulnerable situations (such as conflict situations) when the situated identities of the communicators are called into question.
3. The cultural variability dimensions of individualism-collectivism and small-large power distance shape the orientations, movements, contents, and styles of facework.
4. Individualism-collectivism shapes members’ preference for self-oriented facework versus other-oriented facework.
5. Small-large power distance shapes members’ preferences for horizontal-based facework versus verticalbased facework.
6. The cultural variability dimensions, in conjunction with individual, relational, and situational factors, influence the use of particular facework behaviours in a particular cultural scene.
7. Intercultural facework competence refers to the optimal integration of knowledge, mindfulness, and communication skills in managing emotionally vulnerable situations appropriately, effectively, and adaptively. (2017: 1-2)

Numerous empirical studies testing this theory revealed that cultural value, self-construal, relational and situational factors, emotions, interpersonal transgressions and forgiveness, intergenerational face, and the dark side of the face were important factors in people’s preference of conflict styles across cultures (Cai and Fink 2002; Ting-Toomey et al. 1991; Trubisky, Ting-Toomey, and Lin 1991; Oetzel and Ting-Toomey 2003; Baig, TingToomey, and Dorjee 2014; Dorjee, Baig, and Ting-Toomey 2013; Zhang et al. 2019; Carballal-Broome & Pinillos, 2022).

FNT has been proven to be a practical theory in intercultural conflict. However, it also has been criticized for its limitations. For example, its overreliance on broad cultural variability dimensions (e.g., individualism– collectivism and power distance) makes it insufficient to capture the individual variations in intercultural conflict contexts. Moreover, a relatively small number of studies taking an emic approach, especially from non-Western cultures, limit its generalizability. There are some methodological limitations as well (Zhang 2017).

These limitations are partly due to the reason that studies testing FNT so far mainly took a functional approach. The functional approach to intercultural communication is useful for identifying variation in communication across different cultures and can specify variables in the communication process, but it has many limitations as well. For example, not all variables can be predicted (Martin and Nakayama 2007). Moreover, this approach can only organize cultures and communication styles into different categories and groups, which are static concepts. In other words, it offers a good framework to analyze why and how people from different cultures take up different conflict styles, but it does not adequately account for why people feel something face-threatening and why this leads to conflicts. Thus, this approach fails to capture some essential factors in intercultural conflict contexts, such as roles of second language, power issues and the dynamics of the conflict management process (Spencer-Oatey and Wang 2019).

As Ting-Toomey (Ting-Toomey 2017: 4) recently suggests,

> The testing of the FNT via the tripartite paradigms of critical–interpretive–functional approaches is to be welcomed and embraced. FNT is viewed as a permeable theory with no rigidly set paradigmatic boundary—although the structure of the theory appears to be skewed toward the functional paradigm.

Following this suggestion, this paper will combine FNT with Spencer-Oatey's face and identity model as well as the post-structuralist approach to identity to analyze the dynamic intercultural conflict management process.

3. Face and Identity

In Face-Negotiation Theory, Ting-Toomey (1988, 2005b) claims that face-threatening episodes or difficulties occur when there is a mismatch of identity expectancy so that face is closely related to identity. As conflicts are face-threatening behaviours in nature and caused by the mismatch of identity expectancies (Ting-Toomey 2005, 2017), face and identity are closely related. The cause of this mismatch is significant for explaining face concerns and the selection of facework strategies in an intercultural context. However, FNT cannot explain why this mismatch occurs due to its limitations discussed above.

Many years ago, Tracy (1990) reviewed and critiqued two approaches taken in the face and facework studies: sociolinguistically-based politeness theory approaches and sociopsy chologically based approaches, and offers the beginning of a communicative theory of facework which combines the strength of the two approaches.

As Tracy (1990) points out, although politeness theory offers a rich, linguistically elaborated sense of how two general identity concerns are displayed, it simplifies the complexity of identity issues in social interactions and thus fails to present an adequate picture. Sociopsychological studies of face, on the other hand, offer elaborated notions of how an individual's own identity concerns motivate communicative action and how these concerns can produce actions. Therefore, she concludes that facework has many faces in the same interaction and is highly complex because meaning is culturally situated and contextually cued. In the process of interaction, desired identities may be in competition, so she suggests that future study of facework needs to take the complexity of identity into consideration. However, little follow-up discussion occurred until Spencer-Oatey's model.

Following Tracy's (1990) suggestion, Spencer-Oatey (2007) draws on social psychological perspectives of identity and develops a framework to analyze face and identity. Identity refers to the reflective self-conception or self-image that an individual derives from his/her socialization process (Ting-Toomey 1993). Spencer-Oatey (2007) points out that many scholars have already defined face with reference to identity; for example, Goffman (1967: 5) defines face as an "image of self", and Brown and Levinson (1987: 61) give the definition of face as "public self-image". Ting-Toomey (1994: 3) refers to face as an "identity-boundary issue", and Scollon and Scollon (1995: 34-36) associate face with identity as "interpersonal identity of individuals in communication" and the "self as a communicative identity". However, she notices that few studies on face and facework have elaborated on the interrelationship between these two concepts, Spencer-Oatey argues that face and identity are similar cognitively. They are both associated with the notion of self-image and have multiple self-aspects or attributes, but they are different in that face is "only associated with those attributes that are effectively sensitive to the claimants" (644). She further claims that interactionally, face threat/loss situations can only occur when there is a perceived mismatch of attributes between the one claimed by an individual him/herself and the one ascribed by others. Spencer-Oatey (2007) also views face and identity as dynamic rather than static. She argues that face and identity, in their nature, are both cognitive and social. Cognitively, people form a relatively stable and enduring identity, but at the same time, their face and identity are under constant reconstruction and renegotiation in the process of social interaction. This dynamic concept of face and identity is very useful to understand the dynamic nature of the conflict management process that this study is trying to capture.

Spencer-Oatey's model enables researchers to analyze the complex face concerns from three perspectives— individual, relational and collective. However, in real social interactions, identity issues are not neat and clear-cut. It is complex and even contradictory. Also, her model mainly focuses on the face-sensitivity aspect and thus is not sufficient to analyze the facework strategies in the conflict management process in which power issues are usually involved. To analyze the intercultural conflict management process in which power is an unavoidable factor, I will also draw on the poststructuralist's assertion that identity is multiple, fluid, sometimes contradictory and a site of struggle (Block 2007; Baxter 2016; Dervin 2012; Norton 2013).

4. Method

The data of this paper is from a big project in which five Chinese overseas students participated. Due to the space limitation and relevance to this paper, only two participants' examples were analyzed here. The two participants had been studying at Australian universities for a year when the data collection started. Both were born and received their education in mainland China before coming to Australia to enrol in a Master's and a PhD program, respectively. The project used the research method of repeated episodic interviews. An episodic interview combines narrative and semi-structured interviews. In the project, each of the participants was interviewed individually. During the interview, they were first asked to give narratives of any face-threatening experience in social interactions, that is, any events they had been involved in which had led to feelings of confusion, anger, embarrassment, humiliation or frustration when they were interacting with others in English. Face-threatening situations are usually emotion-laden, and storytelling is a good way for the teller to mentally relive the experience to some extent so that genuine emotions are evoked and expressed (Rintell 1990). As Labov (1972) claims, telling stories and describing emotion-evoking events could provide the speaker with opportunities to reflect on his/her own responses to the experience. These claims echo Flick's (2009) argument that talking about experiences in a narrative way often provides a richer version than other forms of presentation.

To avoid interrupting the fluency of the narrative and minimize distraction, only a few questions regarding the details were asked during the participants' narrative, such as "What do you mean by using this word?" "Could you possibly recall the words as exactly as possible that he/she used in English at that moment?" Questions regarding perceptions were noted down and delivered when the narrative was completed.

When the narrative was completed, questions regarding participants' perceptions were asked, such as why they felt angry or embarrassed, how they expected to be treated, why they reacted to these problems in that way, what might be other options to deal with the situations, what the consequences were and how they perceived their English communicative competence.

As shown above, an episodic interview is not a one-sided situation as it is in the case of a narrative interview, but rather an open dialogue between the interviewer and the interviewee. As Flick (2009: 185-86) claims:

> The episodic interview yields context-related presentations in the form of a narrative because these are closer to experiences and their generative context than other presentational forms. They make the processes of constructing realities more readily accessible than approaches which aim at abstract concepts and answers in a strict sense. … it starts from episodic—situational forms of experiential knowledge. Special attention is paid in the interview to situations or episodes in which the interviewee has had experiences that seem to be relevant to the question of the study.

In other words, the episodic interview has the advantages of both the narrative interview and the semi-structured interview. On the one hand, an interviewee is allowed to express his/her views with minimal interruption from the interviewer. On the other hand, by asking different types of relevant questions to the interviewee's narration details, assumptions and perceptions, the interviewer can further explore his/her interviewee's knowledge, assumptions, and positions in a dialogical form.

In this way, narratives and question-answer sequences in the episodic interview compose two different forms of data. That is the narrative of the interviewee's experience and his/her assumptions and perceptions of the experience.

Triangulation of the research requires multiple sources of data (Lincoln 1985). But how could I enhance the triangulations of my study? In doing interviews, I noticed that my participants mentioned that "At that moment I felt…, but now I felt…." This was very important for my study. As Stryker (1976: 259) claims that

> …when a person defines a situation as real, this situation is real in its consequences, which leads directly to the fundamental methodological principles of symbolic interactionism: researchers have to see the world from the angle of the subjects they study.

In other words, this approach requires the reconstruction of the participants' viewpoints in different respects (Flick 2006). In relation to my study, the focus is not solely on what actually happened but more on how my participants interpret their experiences from their own perspectives and their reflections over time. Thus, I went back to my participants from time to time and interviewed them about their reflections on their experiences. These repeated follow-up interviews conducted at different points in time could be regarded as a third source of data. They made it possible for events or processes to be analysed in terms of their meaning for individuals retrospectively (Flick 2009) because the event itself might not be very meaningful to them at the time of its performance or it may acquire different meanings for them over time (Anderson 1987). This reflection can be regarded as experiential learning, that is, "a dynamic view of learning based on a learning cycle driven by the resolution of the dual dialectics of action-reflection and experience-conceptualization" (Passarelli and Kolb 2012: 138). It is quite similar to the method of moment analysis (Li 2011), in which participants recall and reflect on their past experiences and identify some important events, referred to as "critical moments". In this way, not only the individual's critical and creative capacity and practice in his/her experience (Li 2011) but also "the concomitant transformative processes of self " (Zhou and Pilcher 2019: 28) can be captured.

Each interview lasted between 60 and 120 minutes. All the interviews were audio-recorded with the participants' permission. When I finished the first round of interviewing, I listened to the recordings and took notes. If some details still needed to be clarified, I went back to my participants for follow-up interviews. At this stage, I faced the question: how did I know whether their stories were true or not? There might be constraints on their memories or they might have lied or exaggerated their own control and ability for self-enhancement. I may lean on Spencer-Oatey's (2007) argument that concepts about subjective perceptions, such as face issues, cannot be judged in terms of true/false.

Across a period of 6 months, each participant was interviewed three times, at an interval of about 2 months, about their reflections on their intercultural experiences. Since I have a fluent understanding of both English and Chinese, interviewees were free to speak in either language. English might well be used because the interactions had taken place in English, and the participants could try to recall them in English so that the conversations and words used in the interview would be as close to the initial event as possible, at least close to what the participants thought they had heard in the interaction. Chinese could be used because participants might feel they could be more flexible and accurate when expressing their true feelings in their native language.

The data were separated into the story-telling section, the question-answer section and the reflection section. The interviews at different times were filed under the name of the participant and by interview order (1, 2, 3) (for example, Leo 1, Leo 2, Leo 3) so that their reflections at different points of time could be clearly indicated. Those conducted in Chinese were transcribed, but only the parts used in the data analysis were translated into English. The conversations that participants in English recalled remained in English. The translation was done by me, who had worked as a professional translator in an earlier career. The interview transcripts and translated versions were presented to the participants for the check to make sure that no misunderstanding or misinterpretation occurred.

There are some limitations to this method. First, this paper focuses on only two Chinese overseas students, and its findings may not be generalized to other contexts. Second, recorded naturally occurring discourses of the conflicts plus interlocutors' interpretations of these discourses can provide ideal data, but practicalities prevented that. Future studies can be done to make up for these limitations.

In the following section, I will present some events extracted from the data of two participants in this paper (Leo and Fay) to illustrate their intercultural conflict management process.

5. Results

5.1. Leo

Leo, a male, 31 years old, was studying a two-year coursework program in Business at an Australian university. Leo received his Bachelor of Science and then worked as a computer engineer for 8 years in China. He had had few opportunities to practice English, but he had been interested in English and had watched English movies a lot. In Australia, Leo was sharing a unit with a Chinese friend and had a part-time job at a local convenience store.

In the first round of interviews, Leo mentioned that his English learning in China had mainly followed the 'native-speaker' model, a teacher-centred, exam-oriented method focusing on vocabulary, grammar and structures. He hoped that he could speak English as well as native speakers. This 'native speaker' model in his English learning led to disappointment and frustration in using English in Australia. For example, he had difficulties in understanding the Australian accent and delivering arguments, as in the following event.

5.1.1. Patrol Station Event

Leo talked about an event in which he was overcharged by a check-out lady at a petrol station. He really wanted to deliver an argument with the lady, but it turned out that he had to take an avoiding strategy—keeping silent.

> What could I say? If I had said one word, she might have followed with a long speech. What if I didn't understand her while she spoke fast? You know people always speak fast when they are excited or angry. I couldn't even understand Australian English well when spoken slowly, not to mention fast-speaking arguments! Who knows what she would say about me? What if people around me thought that I was picking on her? Anyway, I didn't want to look ugly or woman-like to be arguing over several dollars in public places, especially with my (Chinese) friend around. (Leo 1)

This event happened shortly after Leo arrived in Australia. As this event revealed, not in line with FNT (TingToomey 2005, 2017), Leo's choosing an avoiding strategy was not out of other- or mutual-face concerns, but selfface concerns: his self-image regarding English use in other local people's eyes, in his community member's eyes (his Chinese friend), and his self-image in public as a man over money issues. Chinese face is communally oriented and determined by the significant others (Mao 1994; Yu 2003). When located in an English-speaking community, a Chinese person's face depends on or is determined by the participation of others in this new speech community.

The 'native speaker' model will make him/her regard the people around as authorities or judges of his/her English use. This will inevitably lead to his/her self-perceived interiority and powerlessness. Just as Aveni (2005) contends that while speaking a second language (L2), L2 speakers have to put their self-image at risk since they might be misunderstood or misperceived during the communication. In other words, under the influence of the 'native speaker' model, Chinese students are sensitive about their English competence face as English learners when they are communicating with native speakers who are regarded as authorities with power.

Furthermore, the Chinese face is "intimately linked to the views of the community and to the community's judgment" (Mao 1994: 46). Leo's avoidance strategy was out of self-face concern as a man because, in Chinese culture, a man arguing with a woman for a small amount of money is usually seen as stingy and mean. After staying in Australia for some time and doing a part-time job at a convenience store, Leo began to change his opinions about English and conflict management, as his reflections on the *Petrol Station Event* showed:

> I would argue and fight for myself the next time I was in a similar situation. Because my English improved a lot and I realized that communication rather than perfect English should be the goal. Also, I learned from my Australian colleagues that people should be tough in this country. If I said nothing in such a situation, other people would assume that it was my fault and I had nothing to say to defend myself. I actually solved some problems using this strategy and being tough makes me feel good. (Leo 2)

However, in the following example, Leo still chose the avoiding strategy, although he claimed he was capable of defending himself.

5.1.2. Excuse Me Event

> Once, I passed in front of a customer to give a hand to my colleague, to whom the customer complained, "Why didn't he say 'excuse me'?" I was surprised and annoyed. I didn't think my passing would bother her since there was enough space for me to get through. But I said nothing. I mean, I could say something to defend myself, but I wouldn't. I didn't want to invite trouble. If I said something that made that woman feel offended, she would make a complaint to the manager. You know, English is my second language; you know how easy

for me to say something inappropriate to cause misunderstandings and offences. So in that situation, I'd better keep my mouth shut. (Leo 2)

Although Leo perceived that different pragmatic rules between Chinese and Australian cultures caused the misunderstanding, and he would have been able to say something to defend himself linguistically, he still chose to keep his mouth shut. For one thing, Leo still viewed the 'native speaker' model of English used as dominant in this situation. He felt that he was disadvantaged in terms of English use and worried that his potentially inappropriate use of English or pragmatic failure might invite more trouble, such as a formal complaint—a more severe face-threatening act. For another, his customer could exert power over him. A customer's formal complaint might threaten his job security, which he could not afford to lose. As Leo said, "When I am a customer, I can be tough and don't have to worry about many things, but as a service provider who needs job security, things are different" (Leo2). By this, he meant, as a customer, he at least had some power and had the right to lodge a complaint, but now he was in a less powerful position, both linguistically and socially. Therefore, potential misunderstandings caused by language problems and long-term interests prevented Leo from being tough and fighting for himself in this situation.

Here, Leo chose the avoidance strategy after weighing the cost and benefit in the interaction (Spencer-Oatey 2008). A stranger (customer) whom Leo has a very slim chance of encountering again in the future actually has little influence on him. Given his job security which was much more important, Leo would rather sacrifice his image in this customer's eyes and not argue with her so that she would not put him in trouble by making a formal complaint.

5.2. Fay

Another participant, Fay, has different experiences than Leo. Fay, a female 29 years old, was doing a PhD in a law program at an Australian university. Fay had received her Bachelor's and Master's degrees in Law in China and had worked as a university lecturer of Legal English and as a part-time lawyer for two years in a big city in China. Passionate about English, Fay had practised English a lot in China and had obtained many English certificates, such as a Certificate as an English Interpreter. She thus had occasionally acted as an interpreter at international conferences in China. In Australia, she was living with her husband in a shared house with other international students. She also had some part-time jobs as a shop assistant and as a casual in an office.

In Fay's repertoire of identities, she was a teacher of Legal English, a lawyer, an international student, an employee, a wife, a Chinese, so she had these symbolic resources available to draw on in conflict management. She encountered a similar English pragmatic problem at her part-time workplace, a local grocery market, but she took a different strategy.

5.2.1. "Please" Event

> I found people here say "please" all the time. But Chinese people seldom say it to people with close relationships. I worked for a grocery in a market. One day I couldn't reach for something on the shelf, so I asked my workmate to reach it for me. My boss said, "Please say 'please'!" She said loudly with a serious look. Then I realized that I had to follow this custom in Australia since I was living in this country. But to be honest, I felt a bit uncomfortable at that moment. I explained to her that in China, people seldom say "please" to people who are close to them to show solidarity. She got it but insisted that I should follow the custom here because they would feel uncomfortable if I didn't say it. Yeah, a little bit uncomfortable, but it's acceptable. (Fay1)

In this event, Fay was faced with a misunderstanding caused by her English pragmatic problem and confronted by her boss. This confrontation made Fay feel that her personality was misperceived and thus her moral face was threatened (Ting-Toomey 2005, 2017), so she was assertive in this confrontation and explained her behavior explicitly to her boss. Apparently, Fay was linguistically capable to do so. Although the event ended up with Fay's obligation (accommodation) to her boss, she successfully protected her moral face by convincing her boss that she was not rude and impolite and her inappropriate language use was due to her cultural background. Though Fay said it was "acceptable", she still felt that Australian people, such as her boss, should have been more "tolerant" of these pragmatic mistakes (Fay1).

FNT suggests that intercultural conflict management needs facework competence which refers to the "optimal integration of knowledge, mindfulness, and communication skills in managing vulnerable identity-based conflict situations appropriately, effectively, and adaptively" (Ting-Toomey 2017: 2). However, this facework competence needs to be mutual. As in Fay's "*Please*" *Event*, although Fay explained the causes of her English pragmatic mistakes, her boss still insisted that Fay should change. That is the power issues involved in intercultural interactions. On the one hand, 'native speaker' model requires L2 users to follow the standard English rules. On the other hand, the power difference in the employer-employee relationship between Fay and her native-speaker boss silenced hear further arguments. This power issue has not been mentioned in FNT.

In the next event, Fay responded differently.

5.2.2. A Quarrel with Mary Event

In the market where Fay worked, Friday evenings and Saturdays were the busiest time of the week. To take as many customers as possible, most shop owners did not give their employees supper break and lunch breaks during these two days, but some employees would buy some finger food if they were starving and finished quickly while serving customers. Fay's quarrel with her boss happened on one of those Saturdays.

> One Saturday, I told her (Mary) I would go to the toilet. On the way back, I bought some food for my lunch. I thought it more convenient to buy my lunch on my way back so that I wouldn't have to waste time by making a second trip. But when she (Mary) saw the food, she was unhappy and told me, "If you want to buy some food, you should let me know first." But I felt that it's my right, you know, it's lunchtime. I just wanted to save time. So, I explained to her that I felt hungry, and I bought something on my way back so that I didn't have to waste time making a second trip. You know, usually on Saturdays, we don't have time to have lunch because it's too busy. So usually, we bought chips or something easy to carry and eat.
>
> After hearing the explanation, she was still unhappy, and I was angry and accused her of being inhumane because we were human beings and we needed to have lunch, but she didn't give us time. I also said that I just bought the food easily to be finished so that I could save some time. After our argument, she changed and gave us some time for lunch on Saturdays.
>
> She later explained to me that it's the rule of the shop that we should let her know whatever we want to do. If we do not come back from the toilet after 15 minutes, she would begin to worry about the safety of her employees. After these explanations, we could understand each other, but I still felt that she was too concerned about her shop to consider our feelings. (Fay2)

In this event, Fay at first tried to be assertive to her boss Mary and explained that as a considerate employee, her behaviour was in the interest of Mary's business. Still, when this integrative strategy did not work, Fay had to shift to a dominating strategy for fairness. Reframing her relationship with Mary from an employee-employer one to a human-human and a lawyer-defendant one by using the legal discourse ("accused"), she strategically changed the power difference and solved the conflict effectively. Only when their power difference reversed did Mary communicate with Fay on the same footing and explain to Fay her intention of making rules for her employees.

6. Discussion

Leo and Fay's examples reveal that intercultural conflict management is a complex process. Face concerns and the choice of facework strategies are changing in different contexts.

Leo's examples show that he chose to avoid strategies in both situations, which is in line with Ting-Toomey's (2005, 2017) claim that people from Collectivistic cultures tend to choose to avoid conflict styles, but the reasons and motivations behind them are totally different. In the *Patrol Station Event*, Leo's avoiding strategy was out of self-face orientation. He remained silent to prevent himself from putting his competence face and moral face at risk and to save his status face as a man in front of his Chinese friend. In the"*Excuse Me" Event*, on the other hand, Leo's silence was to avoid further face-threatening interactions between him and his customer, and therefore it was out of mutual-face orientation. Examined further, these two examples demonstrate the complexity of face and identity issues in intercultural conflicts. As an L2 user, Leo was very sensitive to his competence face when he was about to deliver an argument with the check-out lady in the *Petrol Station Event*. But in the "*Excuse me*" *Event*, his identity as a customer service provider was more sensitive than his identity as a L2 user at that moment, which led to his giving up defending for himself to avoid further arguments.

Interestingly, when asked whether he was worried that this customer and his colleague might think him rude for not saying "excuse me" to customers, Leo turned back again to his 'foreigner' identity for rescue, saying, "Actually, I didn't worry about my image in my colleagues' eyes. They knew I was a foreigner who couldn't speak English well. Even if I said something wrong, they understood I didn't mean it" (Leo3). As for the customer's opinion, Leo thought job security was much more important than a "stranger" (the customer)'s opinion (Leo3). This shows that Leo's identity as an L2 user was sometimes contradictory. On the one hand, he felt that he was disadvantaged because of his language problem. On the other hand, he sometimes used that identity as a protection against his language mistakes.

Fay's examples demonstrate that identity is multiple, fluid, sometimes contradictory and a site of struggle (Block 2007; Baxter 2016; Dervin 2012; Norton 2013). When Fay came to Australia and engaged in interactions with her Australian interlocutors, she brought in different social and symbolic resources. Drawing on her symbolic resources in conflict management, she reframed their identity and relationships with her interlocutors and thus influenced the selection and outcomes of strategy use. When her relationships and power difference between her and her interlocutor are reversed, or on an equal footing, their intercultural communication could possibly go on effectively.

7. Conclusion

This paper analyzes some intercultural conflict management examples from Spencer-Oatey's face and identity (2007) and the post-structuralist perspective of identity (Block 2007; Baxter 2016; Dervin 2012; Norton 2013). The data show that face and identity are critical to spell out the dynamics and complexity of the intercultural conflict management process. They enable researchers to figure out the motives and reasons for choosing a particular facework strategy. Post-structuralist assertion of identity that identity is multiple, fluid, sometimes contradictory, and a site of struggle (Block 2007; Baxter 2016; Dervin 2012; Norton 2013) helps to elaborate on the play of power issues in conflict management.

This study has some theoretical and methodological implications. Theoretically, combining FNT and Spencer-Oatey's model as well as the post-structuralist perspective of identity, that is, both functionalist and poststructuralist approaches, enables the researcher to analyze the dynamic characteristics of intercultural conflict management on both cultural and individual levels. Methodologically, using qualitative approaches, this study explores the functions of context and intercultural interactions in depth. The repeated episodic interview method makes it possible to capture the complexity of decision-making and change in the process of intercultural conflict management.

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Seminar 4

Prandi, F. (2023). Does Speaking A Foreign Language Change Your Personality? Babbel. February 13, 2023.
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Does Speaking A Foreign Language Change Your Personality?

Frederico Prandi (February 13, 2023)

My high school English teacher used to tell us stuff like, "Learning a foreign language changes you forever." Despite being an obvious attempt to make us passionate about her subject, her words made sense to me — the kid who quoted obscure *Buffy the Vampire Slayer* lines and treated Alanis Morissette's lyrics like the word of God. After all, without a basic understanding of the English language I couldn't have done any of that, and all those beautiful imaginary friendships would have never blossomed. It might sound a bit over-the-top, but it really is true that learning a new language can change your personality.

Then I made it to adulthood (I think) and experienced first-hand the perks of speaking a new language: hitting on exciting men (while still using Buffy references as pickup lines) and weaseling my way into more office gossip than ever before.

The Language Split Forms Online

Learning English strongly affected my habits, but was I really profoundly changed by it? Not until I moved to Germany. In Berlin, I started speaking and writing ten times more English than I had ever done before. The more I spoke, the more my teacher's prophecy took an unexpected shape. I wasn't only changing — my Italian-speaking self and my English-speaking self had become two very different individuals.

Blogging is where the signs of this metamorphosis first showed. Every time I write something in Italian, my mother tongue, darkness falls on my glittery intentions, leading to emo poetry and crepuscular thoughts. I reread my old posts and imagine myself writing from a semi-dark basement, drinking cheap wine and lip syncing to "I Dreamed a Dream" from Les Miserables, putting special dramatic emphasis on the bit that says, "My life has killed the dream I dreamed" (of course the cheap wine part is true, and I'm pouring myself a glass right now).

Whenever I blog in English, on the other hand, it's a different story. I feel like my mind is riding alpacas, sliding down rainbows, having a sugar rush from a six-layer wedding cake. I don't know what this language does to me, but I know that the casual reader probably thinks I'm on my seventh espresso.

And it certainly seems weird — this personality divide — but who isn't weird in the online world? From time to time we all look up photos of Mary Berry thinking they'd make for good desktop wallpaper; we also Google our name to make sure we are the most successful among our homonyms and develop delusional relationships with people found on LinkedIn. We do.

My linguistic bipolarism looked perfectly fine until the day I realized the offline world was affected too. It started to show in different social situations, especially in the most stressful of them all: the party.

The Persistent Vegetative State Of The Party

Does the expression *life of the party* have an opposite? If it does, that's probably an accurate way to describe my role at Italian-speaking parties. I drag myself to the host's flat, usually moved by guilt from missing previous social happenings. I'm dress in camo so I can mingle with plants and fly under everyone's radar, careful not to make eye contact with strangers, deadly silent unless the chips run out and I need to demand a refill. I'm the *persistent vegetative state of the party*, and every Italian word that mistakenly comes out of my mouth seems tremendously heavy and strangely out of place.

Surprisingly, I don't have this problem at at English-speaking parties. It has nothing to do with the people or with my language skills; it's just that I feel more free, more funny and so very close to having sober fun whenever I speak English.

"Either I am possessed by the devil or I am crazy," I thought when I started questioning my mental health. I imagined my personalities diverging more and more over time, till the horrifying moment in which Spencer Glinston (the name of my English personality) would insist on putting pineapple on pizza, traumatizing my Italian self and leading to a mental breakdown.

Not Losing It, I Guess

Luckily, in the midst of my delirium, I stumbled on this interesting article from the New Republic. Over the past several decades, scientists have studied whether speaking different languages makes us intrinsically different. In the late 1960s, Susan Ervin tested a group of Japanese women living in the US and had them answer a set of questions both in English and Japanese, with staggering results. Whenever answering in Japanese the women gave conservative, reassuring answers à la Betty Draper, whereas the English answers kinda made them sound like a gang of anarchist truck drivers who throw molotovs at cars for fun (DISCLAIMER: this interpretation of the test is personal and powered by too much cheap wine).

More studies followed and they all seem to suggest that — indeed — bilingual or trilingual people's personalities slightly differ depending on which language they are using, but we don't know why. Is it something inherent to each language — as the article suggests – or does it have to do with the different circumstances in which those languages are used? I've never lived certain situations during my first 26 years in Italy. For example, I have never asked for a raise in Italian; I haven't requested a credit card, debated over obscure IKEA instructions or quit my job; I haven't apologized for losing someone's keys and almost killing their cats; I haven't rejoiced for winning a pub quiz and — weirdly enough — I have never told anyone "I love you" in Italian.

Maybe languages have no special powers after all, and it's not the terms we know (or don't know) that shape our personalities. Maybe we can have the whole Oxford Dictionary in our brain, but it isn't until we pour all that into the ear of someone who's willing to listen, react and respond, that language really has an impact on who we are.

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Feel more fun in French? Your personality can change depending on the language you speak

Nicola Prentis (March 8, 2017)

In the book Me Talk Pretty One Day, humorist David Sedaris recounts learning to speak French as an adult under a vicious instructor. Fumbling in his attempts to master the new tongue, he feels powerless and vulnerable—almost like a different person entirely.

Anyone who's taken on the challenge of learning a new language can probably relate. But it's more than just a feeling: Research suggests our personalities really can shift depending on the language we speak.

Margarita, a Russian-American immigrant, came to the US at age 19 to escape anti-Semitism in the former Soviet Union. Today, her experiences with both cultures seem to have colored the way she feels when she speaks each language.

When she speaks Russian, she says, she feels "guarded, reserved, uncomfortable." But when she speaks English, she describes herself as "curious," "outgoing," and "free."

Similarly, Tony, who grew up speaking English and Spanish and went on to learn French, says that when he speaks French he feels "sophisticated, elegant, suave." His opinion of French people and culture? "Smart, elegant, admirable."

Indeed, research suggests that our perceptions of the culture associated with a given language can impact our behavior. A 2006 study (pdf) led by Nairan Ramírez-Esparza, an assistant professor of social psychology at the University of Connecticut, and her colleagues, asked bilingual Mexican Americans to take a personality test in both English and Spanish. The test measures the "Big Five" personality traits: extraversion, agreeableness, openness, conscientiousness, and neuroticism.

The study found that subjects scored higher in extraversion, agreeableness, and conscientiousness when they took the English version of the test. The authors speculate that this may reflect the fact that individualistic cultures (like that of the US) place a high premium on assertiveness, achievement and superficial friendliness, whereas it's less important to sing one's own praises in collectivistic cultures (like that of Mexico).

As a follow-up, in a not yet published paper, Ramírez-Esparza and colleagues asked subjects to write a 15-minute description of their personalities. They found that, while writing in Spanish, the Mexican-American subjects talked about themselves in relation to their families, relationships and hobbies. In English, they spoke of their achievements, college, and daily activities. Ramírez-Esparza ascribes the changes in personality and the differing focus on values to the way that language "primes" behavior.

"The language cannot be separated from the cultural values of that language," she says. "You see yourself through the cultural values of the language you are speaking." It makes sense that this effect is felt particularly strongly by people who are bicultural, as well as bilingual, because they have a strong grounding in multiple cultures.

It's also possible that our perceptions of our own personalities change because we notice how people react to us when we speak different languages. After all, identity is "your sense of self, but also how you feel others are perceiving you and how that impacts on how you can project who you are," says Carolyn McKinney, a professor of language and literacy studies at the University of Cape Town. And so you might see yourself as a confident, poised professional when speaking your native English in front of a crowd and watching the audience hang on your every word—and then feel like a blundering goofball when conducting a meeting in beginner German.

"The minute you speak to someone you're engaging in an identity negotiation," says Bonny Norton, a professor of language and literacy education at British Columbia University. "'Who are you? Where are you? How do I relate to you? How do you see me?' So when someone says their personality changes, what they're saying is: 'When I talk *to other people* my personality changes.'"

It may also be that the context in which you learn a second language is essential to your sense of self in that tongue. In other words, if you're learning to speak Mandarin while living in China, the firsthand observations you make about the people and culture during that period will be built into your sense of identity as a Mandarin speaker. If you're learning Mandarin in a classroom in the US, you'll likely incorporate your instructor's beliefs and associations with Chinese culture along with your own—even if those beliefs are based on stereotypes.

And if you learn a language without any kind of context, it may not impact your personality much at all. "It is arguable," Jill Hadfield, a professor of language studies at Unitec Institute of Technology in New Zealand, writes in an email, "that if all you use a language for is to translate or fill blanks in decontextualized sentences such as 'The pen of my aunt is on the table,' you will not develop a [second-language] identity."

For people learning a language associated with a culture they admire, that's all the more reason to immerse yourself in it—whether that means taking a trip abroad, watching movies in your chosen tongue, finding a native speaker who can help you learn about their country's traditions, or all of the above. When you learn a new language, you're not just memorizing vocabulary and grammar rules—you also have a chance to tap into new parts of your identity.

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MULTILINGUALS:
YOUR PERSONALITY CHANGES WHEN YOU CHANGE LANGUAGE

Declan Mulkeen

We have all met multilinguals and marvel at their ability to change from one language to the another seamlessly. While you may be envious of their ability to speak more than one language are you aware that they may behave differently depending on which language they are speaking?

Discover the latest thinking on multilinguals and how their personality may well change depending on which language they are speaking.

An interesting concept has been explored about multilingualism and personality in an article published in The Economist. It questions whether a speaker's personality can change when their spoken language changes. Many issues are considered. For example, being able to speak another language is linked to a more flexible brain. This, coupled with cultural influences amongst languages, may have an impact. For example, some multinguals reported a difference in speaking style. These differences ranged from the level of perceived rudeness to frequency of interrupting another speaker.

Reasons cited for these characteristics included cultural differences in the acceptance of more rude language to the structural differences between the languages spoken.

Word order may have an impact. If the meaning of the sentence is revealed earlier in one language, interrupting in that language may reduce the risk of misunderstanding the speaker if the significant word or words have already been uttered.

LACK OF SUBTLETY AND NUANCES WHEN LEARNING A NEW LANGUAGE

Different speaking styles may exist with little choice, especially as they are being learnt.

Many language learners report that when learning a new language they often feel too blunt or direct, not because they wish to be so, but because they have not yet developed a sufficient vocabulary in which to be more nuanced.

Others report that they are still translating words in their head when speaking in their new language and may not have an awareness or are forced to ignore subtleties in the other language.

LANGUAGE AND CULTURE

The connections between language and culture are complex, and no doubt have some influence on language and personality.

The author of the article goes on to explain how in a French-speaking country in West Africa there is a tradition of greeting complete strangers with a hearty 'bonjour'.

Meanwhile, next door in an adjacent English-speaking West African country the author noted it would be odd to say 'hello' to a complete stranger for no apparent reason in English!

THE LINK BETWEEN LANGUAGE AND CULTURE

Many multilinguals are not necessarily multicultural. For example, a business professional may learn another language for work, but as an adult, they are much more likely to transfer their own culture into their new language or perhaps merge their new language skill into the corporate culture.

On the other hand, there are people who grew up in a truly multicultural environment, where their cultural reference points are likely to switch along with the shift of language.

This was explained to the author of the article by someone who was born and raised in Gibraltar with one Spanish parent and one British parent. Growing up bilingual, he explained a constant feeling of needing to either restrain or express himself if he was speaking the language that did not match his emotional state at the time!

BILINGUALISM AND PERSONALITY: LEVEL OF FLUENCY CANNOT BE IGNORED

Finally, the level of linguistic and cultural fluency should not be ignored. Being able to speak a new language with all of the correct syntax and other formalities may still make the speaker sound like they have little personality when speaking it.

Transferring the personality of their mother tongue may sound confusing, especially if very different emotions are expected between the words and actions exhibited.

Only when a speaker matches their linguistic personality with their new language are they likely to be considered truly multilingual.

This includes the use of slang, tone and matching body language. A whole new you, perhaps?

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Networks, and Acculturation, Interpersonal the Learner's Sense of Self: The Effects of Social Relationships on Second Language Learning

Kathy Bluestone

Introduction

In reaction to what they considered the prevailing bias of second language acquisition (SLA) research towards cognitive-oriented theories, Firth and Wagner (1997) called for a greater recognition of the social context and interactive nature of language use. Without negating the importance of cognitive dimensions of learning, the authors noted that "language is acquired and learned through social interaction ... and should be studied in interactive encounters" (Firth & Wagner, 1997, p. 287). The article set off a firestorm of controversy. Some critics argued that language acquisition is "fundamentally a psycholinguistic process" (Gass & Selinker, 2001, p. 239), and that language acquisition and language use are two entirely separate entities (Gass 1998). Firth and Wagner acknowledged this criticism, but still maintained that language acquisition "is built on language use" (Firth & Wagner, 2007, p. 806) and that it is a process that takes place "in the micromoments of social interaction" (Firth & Wagner, 2007, p. 807). This perspective was echoed by Wenger (1998), who stated that "learners are social beings ... this fact is a central aspect of learning" (Wenger, 1998, p. 4). For Wenger, learning is a fundamentally social activity that occurs in *communities of practice*, where learners form identities as they negotiate meaning through interactive practice with others.

Recognizing that there is still debate over the role of social context in SLA research (e.g., Larsen-Freeman, 2007), the intention of this paper is not to restate the controversy. The purpose instead is to explore the ways in which the social relationships experienced by learners — with society in general, with their network of family, friends, and acquaintances, and with themselves — may contribute to individual differences in what, and how, second language learners learn. The perspective taken in this paper is informed less by Firth & Wagner (1997) and more by Spolsky (1988), who acknowledged that while social factors have an indirect rather than a direct influence on language learning, their effects are "strong and traceable" (Spolsky, 1988, p. 382). According to Spolksy, social context can be expressed in *macro* policies (such as the determination of the official language of a country, or the provision of language education to immigrants) and in *micro* policies (such as a family's decisions about what language(s) to speak in the home). The social context is seen as affecting a learner's attitudes toward the target language and motivation to learn, which combines with other characteristics of the learner (e.g., age, aptitude, learning styles and strategies, and personality factors such as anxiety). This complex combination contributes to determining whether the learner makes use of the formal or informal opportunities for learning provided by the social context.

Taking the perspective that a learner's social environment can affect his learning in underappreciated but powerful ways, this paper will attempt to create a broad picture of how the learner is situated in the world as a social being, and how this may advance or impede his progress in acquiring a second language. The discussion will also include examples of how a learner's choice of which language to use can be affected by his social relationships. With a few exceptions, the focus will be on adult immigrant learners who are acquiring a second language in a host country. The paper will analyze three levels of relationships experienced by this learner population, each level providing another "layer" of information that helps explain individual differences in second language learning outcomes. The paper begins at a macro level by addressing the learner's relationship with society at large, which may be reflected in the learner's willingness to acculturate to the host society. The discussion then turns to the micro-level effects that an interpersonal social network brings to bear on an individual's ability to learn. Finally, the discussion moves to an internal level, focusing on the relationship the learner has with himself, as expressed in the idea of self-identity. The paper concludes with a summary of implications for the classroom that are suggested by the research.

Relationships at the Macro Level: The Learner and Society

An immigrant who moves to a new country is immediately immersed in an unfamiliar culture, which may be radically different from his own. As the individual resides in the new country over time, he may experience various relationships with the host culture, ranging from complete rejection of the host culture to complete acceptance and internalization of host culture norms. This process of adapting to the host culture over time is frequently called acculturation. Before discussing how this process affects language learning specifically, it may be helpful to describe some of the forms acculturation can take and the variables that can affect the strategy an immigrant chooses to adopt. A useful starting point is provided by Berry (1997), who identified four possible acculturation strategies which provide a framework for understanding the various ways an individual can adapt.

According to Berry, individuals who shed their original cultural identity in favor of adopting the target culture are using an *assimilation* strategy. Those who retain their original culture and reject the target culture are adopting a *separation* strategy. When the individual maintains his original culture while participating in the target culture as well, he is using an *integration* strategy. Finally, when there is no interest in either maintaining the original culture or participating in the target culture, the individual is experiencing *marginalization.* Variables which could affect the level to which an individual acculturates to the host society exist at both the group level and the individual level. Group-level variables include social forces present in the society of origin and the society of settlement (such as the political context and attitudes towards particular ethnic groups); individual-level variables include the length of time the individual resides in the host culture, the social support resources available to the individual, and the acculturation strategy the individual chooses to adopt. These group- and individual-level variables may interact in multiple ways to determine how an individual chooses to integrate into the host society. Although Berry did not specifically discuss the way these variables affected language learning, his themes will be repeated many times over in the second language learning (2LL) literature.

Work on the effect of acculturation on immigrant language learning has generally focused on the effects of interrelationships between cultural groups rather than between individual learners. The archetypal theory of this genre is the Acculturation Model developed by Schumann (1986), which explained the second language learning of immigrant groups who were learning a second language (L2) without instruction while residing in the target culture. Schumann's model distinguished between two types of acculturation. In Type 1, the learner becomes socially integrated, developing social contacts with L2 speakers who provide him with input while continuing to retain the lifestyle and values of his native culture; this is similar to Berry's integration strategy. In Type 2 acculturation, the learner develops social contacts in the target culture and also moves toward adopting the lifestyle and values of the target language group; this corresponds to Berry's assimilation strategy. By encompassing both definitions of acculturation, the model implies that a learner could succeed in acquiring the target language regardless of whether he chose to adopt the norms of the target culture or not. An important difference between Schumann and Berry is that both of Schumann's categories assume that there is social contact between the learner and members of the target culture, whereas Berry's taxonomy allows for the possibility of limited or zero contact between groups.

Schumann's (1986) model identified numerous ways in which social relationships between groups could affect second language learning. The possible effect of power relationships between cultural groups is reflected in the degree to which the target language (TL) group is socially dominant over the 2LL group; if the TL group is more dominant, presumably the 2LL group would have more reason to learn. Other variables in the model focus on the amount of contact, or "social distance," between the groups. The degree to which the 2LL and TL groups are enclosed—that is, the degree to which they share social and occupational facilities such as churches, schools, and professions—could affect willingness to learn the TL; if there was less interaction between groups, there would be less reason to learn. If the 2LL group is more cohesive and/or large, the members would tend to maintain contact among themselves rather than initiating contacts with the TL group. Similarities between the 2LL and TL cultures could facilitate social contact between the groups, as could the existence of positive attitudes from one group toward the other. In addition to the amount of contact maintained with the TL group, the 2LL group's intended length of stay in the target culture was theorized to be predictive of learning success — the longer the intended length of stay, the higher the motivation to learn the target language would be.

Brown (1980) drew on Schumann's (1976) idea of *social distance* to hypothesize the optimal time for learning a second language when residing in a new country. He identified four stages involved in acculturation: (1) excitement upon exposure to the new environment; (2) culture shock as the individual realizes the distance between his own identity and the host culture; (3) gradual recovery as the individual begins to accept or at least empathize with differences in the second culture; and (4) assimilation or adaptation as the individual adjusts completely to the host environment. Brown hypothesized that mastery of a second language would optimally happen during the third stage (recovery), when the social pressure (resulting from "social distance") felt by an individual is neither too strong (as would be the case during the period of culture shock) or too weak (as would be the case during complete recovery). If the individual did not master the language prior to proceeding to the fourth stage, he might never master it, because social pressure would be too weak; conversely, if he mastered it prior to that stage, he might not psychologically acculturate completely because his linguistic and social development were out of line. Because successful transition to the third stage is necessary before completely mastering the language, Brown suggested that language learning would be optimized if teachers allow students adequate time to pass through the second stage, giving students the opportunity to express frustration and anger with the host culture rather than expecting them to adapt to their new environment quickly.

Research by Tinker Sachs and Li (2007) validates the idea of social distance. The authors attempted to determine why so few non-Chinese residents of Hong Kong were successful in learning Cantonese, noting that one of the most obvious indicators of an individual's attempts to integrate into the host culture is attempting to learn the language. The authors found that over 80 percent of the 40 non-native speakers surveyed had attempted to learn Cantonese, but that only 35 percent reported having the opportunity to use it, despite the fact that they were surrounded by native speakers. Even when non-natives attempted to speak Cantonese with Hongkongers, the native speakers would switch to English. It appeared that while some Hongkongers appreciated the foreigners' attempts to speak Cantonese, others felt they were being negatively perceived as "not smart enough" to speak English. Additionally, there seemed to be little expectation (and even some resistance to the idea) that immigrants would integrate into the Hongkong society; speaking English was seen as a way to keep the foreigners at a distance from the native culture. This lack of willingness on the part of native speakers to engage with learners in the local language made it difficult for learners to practice the language and it inhibited their ability to integrate into the host society. It appears that even where there is motivation on the part of the learner to acquire the language and assimilate into the host culture, the social attitudes of the local population can make it very difficult to do so. This finding is congruent with Schumann's (1986) theory that the attitudes of the majority and minority groups towards one another can affect willingness to assimilate.

In a model describing variables that affect a learner's willingness to communicate in an L2, Macintyre, Clement, Dornyei, and Noels (1998) discussed the effect that power relationships and social distance could play in language choice among L2 speakers. In addition to acknowledging the effect that a learner's motivation and self-confidence (or anxiety) could have on his willingness to communicate, the authors also hypothesized that attitudes (positive or negative) of one ethnic group towards another could play a significant role since intergroup attitudes could presumably lead to more or fewer interactions between language groups. A desire to affiliate with the TL group could have a positive effect, as this could lead to increased contact with L2 speakers; conversely, prejudices and discrimination could negatively impact attempts to communicate in the target language. The authors noted that learners could experience conflict between the desire to assimilate with the host culture and the fear of losing "membership" with one's own culture; willingness to use the L2 would depend on which force became more dominant in the individual. A strong L1 enclave could ameliorate the desire to assimilate and discourage use of the L2.

The effect of enclaves was also discussed by Lazear (1999), who framed the idea of how social distance affects the decision to learn the language of the host culture as a question of economics: speaking the majority language is necessary in order to have a larger pool of people to trade with. Through analysis of U.S. Census data, Lazear found evidence that immigrants who clustered, or settled in areas with higher concentrations of immigrants from their native country, were less fluent in English than those who resided in areas where there was a lower density of immigrants speaking the same native language. The author posed two possible reasons for this: either immigrants in areas where the majority language is predominant have fewer opportunities to trade with those who speak their same native language, giving them a greater economic incentive to become more fluent; or immigrants who lack fluency in English to begin with choose to settle in areas where it is possible to "get by" speaking their native language instead. The author's analysis of the interaction of length of stay in the U.S., concentration of immigrants speaking the same native language, and L2 fluency showed that the second explanation is the more likely one. This implies that low proficient L2 learners deliberately choose to immigrate to areas with high concentrations of people who speak their same native language, which in turn increases social distance from the TL group and makes it less likely that the learners will become proficient in English.

The ideas proposed by Schumann (1986) have not always held up well in empirical studies, however. For example, Scully (2002) used the variables proposed in the Acculturation Model to study seven Filipino women who immigrated to Japan to marry Japanese farmers. Each subject was scored for competency in accent, grammar, vocabulary, fluency, comprehension, and pragmatics. Acculturation was measured using interviews, field observations, and a questionnaire to determine the subjects' perceptions of family and community relationships and the amount of language contact they had with native speakers. The degree of acculturation seemed to track linearly with the measured competence of the subjects — subjects with low acculturation scores had low oral competency scores, and subjects with high acculturation scores had high oral competency scores. However, the author noted that each subject displayed individual acculturation factors (e.g., motivation) that were out of line with the total acculturation score. For example, one subject who obtained high overall competency and acculturation scores during the interviews also gave a strong impression of being dissatisfied with the Japanese environment during field observations. All subjects were considered to have minimal social distance with the Japanese because they married into Japanese families, but the expected positive effect on L2 learning seemed to be ameliorated by other social factors, such as the family dynamics specific to each subject (such as whether the mother-in-law was supportive of the subject or not). Scully concluded that the Acculturation Model was not valid because the individual acculturation variables seemed to have varying degrees of usefulness in predicting L2 learning success.

The problem with applying the Acculturation Model, or in talking about macro-level group-to-group relationships in general, may be that these analyses take into account only one dimension of the many levels of relationships experienced by learners. A more complete picture may be achieved by including the micro-level effects of an individual's personal social network, to which we now turn.

Relationships at the Micro Level: The Learner and His Personal Social Network

Although it acknowledges that the degree of social distance between cultural groups can affect language learning, the Acculturation Model does not provide a means of actually measuring social distance. In addition, because the model deals with cultural groups rather than individual learners, it is not useful for accounting for individual differences in learning outcomes.

The Social Network Theory model developed by Milroy (1980) provides a solution to both problems. First, the model provides a means of measuring social distance by analyzing an individual's network of relationships or contacts, as it is termed in the study. Contacts are divided into first-order zones (those people with whom the individual is directly linked) and second-order zones (people who are linked to the individual via contacts in the first-order zone—e.g., "friends of friends"). Networks are classified as either *exchange* networks, where communicative transactions result in an exchange of goods and services and there is an implied mutual obligation between the individuals, or as *interactive* networks, where communication is more likely to be unidirectional and there is no implied obligation between individuals (such as speaking with a pharmacist when picking up a prescription or listening to a sermon at church). Further, the density of an individual's network is measured by determining how many individuals within the first-order zone know one another. Segments of networks which have relatively high density are identified as clusters; all the members of a particular cluster know one another. Examples of clusters include family members, co-workers, and neighbors. Because clusters are particularly dense, they have a strong effect in enforcing group norms, including language.

The number and types of relationships that exist between the individual and each member of his first-order zone can also be measured. If the individual relates to one member in a single capacity (e.g., as a co-worker), the relationship is categorized as uniplex. If the individual has multiple relationships with a member of his network (e.g., as family member, neighbor, and coworker), the relationship is categorized as multiplex. Networks with high multiplexity are often high in density as well, which tends to further reinforce the norms of the group. The conclusion Milroy (1980) drew is that “a dense, multiplex personal network structure predicts relative closeness to vernacular norms” (p. 160). Milroy also acknowledged that the composition of personal networks varies from individual to individual due to their level of education, occupation, and age. This explains why networks can be very different for individual members of the same larger social group; the variance in network structure also leads to variance in the amount of pressure an individual feels to conform to the linguistic norms of the network group.

Lie (2002) used Social Network Theory to analyze the English-speaking ability of ten women who immigrated to England from Sylhet, a district in northeast Bangladesh. The author found that the ratio of English-speaking contacts to total contacts within the individual’s social network was moderately correlated with English-speaking ability ($r = .645$, $p < .05$) — i.e., the subjects with the greatest number of English-speaking ties in their network also had the highest English-speaking ability. Despite the influence of the English-speaking contacts, none of the subjects had a high level of English proficiency. Lie believed that this was because the Sylheti community as a whole had made limited effort to integrate into the native culture. Because the community networks were strong, they were serving to enforce the continued use of Sylheti rather than encouraging members to learn English. Echoing themes raised by Schumann (1986) and Lazear (1999), Lie noted several social factors that may have contributed to the community’s lack of integration, including the racial harassment and crime experienced by Bangladeshis in England and the tendency for Bangladeshis to live in the same part of town rather than dispersing. The author concluded that the “relationship between language ability and social networks is by no means a relationship in isolation” (Lie, 2002, p. 396).

Lybeck (2002) applied both Social Network Theory and the Acculturation Model to a population of nine American women who immigrated to Norway as a result of job transfers (either theirs or their husbands’). Lybeck used interviews to measure the subjects’ proficiency in Norwegian pronunciation and to obtain information about the subjects’ participation in and attitudes toward the target culture. The author identified the contacts and clusters within the exchange network for each subject; the subjects were then identified as having close, moderate, or distant relationships with Norwegian speakers. Lybeck demonstrated that each group exhibited predictable perceptions of the target culture — for example, those whose social network included close relationships with Norwegian speakers had a more positive view of the Norwegian culture. The author also found a strong relationship between these measures of assimilation and success in learning Norwegian, at least for the groups that had made an effort to establish close or moderately close relationships with native speakers. Lybeck noted that “acculturation is a two-way street” (p. 175), meaning that the attitudes and behavior of the target group can be just as influential as the attitudes and behavior of the learner group. This is important in explaining the difficulty many of the subjects had in establishing relationships with Norwegians, despite their stated willingness to try. As in the study of Honkongers by Tinker Sachs and Li (2007), the Norwegians studied by Lybeck tended to be closed and suspicious of “outsiders,” which made it difficult for immigrants to befriend native speakers, which consequently inhibited L2 learning.

Rather than focusing on language learning, Tong (1997) used the both the Acculturation Model and Social Network Theory to analyze language choice among 190 recent Chinese immigrants in New York City. Information was collected about the individual’s choices of whether to use Chinese or English in a variety of situations, including home, school, and work.

The subjects clearly preferred to speak Chinese most of the time, which was reinforced by the strength of their social networks within the large Chinese immigrant population in New York City. However, they attempted to use English more as they began to explore and adapt to American culture. The subjects seemed to be developing what Tong (1997) called a "cross-group identity" (p. 53), using English or Chinese interchangeably depending on the situation. The author observed that this is consistent with Schumann's model, which says the learner group need not adopt the lifestyle and values of the target language group to acculturate (Schumann, 1986). The author also noted that while the strong Chinese social networks enforce the continued use of Chinese, as would be predicted by Social Network Theory, they may also provide the recent immigrants a sense of security that gives them confidence to explore the unfamiliar American society. In this way, the strength of the Chinese social networks may actually indirectly *encourage* the new immigrants to learn to speak English.

Akresh (2007) also analyzed the frequency with which immigrants used English in the contexts of home, work, with a spouse, and with friends, comparing it to the immigrants' age at arrival and the cumulative number of years spent in the U.S. The author found that an older age at arrival was associated with a lower probability of using English in all four contexts, but that the probability of English use increased the more time the immigrant spent in the U.S. In particular, the likelihood of speaking English with friends increased substantially the longer the immigrant stayed in the U.S. (e.g., for those aged 20-39 at arrival, the probability increased from approximately .25 at arrival to approximately 85 after a 20-year stay). This could be an indication that the immigrants are increasing their networks of English-speaking friends over time. The data also showed that women's use of English was far more sensitive to time spent in the U.S. than was men's, suggesting that social networks change more substantially over time for women than for men. All these findings indicated that even among first-generation immigrants, there was a significant increase in linguistic integration with the immigrants' social contacts.

The idea of social networks affecting language use and learning is also reflected in research by Buttaro (2004), who conducted ethnographic studies of eight Hispanic female immigrants in New York City to determine how linguistic, cultural, and educational factors combined to affect their English language learning. For all the participants, the opportunity to practice English informally (e.g., with shopkeepers or their children's school teachers) was crucial to helping them improve their English proficiency; interacting with Americans in their social networks also improved their understanding of the target culture and language. Beyond providing an opportunity to practice, family and friends played a significant role in convincing the participants to attend English classes; in fact, a supportive family environment was the most significant factor determining the student's ability to progress in English. Similarly, the six Dominican English language learners in New York City interviewed by Reynoso (2008) indicated that family situations were either a major obstacle to or a primary motivation for their educational success in English. Some participants had children and were motivated to learn to improve their children's lives; other participants experienced difficult relationships with their relatives which made it hard to focus on their studies (e.g., one student lived with a brother who physically abused her).

The idea that social networks provide an opportunity to practice is further illustrated in a study by Cooke (2006), who analyzed 76 adult immigrants in the United Kingdom to attempt to discover their language educational goals and the social factors that constrained their learning process. Despite their strong motivation to learn English in order to obtain a better job, many of the learners had limited opportunities to practice English with their co-workers because they worked in jobs that were typically performed by immigrants who did not speak English. These learners expressed frustration with their inability to develop social networks with native English speakers beyond the brief transactional encounters they had with bureaucrats or shopkeepers. In this study, the English classes attended by the learners became important social networks that provided the opportunity to meet other English speakers (even if those speakers were fellow learners) and practice English. Equally important, attendance at the classes improved the learners' sense of independence and helped them to begin to identify themselves more positively as students rather than as immigrants. The effects on learning from shifts in self-identity will be explored in greater detail in the following section.

Relationships at the Internal Level: The Learner's Sense of Self-Identity

The final level of relationships to be explored in this paper is the relationship of the learner with himself — i.e., how the learner perceives himself changing in relation to others in his social sphere as he acquires a new language. As described by Armour (2000), practicing a second language is like playing a new role, tantamount to "impersonating" another. Armour calls the process of becoming an authentic speaker in a new language *identity slippage,* identifying the learner as part of a "kind of diaspora" who is required to make meaning "using someone else's tools" (p. 263).

The author most closely associated with the subject of language learner identity is Norton Pierce (see Norton, 2000; Norton Pierce, 1995), who found that identity could be expressed in multiple ways and change over time and location in relation to the social context. Expanding on Gardner's (1985) theory of motivation, Norton Pierce introduced the concept of "investment" to explain why the language behavior of L2 learners did not always appear to be synchronous with their motivation to learn: e.g., whether a learner chooses to remain silent or speak is dependent on how the learner identifies himself during a particular social interchange. Connecting with Bourdieu (1991), who stated that "linguistic exchanges ... are also relations of symbolic power in which the power relations between speakers or their respective groups are actualized" (p. 37), Norton Pierce's (1995) research found that power relationships between learner and target language speakers play a large part in determining whether learners have opportunities to use the target language. Even when the learner is highly motivated to learn, such power relationships could have the effect of "blocking" their ability to practice and therefore inhibit their proficiency. One example given by the author is Martina, a Czech immigrant to Canada who was highly motivated to improve her English in order to gain better employment. Despite her motivation to advance at work, Martina was reluctant to speak English with co-workers because she felt the identity imposed on her at work was that of "stupid immigrant." However, Martina also strongly identified herself as the primary caregiver in her family. When her English-speaking landlord accused her of breaking her lease, Martina broke out of her silence and engaged in a lengthy argument with the landlord in English because her strong identity as "caregiver" took over. As Norton Pierce (1995) explained, Martina's investment in protecting her family caused her to overcome her fear of speaking with someone who had more power. Eventually, Martina's identity as a mother transferred to the workplace, where she was finally able to overcome feelings of being marginalized by her much younger co-workers by conceptualizing them as children; at that point she began to speak with co-workers and customers more frequently.

In analyzing linguistic interactions between her subjects and their social networks, Norton Pierce (1995) also drew on Bourdieu's (1991) concept of *legitimate language.* This is spoken by an individual who is legitimately recognized as able to produce a particular type of discourse (e.g., a priest can say a mass), in a legitimate situation in front of legitimate receivers (e.g., mass could be read in a church), using legitimate linguistic forms. Norton Pierce applies this idea to interactions experienced by her subjects, showing how individuals determine whether to speak in a particular situation based on how "legitimate" they perceive their contribution to be. The perceived legitimacy is in turn based on a learner's feelings about his own identity and is affected by the power dynamics that exist between the individuals sharing the conversational exchange.

McKay and Wong (1996) used Norton Pierce's (1995) concept of social identity as a framework for studying the language learning progress of four junior-high Chinese immigrant students in California. The authors found that variances in how the students progressed in English seemed to depend on how they perceived their identities at particular points in time and how they saw speaking English as helping or inhibiting that identity. One immigrant student, Michael, quickly developed an identity as an athlete, which made him more 'acceptable' to his white classmates. As a result, he began to spend increasing amounts of time with English-speaking students, and his speaking and listening abilities (which were the language skills most valuable to him as an athlete) progressed rapidly, far outstripping his reading and writing proficiency. Another student, Jeremy, adopted the identity of a model student in response to pressure from his parents, and focused his energy on improving his writing, which was the skill most valued in academic work. The authors conclude that a learner's willingness to invest in the four skills of reading, writing, listening, and speaking will shift as multiple identities emerge. In addition, they found that although the students were willing to learn to fit in as Americans and learn English, they continued to retain their Chinese language, which they used frequently with other Chinese students in the school. In fact, the Chinese dialects spoken among the Chinese immigrants were used as markers that identified the speakers with specific regional, ethnic, and socioeconomic groups. Thus, while the immigrant students were establishing a new identity within the American culture, they were also using their L1 to position themselves within the complex maze of cliques that were formed among the cohort of Chinese speakers. It appeared that they were identifying themselves culturally as both Chinese and American, a finding that is congruent with Berry's (1997) integration strategy or Schumann's (1986) type 1 acculturation.

The experience of the learners in Reynoso's (2008) study illustrates the interplay of identity, social networks, and acculturation. Like the subjects studied by Norton Pierce (1995), several of the participants in Reynoso's study reported that the humiliating treatment they endured from coworkers and employers motivated them to improve their English. The experience of discrimination appeared to force these learners to re-assert their identities. As one participant stated, "I felt like a slave. However, one day I asked myself what I was doing here. I had completed high school in my country with honors. This experience motivated me the most to learn English and attend college" (Reynoso, 2008, p. 405). In addition, the participants reported that it was important to retain their identity with their native culture while they were beginning the process of establishing a new identity in the target culture. As in the study by McKay and Wong (1996), most participants ended up developing a new, bicultural identity, which encompassed a new social network of American friends and participation in American cultural activities as well as continued close ties to family and return trips to the Dominican Republic. As one participant stated, "I am part of two cultures: American and Hispanic."

Menard-Warwick (2005) explored how the English learning experience of two Central American immigrants was shaped by their personal histories. The author demonstrated how the personal investment made in education by the subjects' parents influenced the subjects' tenacity in learning English. In turn, the learners' own investment in learning English affected their decisions about which language to teach their children and when. The motivation of both women to learn English was significantly affected by their identities as young mothers; they wanted to improve their English so they could help teach their children and instill in them a love of learning, just as their own mothers had done for them. However, both women experienced social constraints which limited the amount of investment they could make in learning. For example, both were only able to find low-wage, unstable jobs with irregular schedules in places where the other workers all spoke Spanish. There was no opportunity to practice English and it was difficult to make time to attend class. In this study, although the learners' self-identity drove them to invest in learning, their lack of English-speaking contacts in their social network made it difficult to practice.

In another illustration of Norton Pierce's (1995) notion of investment, Skilton-Sylvester (2002) studied four Cambodian adult ESL learners to explore how their desire and ability to attend class changed as their roles and identities changed over time. The author found that the learners' identities as spouses, mothers, and workers had complex effects on their progress in learning. For example, one learner no longer needed to work after she got married; when she no longer valued English as a way to improve her job, her attendance at class waned. When another learner's husband saw that her social contacts were expanding as a result of attending ESL classes, he pressured her to stop going to school and start working in a sewing shop ten hours a day, six days a week. Other learners needed to be able to help their children with their homework. Because learning English was associated with child-rearing in these families, it was seen as the domain of the female and it was supported by the husbands. In a similar analysis of shifting gender identities within two Laotian families residing in Philadelphia (Gordon, 2004), the workplaces in which the men were employed were populated mostly with other Latinos and Spanish speakers. Workers were grouped according to their native language, so workers needed only to speak their L1. In contrast, because the women bore the responsibility of dealing with external social institutions (e.g., their children's schools, the legal system, and the landlord), they had many more opportunities to practice English. In these families, learning English ultimately became the domain of the female, which in turn shifted the power relationship between husband and wife. The author concluded that as identities shift, language learning can be affected, which in turn may cause identities to shift again.

The idea of identity shift is again documented in a study of the English language learning experience of older Russian immigrants to the U.S. by Hubenthal (2004), who noted that many of these immigrants had previous identities as well-educated professionals. On arrival in the U.S., however, many did not find employment (either because of lack of English skills or because of their age, or both), and ended up spending most of their time with other Russian speakers. The older immigrants also tended to live in enclaves where they could get by without speaking English, as described by Lazear (1999). Despite their separateness, the learners studied by Hubenthal were happy to be living in the U.S. and wanted to be a part of American society, considering citizenship the ultimate expression of integration. As well-educated professionals, they wanted to have enough proficiency in English to allow them to express their identities as "informed members of society and adept conversationalists, retaining their importance as grandparents, and being autonomous" (Hubenthal, 2004, p, 118). Despite this motivation, their behavior did not follow; they preferred to study in intensive classes on their own instead of making attempts at conversation with native English speakers. Many of the learners studied stated that they were embarrassed to talk to English speakers because their own English was so low and that they felt ashamed as a result. The result was a vicious cycle: their social networks were limited to Russian speakers, which helped them maintain their Russian identity; however, they had little opportunity to practice English in informal conversations with English speakers, which would have helped them learn to express their complex identities in English.

A different type of identity shift is documented by Warhol (2004), who studied a population of elderly Liberian women immigrants to the U.S. to understand how these learners defined academic success. The author found that the standardized assessment tools required by the ESL program these women attended provided a poor measure of their achievement. Many of these women had never enrolled in school before because it was not common for Liberian girls to attend school; some were illiterate in their L1 because they spoke languages that had no written form. When tested, the students appeared to have made little progress in learning; however, because of their newly constructed identities as learners in the U.S., the students stated that they felt they were making progress simply because they were finally attending class. Those who were illiterate in their L1 found learning the ABCs challenging, but they were committed to investing time into the process because they felt that completing a task was another indication of success. In fact, when the students completed a project in class, it was celebrated with applause or a prayer of thanks—even if the task was a small as finally producing the written letter “c” correctly. In contrast to the Russian immigrants studied by Hubenthal (2004), who were motivated to learn English because they felt they were unable to express their complex social identities, the Liberian women were celebrating the opportunity to learn English in order to structure a better identity than they had experienced in their home country.

To test attitudes toward the idea of identity shift among L2 learners who had not yet immigrated, LoCastro (2001) studied Japanese university students who were learning English to determine whether they evidenced readiness to adopt target language pragmatic norms, even if adopting those norms meant shifting their identity. The author used questionnaires, group discussions, and student writing assignments to collect data on the learners’ attitudes and language awareness. The data indicated that the students had a positive attitude towards learning English and felt that gaining proficiency had value for careers, academic work, and traveling and living in English-speaking countries. However, they expressed resistance to the idea of changing their identity in order to become more proficient in English. As one student stated, “Somehow we may have to change our way of thinking when we speak a foreign language and it’s necessary. But it doesn’t mean that we throw our own identities out, instead, we should keep ‘ourselves’” (LoCastro, 2001, p. 80). As theorized by Milroy (1980), it is possible that this resistance is the result of the pressure of the strong L1 social networks that would be inherently present when learning an L2 while living in one’s native country.

The Language Learner as Social Being: Implications for the Classroom

The need to translate the idea of the language student as social being to the classroom setting is illustrated by Cooke (2006), who analyzed the specific language learning goals of four students who were enrolled in English classes in Britain. Despite the fact that the curriculum required teachers to create an individual learning plan for each student, the teachers seemed unaware of the real educational and occupational goals of the students and how dramatically these goals varied from the “job-related education” that was reflected in the curriculum. As discussed earlier, many of these students had a limited opportunity to practice English outside the classroom due to the limited nature of their social networks. Despite high motivation, investment, and access to ESL classes, the students were stymied in their learning because the curriculum did not address the real social situations they faced.

Duran (1996) also highlighted the importance of understanding the cultural-linguistic needs of ESL students. While the families in Duran’s study recognized the need to learn English in order to be qualified for employment, they also needed to learn how to find places where jobs were posted, what kinds of skills and experience were expected of workers, and how to find transportation to a new job. As their children entered the school system, some family identities were upended; the parents perceived the discipline in school to be too lax, but if they tried to enforce discipline at home, the children threatened to report them. As their identities shifted in a new culture, these immigrants needed the language and pragmatic skills that would help them deal with unfamiliar and complex social situations. This need was echoed by Buttaro (2004), who called for a "broader definition of literacy" that takes into account the need of students to use language to establish identities in a new social and cultural community, stating that the best way to help immigrant learners is "to explore how language, culture, and society are intertwined" (Buttaro, 2004, p. 37).

Buttaro (2004) concluded that understanding the English language needs of learners requires more than merely assessing students' abilities in reading and writing; it also requires understanding the social and cultural factors that are at play in the students' lives, and developing curricula that address these realities. Buttaro noted that the curricula of ESL classes often reflect idealized American middle-class values and economic situations rather than the economic and social realities of the students (e.g., unsafe working conditions, inadequate access to health care, communication difficulties). Similarly, Gordon (2004) described the disconnect between the ESL textbooks she studied and the realities of students' lives; the textbooks concentrated on vocabulary for the workplace (where the students did not need to use English), but did not address English as used in the legal system, which was a pressing concern for the families in her study. Menard-Warwick (2005) agreed, stating that educators need to understand the societal and personal forces that create dilemmas for students and address them directly by making them topics for discussion in class, allowing the students to use the target language to derive a collective solution based on the resources that each student brings to the class. Skilton-Sylvester (2002) encouraged teachers to learn as much as they can about their students' identities outside the classroom, and draw on those identities in classroom activities to encourage the students to continue their investment in learning.

Cooke (2006) reminded teachers that the classroom not only provides an important forum for learners to practice English, but also serves as a means of meeting other people and widening the students' social networks. Macintyre et al. (1998) stated that "the ultimate goal of the learning process should be to engender in language students the willingness to seek out communication opportunities and the willingness to actually communicate in them" (Macintyre et al., 1998, p. 547). Since a learner's willingness to attempt to practice may be inhibited by power relationships, Norton Pierce (1995) noted that language teachers should help learners learn to claim the "right to speak" outside the classroom, and encourage learners to reflect on situations where they feel marginalized so that they can learn to transform them through their language.

Finally, the importance of acknowledging the complexity of learner identities in the classroom was discussed by Nero (2005), who noted that educational institutions tend to assign learners "fixed ethnolinguistic identities" (p. 195), all too often simply identifying learners monolithically as "non-native speakers" rather than as complex individuals with multiple and shifting identities. Although immigrant learners may be experiencing rapid shifts in identity, it is important not to force learners to acculturate too quickly, giving them the opportunity to express frustration with the new culture they are experiencing (Brown, 1980). LoCastro (2001) concluded that in light of the increasingly widespread use of English as a lingua franca, it is important to take into account an individual's desire to maintain identification with his own culture while becoming proficient in English: "[t]o do otherwise smacks of neo-colonial and hegemonic pretensions" (p. 83).

Conclusion

From the prior review, it appears that an immigrant learner's relationships with the host society, his social network, and his own identity act in complex ways to affect his second language learning. These relationships may be described as "layers" because they are overlapping and interdependent — a change in one can easily create changes in the others as well. For example, an individual's identity as a parent may motivate her to attend class to improve her English skills so she can communicate with her child's teachers; as the learner enters into conversations and relationships with the child's teachers, she broadens her English-speaking social network ties, which provides her with the ability to practice outside the classroom. The confidence the learner gains from these interactions could in turn have the effect of creating a positive attitude toward the host society and give the learner a greater desire to adopt the norms of the host culture.

If this is true, then the effectiveness of a teacher of English lies not only in assessing what students need to learn linguistically, but also in understanding how their progress may be enhanced or impeded by the multiple social relationships that students experience outside of the classroom. This requires thinking beyond placement tests and developing a methodology for collecting information about the students' willingness to acculturate, the type and extent of their social networks, and the reasons (e.g., personal identities) which are driving them to "invest" in studying English. The questionnaires used by LoCastro (2001) and Buttaro (2004) provide a range of ideas for constructing a "social assessment" survey. In addition, teachers could obtain writing samples to both assess language and social experiences by providing an essay prompt along the lines of those used by LoCastro, such as "Describe your life as an immigrant woman in New York City. You may want to include the types of experiences you had (either positive or negative)" (p. 38).

In addition to collecting information, the teacher must be sensitive to the fact that the learner's social relationships will change over time, which may change the individual's willingness to invest in learning. As illustrated by Skilton-Sylvester (2002), students may drop out of classes suddenly for reasons unknown to the teacher; rather than assuming a lack of motivation, the teacher may want to follow up with the student to try to understand the change in situation and encourage the student to persevere, if that is practically possible for the student.

Finally, as Gordon (2004), Duran (1996), and Buttaro (2004) suggest, the language teacher can draw on the students' social experiences outside the classroom as a resource for discussion within the classroom. Giving students the opportunity to voice their experiences gives them the opportunity to support one another; it also provides the teacher with additional information about the learning needs of her students, and may spark ideas for modifications to what is taught in the classroom. For example, a thematic unit on "finding a job" may require less focus on how to read classified ads and more on how to find transportation to work.

In the end, as Spolsky (1988) stated, some variables in language learning can be controlled and some cannot, but all of them must be taken into account by the language teacher. Successful second language teaching requires not only the ability to impart grammatical knowledge, but also a sensitivity to the social realities faced by students residing in an unfamiliar culture. The teacher then becomes not only an instructor but also an important source of social support for the student, which may in turn be reflected in the student's willingness and ability to invest and progress in language learning.

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Seminar 5

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The Cultural Adaptation Process During a Short-term Study Abroad Experience in Swaziland

Nathan W. Conner[1] *and T. Grady Roberts*[2]

The world has seemingly become a smaller place in which people interact with people from all over the world (National Research Council, 2009). Globalization is evident through population changes in the United States. Simultaneously, "globalization of markets has led to more multinational enterprises, exponential growth in foreign trade, the creation of an increasingly diverse consumer base, and extended efforts at international marketing" (Clark, Flaherty, Wright, & McMillen, 2009, p. 173). Held, McGrew, Goldblatt, and Perraton (1999) described globalization as the interconnectedness of the world's economy, cultures, and all other aspects of life. Despite societal changes due to globalization, Gorki and Niesenbaum (2001) recognized that faculty at universities have not updated their undergraduate curriculum to reflect globalization. University faculty should work as a unit to internationalize the curriculum in order to showcase the significance globalization has on the entire department (Gorki & Niesenbaum, 2001; Navarro & Edwards, 2008). Training students to effectively operate within a global community presents a plethora of challenges (Zhai & Scheer, 2002) and to compound the challenges, Wingenbach, Boyd, Lindner, Dick, Arisoe, and Haba (2003) asserted that agricultural education students were narrow minded when it comes to perspectives on international agriculture and culture. Study abroad programs have become a popular method of exposing students to international perspectives (Zhai & Scheer, 2002). However, Anderson (2003) found that students need guidance when recognizing cultural traditions and often view short-term study abroad programs as glorified vacations rather than learning experiences.

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[1] Nathan W. Conner is an Assistant Professor in the College of Agriculture and Human Ecology at Tennessee Tech University, PO Box 5034, Cookeville, TN 38505, nconner@tntech.edu.

[2] T. Grady Roberts is a Professor of Agricultural Education in the Agricultural Education and Communication Department at the University of Florida, PO Box 110540, Gainesville, FL 32611, groberts@ufl.edu.

Purpose and Objectives

The purpose of this study was to explore how undergraduate students in a college of agricultural and life sciences experienced cultural adaptation during a short-term study abroad program in Swaziland, Africa. This study is needed in order to gain an understanding of how students adapt to the culture during a short-term study abroad program. The knowledge gained from this study will help short-term study abroad facilitators develop programs that will allow students to positively adapt to the culture. The specific objectives of this study were to describe how undergraduate students experienced culture throughout a short-term study abroad program and were affected by their cultural surroundings and to propose a conceptual framework of cultural adaptation for undergraduate students on a short-term study abroad program.

Conceptual Framework, Theoretical and Epistemological Perspective

The following three theories of cultural adaptation were used to guide this study: The U-Curve of Culture Shock (Oberg, 1960), the Dynamic Model of Culture Confusion (Hottola, 2004), and the Model of Intercultural Sensitivity (Bennett, 1986, 1993, 2004). The U-Curve of culture Shock and the Dynamic Model of Culture Confusion were selected to guide this study due to their focus on international traveling and experiencing other cultures (Oberg, 1960; Hottola, 2004). Additionally, Bennett's (1986, 2004) Model of Intercultural Sensitivity was selected to guide this study due to its focus on cross-cultural adaptation. The U-Curve of Culture Shock depicts the cultural adaptation model that tourist experience (Oberg, 1960). The stages are depicted in the figure below and consist of euphoria, disillusionment, hostility, adaptation, and assimilation.



Figure 1. The U-curve of culture shock (Oberg, 1960).

The Dynamic Model of Culture Confusion (Hottola, 2004) is a modified version of Oberg's (1960) U -curve of Culture Shock. Hottola claimed travelers' experience stages that help the individual navigate between initial cultural confusion, adaptation, and opposition of culture.



Figure 2. Initial culture confusion and adaptation/opposition (Hottola, 2004).

Additionally, Bennett (1986, 1993, 2004), developed the Model of Intercultural Sensitivity. Bennett's model has been used to explain how an individual handles cross-cultural experiences. The model consists of a continuum that includes denial, defense, minimization, acceptance, adaptation, and integration. Bennett's Model also depicts the progression from ethnocentrism to ethno relativism (1993). Ethnocentrism was described as accepting one's personal culture without further questioning and ethno relativism was described as viewing one's beliefs as only one possible reality (Bennett, 2004).

Table 1. *A Developmental Model of Intercultural Sensitivity (Bennett, 1993)*

Ethnocentrism			Ethno relativism		
1	2	3	4	5	6
Denial	Defense	Minimization	Acceptance	Adaptation	Integration

Constructivism was the theoretical perspective used to develop this study. According to Crotty (2004), a theoretical perspective is used to guide the methodology of the study and to provide a solid context for the study. According to Lambert (2002), constructivism is the foundation of learning in which individuals construct meaning based on their experiences. The construction of meaning based on experiences is the core of constructivism (Fosnot, 1996; Steffe & Gale, 1995). Additionally, constructionism was used to as the epistemological perspective (Crotty, 2004). In accordance with Crotty, the epistemology is "the theory of knowledge embedded in the theoretic perspective and thereby in the methodology" (p. 3). Constructionism posits that individuals give meaning to reality through interactions with the external world (Crotty, 2004). The short-term study abroad program provides the external world and the participant constructs meaning from the interactions.

Subjectivity and Methods

According to Glesne (1999), the subjectivity statement provides an opportunity for the researchers to share any personal bias that may impact the study. Researcher one has experience educating secondary students from multiple cultures in the area of agriculture, has taught secondary school students in Belize, and has traveled to 6 additional countries. Researcher one has also conducted research in the area of agricultural teacher preparation, as well as international agricultural extension and development, and has been involved in two different study abroad programs. Researcher two was raised in a military family and lived abroad for a portion of childhood and has continued to travel internationally. Researcher two is formally trained as an agricultural educator and has developed a graduate level study abroad program.

The case study approach was selected for this study because it allowed for a bounded system to be studied (Creswell, 1998). The data collected allowed the researchers to vicariously enter the event being studied and to examine the event holistically (Creswell, 1998). The shortterm study abroad program for this case study was entitled *African Savannah Wildlife Ecology* and was conducted in Swaziland, Africa. Permission was granted from the Institutional Review Board before beginning the study. The study abroad program was purposively selected because it consisted of 15 undergraduate students in the College of Agricultural and Life Sciences at the University of Florida and lasted 19 days. The participants consisted of thirteen females and two males. Four of the 15 participants had previously traveled outside the United States. The countries those students had traveled included Belize, France, and Switzerland. None of the participants were classified as International students. The participants were studying wildlife ecology and conservation and had aspirations of obtaining employment in the field. The program took place in the summer of 2012 and was led by an Assistant Professor of Wildlife Ecology and Conservation. The faculty member that led the short-term study abroad program was familiar with Swaziland and the culture associated with Swaziland due to leading the short-term study abroad program once before.

Data-collection methods included pre-travel questions, post-experience reflection questions, and reflective journaling. Bennett's (1986, 1993, 2004) Model of Intercultural Sensitivity was used as a conceptual frame work when developing the questions used for data collection. Pre-travel questions gave an opportunity for students to think about future learning and to prepare for later experiences (Jones & Bjelland, 2004). This study used four pre-travel questions to encourage the students to begin thinking about the culture they would experience in Swaziland, and to allow the researcher to understand the students' perceptions regarding culture in Swaziland. The pre-travel questions were modified from existing pre-travel instruments (Wingenbach, Chmielewski, Smith, Pina, & Hamilton, 2006; Edgar, Egar, Briers, & Lawver, 2006; Dooley, Dooley, & Carranza, 2008). The pre-travel questions consisted of the following:

1) What are your initial attitudes/beliefs about visiting Swaziland? Please describe your pre-trip thoughts about Swaziland, while concentrating on and describing your top five attitudes/beliefs.
2) What are your initial attitudes/beliefs about Swaziland culture? Please describe your thoughts in terms of your top five attitudes/beliefs about cultural (language, customs, etc.), social, economic, or political issues.
3) How do you expect the culture in Swaziland to affect you during your experience?
4) How do you think the culture in Swaziland will influence your thinking both personally and professionally?

The pre-travel questions were administered face-to-face during a pre-session meeting. Fourteen of 15 students were present at the meeting and completed the pre-travel questions. One set of pre-travel questions were given to the faculty instructor to give to the missing student at a later date. The missing student did not return the pre-travel questions.

Post-experience reflection questions were given to the students at the end of their program, prior to returning to the United States. All of the participants completed the questions. The questions allowed the researcher to understand how the students' thoughts and perceptions had changed due to the short-term study abroad program. The post-travel questions were modified from existing post-travel instruments (Wingenbach, Chmielewski, Smith, Pina, & Hamilton, 2006; Edgar, Edgar, Briers, & Lawver, 2006; Dooley, Dooley, & Carranza, 2008).

The post-experience reflections questions included the following:

1) What are your post-experience attitudes/beliefs about visiting Swaziland? Please describe your thoughts about Swaziland, while concentrating on and describing your top five attitudes/beliefs.
2) What are your post-experience attitudes/beliefs about Swaziland Culture? Please describe your thoughts in terms of your top five attitudes/beliefs about Swaziland cultural (language, customs, etc.), social, economic, or political issues.
3) How did the culture affect your experience in Swaziland? Describe the emotions that you experienced during your trip and how you dealt with cultural differences.
4) Did your cultural experiences in Swaziland influence your thinking both personally and professionally in the way that you anticipated it to?

Additionally, reflective journaling was used to allow for an opportunity for individuals to analyze and document their feelings (Russell & Vallade, 2010). The following two reflective journaling questions/prompts were used:

1) What were your observations about the culture in Swaziland?
2) What activities of the day had the greatest significance to you? Why?

Due to the time commitments associated with journal writing, it was decided that the participants would not write in their journals on a daily basis. Participants made journal entries every other day for a total of 7 entries. Journaling was not done during travel to and from the country. Participants used field journals to hand-write their entries. All of the participants completed the reflective journaling and turned in their responses to the instructor of the program. Responses were then given to the researchers. The journal entries were transcribed verbatim by a hired transcriptionist.

In an effort to identify patterns, similarities, and differences in the data, the constant comparative method was used (Dooley, 2007). More specifically, a grounded theory analysis was used (Koro-Ljungberg, Yendol-Hoppey, Smith, & Hayes, 2009). Corbin and Strauss's (1990) grounded theory analysis method was used and included open coding, axial coding, and selective coding. In agreement with Glaser (1978), line by line coding was selected in order to categorize each individual data line. Line-by-line coding allowed the researcher to categorize based solely on the data and not preconceived notions (Glaser, 1978). In order to avoid preconceived notions, the researcher conducted open coding as quickly as possible (Charmaz, 2006). The second stage of coding was axial coding, allowed for categorization of the pre-existing codes (Grbich, 2007). The final stage, selective coding, allowed for further delineation of categories (Strauss & Corbin, 1990).

In order to achieve trustworthiness, the following four areas were considered throughout the research study: credibility, transferability, dependability, and conformability (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Credibility was addressed through triangulation and referential adequacy materials. Three data collection methods were used to triangulate the data, to help ensure credibility. Reflective journals were used as referential adequacy materials because of their unobtrusive ability to collect data in the context of the study. Transferability was achieved by the use of thick descriptions throughout the case study (Dooley, 2007). To address dependability and conformability, a methodological journal was used to record methodological decisions, in order to provide a dependability audit and a confirmability audit (Dooley, 2007). It is important to note the potential limitations of this study. All three data collection methods provided only selfreported data and the absence of participant observation data from the researchers' may have skewed or altered the results and the conclusions.

This study aligns with priority area four of the National Research Agenda for Agricultural Education (Doerfert, 2011) focusing on active learning in all areas of agricultural education and in all learning environments. Specifically, the focus is on short-term study abroad programs in the College of Agriculture and Life Sciences at the University of Florida with special attention given to the cultural adaptation process.

Findings

Findings are presented in the form of quotes and summaries from participants. Each statement includes which participant made the statement (e. g. P-1) and when the statement was made (pre-experience, day #, or post-experience).



Figure 3. Cultural Adaptation stages and sub-stages for the African Savannah Wildlife Ecology short-term study abroad program.

Initial Feelings

Initial Concerns. Many of the participants experienced feelings of concern while preparing for this study abroad program. Nervousness abounded, because of the long airplane flight and navigation through the airports (P-12, Pre-experience). P-2 (Pre-experience) was "nervous about traveling internationally so far away from home" and P-13 (Pre-experience) expressed concern over cultural differences he believed he might experience. The fact that he was visiting a part of the world for the first time made him nervous because of his unfamiliarity with Swaziland (P-13, Pre-experience). There was also concern about political turmoil in Swaziland (P-6, Pre-experience). Participants were also concerned with interacting with locals in a way that would not be offensive (P-4, Pre-experience). P-12 (Pre-experience) expected to feel increased anxiety and to be unsure how to appropriately interact with locals.

Initial excitement. Before leaving the United States, many of the participants experienced great excitement at the prospect of the upcoming study abroad program. Participant P-5 (Pre-experience) said, "I'm very excited to experience a new culture and country." Participant P-4 (Pre-experience) said, "I have never traveled to a place out of my comfort zone so I'm excited about that." Anticipation was building at thoughts of interacting with children and giving them gifts (P-4, Pre-experience). Expectations of friendly people in Swaziland were prevalent (P-3; P- 6; P-8; P-13, Pre-experience). Participant P-1 (Pre-experience) said, "I'm so excited! I look forward to being in the village mostly, interacting with the people." Overall there was genuine excitement about traveling internationally in an effort to widen personal views (P-12, Preexperience). Additionally, participants were excited about the academic focus of this study abroad program. Participants were very excited about working in the field, and viewing wildlife (P-1; P-2; P-3; P-15, Pre-experience). Excitement about viewing wildlife in its natural habitat was experienced before leaving the United States (P-1; P-3; P-15, Pre-experience).

Need for personal growth and cultural growth. Participants of this study abroad program expressed a need for both personal and cultural growth. There was anticipation of the culture influencing the participant and allowing the participant to keep an open mind, in an effort to grow as a person (P-7, Pre-experience). Interactions with the people and culture of Swaziland enhanced the participants' cultural knowledge and allowed them to enhance their world view (P- 8; P-9, Pre-experience). P-9 (Pre-experience) said, "I think the culture in Swaziland will help bring me out of my American bubble" and ". . . it will help me be aware that different cultures have different customs." However, P-1 (Pre-experience) acknowledged her lack of understanding of other cultures and wanted this program to positively challenge her as a human being. P-13 (Pre-experience) aspired to learn from the experience and become a more balanced person. One participant wanted to experience emotional changes from exposure to the people and culture of Swaziland (P-14, Pre-experience). P-6 (Pre-experience) felt she could be shut off to others and hoped this program would help her become more aware of the needs of others. Cultural differences were considered when deciding how to react to the surrounding culture (P-7, Pre-experience). Participants also felt a need to make friends with the Swazi people (P-3, Pre-experience) and learn about the country, to expand their world view (P-2; P-15, Pre-experience).

Expects culture shock. Participants anticipated experiencing culture shock upon entering the country. P-15 (Pre-experience) said, "It will probably be a bit of a culture shock." The culture shock was anticipated, but welcomed by some of the participants (P-14, Pre-experience). P-14 (Pre-experience) said, "I am excited to experience another culture and environment. I really want to meet people and learn about their way of life. I believe it may be a bit of a cultural shock for me and I'm actually really excited about that." The cultural customs of Swaziland were discussed before the trip, but the participant did not believe learning about the culture before the program would ease the culture shock experienced once entering the country (P-9, Pre-experience).

Cultural Uncertainty

Cultural surprises. Throughout the program, participants had experiences that were unexpected and different than their preconceptions. P-1 (Day 5) expected the indigenous people to dress differently than Americans. She thought that the dress would be unique to the location. However, P-4 (Post-experience) was surprised by the traditional culture, ceremonies, dances, clothes that were observable throughout the region. A Participant also noted that the people of Swaziland enjoy music that is or has been popular in the United States (P-7, Day 16). Additionally, cell phone technology common in developed countries was also present in Swaziland (P-2; P-11, Day 4; Day 11). P-11 (Day 4) said, “I found it odd that the houses and communities were so old/had few technological items yet most of the citizens could be seen carrying cell phones.”

P-2 (Day 3) focused on the behaviors of the people and was surprised how friendly the children were. The children were eager to wave to the group and say hello (P-2, Day 3). Once participants began a conversation with Swazi college students, P-13 (Day 6) realized that Swazi college students knew much more about Americans than he anticipated. P- 13 (Day 6) said, “It is interesting to hear their views on things. They actually know quite a bit about American culture, which was surprising to me.” When learning about the people of Swaziland, P-8 (Post-experience) was surprised when she learned about the treatment of women and that “women aren’t really treated equally in Swaziland which I found surprising.”

Comparisons. While participating in the study abroad program, participants continually compared Swaziland and the United States. P-6 (Post-experience) said, “Many parts of Swaziland reflect a mixture of traditional Swazi and non-traditional Western influences.” The people of Swaziland cherish traditions and emphasize their customs while integrating Western influence into their culture (P-10, Post-experience). Comparisons were made among styles of clothing worn in each country (P-1, Day 4). P-11 (Day 4) felt that the culture in Swaziland was both similar and different than American culture. However, P-5 (Post-experience) felt there was a vast difference between urban lives in the United States compared to urban life in Swaziland. P-1 (Day 7) noted the lack of large vehicles parked in driveways. Comparisons were made regarding the friendliness of Americans versus Swazis. Participants felt people of Swaziland were much friendlier than people in the United States (P-13, Day 8). Friendliness prevailed even though P-9 (Post-experience) felt “the people in Swaziland have a lot less than the States, the towns are pretty run down.” That in mind, the people of Swaziland assumed all Americans were wealthy (P-11, Post-experience). Additionally, P-9 (day 14) compared the custom of looking each other in the eye when communicating to one another. She stated, “It was hard for me to not look Swazis in the eye while talking to them because it is the complete opposite for our American culture”.

Cultural Barrier

Language barrier. Participants did not report many issues with the language barrier. However, several participants admitted that the language barrier presented challenges when communicating with locals (P-5; P-13; P-14). P-5 and P-13 felt the Swazi language was difficult to learn (Post-experience). The language patterns were difficult for participant P-13 (Post-experience) to master and he believed the Swazi language would be challenging to learn. P-14 (Day 8) said,

> Today I finally felt the awkwardness that comes with lack of a common language when a group of students and I rode in the back of a pickup with a group of Swazi construction workers. We had only learned greeting thus far and I don’t think the men knew more than greeting in English.

Cultural Negativity

Frustration. Frustration was experienced throughout the study abroad program. Two female participants, P-1 and P-8 (Post-experience), were frustrated with the polygamist lifestyle present in Swaziland. P-8 (Post-experience) said, “I don’t really like their polygamy views-it kind of disrespected women.” Additionally, P-12 (Day 4) was frustrated by the cultural meanings of body language. She expected the meaning of body language to be universal and she discovered it was not. Frustration added to the difficulty of interpreting body language (P-12, Day 4). One participant seemed frustrated with the way organizations come to Swaziland and provide aid (P-1, Post-experience). She felt the handouts were stifling economic growth in Swaziland and that was frustrating to her (P-1, Post-experience).

Academic and Career Growth

Academic focus. Participants focused on academic content throughout this study abroad experience. Participants spent time in the field conducting wildlife research (P-13, Day 8) and learning about native wildlife. Conversations with locals seemed to focus on wildlife or wildlife conservation. P-6 (Day 6) discussed poaching with the locals, to better understand the issues that go along with poaching. Exploring protected conservation land and the non-protected land allowed P-2 (Day 17) to visually observe the importance of setting aside land for conservation to protect wildlife. Visiting nature reserves allowed them to learn about the wildlife and the issues that come with protecting wildlife (P-4, Day 17). P-13 (Post-experience) learned that “Swaziland lifestyles clash with wildlife-modernization is leading to habitat destruction and fragmentation, similar to everywhere else.”

During the program, participants learned about native birds. P-8 (Day 14) said, “I really enjoyed going out with the bird group and learning some calls.” P-12 (Day 9) said, “I am starting to recognize a few of the bird species. . . .” Participants also learned to identify and track wildlife based on feces and tracks (P-9, Day 6). Excitement was shown toward the field exam. P-9 (Day 6) said, “The activity that has had the most significance to me was actually taking our field exam, because I didn’t realize how much I have learned! It wasn’t stressful and I felt confident in what I had learned.”

Professional growth. Professional growth was experienced by many of the participants during this program (P-6; P-7; P-10; P-11; P-13). Experiencing the culture of Swaziland allowed P-7 to learn about a different way of life and to become more aware of other people and their personal beliefs (Post-experience). While working within the communities, P-10 (Postexperience) realized the importance of gaining the respect of the people in the community and becoming accepted by that community. It is also important for local people to be involved in conservation work, for the community to buy into the project (P-13, Post-experience). The experience in Swaziland allowed participants to realize the need for international conservation work and helped them realize they want to have a role in future conservation efforts (P-6; P-11, Post-experience).

Feelings throughout the Program

Excitement. Excitement was felt after interacting with the people of Swaziland (P-6, Day 4. P-6 (Day 4) said, “I’m excited to meet more Swazis, and learn about more of their culture.” As participants interacted with locals, they built relationships. P-6 (Post-experience) was excited about the relationships she formed during the study abroad program. The experience in another country encouraged her to graduate as quickly as possible, to get a job working in countries similar to Swaziland (P-6, Post-experience).

Discomfort. Interactions with people in Swaziland allowed participants to come out of their comfort zone and experience discomfort (P-3, Post-experience). P-3 (Post-experience) said, “Swaziland has enhanced my belief that coming out of your comfort zone is the greatest way to live life to the fullest." Discomfort when interacting with locals was minimal, because of the friendly people of Swaziland; but discomfort was still present when interacting with people (P-12, Post-experience). P-4 (Post-experience) was removed from her comfort zone and forced to relax and let her guard down when visiting the villages (P-4, Post-experience). Another participant felt discomfort when the men in the village continued to stare at the women and offer cows for the women (P-2, Post-experience). P-2 (Post-experience) also felt uneasy about the amount of trash present in the village and the presence of sick children leaking bodily fluids. Experiences in the village made P-10 (Post-experience) say, "You're constantly pulled out of your comfort zone and you have to adapt to a situation quickly."

Negative attitude toward the United States. P-7 (Day 11) was impressed with how people in Swaziland held onto cultural traditions. She felt that Americans do not value traditions in the same manner and upholding cultural traditions is something Americans should do (P-7, Day 11). As some of the participants learned more about the culture in Swaziland, participants' attitudes about the United States changed and became negative (P-1; P-7, Day 11).

Cultural Growth

Overcoming language barriers. Throughout the study abroad program, participants worked on overcoming the language barrier, to effectively communicate with the people of Swaziland. Participant P-12 (Day 10) stated,

> I think it was really neat to watch the Swazi children and ourselves overcome the language barrier. We managed to convey "let me open that," "what do you want," "look," "good job," and several other phrases through facial expressions and gestures. I even made a poorly-molded play-dough cow and managed to convey that it was a cow by making it walk and "moo."

Efforts were made to communicate by any means necessary, even if it was not with verbal language (P-12, Day 10). However, attempts were made to learn and speak the Swazi language. The Siwati language was considered unique and this made P-9 (Post-experience) interested in learning the language. P-13 (Day 6) learned common Siwati phrases in an effort to communicate with the locals.

Cultural respect and acceptance. Participants were subjected to many cultural traditions and customs different than in the United States. Cultural respect was shown throughout the program when the participants showed they were willing to embrace the local customs. A group of Swazi women wanted to dance with some of the participants and instead of being shy or embarrassed, a participant showed respect for the Swazi women and took turns dancing with them (P-8, Day 9). Acceptance of the Swazi's traditional marriage ceremony was also mentioned by Participant P-8 (Post-experience), "I liked their marriage ceremony. It lasts for multiple days, involving many family members and was a huge celebration." Participant P-4 said (Postexperience) "They are very traditional people that don't seem to be open to changing to a "Western" civilization, not that they should." Similarly, Participant P-1 (Post-experience) accepted the traditions of the Swazi people and felt that they should continue.

Positive cultural experiences. Positive cultural experiences throughout the study abroad program led to cultural growth of the participants (P-2; P-3; P-7). Visiting villages allowed participants to experience friendly people, happy people, and another way of life (P-2; P-3; P-4; Day 3) and the interactions with children were positive experiences. P-3 (Day 7) helped to teach the children of the village to play a game using empty soda cans. Another positive cultural experience was visiting the markets. P-7 (Day 14) said, "I was impressed by the amount of things to buy: so many stalls for food, crafts, fabric—everything! So much culture in one place! It was so cool!"

Participants were able to interact with college students from Swaziland. The conversations turned into a positive experience and allowed participants to realize they were similar to the Swazi students (P-6, Day 10). P-12 (Post-experience) said, “Speaking with Vesi and Maps, two students that joined our group, really increased my understanding of Swaziland.” Additionally, visiting a school in Shewela was a positive experience because it allowed participants to see the disparity between schools in Swaziland compared to schools in the United States (P-2, Day 9). Participants appreciated all their cultural experiences and did not believe the program would have been as meaningful without the experiences (P-8; P-13, Post-experience).

Cultural identification and recognition of culture. Participants were continuously identifying and giving recognition to the cultural traditions that surrounded them. From the beginning, participants noted that Swazis were social people who focused on relationship building (P-3; P-7, Post-experience). The people were welcoming and friendly toward the participants (P-2; P-3; P-4; P-5; P-8; P-10; P-11, Post-experience). However, it was noted that men and women do not socialize much (P-5, Post-experience) and that “men are considered superior to women” (P-11, Post-experience). The practice of polygamy is present in Swaziland and exacerbates gender inequality (P-12, Day 19). Despite the poverty many Swazis live in, the people of Swaziland seem happy (P-11, Post-experience). “Swazi people might be poor and the age of death is very low but they are very happy people with a real sense of community and family values” (P-4, Post-experience). Participant P-8 (Post-experience) said, “Swazis don’t have much money, but seem to have a positive outlook on life.” The cultural traditions of Swaziland are passed from one generation to the next (P-11, Post-experience) and can be seen in everyday life (P-13, Post-experience).

Cultural learning. Cultural learning took place throughout the study abroad program and helped participants gain a better understanding of the culture in Swaziland. Cultural learning started at the beginning of the program when the students were visiting the villages. P-12 (Day 10) learned that the Swazis valued family and lived in close proximity to their extended family. Swazi children are highly prized and viewed as a blessing no matter how many children are in the family (P-9, Day 6). Swazis were unconcerned about whether the family could provide for the children (P-9, Day 6). If the family could not feed their children, they would send the children to eat at a community daycare (P-10, Day 9). The food habits of the Swazis provided another opportunity for cultural learning. P-9 (Day 8) said, “One thing I have learned very well about Swazi culture is that mealy pop is the main cultural food dish.” Meals are often consumed as an entire family out of one bowl. The family used their fingers to consume the meal (P-4, Day 8). Participants also learned about traditional Swazi wedding ceremonies. Younger Swazi college students do not want a traditional Swazi wedding (P-10; P-11, Day 6).

Personal growth. Personal growth took place throughout the study abroad experience (P-1; P-2; P-4;P-7; P-9; P-11). The study abroad program helped broaden the world view of participants (P-1, Post-experience) and increased their personal confidence, so they could become more independent (P-2, Post-experience). P-2 (Post-experience) said, “This trip made me grow tremendously as an individual.” Interacting with the people of Swaziland allowed four participants to gain a sense of appreciation for what they have in the United States and to be thankful for their lives (P-4; P-7; P-9; P-11, Post-experience). Additionally, P-1 (Post-experience) enhanced her listening skills and P-3 (Post-experience) discovered the importance of cultural interactions.

Increased interest in future experiences abroad. The experience in Swaziland made many of the participants decide that they want to travel internationally again. P-6 (Postexperience) said, “Being in Swaziland made me feel very refreshed, I realized just how unique this country was, and unique even for Africa. I love the warmth of the people and the beautiful mountains and I can’t wait to come back.” Similarly, P-9 (Post-experience) was interested in returning to Swaziland, because of her positive experience. Future international travel was not limited to tourism; P-12 (Post-experience) wanted to travel in a professional capacity to help other countries.

Conclusions

The findings from this case study provide a conceptual framework of how students experience culture during a short-term study abroad program in Swaziland and are depicted in Figure 4.



Figure 4. The cultural adaptation process of agricultural and life sciences students on short-term study abroad program in Swaziland.

The participants experienced a plethora of feelings prior to leaving the United States and the concern for safety was expressed through the concern of political turmoil. Despite the concern of traveling overseas and to a potentially hostile environment, participants exhibited excitement towards the study abroad program. The Swazi people were viewed as friendly people who would be delighted to see Americans. Additionally, participants were excited to track wildlife and learn about the wildlife habitat in Swaziland. The excitement towards interacting with Swazis and gaining academic experience contradicts Anderson’s (2003) assertion that students view study abroad as vacation instead of an academic experience.

Participants expressed a need to learn about different cultures and to enhance their worldly view. The continuous exposure to people from around the world (Anderson, Lawton, Rexeisen, & Hubbard, 2005; Boyd et al., 2004) may have contributed to the participants’ expressed need to enhance their world view. Participants in this short-term study abroad program expected to recognize the culture of the country and in turn learn from the culture in order to broaden their worldview, grow as human beings, and learn about cultural differences. However, participants expected to experience culture shock upon entering Swaziland. This anticipation of experiencing culture shock immediately upon entry to the country goes against Oberg’s (1960) assertion that travelers would initially experience euphoria on entering the country. However, the anticipation of culture shock when entering the country is similar to Hottola’s (2004) initial stage of cultural confusion on entering the country. It is important to remember that, at this stage in the short-term study abroad program, it is only anticipation of culture shock and not necessarily what happened.

Cultural surprises took place throughout the program, but did not have a major impact on the participants. Participants did not retreat into Hottola’s (2004) metaworld, disillusionment stage, or any other stage in the model. However, participants did spend time comparing their personal culture to the culture represented in Swaziland. According to Bennett (1986), cultural comparisons are prevalent in the minimization stage in which an individual recognizes cultural differences, but does not consider them important. Participants recognized the challenges associated with learning an African language. The findings contrasted Ingram's (2005) assertions that students participating in study abroad programs have an increased interest in learning a foreign language. The participants of this study did not indicate any interest in learning the Swazi's native language after the completion of the program. Frustration was also experienced by the participants, but to the extent that Oberg (1960) describes in his U curve of culture shock model. The participants did not reach the stage of hostility to warrant entering Oberg's hostility stage.

In accordance with Bennett's (2004) reversal of the defense stage, some participants gave a higher value to the culture and values of Swaziland than their American culture and values. Experiences during the program may have encouraged participants to critically analyze the experience in the host country and to form negative beliefs and attitudes toward the United States. In an effort to overcome the language barrier, participants experienced cultural growth and fit within Oberg's (1960) and Hottola's (2004) adaptation stage. Positive cultural experiences helped the participants reduce cultural uncertainty (Gudykunst & Hammer, 1988) and adapt to the culture. Additionally, the participants showed an interest to travel abroad in the future. However, future travel plans do not always indicate that the individual is moving closer to Bennett's (1986, 2004) stage of cultural integration.

Recommendations

In an effort to globalize the undergraduate curricula (Navarro & Edwards, 2008), short-term study abroad facilitators are recommended to structure their programs in a way that allows for learning experiences to take place before arriving in the host country, while visiting the host country, and upon returning to the home country. Connecting cultural traditions and cultural learning to the academics will enhance participant learning. The academic focus should not be separated from the focus on cultural learning/cultural growth. Learning activities conducted before leaving the home country should aim at preparing participants to experience cultural growth while in the host country. Learning activities while in the host country should focus on cultural traditions and connect with what the participants discussed prior to traveling.

A fine line exists regarding how much cultural information and foresight short-term study abroad facilitators should provide to participants before entering the host country. Cultural preparation will allow participants to be more comfortable in the county and to positively focus on the culture and the academics of the program. However, if the program lasts multiple weeks, facilitators should tell the participants less about the cultural traditions and stereotypes before entering the host country than they would on a 7-day program. Facilitators should allow the participants to experience the culture for themselves instead of extensively informing the participants about cultural traditions. However, it is important to allow participants to briefly explore their preconceptions of the cultural traditions before entering the host country.

Short-term study abroad facilitators should also discuss cultural acceptance with the participants during each part of the program. This will help the participants understand what it means to accept the culture. The activities may also be designed to encourage and promote cultural acceptance. The facilitator should make sure to allow time for reflection and generalization in order to help participants handle culture shock in a positive manner. Reflection should take the shape of group and individual reflection. Individual reflection may take place through reflective journaling. Prior to departure, guest speakers may be used to discuss culture and to answer the participants' questions. Additionally, it is recommended that facilitators assist the participants in language development in order to help the participants learn common words and phrases. Learning commonly used words and phrases should be done before entering the host country and while in the host country, in order to help the participants positively adapt to the culture around them.

Throughout the entire short-term study abroad program, the facilitator should educate the participants about the various cultural adaptation models and include the models in discussions and learning activities. Reflecting on the cultural adaptation models may help participants to understand what they are experiencing. The entire program should be based on learning experiences provided before entering the host country, while in the host country, and upon returning to the home country. For experiential learning to take place, the facilitator must allow time for reflection and generalization (Roberts, 2006). Reactions of the facilitator throughout the experience may influence participants and help determine how participants move through the stages of cultural adaptation.

Recommendations for Future Research

In order to make comparisons between the short-term study abroad program in this study and other short-term study abroad programs, replication of this study is recommended. Future studies should purposefully select the short-term study abroad program based on program type and geographic location. Exploration of programmatic differences and facilitator qualities/differences should be examined in order to further understand factors that influence cultural adaptation.

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction: Cultural Literacy and Creativity

FOCUSES, PREMISES, AND OBJECTIVES

Literacy is a core skill for learning and development. It enables communication and dialogue within a community and allows people to engage in society. Since the 1990s, scholars and educators have approached literacy as more than the ability to read and write language-based texts. The concept of multiliteracies, introduced by the New London Group in the mid-1990s and since then broadly utilized in education policy discourses and national curricula, stems from a wider understanding of text by emphasizing multimodality in meaning-making: Language-based communication intertwines with visual, auditive, corporal, gestural, and spatial patterns of meaning. The need to rethink and redefine literacy also reflects the diversification of contemporary societies and the rapid development of information technologies during the past two or three decades. For the New London Group, the multiplicity of new communication channels and increased cultural and linguistic diversity demanded a new approach to literacy pedagogy (Cazden et al. 1996). Since the introduction of the concept of multiliteracies, the social reality in different parts of the world has become even more culturally plural or "super-diversified," as Vertovec (2007) has described this change. In super-diversified societies, diversity itself is complex, multidimensional, fluid (Vertovec 2007; Blommaert and Rampton 2011), and characterized by the intersection of different social locations and positions related to culture, ethnicity, nationality, religion, language, gender, sexuality, and ability.

Since societies are diversifying, creating new challenges to communication, we need to approach the concept of literacy in a broader context. in this book, we explore positive responses to this context: The idea of difference and the ability to encounter, communicate, learn, and live together through empathic, tolerant, and inclusive interaction with others who may be different from us. We show how the concept of cultural literacy as a tolerant, empathic, and inclusive approach to differences can be taught and learned in schools through creative practices. Our focus is on meaning-making in children and young people's visual and multimodal artifacts created in schools as an outcome of tasks aiming to foster cultural literacy learning. This interdisciplinary exploration is located at the intersection of different approaches to children's creativity, art, and learning: We draw on research in cultural studies, communication studies, art education, and educational sciences.

Our approach to children and young people's creative expression of cultural literacy relies on two intertwined premises about living together as cultural beings. First, in our view, creativity and imagination are essential features of humanity that particularly characterize children's way of grasping the world. A considerable body of literature discusses the nature of children's creativity and visual expression. While some scholars have explained this as either children's attempts to draw what they know or what they see, recent studies give a more nuanced view of children's creative processes in image-making and its various possible functions. For Deguara (2015), drawing can function as a constructor of children's identity, communicator of the child's self, processor of children's knowledge, and a play process. In this book, we approach image-making and other artistic practices as modes of expression that allow children to develop their imagination, personality, dialogic relationship to others, and emotional responses in a creative way (see Lahdesmaki and Koistinen 2021); these practices help children to deal with and shape their mental images and understanding of the world in a constructive process of thinking in action (see Cox 2005; Deguara 2015). For many children, image-making and artistic creation are acts that connect their inner thoughts, emotions, and imaginings to the external world by intertwining their events and experiences that are personal to them with real-life episodes (Jolley 2010; Wright 2010; Deguara 2015). These entanglements of the inner and external worlds are impacted by the culture of the environment in which children create their images as well as by the imageries of contemporary popular culture (Toku 2001; Jolley 2010; Wright 2010). Image-making and nonlanguage-based artistic practices enable children to process what can be difficult to express in words through oral or written communication (Clark 2005; Deguara 2015). As an instrument, it is, thus, suitable for the teaching and learning of abstract topics such as cultural literacy.

The second premise of the book stems from an increasing need for respectful cultural encounter, mutual understanding, and constructive dialogue in today's super-diversified, but polarized, societies (see Lahdesmaki et al. 2020). While many societies have become increasingly diverse social spaces where people can simultaneously identify with multiple different cultural and social groups, monoculturalist views and cultural purism have struck back. Western societies have faced a rise in populist, nationalist, and extremist movements that have incited xenophobic, anti-immigration, misogynist, racist, anti-Semitic, and Islamophobic political attitudes and actions. Western societies have commonly recognized cultural pluralization as a richness that, however, entails diverse challenges when the cultural encounter is not based on mutual respect and an interest in understanding differences. Cultural literacy learning is a key to advance tolerant, empathetic, and inclusive attitudes toward diversity.

For our book, we have four core objectives. First, we seek to strengthen a sociocultural approach to children's expression moving away from developmental and cognitive approaches that have long dominated the research on children's art to understanding children as active cultural agents. Therefore, we do not take a psychological approach (using art to discover the child's inner conflicts), a behavioral approach (using art to examine the child's thinking processes), a developmental approach (exploring the child's visual expression at a particular age level), or an art pedagogical approach (helping children develop visual expression) (Nikoltsos 2001). In the 2000s, scholars (e.g., Anning 2003; Ivashkevich 2009; Atkinson 2009; Coates and Coates 2011; Deguara 2015) have noted a paradigm shift toward researching children's art as a process of communication influenced by various sociocultural contexts. This research has shown how children are influenced by the culture(s) and societies surrounding them and how these influences can be perceived from their visual expression. Toku (2001, 46) notes how the influence of culture and technology emerges in children's drawings when they start primary school. While children and young people—as all people—feel the impact of their social and cultural contexts, they are not only passive receivers but also active creators of culture. The recent participatory approach to children's art and culture has emphasized children as "social beings who are able, competent agents and active constructors of their knowledge and understanding" (Deguara 2015, 12) and agents of their own learning, "actively defining reality, rather than passively reflecting a 'given reality'" (Cox 2005, 12) in their creative practices. Our research for this book is grounded in a contextual and sociocultural approach to children's visual creation, seeing it as a valuable contribution to culture and cultural heritage (Venalainen 2019).

Second, we seek to determine the potential and limitations of children's creations as research material. Some of these limitations stem from the power relations involved whenever adults research children. We thus critically explore the setting in which the children produced our research material, and the position of the (adult) researcher, as an interpreter of children's visual expression and as a knowledge producer based on the analysis of such data.

Third, we apply theoretical discussions on multimodality to explore children and young people's creative practices. We follow Kress's notion of multimodality as a "normal state of human communication" (Kress 2010, 1) that is based on a "multiplicity of ways in which children make meaning, and the multiplicity of modes, means, and materials which they employ in doing so" (Kress 1997, 96). In our research, we emphasize how different modes in meaning-making interact and impact on each other in a multimodal synthesis (Jewitt 2008; Walsh 2009). Due to this interaction, all meaning-making can be perceived as multimodal (Cazden et al. 1996).

Fourth, we seek to explore the role of dialogue and creativity in cultural literacy learning and to share new knowledge about how, through dialogic creative processes, children and young people can construct and deepen their understanding of a contemporary world filled with difficult challenges such as exclusion, intolerance, and climate change.

CONCEPTS: CULTURAL LITERACY AND CREATIVITY

The key concept of our research, cultural literacy, is a social practice that is inherently dialogic and based on learning and gaining knowledge through empathic, tolerant, and inclusive interaction. It has been defined as a process of engaging with cultures and a cocreation and expression of cultural identities and values (Maine et al. 2019; Maine and Vrikki 2021). Cultural literacy as such is not a new concept: It has been discussed in academia since the end of the 1980s. The first scholars (e.g., Hirsch 1988, 1989; Hirsch et al. 1993, 2002) of cultural literacy often perceived it narrowly, as knowledge gained through the exploration of cultural products, such as literature and art, and learning canonical cultural and historical facts and narratives. Hirsch (1989), who utilized the concept to argue what students need to fully engage in contemporary society, even lists 5000 "essential names, phrases, dates and concepts" that "every American needs to know," as the cover of his book claims.

The idea of becoming culturally literate by learning selected facts and features of one's own and/or others' culture, history, and heritage has serious limitations. First, it does not recognize culture within a society as an inherently plural, constantly transforming, and fluid social construction based on interaction between diverse people (Otten 2003; Abdallah-Pretceille 2006). Second, the emphasis on factual knowledge of culture, history, and heritage as a key element for cultural encounters may direct people to perceive others as stable representatives of their culture or community. This may lead to cultural stereotyping, making it more difficult to see people as individuals, and even bring about prejudices (Abdallah-Pretceille 2006; Portera 2008). Third, learning facts and features is not cocreation of knowledge: It does not encourage learning with or from others who may be different from us. As Messelink and ten Thije (2012, 81) note: "The ability to gain knowledge in interaction allows individuals to search for similarities and successfully operate in intercultural (...) contexts, regardless of the cultural backgrounds present." Cultural literacy teachers should seek to promote this tolerant, empathic, and inclusive attitude in social interaction and gaining knowledge with others (Maine et al. 2019).

The concept of creativity is embedded in our approach to cultural literacy. In our view, cultural literacy is learned in a process that allows new ideas and views to emerge, as well as knowledge of differences and similarities, one's own and others' cultural values, and how to encounter, interact, and live together with others. For us, cultural literacy learning is about dialogic cocreation of (or attempts to cocreate) knowledge that can be stimulated by concrete creative practices, such as making an artwork together.

In our approach, creativity, the act of creating, and its outcome, creation, are linked but not equivalent concepts. Dictionaries often define creativity as an individual's ability. It is seen for instance: "The ability to produce original and unusual ideas, or to make something new or imaginative" (Cambridge Academic Content Dictionary 2020) or "the faculty of being creative; ability or power to create" (Oxford English Dictionary 2020). In scholarly literature, the concept has been discussed in a more nuanced manner, emphasizing the complexity of its connotations in different historical periods and in scholarly contexts ranging from aesthetics to philosophy and from psychology to logic, to mention just a few (Pope 2005). The scholars have often concluded that creativity involves the production of novel, useful, or valuable ideas and/or products (Mumford et al. 2002; Mumford 2003; Pope 2005). These views home in on the act of creating. Taking this act as a point of departure for creativity, Mumford et al. (2002) have listed two sets of processes that are involved in creative work: Activities leading to idea generation (ideation) and activities needed to implement ideas (implementation). More recent scholars have criticized the views that equate creativity with creative work and its outcome. This "dynamic definition of creativity" (Corazza 2016; Walia 2019) focuses on ongoing processes in which individuals seek to produce novel and useful ideas or products but may not always succeed. Hence, Corazza (2016, 265) has claimed that "the dynamic interplay between inconclusiveness and achievement must be subsumed by the definition of creativity." Walia (2019, 239) continues this idea by noting how "creation can be judged only when it has concluded, whereas creativity is active throughout the process and may not even end after having led to creation."

Many adults consider children's art as an example of fascinating self-expression and genuine and spontaneous creativity uninfluenced by cultural norms (Nikoltsos 2001). This imagined genuineness and spontaneousness has found its way into discourses of modern art. Since the beginning of the twentieth century, various artists and artistic groups have been inspired by children's visual expression and admired its creativity (Fineberg 1997). In this book, we acknowledge the creative ability of all people, including children, and understand children's visual and multimodal expression as a way to process, seek, and possibly find novel and useful ideas and outcomes. We do not seek to evaluate the creativity of the children's visual and multimodal artifacts that form the core of our data. For us, creativity is not a feature of a person or a product but a dynamic process that stimulates cultural literacy learning through curiosity and openness to something new or imaginative. Artistic creation provides children and young people an arena to practice creativity, meaning-making, and "engage their minds, hearts and bodies" (Wright 2010, 2). This engagement itself may be the new outcome. Indeed, various researchers have connected creativity and empathy, to emphasize that art can evoke empathetic responses and understanding of other people's points of view (Lahdesmaki and Koistinen 2021).

THE CULTURAL LITERACY LEARNING PROGRAMME, DATA AND METHODS

As a response to the increasing need for respectful cultural encounters, mutual understanding, and constructive dialogue in today's superdiversified societies, the Dialogue and Argumentation for cultural Literacy Learning in Schools (DIALLS) project developed a Cultural Literacy Learning Programme (CLLP), that was implemented in over 250 classes in Cyprus, Germany, Israel, Lithuania, Spain, Portugal, and the UK in the school year 2019-2020. The program was built by an international group of scholars and teachers and it was aimed at three age groups: students aged 5-6, 8-9, and 14-15. In the implementation of the program, the age span in the groups was a year or two wider in some classes. The program and its pedagogy was based on the concept of cultural literacy defined above: Its builders saw dialogue, argumentation, and interactive creative practices as tools for encountering differences, expressing one's own cultural features and values, and learning cultural literacy. In each age group, the CLLP included 15 lessons addressing different themes, ranging from one's cultural attachments to being part of a community and engaging more broadly in society. These themes fell into four groups: Living together (explored by talking about celebrating diversity, solidarity, equality, human rights, democracy, and globalization); social responsibility (focusing on social and civic competences, sustainable development, and active participation); belonging (discussion on home); and the core attitudes for cultural literacy learning (tolerance, empathy, and inclusion). These themes were selected for the CLLP through a clustering exercise of a broad array of concepts and terms highlighted in scholarly literature and education policy documents on cultural literacy and intercultural dialogue (see DIALLS 2018; Lahdesmaki et al. 2020).

The lessons in the CLLP were based on classroom and small group discussions that were stimulated by wordless picture books and films. These books and films had been selected by the project researchers in an attempt to promote the tolerant, empathic, and inclusive encounter of differences and to reflect multicultural, multiethnic, and multilingual social landscape of places, people, and ways of living in Europe and its neighboring regions. Using the books and films in the CLLP enabled "an exploration of the critical and creative thinking processes involved in meaning-making, which is viewed as a dialogic process between readers together and between text and readers" (Maine 2015, 5). Moreover, each lesson in the CLLP included a creative task in which the students were encouraged to explore with visual or multimodal means the ideas developed during classroom and small group discussions, and to explain the content of their creation in a caption.

The learning process in the CLLP was based on multimodal communication in which one mode of communication became interpreted and explored through another. The wordless picture books and films were given meaning through words in oral classroom and small group discussions. The students then explored these meanings through creating (mostly) visual artifacts (which often included written text), for which the students (or their teachers as mediators of the students' voice within the youngest age group) wrote a brief separate explanation, a caption. These artifacts and their captions form the core of our data.

The intertwinement of visual and linguistic modes in our data reflects the central feature of children's creative practices: They are typically based on the interplay of two or more semiotic resources (Deguara 2015, 4). Particularly in young children's creative practices, visual and oral modes may be difficult to distinguish. As Kinnunen (2015) notes, drawing can be perceived as a kind of dialogue between the marks made on paper and orally narrated thoughts. Some scholars (Siim 2019) have emphasized that children's visual creations cannot be interpreted outside the narrative context and explanation of the artifacts given by the children themselves. We analyze our data based on our understanding that children's creative practices are multimodal. The captions in our data function as a key to the meanings that the children themselves have affixed to their artifacts. In interpreting them, our aim is not to trace the children's thoughts: We believe this is impossible. Following common communication theories, we interpret the data based on "decoding" the signs which the students have "coded" to the artifacts within the various contexts in with they participated in the CLLP (see Rose 2001, 16). This decoding can, however, only occur between us as interpreters and the artifacts as a complex sign.

The lesson plans in the CLLP represent the pedagogical ideal for cultural literacy learning. Respectively, its implementation represents the pedagogical reality, in which the aims and ideals of cultural literacy learning were put into practice in various social and cultural contexts that differ between countries, regions, schools, and classes. The teachers received at least 18 hours of face-to-face professional development on the core ideas of the CLLP. We expected teachers would need 30 hours of working time to prepare and reflect on the lessons. The teachers were encouraged to creatively implement the lesson plans in their classes. Some of them applied the lesson plans more freely, while others closely followed the guidelines. The CLLP pedagogy was based on dialogic teaching emphasizing the co-construction of meanings among students and between them and their teachers: The teachers modeled how to engage democratically in the dialogue (Maine and Cermakova 2021). As in all teaching and learning, this pedagogy included distinct roles for teachers and learners. In the CLLP, the teachers were expected to model the discussion on the themes in the lesson plans and give students instructions for the tasks; the students were expected to participate in the discussions and follow the instructions. The implementation of the CLLP was, thus, intertwined with various issues of power that impacted on what was expressed, how, and why in the artifacts.

Various scholars have explored the impact of school on children's communication and creative expression. These studies argue that the school context effectively unifies the children's cultural and communicative resources by moving them from being communicative agents of their own worlds alone to also become communicative agents of their society and culture (Kress 1997, 2000; Deguara 2015). The school context—including teachers, peers, classroom practices, and curricula— either explicitly or implicitly emphasizes certain values, perceptions, and expectations that influence children's visual expression (Einarsdottir et al. 2009; Deguara 2015). Some scholars (Fargas-Malet et al. 2010) have seen this "acculturation to school" as the main shortcoming of research utilizing children's drawings as data: Children may create images that they think will please the teacher or researcher.

Our data includes hundreds of artifacts, mainly multicolored drawings but also a small number of collages, three-dimensional sculptures, short films, and photographs of roleplaying. Most of the artifacts were created individually, but many were made in small groups of 3-6 students, and some by the whole class connecting individually created pieces as a collage. When counting these individual pieces as separate works, the number of artifacts in our data increases to 1906 (Table 1.1). The CLLP teachers photographed the artifacts and sent the photographs and captions to the researchers. The teachers also completed a brief survey including some background information indicating the country, students' ages and genders within the groups, and teachers' description of the progress of the lesson, particularly if some changes to the lesson plan were made. These forms are included in our data. The spread of the COVID-19 pandemic in spring 2020 impacted on the implementation of the CLLP and thus our data collection. Due to the exceptional conditions, not all teachers were able to implement each lesson. Some of our data was created during lockdown when students were learning at home. In this book, some artifacts arising from the subthemes of democracy, globalization, and active participation are not analyzed separately but within the broader themes of living together and social responsibility. Due to the exceptional conditions caused by the pandemic, the CLLP was extended in some countries with an additional lesson in which the students reflected on how COVID-19 had impacted on their social environment and explored ways of practicing empathy, tolerance, and inclusiveness in pandemic conditions.

Table 1.1 Quantity of individual creative works per country in the CLLP

	Cyprus	*Germany*	*Israel*	*Lithuania*	*Portugal*	*Spain*	*UK*
age 5-6	265	9	222	16	199	8	149
age 8-9	134	48	93	36	97	18	94
age 14-15	0	103	117	90	97	48	2
COVID-19 works (all age groups)	25	0	0	23	13	0	0
country total	424	160	432	165	406	74	245
Total number of individual creative works: 1906							

Our research is based on data-driven content analysis utilizing both qualitative categorizing of the data and quantification of its core features and visual elements (see Rose 2001) and a self-reflexive and collaborative interpretation of what the artifacts mean within their context in the lesson. By self-reflexive interpretation, we mean acknowledging our position as researchers and considering our cultural and social contexts, from which we look at and interpret images (Rose 2001, 15-16; Passerini 2018). Besides, our interpretations have been formed in close collaboration, open dialogue, and sharing of views within our team during the research process.

After this introductory chapter, we proceed to the core theoretical aspects of our analysis. We start by exploring a sociocultural approach to the research on children's visual expression, including the issue of power. Next, we move to multimodality as a way in which students make meanings in our data. The subsequent four chapters each focus on different thematic aspects of cultural literacy learning: Attitudes of tolerance, empathy, and inclusion; living together; social responsibility; belonging; and practicing tolerance, empathy, and inclusion during the pandemic. We start these chapters with a critical discussion of their themes and core concepts—and, in the last chapter, an overview of the pandemic conditions—followed by the data-driven content analysis and interpretation of meaning-making around the themes in the artifacts. When the data allows it, we also compare how the different themes are dealt with in different countries and age groups. To avoid methodological nationalism (creating artificial national categories), we do not systematically pinpoint the home country of students unless we consider this information relevant to the discussion. In our analysis, we also pay attention to how the artifacts are influenced by global popular culture and imageries of children's culture that circulate symbols and images from cartoons, films, storybooks, games, or digital environments (see Toku 2001, 52; Coates and Coates 2011; Deguara 2015, 83). We end with a chapter summarizing our core results and showing how they expand the understanding of children's creative and multimodal meaning-making processes. In the concluding chapter, we suggest avenues for future research and ways to improve cultural literacy learning through creative practices.

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Seminar 6

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Language contact research: scope, trends, and possible future directions

Jeroen Darquennes, Wim Vandenbussche, Joseph C. Salmons

1. Introduction

Almost a quarter century ago, Mouton published a massive two-volume set called *Kontaktlinguistik / Contact Linguistics / Linguistique de Contact* (Goebl et al. 1996, 1997). The book you are reading now builds on that foundation, but even as we ‘stand on the shoulders of giants’, the field has progressed so rapidly and changed so dramatically that these two handbooks represent two fundamentally different books about very different fields. The present volume is not really a new edition of Volume 1 of the 1996 handbook in any sense, but instead a fresh collection on the same topic. This introduction provides a brief comparison of the two projects and situates the present volume in a broader context.

As pointed out by Oksaar (1996: 2), language contact phenomena have been “perceived and discussed in their various applied aspects throughout the history of Europe”, and of course far beyond. The emergence of language contact as an area of scientific interest, however, basically dates back to the second half of the 19th and the first half of the 20th century, when Hesseling, Paul, Schuchardt, Whitney, and others developed an interest in dialect contact, pidgin and creole formation, and the roles of lexical, phonological, and syntactic transfer in language change (Clyne 1975, 1987; Winford 2007: 22). Also important to the later development of research on the linguistic consequences of contact between people and social groups was the work of Georg Schmidt-Rohr, Heinz Kloss, and other representatives of the *Auslandsdeutsche Volksforschung*, though Clyne (1987: 456) reminds us with reference to the work of Schmidt-Rohr that this work was “steeped in the racist ideology of National Socialism”; see also Hutton (1999). The bibliographies of Weinreich’s ([1953] 1968) *Languages in Contact: Findings and Problems* and Haugen’s ([1953] 1969) *The Norwegian Language in America* offer broad samples of early literature on intra- and extralinguistic language contact phenomena. During the time of the emergence of what Voegelin (s.d.) called ‘hyphenated linguistics’, both monographs are also generally considered to have sparked more systematic study of language contact phenomena (Matras 2009: 1). Particularly Weinreich’s (1968) volume continues to inspire contemporary specialists, for example, Lim and Ansaldo (2016: 187-190).

Less discussed in recent literature, but an equally important source of inspiration for the present volume, is Mackey’s (1976) *Bilinguisme et Contact des Langues*. The work of Mackey and his colleagues at the University of Laval’s International Center for Research on Bilingualism inspired Nelde’s (1980, 1983) take on language contact. As a consequence, it also had an influence on the scope and the structure of the 12th volume in De Gruyter’s HSK-Series mentioned just above: the international and trilingual (English-French-German) handbook on *Contact Linguistics,* edited by Peter H. Nelde (who acted as lead editor) together with Hans Goebl, Zdenek Stary, and Wolfgang Wolck and published in 1996 (Volume 1) and 1997 (Volume 2). Thomason (2001: 13) refers to the handbook as a “major [...] encyclopedic treatment of the subject”. Rindler Schjerve (1999: 8) sees it as offering “an ultimate synthesis of contact linguistic endeavours”. While this might be an overstatement, it cannot be denied that the thematic coverage of the field offered in the first, theoretical volume of *Contact Linguistics* is vastly broader than that offered in other, more recently published monographs and handbooks on language contact. At the time of this writing, the field has a rapidly growing set of handbooks beyond the original Mouton project, including Hickey (2013, new edition in preparation), Grant (forthcoming), and Mufwene and Escobar (in preparation), as well as textbooks and journals.

As will become clear in Section 2 of this introduction, the structure of and philosophy behind the 1996 volume have inspired the present volume in many ways. Section 3 is devoted to some current trends in language contact research. Section 4 closes with potential directions for future research.

2. **Scope**

Matras (2009: 1) lists borrowing, areal language clusters, new ‘contact’ languages, pidgins and creoles, and code-switching as topics that receive especially extensive attention in recent publications on language contact. Those are, for example, topics that are dealt with frequently in the *Journal of Language Contact* (JLC), a thriving platform for language contact research established by Robert Nicolai' in 2007. As stated on the journal’s website, *JLC* particularly aims at “advancing our understanding of the nature of language” (https://brill.com/view/journals/jlc/jlc-overview.xml), which almost automatically entails a focus on the structural linguistic consequences of language contact rather than on speakers and social groups as the loci of language contact. In the opening article of the first issue, Nicolai (2007: 17) does, however, point to the variety of intersecting angles from which language contact phenomena are or can be studied. In doing so, he refers to Winford's (2007: 22) view that "[t]he earliest conceptions of the field of Contact Linguistics envisioned it as a multi-disciplinary area of study, encompassing a broad range of language contact phenomena and issues, linguistic, sociolinguistic, sociological and psycholinguistic". That is indeed what emerged early on in the preface of *The Norwegian Language in America,* in which Haugen (1969: xi) writes: "It has been my intention throughout this book to treat language as a social phenomenon, in such a way that it might offer something of value to students of history and sociology". This is also the vision that Weinreich (1968: 4) presents in the first chapter of *Languages in Contact*:

> Purely linguistic studies of languages in contact must be coordinated with extra-linguistic studies on bilingualism and related phenomena. Geographers and ethnographers have described bilingual populations; sociologists have examined the functioning of coexisting languages in a community; jurists have studied the legal status accorded to minority languages in various states; the inquiries of educators interested in bilingual children and in foreign-language teaching have stimulated psychologists to analyze the effects of bilingualism on personality. All the studies are described in a vast, scattered literature. But divergent as they are in purpose and scope, they are all essentially complementary in understanding a phenomenon of so many dimensions.

Work on language change, and linguistic theory more broadly, has long wrestled with how to put material into discrete boxes of 'internal' versus 'external' motivations, i.e. structural versus social. These passages show that work on language contact has engaged with the problem in a more holistic way, increasingly avoiding what Dorian (1993: 152) calls "the weakness of simplistic dichotomous thinking". In this regard, other subfields of linguistics are finally catching up with language contact studies.

The broad, inclusive take on language contact research just sketched is reflected in the many working papers and publications of the International Center for Research on Bilingualism (1967-2001; known from 1990 onward as the Centre international de Recherche sur l'Amenagement linguistique), as well as in the 30 volumes of the *Plurilingua* series published by the Brussels-based Research Center on Multilingualism (19772007). The content of these publications can be classified according to the interrelated main foci of research on language contact identified by Clyne (1975, 1996), Mackey (1976), and Nelde (1992), namely: language, individual language user(s), and society. In line with this view, the first three sections of the present volume focus on these three areas, while the final two turn to issues of methodology and connections to neighboring disciplines.

> **Section 1** focuses on linguistic aspects of language contact, and contains ten chapters covering contact-induced change from a general point of view (Chapter 2), contact-induced syntactic change (Chapter 3), contact-induced semantic change (Chapter 4), lexicon and word formation (Chapter 5), morphology (Chapter 6), orthography and graphemics (Chapter 7), levels of representation in phonetic and phonological contact (Chapter 8), pidginization and creolization (Chapter 9), varieties in contact (Chapter 10), and constructed languages (Chapter 11).
>
> **Section 2** deals with language contact and the individual. Its ten chapters focus on pragmatic aspects of language contact (Chapter 12), borrowing (Chapter 13), code-switching (Chapter 14), age groups (Chapter 15), uninstructed language acquisition in multiple language learners (Chapter 16), first language attrition (Chapter 17), individual variation in bilingual lexical processing (Chapter 18), metalinguistic awareness and multilingual development (Chapter 19), language attitudes (Chapter 20), and gender (Chapter 21).

Section 3 covers societal aspects of language contact. It starts with chapters on multilingualism (Chapter 22), geographical and social boundaries (Chapter 23), language and identity (Chapter 24), and language ideology (Chapter 25). It further contains chapters on the notion of speech community (Chapter 26), on urban and rural language contact (Chapter 27), globalization and superdiversity (Chapter 28), states, nations, and language contact (Chapter 29), language politics, policy, and planning (Chapter 30), majorities and minorities in language policy and language rights (Chapter 31), and language standardization (Chapter 32). It ends with chapters on domains of language use (Chapter 33), education (Chapter 34), media (Chapter 35), linguistic landscapes (Chapter 36), language shift (Chapter 37), and language maintenance (Chapter 38).

Organizing these chapters into these three sections with a focus on language, individual language user(s), and society seemed more straightforward than trying to force the chapters into the structure of 1996's Volume 1, which contained sections on: levels of linguistic structure (Section III; 8 chapters), external research (Section IV; 6 chapters), basic approaches to contact linguistics (Section V; 17 chapters), central issues in contact linguistics (Section VI; 45 chapters), and applied contact linguistics (Section VIII; 15 chapters).

The earlier Volume 1 also contains a section on empirical methods and procedures (Section VII; 13 chapters), on which we modeled the empirical section of the present volume. Yet we have chosen to include more specific (rather than more general) methodological chapters.

Section 4, on methodological issues, contains two broad introductory chapters on quantitative (Chapter 39) and qualitative analysis (Chapter 40) of language contact data. It also contains two overview chapters written by social scientists on surveys (Chapter 41) and the representativeness of samples (Chapter 42), which also serve as background for a chapter offering a broad introduction to the geolinguistic analysis of demolinguistic data (Chapter 43). Furthermore, this section contains chapters on domain analysis (Chapter 44), ways to establish a sociology-of-language framework to compare minority languages (Chapter 45), social network analysis (Chapter 46), nexus analysis (Chapter 47), ethnography (Chapter 48), interviewing (Chapter 49), participant observation (Chapter 50), discourse analysis (Chapter 51), corpus linguistic methods (Chapter 52), psycholinguistic methods (Chapter 53), and research ethics (Chapter 54).

Inspired by Section II (9 chapters) of the 1996 handbook, the present volume also contains a number of chapters that offer a more 'external linguistic take' on the study of language contact phenomena.

Section 5 treats robust interactions with neighboring disciplines from the perspective of anthropology (Chapter 55), colonial studies (Chapter 56), economics (Chapter 57), educational sciences (Chapter 58), legal studies (Chapter 59), literary studies (Chapter 60), media and communication studies (Chapter 61), political science (Chapter 62), social psychology (Chapter 63), and translation studies (Chapter 64).

The chapters have been ordered simply by our sense of what might work for someone reading cover-to-cover, in the unlikely event that someone would actually do that. The exception is Section 5, which, as an overview of neighboring disciplines, was ordered alphabetically by field of study. Since all chapters are encyclopedic, stand-alone chapters, they can be read separately, and it will make sense to read them in various orders depending on the goals and background of the reader. Thematically related chapters in Sections 1-3 do create potentially useful clusters of chapters. Section 1, for example, contains a number of related chapters on structural aspects of contact-induced change (Chapters 2, 3, and 4). We can also imagine value in a 'combined reading' of the chapters on urban and rural language contact (Chapter 27), globalization and superdiversity (Chapter 28), and states, nations, and language contact (Chapter 29).

While we have tried to offer our readers a volume which is both condensed and comprehensive, with theoretical chapters on a great variety of language contact phenomena, there are gaps. Section 1 was supposed to contain a chapter on sign languages, and Section 2 chapters on language contact and the brain, intercultural communication, and multiliteracies. For Section 3, we had planned a chapter on migration, *Abstand* and *Ausbau*, and language conflict (given the inextricable relationship between language contact and language conflict as expressed in Nelde's Law: there is no contact without conflict, Nelde 1987). Section 4 should have included a chapter on neurolinguistic methods, and Section 5 a chapter on history and a chapter on sociology. These gaps result from the usual academic and nonacademic 'facts of life', ranging from administrative duties that made it impossible to deliver on time, unforeseen dramatic personal circumstances, and our decision to give priority to the timely publication of the project rather than allowing a long postponement in the name of creating a more complete volume. While we will weave these missing topics into the second volume of this handbook, there is, of course, enough literature out there today that readers can consult to see the state of the art on these matters. The 1996 volume on *Contact Linguistics* provides an easy point of departure, one that has stood the test of time. Yet it is also clear that new trends have come into being, a topic to which we now turn.

3. Trends

As editors, we happily refrain from the common practice of summarizing individual chapter content to introduce a volume like this, but instead take the opportunity to offer a 'snapshot in action' of ongoing changes in our field of inquiry, to assess its vitality and agility, and to testify to its methodological innovations, engagement with societal change at large, and manifold interactions with neighboring disciplines.

To this end, we highlight a number of trends that consistently manifested themselves across chapters in the major sections, both as marked progress from the previous HSK handbook on contact linguistics and as harbingers for key future research directions. Above all, we underscore how profoundly different the field is today as compared to only a few years ago on every relevant parameter, from new amounts and kinds of data, to new theories about language structure and social dimensions of language, to methods and topics of research.

3.1. *Linguistic aspects of language contact*

The past two decades have witnessed a major leap in the study of structural aspects of language contact. Our understanding of contact-induced change has substantially deepened, regarding both contact in the distant past and change now in progress, and especially of the latter, driven by the rise of language variation and change as a field and inspired by Weinreich, Labov, and Herzog (1968). Synchronic and diachronic approaches have enhanced one another. The massive increase in available evidence, as well as methodological innovations allowing for more refined analyses of these data, have led to increased insights into the (ir)regularity of language change, allowing (among many other things) for more refined models of contact-induced change, far beyond the 1996 canon. Growing attention to the distinct processes of 'matter' and 'pattern' borrowing is but one illustration of this epistemological progress.

The basic theoretical underpinnings of grammar (be it phonology, morphology, or syntax) are increasingly tightly woven into the fabric of language contact theory proper, offering insights into grammatical contact effects that can be directly applied to both the conversational role and the language proficiency of the individual speaker in a given interaction. The landscape in grammatical theory has itself been transformed since the original volumes appeared; while the Contrastive Hierarchy in phonology and Minimalism in syntax were only emerging 20-25 years ago, they are central to some discussions in this volume. The systematic study of semantic change (aside from grammaticalization and related research) barely existed in some sense, but has boomed recently, opening new avenues in the understanding of the ‘mechanics’ of linguistic systemic convergence and of the societal and cognitive practices involved.

All of these evolving insights into the structural properties of language contact in the strictest grammatical sense have in particular informed (and apparently also created new momentum in) the study of contact varieties and contact languages. This obviously holds true for the processes of pidginization and creolization, but also for other emerging ‘mixed’ varieties. Universal second-language acquisition strategies are now instrumental- ized, for example, to account for current developments in creoles, complementing traditional work on (de)creolization or substrate effects. We note a major shift from purely systemic to more inclusion of sociohistorical and usage-based criteria. The integration of sociocultural (and other extralinguistic) practices in the study of writing systems for these languages exemplifies this evolution, and provides telling evidence of the growing integration of purely linguistic dimensions of language contact studies with the role of the individual speaker in the process.

3.2. *Language contact and the individual*

The chapters in this volume make many clear and convincing cases for a shift in the study of the role of the individual language user in language contact situations, both complementing and rivaling the impressive progress made regarding the systemic aspects proper of language contact. Compared to 1996, the notion of the ‘multilingual repertoire’ now dominates the multidisciplinary assessment of language use in interaction. Ethnographic and anthropological perspectives on 21st-century communication seem to have inspired a widespread, and well-received, urge for terminological innovation when describing and categorizing the individual’s variety choices in distinct settings.

The present volume bears witness to this new mainstream discourse with ample reference to an elaborate corpus of vogue terms, including *superdiversity, polylanguaging, translanguaging,* or even plain *languaging.* The chapters where these concepts are used to both reappraise and reframe dimensions of linguistic contact together present a concise overview of the potential longevity and impact of this rejuvenated jargon, well beyond the ideology-laden contexts where it appears as a fixed asset.

While the intricacies and added value of these new labels lead the initiated to a deeper understanding of previously unfathomed dimensions of contact, we as editors were nevertheless struck by the sheer amount of effort and explanation required to enlighten the linguistic community at large about the relevant differences separating two terminological generations. Looking towards the potential third incarnation of this handbook in a decade or two from now, we marvel at the outcome of this terminological inflation, as more eloquently and elaborately explicated by Pavlenko (2018), Grin (2018), and Meyerhoff (2019: 136-137), to name but a few.

A river of present-day scholarship foregrounds ideologies, attitudes, and agency - whether linguistic or not - that control and shape shifts in speakers’ repertoires, turning conversation in contact situations into a sequence of enactment and performance, with the individual speaker as a continuously stimulated actor responding to highly context-specific impulses.

While the appeal of the new in some cases tends to eclipse (or depreciate) terms from the traditional sociolinguistic canon, like ‘code-switching’ and ‘transfer’, this transparent classic terminology also saw continued refinement, appealing to new developments in the neighboring disciplines of sociology and psychology.

As opposed to this terminological modernism, the study of language acquisition proper saw substantial advancement through the full integration of psycholinguistic insights and experimental methods. The emergence of longitudinal studies over the lifespan, the further exploration of instructed versus uninstructed acquisition, and the study of cross-linguistic factors in language loss and attrition are just a few of the many innovations that led to deeper understanding of language learning in contact situations. These insights now also inform new approaches to the study of systemic language change at large, and at the same time, re-dynamize scholarship on the societal aspects of language contact.

3.3. *Societal aspects of language contact*

It comes as no surprise that the reach and impact of the 'language ideological turn' transcended the domain of personal multilingualism, and percolated steadily into the study of societal aspects of language contact over the past two-plus decades. The superdiversity paradigm informs many new contributions to this field, indeed, even if it sometimes appears to border on infatuation. Classic methodological categories and terminology are in constant flux, as the locus of research shifts from languages and their communities of users to the ways in which these are embodied, created, and manipulated. Identity creation, stance-taking, and other forms of speaker agency are now at the heart of societal contact studies, in a clear shift away from more traditional concepts of distinct speech communities with clearly defined properties. The multilayered, quicksilver linguistic identity of the 21st-century speaker is mirrored in a conceptualization of language communities which continuously adapt and change according to a multitude of social stimuli. Increased migration and globalization are most certainly the first among equals in this respect: whilst to the historically informed observer, current migration patterns may not be as novel as they are sometimes presented as being, this mobility is definitely the best attested and easiest to trace ever, including also in terms of its linguistic effects. We may, in other words, be in the most privileged position ever as linguists to observe, analyze, and contextualize processes of change 'in action' during the contact process. Whether approached from an ethnographic or anthropological perspective, relatively straightforward models of language communities gave way to the concept of a 'pixelated' society, with individuals that permanently redefine their (linguistic) position and nature. Bridging this collection of micro-studies of hyper-individual variation to a solid and relevant assessment of macro-level change remains a challenge. Interest in stance-taking and sociopolitical agency among scholars in this new playing field enhances the position of the observing and analyzing linguist with a 'critical' guise, and certainly adds an extra layer to the defeat.

An equally influential transformation touches upon the very nature of language contact itself. The tsunami of 'new' internet-based media is changing our conception of communication, to the extent that language contact no longer requires the co-occurring physical presence of speakers. As such, the nature of processes of societal language attrition and loss, traditionally established in a context of actual real-life encounter and/ or withdrawal, has been reconceptualized. It would be an oversimplification to state that speakers nowadays are in constant contact due to the inescapable intrusiveness of the internet beyond their own will; yet technological advancements may have had their biggest impact, so far, when it comes to facilitating and simplifying worldwide contact between language users.

On the other hand, given that only roughly half of the world's population has internet access, ethical considerations on a divide between the 'haves' and 'have-nots' can complement the observation that the more traditional approaches to language contact may still be applicable, and should not be discarded for some time to come.

3.4. *Methodological issues*

The great strides in linguistic methods generally are obvious enough, especially in the rapidly increasing quantitative and qualitative sophistication of the whole field, including in language contact studies. Those methods are now more varied and sophisticated than ever, and are applied across the whole gamut of available data, whether spoken, written, or signed, in both experimental and real-life settings.

The old dichotomy between quantitative and qualitative perspectives has given way to a set of combined-methods approaches, incorporating the best of both worlds to better understand how language contact works, and getting rid of the cliched opposition between ‘subjective’ micro-studies and ‘objective’ figure-based macro-surveys. As a consequence, quantitative techniques themselves are now also a subject of qualitative consideration, including the ideological caveats inherent to specific methodologies. Accordingly, a persistent concern for the ethical dimensions of methodological choices has now become an acquired feature of research design. The clustering of analytical frameworks from various neighboring disciplines is one creative solution used to navigate possible pitfalls in this respect.

There is no doubt either that the material we work with has gotten substantially better as well. If the sheer amount of additional data available compared to the mid-1990s changed the scene, the organized ways in which this data is now available to researchers give an unprecedented boost to the field. To mention but one obvious example, corpus data and other large datasets make statistical analyses possible that could not be done with the far smaller amounts of data many early studies were built upon. Technological innovation was the driving force both enabling the compilation and facilitating the increasingly powerful manipulation of these ‘big data’, from high-level supercomputing to day-to-day routine data processing on commonly available and omnipresent devices.

These methodological and technical revolutions have had salient effects for all to see in a wide range of applications. The fine-grained mapping and monitoring of linguistic diversity not only gathered momentum (and especially so in sensitive or traditional areas of language contact), but also had decisive impact on political and societal decisions relating to the communities concerned. Advances in imaging techniques have revolutionized the study of language processing, with impressive applications in healthcare and clinical research, but with equally groundbreaking progress in the psycho- and neurolinguistics of language contact.

These new horizons in subject matter (data) and subject method (analytical techniques) will shape the field in the years to come. We have included chapters and discussions on these, but also on traditional, concerns, stretching back to domain analysis. As noted above, the input from non-linguists in these discussions is much valued and vitally important, underscoring our methodological connections to allied disciplines.

3.5. Interactions with neighboring disciplines

While language contact studies are defined by interaction, exchange of information, and an integration in society at large, the discipline itself can only realize these properties in dialogue with neighboring fields of inquiry. No matter how fascinating the massive changes may have been over the past 25 years in the splendid isolation of our profession, the reality check for any of these should also be assessed by its reception across the humanities and social sciences, and increasingly across the rest of the scientific enterprise, such as biology and mathematics.

The role of languages-in-contact as a key factor of social identity has been overtly embraced by adjacent disciplines, including the speaker’s autonomous capacity to reposition and redefine this very identity through linguistic variation. The multilingual and multimodal individual has by default become a core unit of analysis. The accompanying discourse on translanguaging may not (yet) pervade all of these proximate subject areas, but intergroup dynamics are - at least partially - increasingly analyzed along with individual linguistic profiling of the group members.

This observation extends to the scholar, in what seems to be the definitive embodiment of the ‘linguistic’ turn in the humanities over the previous century. While the fact that the medium of language colors the nature of scholarly opinions and views has been common core for decades, recent scholarship now redefines the complex relationships between researchers and their subject matters from the perspective of their meta-identity as active language users who are prone to all of the ‘languaging’ strategies discussed above.

Many other dimensions of the (socio)cognitive paradigm that have reinvigorated our discipline are now being equally applied in contact-related studies outside of the strictly linguistic sphere. A focus on language and diversity, and the possible societal and political consequences of linguistic inequality and/or injustice, now also informs much of the sociology- and education-related research in the social sciences writ large. A discourse of empowerment takes center stage in these disciplines, too, one which refers to language contact effects and is similar to the agency-driven positioning in contact linguistics discussed earlier.

The exponential spread of language contact through the ‘digital revolution’ is touched upon in various other domains. Considerations of both the strengthening and weakening effects of technology on minority groups, the spread of (language) ideologies through technological innovation, and the default state of 24/7 connectedness have sparked scientific ambitions and concerns that both mirror those voiced by the contributors to this volume, and also guarantee an interdisciplinary interest in ongoing collaboration with contact linguists.

Overall, we see a pressing shared concern for the cultivation and preservation of a diverse language ecology worldwide, including the tension between maximizing personal expression, resisting commodification, and policing the fragile equilibrium between dominant and marginalized voices.

4. Possible future directions

If the next decades bring changes to our understanding of language contact of the magnitude we have witnessed since the original handbook, all bets are off about where the field will be. Predicting the precise paths of progress in distinct domains and on specific topics is tricky for any scholar, but it feels safe to say that the major trends affecting the daily lives of our speakers - be they political, societal, cultural, natural, or technological - will have an impact on language contact as well. As the second decade of the 21^{st} century draws to a close, migration worldwide is on the rise for a variety of reasons - triggering new contact situations alongside political reactions aimed at both inclusion and isolationism. Shifting geo-economic dominance may complement and reinforce these changes with unprecedented vigor.

Advances in technology will likely push the limits of our analytical capacities well beyond the current state of affairs, be it in the realm of brain studies, cognitive insights, or data processing. As interdisciplinarity becomes the norm, part of the core of language contact research may actually be taken out of linguists’ hands. The expected quantum leap in communication technology directed at mass use by the public at large is bound to redefine the very concept of language contact, especially when high-level scholarship and day-to-day-life intertwine in a combination that is anything but science fiction. More dramatically, facts such as climate change will create unprecedented contact situations. Linguists working on these issues may have even moral and ethical roles to play as the anticipated ‘ecolinguistic crisis’ sets in, with hundreds of now-endangered languages potentially wiped away in coming decades. More broadly, many changes are taking place in society that have and will continue to have impact on language contact as a phenomenon that colors the daily life in many increasingly hybrid speech communities around the globe. We hope that researchers - on the example of Fishman (1991) and others - will contribute to theoretical and empirical foundations to assist speech communities whose languages and whose very existence are threatened.

Judging from the insights and expertise gathered in this volume, we are confident that all concerned are ready to tackle these challenges, and that the shock of the new will not eclipse the knowledge and impact of insights developed in the earlier days of language contact studies proper. In that spirit, we sincerely hope that this handbook may serve as a gateway to language contact research, especially for a younger generation.

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Five Reasons Why People Code-Switch

Matt Thompson

Monday, April 8, marked the launch of Code Switch, our new blog covering race, ethnicity and culture. To commemorate the blog's launch, all week we solicited stories about code-switching — the practice of shifting the languages you use or the way you express yourself in your conversations.

People sent us hundreds of stories illustrating the many ways we code-switch and the many reasons for doing it. Five of those motivations came up again and again in the stories we read:

Eventually, I started code-switch-screaming English profanities.

Lisa Okamoto

1) Our lizard brains take over: The most common examples of code-switching were completely inadvertent; folks would slip into a different language or accent without even realizing it or intending to do it. One such story came from Lisa Okamoto, who told us she was born and raised in Los Angeles by two parents from Japan, a place she's visited all her life. This trip was particularly memorable (warning, profanity euphemisms ahead):

If you ever watched the original Ring movie, I think you will understand this: the Japanese take horror stories pretty seriously, but in a very creepy quiet way. I find Japanese horror movies and haunted houses to be ten times scarier than the American counterpart.

I went back to Japan with a friend during the summer of 2009, the height of haunted house season in Japan. (The Japanese have this concept that the summertime is the best time to tell scary stories, because the chill you feel from fright will cool you down during the humid months.) My friend loves scary stories, and she wanted to go into a haunted maze when we were visiting Yokohama. I protested and protested but eventually she convinced me to go through the haunted maze, instead of making her go through it alone.

The premise of the haunted maze was the following: The setting was a haunted middle school, where a little girl named Mi-chan died a tragic death. She died so suddenly that she didn't properly enter the afterworld, and her spirit was still lingering at the school. You were supposed to go through this maze with an amulet, find Mi-chan, and place it on her so that she can properly enter the afterlife.

We were handed a flashlight and an amulet prop, and entered into the maze. I already knew I was getting myself into trouble, but I didn't expect how scary it was going to be. It was terrifying. Periodically, you would hear quiet scratches and taps on the walls of the maze, with a voice saying, «*Watashi wa Mi-Chan*» – translation: I am Mi-Chan.

I was talking in Japanese when entering the maze, but I started losing control because I was just so scared. Eventually, I started code-switch-screaming English profanities — «OH MY F-ING GOD, GET ME THE F OUT OF HERE!» — etc., etc. You can fill in the blanks with your imagination. I consider myself fully bilingual, but I realized at this moment that, when I'm in a fight or flight/survivor instinct situation, my mind switches to English. (This is probably because I've lived in the US all my life, and never lived in Japan.)
I was yelling and screaming in English throughout the whole maze, and still hearing the «*watashi wa Mi-Chan*» voice here and there. But suddenly the voice said, «*Watashi wa Mi-Chan… watashi wa… I am… My name is Mi-Chan,*» in the most awkward, Japanese-accented English possible. The staff had taken such pity on my rude profanity-stricken fear that they also code-switched for me. When I heard that awkward English, I literally fell to the floor and cried and laughed at the same time. I was so scared, but the English took me by such surprise, and I felt the oddest combination of release.

2) We want to fit in: Very often, people code-switch — both consciously and unconsciously — to act or talk more like those around them. While this can be effective, it can also be perilous, as John Davis told us:

I am a Spanish teacher in a high-needs school in Nashville. I grew up in a homogenous town in rural Pennsylvania. Foreign languages came easily for me, so I majored in Spanish and minored in French at the University of Pittsburgh. When I moved to my school in Nashville, I had to learn another language: Southern, African American English. I entered my learning experience with fervor. My students taught me almost as much as I taught them in my first years. Now that I am well versed in the language, I have trouble code-switching back to Standard American English.

One day my principal walked into my room and asked me, «Mr. Davis, I didn't receive your editions to the School Improvement Plan.» I replied, «Nah, you flaugin' bruh, I put that on your desk yesterday.» My boss froze, with his jaw dropped and one eyebrow raised. After a moment he shook his head and said, «you're spending too much time with the kids.» «My bad.»
In our pitch to users for stories about code-switching, we asked jokingly whether anyone learned Farsi to eavesdrop on their in-laws. And sure enough, in came this story from Amy Proulx:

Yes, I actually did secretly learn Farsi to snoop on the in-laws. I married an Iranian-Canadian, and after torturing myself trying to learn through the standard language tapes and computer programs, I sort of gave up, and instead, started watching Iranian soap operas. Oh the drama, the intrigue, the suspicion and suspense! What a way to learn Farsi, through the vice of sappy television.

My bad habit led to good Farsi skills, but my handle on slang and colloquial language was the real kicker. When at a memorial ceremony for my late father-in-law, I proceed to intone a rather dramatic, but reasonably common Shi'ite prayer (courtesy of my TV watching), my brother-in-law, in the middle of this most dramatic and somber moment, nearly fell over laughing. He declared that I proclaimed this Shi'ite prayer with perfect diction and pronunciation, and that I was a model of a perfect daughter and sister-in-law. I was in the in-crowd with the in-laws, thanks to soap operas.

3) We want to get something: A lot of folks code-switch not just to fit in, but to actively ingratiate themselves to others. We can not tell you how many dozens of stories we got from people who work in service industries who said that a Southern accent is a surefire way to get better tips and more sympathetic customers. Apparently everyone who works in a restaurant picks up «y'all» immediately upon arriving at their job. If you can pull off the right accent in the right context, you can get all kinds of favors, as this story from Patti Hollingshead illustrates:

We lived in Ireland some years ago and noticed there were often two prices for goods and services — reasonable prices for the locals and much more expensive costs for others (Americans). It was not easy, but I practiced my Irish accent until we qualified for 'local pricing'. Still, they would often ask me where I was from, as my accent was anything but flawless. But I'd come up with the name of some obscure town hundreds of miles away, which explained my 'odd' Irish accent and usually satisfied them. Once, to my, «Ack, I'm from dahn twards Clara Bog,» the guy responded in Gaelic.

I had no idea what he was saying. I continued to smile, laugh, and nod at what I hoped were appropriate times as he excitedly talked on and on. Finally, another English-speaking customer entered the shop and he flipped back to English, then whispered to me, «We need to be careful here (in Northern Ireland) about speaking Irish.» «Oh, aye,» I replied.

I pulled my wallet out to pay for my flowers and he held up his hands, «No, me lass, keep yer money. 'twas a pleasure speakin' to ya.»

4) We want to say something in secret: We collected many sweet stories of people code-switching in order to hide in plain sight, a habit most common among people in love. Because this tactic often relies on assumptions, it can get one in trouble, as Veronica Rodriguez can attest:

I am from Venezuela and speak Spanish and English fluently and without an accent in either language. However, I look what most would describe as «Middle Eastern,» this means that not only do people assume that I am from Turkey or Lebanon and try to speak to me in Farsi or Arabic and become very disappointed when I don't, but many times Hispanic people assume that I don't speak Spanish. This ultimately leads to someone speaking very candidly around me thinking that I cannot understand what they are saying.

I also speak French fluently enough to get myself into trouble. Living in Chicago during college I encountered lots of interesting people on the L. We often chose to comment on some of these people in French rather than English or Spanish since it was far less likely that someone would understand us. One rainy afternoon a very nice-looking man ran into the train, and my friend and I made some comments to each other in French about how handsome he was. To our surprise, he answered back, «*Merçi*!» — in perfect French. Suffice to say, we were both extremely embarrassed and decided that maybe we would keep our comments to ourselves from then on.

5) It helps us convey a thought: Certain concepts need that perfect bon mot to come across effectively. Many people switch languages or employ colloquialisms to express particular ideas, as in this story from Jennifer Monahan:

I … work in a bilingual school, and my coworkers and I code-switch constantly. Here … code-switching centers around lexical gaps: Nonprofit fundraising is a very American idea, so the French speakers tend to switch to English when that's the topic. Same with technology; if I learned about a piece of equipment or software in English I have a hard time discussing it in French. It's not just a language proficiency issue, my coworkers who are native French speakers follow the same pattern. So we tend to talk about «le smartboard» or «un programme de planned giving.» And some concepts just don't translate. French kids eat lunch in the school cafeteria; the notion of bringing lunch from home is, well, foreign. So is the notion of having a designated container to bring your lunch from home. So we all refer to «le lunchbox.»

The reasons people code-switch and the ways in which they do it are far more numerous than the few examples we've listed here. While many people told us they code-switched to fit in, for example, several also told us they did it to stand out.

Seminar 7

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The Native Speaker: An Achievable Model?

Joseph J. Lee

Abstract:
In this more mobile and globalized world, the concept of what it means to be a native speaker of a language is becoming ever more difficult to define, especially in regards to English. In recent developments in second language acquisition and language teaching, this concept has been the focus of attention for numerous scholars (e.g. Davies, 1991; Medgyes, 1992; Phillipson, 1992) to get a better understanding of this concept, and, perhaps, to reevaluate and revise the "native speaker model" in the field of language teaching. In this article, the definition of the native speaker is explored based on the works of various scholars who have investigated this concept. Based on the findings of what it takes to be a native speaker, the issue of whether the native speaker model is the appropriate model in language teaching is discussed.

Introduction

The concept of the native speaker is one that is understood and self-explanatory until the notion is explored or thought about (Ellis, 1993). There are those who would argue that it is a unitary concept, hence the question of what it means to be a native speaker is pointless as "everyone is a Native Speaker of the particular language states that the person has "grown" in his/her mind/brain. In the real world, that is all there is to say" (Chomsky, 1965, quoted in Paikeday, 1985, p. 58). However, the quest for a better understanding of the concept of the native speaker, and, perhaps, reevaluation, is not pointless and has been critically discussed by numerous scholars in recent times (e.g., Davies, 1991; Medgyes, 1992; Phillipson, 1992) in the field of language teaching. As the English language and the mobility of the human race become more and more accessible, the concept and perception of the native speaker is being challenged. In this paper, I attempt to explore and systemize a more cohesive definition of the native speaker based on the collective works of various scholars in the field of language teaching, particularly English. The question of what the native speaker actually knows is, then, examined. Based on the internalized knowledge that a native speaker has of his or her language, the abilities of the native speaker is presented. Upon presenting the concept of the native speaker, the issue of whether it is possible for a nonnative speaker to acquire membership into the "native speakerdom" (Nayar, 1994) is addressed, briefly. At last, the question of whether the native speaker is the appropriate model and goal of language learning and teaching is discussed.

What is a Native Speaker?

Is there a systematic way of defining or characterizing what a native speaker is? Or is this a question that is so circular that it needs no attention? In recent developments in the field of language teaching, this question seems to be of particular importance and necessity to resolve the issue of what a native speaker is, and whether he or she is the goal that learners should strive to achieve. However, this puzzle seems to be elusive since it is unclear as to what a native speaker is and knows based solely on being a native speaker of a language (Davies, 1991; Myhill, 2003; Paikeday, 1985). In this section of this paper, I will attempt to make some sense of this elusive enigma based on recent investigations and studies by different scholars in the fields of Second Language Acquisition and language teaching.

The first account of the use of the native speaker, according to Davies (1991), seems to have been referenced by Bloomfield (1933) who states, "The first language a human being learns to speak is his native language; he is a native speaker of this language" (p. 43). However, this definition seems to be too restricting. In fact, the first learned language can be replaced by a language that is acquired later (although may not be completely forgotten) through the more frequent and fluent use of the later-acquired language where the first language is "no longer useful, no longer generative or creative and therefore no longer 'first'" (Davies, 1991, p. 16), as in the case of children who are transplanted, either through migration or adoption, at an early age. In the field of theoretical linguistics, the native speaker is the authority of the grammar of his or her native language (Chomsky, 1965) who "knows what the language is [...] and what the language isn't [...]" (Davies, 1991, p. 1). According to this logic, a native speaker is an individual who is infallible and has perfect command of his or her language. This may not absolutely be the case, as Nayar (1994) argues that native speakers are not "ipso facto knowledgeable, correct and infallible in their competence" (p. 4). He further contends that the notion that the native speaker "has the power to err without a blemish in his competence" based purely on the fact that the individual is perceived as a native speaker needs to be challenged and reevaluated. So far, the two explanations presented by Bloomfield and Chomsky do not adequately resolve this complex puzzle.

From an etymological perspective, the word "native" suggests that an individual is a "[native speaker] of a language by virtue of place or country of birth" (Davies, 1991, p. ix). This implies that the individual acquired the language from birth (Davies, 1991; Paikeday, 1985; Phillipson, 1992). However, as stated above, this is inadequate in determining whether an individual is a native speaker of a language, or not, due to the fact that individuals can be resettled to other places in childhood, as in the case of children who immigrate or are adopted in early childhood. Additionally, being born in a place does not guarantee that the person will be a native speaker of the native area because the language that the individual speaks at home may not coincide with the language in the native area; and children who are adopted in early childhood may not develop in the same linguistic environment of his or her birthplace.

Some may state that the only bona fide native speaker is a monolingual speaker of a language; being a monoglot is the only attribute that absolutely guarantees membership owing to the fact that the individual does not have any other language to be a native of. However, this assumption is not completely factual, as many native speakers of a language do, in fact, speak other languages besides their own; and monoglots may be the exception rather than the norm (Maum, 2002). So, where does that leave us? Being a monoglot (which is rare) and being born in a particular place does not adequately facilitate the quest in defining the native speaker. To get a clearer picture of what a native speaker is, I have isolated six defining features of a native speaker that numerous scholars in the field of Second Language Acquisition and language teaching support and agree with.

1. The individual acquired the language in early childhood (Davies, 1991; McArthur, 1992; Phillipson, 1992) and maintains the use of the language (Kubota, 2004; McArthur, 1992),
2. the individual has intuitive knowledge of the language (Davies, 1991; Stern, 1983),
3. the individual is able to produce fluent, spontaneous discourse (Davies, 1991; Maum, 2002; Medgyes, 1992),
4. the individual is communicatively competent (Davies, 1991; Liu, 1999; Medgyes, 1992), able to communicate within different social settings (Stern, 1983),
5. the individual identifies with or is identified by a language community (Davies, 1991; Johnson & Johnson, 1998; Nayar, 1998)
6. the individual does not have a foreign accent (Coulmas, 1981; Medgyes, 1992; Scovel, 1969, 1988).

Other features of the native speaker include race (Liu, 1999; Kubota, 2004); the capacity to write creatively (Davies, 1991); knowledge to differentiate between their own speech and the standard form of the language (Davies, 1991; Kubota, 2004); and the "capacity to interpret and translate into the L1 of which s/he is a native speaker" (Davies, 1991, p. 149). These four other features that have been presented are debatable and dubious in many ways. The race (or ethnicity) of an individual, I believe, is not a determining factor since, as noted above, in the case of a child who is adopted by individuals who differ from the child's ethnic background can surely transplant him or her to a place where he or she is not a native inhabitant of. Therefore, an ethnically Chinese child, at an early age, can be adopted by a family who is not Chinese (and does not speak the child's first language) who relocates the child to another country where the local language is not the child's first language. The child will mature and develop, perhaps, being no longer a native speaker of Chinese, but rather his first language—Chinese—will most likely be substituted for the language of his new environment. As a result, the later-acquired language will, in all probability, become his native or first language. Furthermore, in countries like the United States, individuals who are not ethnically of English decent do, in fact, speak English as their first and native language, as in the many cases of descendants of non-British immigrants who have lived in the U.S. for several generations. Additionally, in China, although 91.8% of the people are of Han Chinese background (CIA, 2003), not all 91.8% speak the same language. The people of China who are ethnically Han Chinese speak languages such as Mandarin, Cantonese, and others, although some may consider these dialects or variants of Mandarin.

Davies (1991) stated that a native speaker has the capacity to write creatively in his or her language. This feature is not completely accurate. We can only suppose this feature to be factual if we assume that all native speakers are highly proficient and creative in writing in their languages through a great number of years of formal schooling, and, most of all, from a talent for expressing themselves creatively in written language. We, also, have to account for proficiency level differences among literate members of a language community, not to mention those individuals who are not literate in their language. Moreover, there are languages that are preliterate (Florez & Terrill, 2003) where there are no written forms of the languages. Therefore, the notion that native speakers are creative writers would only be accurate, if all languages have writing systems, and all native speakers of those languages were highly proficient and creative individuals such as writers and poets.

The last two features that Davies suggests of a native speaker are debatable as well. Cook (1999) indicates that “many native speakers are unaware how their speech differs from the status form, as shown, for example, in the growing use of nonstandard *between you and I* for *between you and me* even in professional speakers such as news readers” (p. 186). Hence, the claim that native speakers can differentiate their speech and that of the standard variety is not as obvious as Davies asserts. Moreover, Cook challenges Davies’ claim that native speakers have the capacity to interpret and translate from another language to their own. This capacity, according to Cook, is only reserved for those individuals who have a language other than the language that they are natives of, and not necessarily by all of them. Among the six essential features of the native speaker that have been laid out above, the most incontrovertible factor in defining the native speaker is that the individual acquired the language in childhood and sustains the use of the language. According to Cook (1999), an individual is not a native speaker of a language unless the individual acquired it in childhood. Furthermore, an individual who did not acquire the language in childhood will most likely maintain a recognizable foreign accent in his or her speech (Scovel, 1969, 1988). Therefore, all other features besides the one that I have mentioned are secondary; a matter of competence and performance of the individual (that is, how well the individual uses his or her language). The most poignant summation of what it means to be a native speaker of a language is offered by Kourtizin (2000):

> English is the language of my heart, the one in which I can easily express love for my children; in which I know instinctively how to coo to a baby; in which I can sing lullabies, tell stories, recite nursery rhymes, talk babytalk. In Japanese, there is an artificiality about my love; I cannot express it naturally or easily. The emotions I feel do not translate well into the Japanese language, and those which I have seen expressed by Japanese mothers do not seem sufficiently intimate when I mouth them (p. 324).

Keeping the above ideas about what it is to be a native speaker in mind, I will present the knowledge and abilities that a native speaker of a language possesses.

What Does a Native Speaker Know?

In exploring the definition of a native speaker, the notion that a native speaker has intuitive knowledge of the language he or she is a native speaker of, and has linguistic as well as communicative competence (Hymes, 1971) has been offered. What does that actually mean? What is it that a native speaker knows that a nonnative speaker does not that distinguishes the two? In this section of this paper, I will present what the native speaker actually knows and can perform that differentiates him or her from a nonnative speaker. Based on findings and studies by scholars in the fields of Linguistics, Applied Linguistics, Second Language Acquisition, and English Language Teaching, the knowledge of a native speaker has been cataloged. Native speakers have internalized knowledge of:

1. appropriate use of idiomatic expressions (Coulmas, 1981; Medgyes, 1992, 1994; Phillipson, 1996),
2. correctness of language form (Coulmas, 1981; Davies, 1991; Phillipson, 1996),
3. natural pronunciation (Coulmas, 1981; Medgyes, 1992, 1994),
4. cultural context (Medgyes, 1992, 1994; Phillipson, 1996) including “response cries” (Goffman, 1978, cited in Coulmas, 1981), swear words, and interjections,
5. above average sized vocabulary, collocations and other phraseological items (Coulmas, 1981; Medgyes, 1992, 1994),
6. metaphors (Coulmas, 1981),
7. frozen syntax, such as binomials or bi-verbials (Coulmas, 1981),

8. nonverbal cultural features (Coulmas, 1981; Davies, 1991).

Additionally, native speakers of a language have pragmatic and strategic competence of their language. They are able to attend to pragmatic conventions of the language, to not only accomplish communication goals but pay heed to interpersonal relationships with other interlocutors simultaneously, depending on different sociocultural contexts (Kasper, 1997). They have the internalized strategic competence to use different verbal and nonverbal communication skills to repair breakdowns in conversational exchanges (Canale & Swain, 1980). Native speakers avoid avoidance (Davies, 1991); that is, they shun from giving up on comprehension or production. However, avoidance is a strategy commonly found in communication acts of nonnative speakers. With the automatized knowledge that native speakers have, what is it that they are able to perform? Native speakers possess the ability to manifest and perform:

1. spontaneous, fluent discourse (Davies, 1991; Maum, 2002; Medgyes, 1992),
2. circumlocutions (Davies, 1991; Halliday, 1978),
3. hesitations (Brown, 2001; Davies, 1991; Halliday, 1978),
4. predictions of what the interlocutor will say (Davies, 1991; Halliday, 1978),
5. clarifications of message through repetition in other forms (Davies, 1991; Medgyes, 1992, 1994).

Additionally, native speakers have other verbal as well as nonverbal communication skills that enable them to communicate effortlessly, in most instances, with other participants in communication exchanges, within appropriate sociocultural contexts.

Conclusion

The question as to whether a nonnative speaker can become a native speaker has been a concern in the field of language teaching. Based on what has been presented, we can conclude that it is impossible for any learner of a language, after the critical period (Scovel, 1988), to become a native speaker unless he or she is born again. It is impossible due to the fact that in order to be considered a native speaker of a language, an individual must satisfy the one most salient criterion—acquire the language in early childhood and maintain the use of that language. If a nonnative speaker cannot become a native speaker based on this one definitive element, then can a nonnative speaker, after the critical period, attain all of the other elements discussed above? According to Phillipson (1996), a nonnative speaker, through effective training, can acquire most of the other elements that define the concept of a native speaker. However, Medgyes (1992) points out that many aspects of linguistic competence do pose tremendous challenges for nonnative speakers. Among the aspects of linguistic competence, accent seems to be a hurdle that is most difficult, if not impossible, to overcome (Scovel, 1969, 1988). Coulmas (1981) asserts that the ability to produce natural pronunciation and perfect grammar are other areas of linguistic competence which are extremely difficult for nonnative speakers. Furthermore, target cultural competence (Liang, 2003) seems to pose another challenge as the exposure to this element is not substantial for nonnative speakers. However, as mentioned above, most of the elements that a native speaker knows and can perform can, through effective learning and teaching principles and approaches, be learned and acquired by nonnative speakers except, perhaps, accent. Therefore, instead of focusing on the elements that are out of the control of language learners and language teachers, such as the definitive element of what a native speaker is and accent, teachers as well as learners should focus on the elements that are achievable.

If the native speaker model is not achievable in language learning, perhaps, it should be reevaluated and revised to set forth models that are achievable by learners. Perhaps, it is time to shift our focus from ‘who you are’ to ‘what you know’ (Rampton, 1990). Alternative terms can be employed, instead, in the field of language teaching (Cook, 1999). Such alternative terms have been explored by Paikeday (1985) who suggests “proficient user of the language;” Rampton (1990) proposes “language expert;” Cook (1991) puts forward “multicompetent speaker;” and I offer “competent language user (CLU).” The purpose of using alternative terms in place of the native speaker is to shift not only the attention away from ‘who you are,’ but to focus the attention on what we are actually attempting to accomplish in language teaching—communicative competence. We should attempt to set the goals for our learners to more attainable goals; not goals which are nearly impossible, if the most irrefutable definition of a native speaker is that he or she acquired the language in childhood and continues to use it. Now, should the label ‘native speaker’ be removed from our mental as well as written lexicon for good? No, the label will not and should not go away (Cook, 1999). However, as stated above, it is time to revisit this label and, perhaps, use alternative terms in the field of language teaching to eliminate the native speaker-nonnative speaker dichotomy which perpetuates exclusion, rather than inclusion of all individuals who are users of a language; to permit all users access into the membership of “competent language userdom.” Additionally, by introducing and maintaining alternative labels in the field of language teaching, we, as educators, are setting a goal for the learners—to become a competent language user of the target language—that is achievable. After all, as Davies (1996) aptly inquires, what is it that we are trying to achieve in language teaching, the native speaker or proficiency?

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Do bilinguals have two personalities? A special case of cultural frame switching

Nairán Ramírez-Esparza, Samuel D. Gosling,
Verónica Benet-Martínez, Jeffrey P. Potter,
James W. Pennebaker,¤

1. Introduction

"Learn a new language and get a new soul" (Czech proverb)

By some estimates, half the world's population is bilingual and many others are multilingual (Grosjean, 1982). With regard to this group, it has often been noted, sometimes by bilinguals themselves, that bilinguals express different personalities when they speak in different languages. Indeed, previous research has even provided some support for the idea that language influences bilinguals' responses to value-related surveys (e.g., Ralston, Cunniff, & Gustafson, 1995). One of the most compelling theoretical explanations for these phenomena is the *Cultural Frame Switching* effect (CFS; Hong, Chiu, & Kung, 1997; Hong, Morris, Chiu, & Benet-Martinez, 2000), where bicultural individuals shift values and attributions in the presence of culture-relevant stimuli.

Bicultural individuals are those who have two internalized cultures that can guide their feelings, thoughts, and actions (Hong et al., 2000; LaFromboise, Coleman, & Gerton, 1993). Recent research on bicultural individuals has shown that the presence of culture-specific cues can elicit culture-specific attributions and values. For instance, in one series of studies, Chinese American biculturals displayed more internal attributions when primed with American icons (e.g., American flag, Superman), and more external attributions when primed with Chinese icons (e.g., Chinese dragon, Great Wall) (Benet-Martinez, Leu, Lee, & Morris, 2002; Hong et al., 2000). Similarly, Hong Kong Chinese and Chinese Americans generated more collective self-descriptions when their Chinese identity was activated, than did North

Americans. On the other hand, North Americans and Chinese Americans generated more individual self-descriptions, when their American identity was activated, than did Hong Kong Chinese (Hong, Ip, Chiu, Morris, & Menon, 2001).

Bilinguals tend to be bicultural (e.g., LaFromboise et al., 1993). So one potential explanation for the language-dependent changes observed in bilinguals' personalities is that these individuals undergo a cultural frame switch when they change from one language to another. Previous research has provided some support for the idea that language can prime bilinguals' responses to surveys (Bond & Yang, 1982; Ralston et al., 1995; Yang & Bond, 1980). In one study, Chinese bilinguals who responded to a questionnaire in English endorsed more values and norms associated with the English-speaking world than did Chinese bilinguals who responded to the same questionnaire in Chinese (Bond & Yang, 1982); however their findings were mixed and they even identified the opposite pattern in some cases. In a more recent investigation, Hong Kong bilingual-Chinese managers who responded to a values questionnaire in English displayed means closer to a group of American managers in the US than did the bilingual-Chinese managers who responded to the same questionnaire in Chinese (Ralston et al., 1995).

Such effects have been explained in terms of *cultural accommodation* (Bond & Yang, 1982), a phenomenon that is conceptually equivalent to CFS. Much like CFS, cultural accommodation is seen when bilinguals respond to situations (e.g., when completing a questionnaire) in a manner that accommodates or favors the culture associated with the language they are currently using. This is because the language itself primes the bilinguals' culture-specific values, attitudes, and memories, which in turn affect that behavior (e.g., their responses to a questionnaire). Thus, when bilinguals answer an instrument in their native language their responses will reflect the values and attitudes associated with that language. When they respond to a questionnaire in their second language, they may favor norms and values associated with that language.

Thus, research on CFS shows that bilinguals display different values and attitudes when responding to questionnaires in different languages. However, it is not clear whether CFS occurs in personality traits. For this to occur, language would have to be a sufficiently strong cue to activate a response and personality would have to be sufficiently malleable to shift in response to the cues. These considerations suggest that any changes in personality due to language could be subtle.

Ideally, a test of CFS in bilinguals would include the following three features. First, it should be established that cross-cultural differences in personality exist; if there are no differences between monolinguals in each culture, how could CFS be used to explain any observed differences when bilinguals are tested in their two languages? Second, an instrument should be used that has established cross-cultural credentials; these credentials should include not only a history of replication of effects across cultures, but also a way of determining that mean levels are not due to differential functioning of the questionnaire items across cultures. Third, given the potential subtlety of the frame-switching effects and the possibility that any effects reflect local or transitory influences (rather than robust, cross-cultural influences), replication across populations should be sought. We next review the past research and evaluate it with respect to these three features.

1.1. Past research on cross-language personality differences using bilinguals

Despite the widespread belief that one's language influences one's personality, very few studies have looked at the effects of language usage on personality. McCrae, Yik, Trapnell, Bond, and Paulhus (1998) did report language-related differences in personality in a large sample of bilingual Hong Kong undergraduates; however, these differences were attributed to a measurement artifact.

But other studies report personality differences in bilinguals and do explain the findings as a function of cultural shifts. For example, Ervin (1964) examined whether French-English bilinguals would show different personalities when responding to the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT) in English versus French. A few intriguing findings emerged, showing glimpses of support for a CFS phenomenon. For example, one finding suggested that women participants, but not men, used more achievement themes in English than in French. Ervin inferred that women used more achievement themes in English because American culture is less concerned with social roles than is French culture (e.g., the role of housewife is more part of the French culture than the American culture). Ervin also found more verbal aggression toward peers in French stories than in English stories. She suggested that this was due to the fact that French education emphasizes the use of oral argument in defense of insults from others. Finally, she found that themes of autonomy were more common in French stories than in English stories. She speculated that this was because French, but not American, families tend to withdraw after disagreement.

Ervin's (1964) findings provide some support for the CFS hypothesis, but they are far from conclusive. Moreover, they are subjected to three limitations. First, no comparative evidence was given regarding the kind of stories French-speaking people living in France and English-speaking people living in the US typically provide. Second, the cross-cultural generalizability of the TAT was not established. Third, no evidence was provided for the replicability of the effects in different populations.

More evidence that language is related to personality was provided by a study using the California Psychological Inventory (CPI) in Spanish-English bilinguals (Hull, 1996). The results showed some support for the CFS effect. For example, bilinguals' scores in the *Good Impression* factor were higher in Spanish than in English. Hull (1996) conjectured that bilinguals showed this tendency because in the Spanishspeaking culture, like in other collectivist cultures, there is greater concern about interpersonal harmony and pleasing others (Marin & Marin, 1991), and also because group affiliation is valued more strongly (Shkodriani & Gibbons, 1995). In addition, bilinguals showed more *Intellectual Efficiency* when responding in English rather than in Spanish. Hull argues that this finding results from the widespread belief that the American-English culture, at the pinnacle of individualistic culture, emphasizes more achievement aspirations than does Spanish-speaking culture (Diaz-Guerrero & Szalay, 1991; Madsen & Kagan, 1973).

Although Hull's study (1996) also provides some support for CFS, it too suffers from a number of limitations. First, as Hull himself points out, the CPI has been criticized as lacking a factorial foundation (see Domino, 1985; Eysenk, 1985; Goldberg, 1972). And, as in Ervin's study, no clear comparative evidence is provided regarding CPI differences between monolinguals who speak either English or Spanish. Finally, as in Ervin's study, the findings have not been replicated in multiple samples.

1.2. The present research

The main goal of this research was to establish and empirically document the CFS effect in the personality domain. We chose to study this phenomenon with Spanish- English bilinguals because there is a widespread belief that Spanish speakers have very different values and attitudes from English-speakers (Benet-Martinez & John, 2000; Diaz-Guerrero & Szalay, 1991; Hofstede, 1980; Marin & Marin, 1991). In addition, there exists a personality questionnaire that has been extensively examined and validated in both Spanish and English. Building on the important earlier work of Ervin (1964) and Hull (1996), we tested whether Spanish-English bilinguals display different personalities in Spanish and English in ways that reflect the personality tendencies associated with each language-culture. Furthermore, we evaluated the robustness of the effects by searching replication across samples in Mexico and the US.

We started by generating predictions for the specific cultural differences to expect by examining personality differences between English and Spanish-speaking cultures (operationalized in this research as individuals living the US or Mexico, respectively). English-speaking Americans and Spanish-speaking Mexicans were the most appropriate comparison group because the majority of bilinguals to which we have access have a cultural background both from Mexico and the US. Specifically, most of the bilinguals in our samples were either immigrants from Mexico now living in the US, Mexican residents who learned English in the US, or second-generation Mexican Americans (i.e., US-born individuals whose parents are from Mexico).

As noted above, we tested the robustness of the CFS effects by seeking replication across samples. In particular, we used within-subjects designs in three samples of Spanish-English bilinguals who completed both the Spanish and English version of a personality questionnaire. It is important to note that we relied only on bilinguals who met very high standards of bilingual proficiency. The advantage of using high standards is that participants are very confident using both languages and can reasonably be assumed to adopt either language and, if the CFS effect holds, activate the relevant cognitive and affective associations (Hong et al., 2000). Had we used lower standards of bilingual proficiency, then a failure to find a language effect would be inconclusive. The disadvantage of using very high standards of bilingual proficiency is that large samples of true bilinguals are difficult to find. Thus, with small samples, we judge the robustness of the effects by their replicability across independent samples rather than by their statistical significance (Thompson, 1994, 1999; Wilkinson & the task force on statistical inference, 1999).

1.3. Measurement of personality

Which elements of personality should be examined? Given the scarcity of previous cross-cultural research using the same questionnaire in Spanish-speaking cultures vs. English-speaking cultures it is important to examine a broad array of traits. Moreover, the instrument assessing those traits should be well-established and should exist in multiple languages. The broadest and most widely used model of personality traits is provided by the Big-Five framework. In this framework, each bipolar factor (e.g., Extraversion vs. Introversion) summarizes several more specific facets (e.g., Sociability), which in turn, subsume a large number of even more specific traits (e.g., talkative, outgoing). Several instruments have been developed to assess the Big Five dimensions. Which of these is most appropriate for the current research? One scale stands out as being particularly well suited for our purposes: the Big Five Inventory (BFI). This instrument has enjoyed wide use in the field due to its efficiency, brevity, and good psychometric properties (John, 1990; John & Srivastava, 1999). More importantly, the instrument has been carefully translated to Spanish and rigorous tests have shown it to have good psychometric properties in English and Spanish-speaking samples (Benet-Martinez & John, 1998; Rodriguez & Church, 2003). Two studies by Benet-Martinez and John (1998) supported the generalizability of the instrument across student and working-class populations. Therefore, the BFI was adopted for the present research.

Both the English and Spanish BFI have 44 items with a 5-point Likert scale, that ranges from 1 *(disagree strongly)* to 5 *(agree strongly).* The five dimensions that the questionnaire measures are: Extraversion (8 items), Agreeableness (9 items), Conscientiousness (9 items), Neuroticism (8 items), and Openness (10 items).

1.4. Overview of research

In four studies we tested the CFS effect. In Study 1, with a sample of English speakers and Spanish speakers we derived predictions for the particular personality differences to expect. In Studies 2-4, we examined the replicability of the CFS phenomenon in three different samples of bilinguals.

2. Study 1: Deriving predictions for expected personality differences

What specific personality differences should be expected across English and Spanish-speaking cultures? Previous research has reported some personality differences between individuals living in American and Mexican cultures. For example, Diaz-Guerrero (1982) found that Mexicans show an avoidant personality under stressful situations, whereas individuals from the US seek to confront them. Other research on responses to stressful situations has shown that Mexican culture values a response characterized as being peaceful, serene, calm, and tranquil, whereas US culture values a response characterized as being active, resourceful, energetic, and effective (Diaz- Loving & Draguns, 1999; LaRosa & Diaz-Loving, 1991).

Other traits that have been associated with the Mexican culture include abnegation and nonassertiveness (Diaz-Guerrero, Diaz-Loving, & Rodriguez de Diaz, 2001) and *"simpatla"* (Triandis, Marin, Lisansky, & Betancourt, 1984). The first two traits refer to a behavioral disposition to put others' needs before one's own needs. *Simpatla* is a construct characterizing individuals who value positive behavior, are agreeable, and avoid interpersonal conflict and negative behaviors. Diaz- Loving and Draguns (1999) described *simpatla* as being manifested in Mexican culture in terms of individuals who value "expressive sociability, positive mood states, affectionate social interactions, and reflective, serene, calm, and tranquil attitudes" (p. 121).

These studies did not assess Big Five traits directly and although they offer some clues as to the kind of cross-cultural differences we might expect to Wnd in terms of the Big Five, clear predictions are hard to make. For example, Mexicans' high sociability (associated with *simpatla)* suggests Mexicans should be higher than Americans on Extraversion but at the same time the Mexican dispositions of low assertiveness and abnegation suggest Mexicans should be lower than Americans on Extraversion. Moreover, many of the past studies draw conclusions about cross-cultural differences based on studies done within each culture independently, often using different questionnaires in the different cultures and assessing constructs that are difficult to place in a Big-Five framework. Thus, although the cross-cultural research consistently suggests that Mexicans and Americans differ in their personalities, the past studies do not provide sufficient evidence to make firm predictions about specific cross-cultural personality differences in terms of the Big Five.

Therefore, the broad aim of Study 1 was to provide an empirical basis for making predictions about the personalities associated with English and Spanish-speaking cultures. Specifically, our goal was to examine directly real personality differences between the two cultures in terms of the Big-Five framework. To accomplish this goal we needed a large and diverse sample of individuals living in the US and living in Mexico. This led us to use a medium of data collection that permits access to large numbers of willing participants all over the world: the Internet. Data collection through the World Wide Web has increased in popularity over recent years because it permits access to samples (in this case Spanish speakers living in Mexico) beyond the reach of methods typically used in psychological research, and because it affords access to large heterogeneous samples (Gosling, Vazire, Srivastava, & John, 2004). Although one should be cautious about new methods, research on the quality of internet data suggests that it is at least as good as that provided by traditional paper-and-pencil methods (Gosling et al., 2004). In addition, although Internet users are not representative of the general population, they are at least as diverse as other samples typically used in psychological research (Gosling et al., 2004).

2.1. Method

2.1.1. Participants

Participants were part of the data collected by means of the Gosling-Potter Internet

Personality Project, which recruits volunteer participants all over the world through the Internet. Only those participants who indicated that they lived in Mexico or the US and whose ages ranged from 18 to 65 years were selected to participate, and we analyzed only those participants who indicated they had not taken the questionnaire before. The final sample of individuals living in the US who responded to the BFI in English was 168,451 (44% men and 55% women). Their mean age was 27.8 (*SD* = 9.3). Their self-reported social class was 2% upper, 28% upper-middle, 46% middle, 16% working, and 8% lower-middle class. The sample of individuals living in Mexico who responded to the BFI in Spanish was 1031 (34% men and 65% women). Their mean age was 24.84 (*SD* = 7.22). Their self-reported social class was 2% upper, 15% upper-middle, 37% middle, 8% working, and 9% lower-middle class.

2.1.2. Procedure

Participants were recruited by means of a website www.outofservice.com that contains the BFI in both English and Spanish, as well as games, quizzes, and other personality questionnaires (see Srivastava, John, Gosling, & Potter, 2003). Potential participants can access the website through several channels: it can be found with major search engines under keywords such as *personality tests*; it is listed on portal sites, such as Yahoo!, under their directories of personality tests; and individuals who have previously visited outofservice.com and signed up for its mailing list receive notification when a new questionnaire is added. As is common on the Internet, news of the site has also spread widely through informal channels such as emails or unsolicited links on other Websites.

The data collection and scoring is automated, providing participants with immediate feedback about their personalities, appealing to their motivation to receive individualized personality feedback for the purposes of self-insight or entertainment. Two web pages were used. The one in English was entitled “All About You—A Guide to Your Personality” and the one in Spanish was entitled “Como Eres Tu—Una Guia de Tu Personalidad.” Both web pages had the same physical appearance, the same instructions, and questions; the only difference was the language. Each time a participant clicked on the “submit” bottom, their Big Five personality scores were computed and provided as feedback. Their specific scores were recorded and saved to a data base.

2.2. Results and discussion

To determine whether different personality profiles were associated with the two cultures, participants’ scores were aggregated within each of our two groups (English speakers in the US and Spanish speakers in Mexico) and were analyzed using independent *t* tests to identify personality differences. Of course, with a sample so large (i.e., 168,451 in the US and 1031 in Mexico), all differences were statistically significant and we instead focus on the direction of the effects. Table 1 shows the means and standard deviations for each of the five factors. Results showed that the participants in the US had higher means in Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, and Openness than participants in Mexico. For the Neuroticism factor, people in Mexico scored higher than people in the US.

The findings from this study point to a modest personality differences between English-speaking Americans and Spanish-speaking Mexicans. These results suggest a specific set of predictions for the CFS phenomenon. In particular, we would expect the language of the questionnaire to prime in our bilingual participants’ culture-specific values, attitudes, and memories (Hong et al., 2000). In turn these values, attitudes, and memories would affect participants’ responses to the questionnaires, such that bilinguals will have higher mean scores in Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, and Openness, and lower scores in Neuroticism when responding in English compared to Spanish.

Table 1. Big Five personality scores of English-speakers in the US and Spanish-speakers in Mexico

Factor	United Sates (English)		Mexico (Spanish)	
	Mean	*SD*	Mean	*SD*
Extraversion	3.18	.91	3.10	.85
Agreeableness	3.64	.73	3.34	.67
Conscientiousness	3.50	.74	3.41	.71
Neuroticism	3.04	.88	3.28	.84
Openness	3.98	.66	3.85	.67

Note. All differences are statistically significant, p <.001. Sample sizes for the US = 168,451; for Mexico = 1031.

3. Studies 2-4: Testing the cultural frame switching effect in three independent samples of bilinguals

The purpose of these additional studies was to test whether bilinguals switch their personality when they switch the language they are using when they respond to a questionnaire. As noted above we are primarily interested in effects that replicate across independent samples of bilinguals. Thus, we will first present the methods used in each of the three studies and then we will present the findings from all three studies together. Note, our predictions focus on cross-language *differences,* and given the variations in methods, administration procedures, and targets, we make no predictions about mean scores on the personality dimensions.

3.1. Study 2: Bilinguals from Austin, Texas

In this study bilinguals were asked to come to the lab on two occasions. In each meeting they completed a paper and pencil version of the BFI either in Spanish or in English. The meetings were conducted at least one week apart, and the order of language was counterbalanced across participants. As noted above, we opted to use rigorous labor-intensive tests of bilingualism, with the consequence that the sample was somewhat smaller than it would have been had we used lower bilingualism standards.

3.1.1. Participants

A total of 25 Spanish-English bilinguals (10 men and 15 women) living in Austin, Texas, participated. Their mean age was 25 *(SD* = 4.65). Participants were recruited by means of flyers. Part of the sample was paid for their participation (n = 23). Others received course credit (n = 2).

3.1.2. Measurement of bilingualism

Two interviews were conducted to ensure the participants met our criteria for bilingualism. First, a bilingual experimenter interviewed the potential participants by phone in both English and Spanish and judged whether the participants were confidently using both languages. Second, a face-to-face interview was conducted prior to the experiment in both English and Spanish where the researcher asked general background questions to the participants and judged how confident the bilinguals used each language. After the second interview, two bilinguals decided not to participate further in the study. Finally, a third measurement of bilingualism proWciency was taken using self-reports of profficiency and experience in both languages. This questionnaire revealed that one participant’s first language was not English or Spanish, but Portuguese; this participant was removed from the analyses.

3.1.3. Procedure

Bilinguals were asked to come to the lab on two occasions. In the first meeting bilinguals were interviewed by the experimenter (as part of the bilingualism screening) and they completed a background questionnaire and the BFI in either English or Spanish. The second meeting, which was scheduled at least one week later, involved completing the BFI in whichever language they had not used in the first session (English or Spanish). At end of the second meeting, participants were debriefed and paid $20 for their participation (with the exception of two participants who took the study for class credit).

3.2. Study 3: Bilinguals from the US and Mexico

This study examined personality differences across languages in Spanish-English bilinguals. The study differed from Study 2 in that bilinguals responded to the BFI by telephone rather than using the traditional paper and pencil format. By using this technique, we were able to reach participants from a wider age range than those assessed in Study 2. Moreover, this method allowed us to interview bilinguals from all over the US and in Mexico, further testing the generalizability of the effects.

3.2.1. Participants

Because true bilinguals are exceedingly hard to identify and recruit, the study adopted a targeted strategy, using nominations from colleagues and research assistants who knew bilinguals in the US or Mexico. Telephone numbers of 70 potential participants were collected. Of these, we were able to reach 54 participants (24 men and 30 women) living in the US (n = 32) or Mexico (n = 22). Their mean age was 33.6 (*SD* = 12.29).

3.2.2. Measurement of bilingualism

To measure language ability, bilinguals were asked to rate separately their confidence in using English and Spanish when writing, speaking, reading, and listening, using a scale ranging from 1 (very bad) to 10 (excellent). If participants gave a score of less than eight in any category, they were excluded from subsequent analyses. A total of 21 subjects were excluded. Furthermore, three additional bilinguals were excluded because their first language was not English or Spanish. After removing 24 participants we were left with two small samples (n = 11 in the US; *n* = 19 in Mexico) so we combined them into a single sample (n = 30) to test our main hypothesis. The final sample consisted of 15 men and 15 women and had a mean age of 34.20 (*SD* = 13.02). The mean language-confidence scores (averaged across writing, speaking, reading, and listening comprehension) were 9.04 (*SD* = .64) for English, and 9.8 (*SD* = .32) for Spanish.

3.2.3. Procedure

Bilinguals were interviewed on the phone twice, once in English and once in Spanish. Phone calls were conducted at least one week apart. In the first phone call, bilinguals provided answers to a background questionnaire and responded to oral presentations of the BFI items. In the second phone call, individuals provided answers only to the other-language version of the BFI. The order of the language in which the interviews were conducted was counterbalanced across participants. At the end of the second phone call, the purpose of the study was revealed to the participants.

3.3. Study 4: Bilinguals from the San Francisco bay area, California

Studies 2 and 3 had two important limitations: the sample sizes were very small and the measurement of bilingualism was largely based on self-reports. In Study 4, we addressed these limitations by recruiting a larger sample and taking several steps to ensure true bilingualism. However, gathering a larger sample required that we incur the cost of having participants answer the two versions of the BFI in the same session.

3.3.1. Participants

This study is based on a re-analysis of participants originally assessed as Study 2 of Benet-Martinez and John’s (1998) research on the structure of the English and Spanish versions of the BFI. A total of 170 bilinguals (66 men and 104 women) living in the San Francisco Bay

Area participated. Their mean age was 25 (*SD* = 10). Students were contacted after they indicated being Spanish-English bilingual in a pretesting form in "Introduction to Psychology" courses. In addition, community residents were recruited by flyers or mail. Part of the sample received course credit for their participation (n = 143) and others volunteered to take part (n = 27).

3.3.2. Measurement of bilingualism

Students were reached by telephone and asked a series of questions in both Spanish and English to corroborate their bilingualism status. Students who did not demonstrate a minimum level of bilingual competency in this interview were excluded from the study. In the lab, both students and community residents were asked to translate two short paragraphs (one in English and one in Spanish) into the other language. Individuals who reported not being able to translate the paragraphs were excluded from the study. A bilingual judge scored the translated paragraphs, deducting points for each mistake. In addition, to check for inter-judge reliability, another judge scored 10 randomly chosen translations. The results showed strong agreement between the judges (with an inter-judge correlation of .94 for English and .97 for Spanish). On average participants got 83-91% correct on both translation tests, so no further participants were excluded.

3.3.3. Procedure

Bilinguals in a single session translated the test paragraphs, answered some background questions, and completed the BFI in English and Spanish. The order of the language in which the BFI was provided was counterbalanced. To reduce memory effects across the two presentations of the BFI, bilinguals engaged in a 5-min filler task between answering the BFI in one language and the other.

3.4. Results for studies 2-4

3.4.1. Preliminary analyses

Preliminary analyses were done to determine psychometric equivalence of the English and Spanish versions of the BFI. These analyses were conducted by correlating the means of the English and Spanish BFI on each of the factors. The resulting cross-language test-retest correlations were strong, ranging from .68 (corresponding to Extraversion in Study 3) to .93 (corresponding to Extraversion in Study 4). The mean test-retest correlation across dimensions and studies was .80 ($p < .001$). These results are comparable, to the test-retest correlations reported for the BFI in one language (Table 3, Gosling, Rentfrow, & Swann, 2003).

3.4.2. Personality differences across languages

Recall that the purpose of this investigation was to test for robust and replicable support for the CFS effect. This can be broken into two questions. Do we find the same pattern of differences across bilingual samples (Studies 2-4)? Is that pattern consistent with personality differences obtained in the cross-cultural sample (Study1)? We tested these questions by conducting five meta-analyses to evaluate the effect sizes of any cross-language differences, and the replicability of the findings across the bilingual samples.[1]

[1] Note that the means of the monolingual samples in Study 1 are slightly smaller than the means of the bilingual samples (Studies 2-4). Follow-up analyses in other monolingual samples from Mexico (n = 53) and the US (n = 53) suggested that these mean differences could be attributed to a "web effect." In particu¬lar, most of the means of monolinguals who responded to the BFI on paper and pencil were very similar to the means in the three bilingual samples. Moreover, and reassuringly, the non-web monolingual samples demonstrated the same pattern of cross-cultural personality diVerences as those found in the web sample of monolinguals (i.e., Study 1).



Fig. 1. Mean Extraversion scores in English and Spanish.



Fig. 2. Mean Agreeableness scores in English and Spanish.

3.4.4. Extraversion

Fig. 1 presents the results of all three studies along with Sample 1 for comparison purposes. The pattern of findings is quite clear. In all three bilingual samples, Extraversion scores are higher in English than in Spanish. Furthermore, the cross-language discrepancies are consistent with the discrepancies found in the cross-cultural sample (Study 1), where English speakers in the US scored higher than Spanish speakers in Mexico. To estimate the effect size of the differences in the bilingual samples a *d* (which is an unbiased estimator of the population effect size) was derived by computing the difference between the means across languages (i.e., English vs. Spanish) and dividing it by the standard deviation of the differences between paired correlations (see Johnson & Eagly, 2000). The effect size was .25 ($p < .05$).

3.4.4. Agreeableness

Fig. 2 presents the results of all three studies along with Sample 1 for comparison purposes. Again the pattern of findings is clear. In all three bilingual samples, Agreeableness scores are higher in English than in Spanish. Furthermore, the cross-language discrepancies are consistent with the discrepancies found in the cross-cultural sample (Study1), where English speakers in the US scored higher than Spanish speakers in Mexico. The effect size was .44 ($p<.001$).



Fig. 3. Mean Conscientiousness scores in English and Spanish.



Fig. 4. Mean Neuroticism scores in English and Spanish.

3.4.5. Conscientiousness

Fig. 3 presents the results of all three studies along with Sample 1 for comparison purposes. Again the pattern of findings is clear. In all three bilingual samples, Conscientiousness scores are higher in English than in Spanish. Furthermore, the cross-language discrepancies are consistent with the discrepancies found in the cross-cultural sample (Study 1), where English speakers in the US scored higher than Spanish speakers in Mexico. The effect size was .51 ($p < .001$).

3.4.6. Neuroticism

Fig. 4 presents the results of all three studies along with Sample 1 for comparison purposes. The pattern of findings is again consistent. In all three bilingual samples, Neuroticism scores are lower in English than in Spanish. Furthermore, the cross-language discrepancies are consistent with the discrepancies found in the cross-cultural sample, where English speakers in the US scored lower than Spanish speakers in Mexico. The effect size was —0.13 (ns).

3.4.7. Openness

Fig. 5 presents the results of all three studies along with Sample 1 for comparison purposes. The findings reveal that although the differences were in the same direction for all samples of bilinguals, the results were not consistent with those found in the cross-cultural study of monolinguals. Moreover, the effect size of the difference was small (d =—0.19, ns).



Fig. 5. Mean Openness scores in English and Spanish.

4. Follow-up analyses of bilingual data

Before speculating on the possible meaning of these results, it is important to address one potential alternative explanation for our bilingual findings. Specifically, it is crucial to address the possibility that the differences in scores between the bilinguals' scores on the English and Spanish version of the BFI are due to differences in the translations, rather than differences in the actual "personalities" of the participants (McCrae et al., 1998). Fortunately, the analytical tools needed to address this question are well-developed and widely used in cross-cultural studies (Van de Vijver & Leung, 1997b).

Item-bias analyses work by testing whether individual items function differently across contexts, in this case, across languages. Essentially, these item-bias or differen- tial-item functioning techniques test whether there are biased items within an instrument and can detect anomalies in instruments at the item level caused by poor translation (Van de Vijver & Leung, 1997a, 1997b). In this investigation we used the analysis of variance method, which is one of the first techniques that has been applied to study item bias (Clearly & Hilton, 1968). This technique analyzes each item across score levels, and requires medium-sized samples (see, Clauser, Mazor, & Hambleton, 1994). The only bilingual sample sufficiently large to run the analyses is that from Study 4, which used exactly the same instrument as that used in the other studies.

Following the steps proposed by Van de Vijver and Leung (1997a, 1997b), we used the analysis of variance technique to test each of the BFI factors. The first step was to divide the responses into two groups corresponding to the two languages in which the questionnaire was administered. Next, we derived interval variables by dividing the number of subjects into score level groups. For example, Extraversion has 8 items with a Likert scale that goes from 1 to 5 so the total score for any subject can vary from 8 to 40; to conduct a score-level analysis, participants are grouped together according to their extraversion score. To allow us to approximate the recommended number of subjects in each interval (i.e., around 50; Van de Vijver & Leung, 1997a, 1997b), we formed 6 levels. The two groups (corresponding to the language in which the instrument was administered) and the interval levels are treated as independent variables in the analyses of variance. Each of the items within each factor is treated as the dependent variables. Thus, to summarize the analyses, we performed 2 x 6 analyses of variance for each item of the BFI.

Three effects are tested in the analyses of variance. The first is the effect of score level, which shows whether there are significant differences in average scores across intervals. This

F ratio is usually expected to be significant because it is reflecting the fact that people in lower score levels have lower scores, whereas people at higher score levels have higher scores. The remaining two effects are the ones that should be scrutinized for possible item bias. An item is shown to be unbiased when both the main effect for language and the language x level interaction are nonsignificant. A significant main effect indicates the existence of a uniform bias (Mellenbergh, 1982). This means that the curve of differences of means between the groups is consistently above or below zero. For example, if we find a significant main effect for the item “has an assertive personality,” it means that bilinguals when answering the question¬naire in English have consistently higher means across the score levels than when answering the questionnaire in Spanish. Finally, a significant interaction indicates the existence of a nonuniform bias (Mellenbergh, 1982). This means that the differences of means between English and Spanish vary across score levels. In other words, the item is anomalous because it is discriminating differently across score levels. A non¬uniform bias would indicate that the item is understood differently in the different languages.

Although power was less than optimal (see, McClelland & Judd, 1993), the item- bias analyses indicated that only one of the 44 items functioned differently across translations. The anomalous item was “has an active imagination”/“tiene una imagination activa” from the Openness scale. This item should be revised before it is used in future cross-cultural research. The fact that we did not find any other biased items hints that the items were invariant across score levels (Mellenbergh, 1982). In other words, the items were not anomalous nor were they understood differently by the bilinguals across languages. This suggests that the cross-language differences cannot be attributed to translation differences in the instrument and lends support to the CFS interpretation.[2]

5. Discussion

The main goal of this investigation was to examine whether the CFS effect among bilinguals can also be found for personality. Specifically, we tested whether bilinguals show different personalities in English and in Spanish and whether these differences are consistent with differences between English and Spanish-speaking cultures. We assessed the robustness of the effects by seeking replication across studies. We found that bilinguals were more extraverted, agreeable, and conscientious in English than in Spanish and these differences were consistent with the personality displayed in each culture. The cross-language personality differences for Neuroticism were relatively small and the differences for Openness were not consistent with the cross-cultural differences identified in Study 1.

Do the personality shifts documented here undermine the very concept of personality, which is meant to persist across time and situations? The correlations between the Spanish and English versions of the questionnaire are very strong (mean r = .80, also see Benet-Martinez & John, 1998). This suggests that individuals tend to retain their rank ordering within a group but the group as a whole shifts. Thus, an extrovert does not suddenly become an introvert as she switches languages; instead a bilingual becomes more extraverted when she speaks English rather than Spanish but retains her rank ordering within each of the groups. This phenomenon is similar to the pattern of age changes described by Caspi and Roberts

[2] Although originally developed in English, the Spanish version of the BFI underwent rigorous construction procedures including the use of back translations (Benet-Martinez & John, 1998). These procedures, plus the results reported in this investigation for the item-bias analyses, indicate that the diVerences found across languages are not the result of an anomalous question or two within each of the factors. Indeed, if we consider the mean for each item across score levels, we found that of the 26 items comprising Extraversion, Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness, 19 (or 73%) were in the English > Spanish direction. Many of these effects are impressive in their simplicity. The reverse-scored extraversion “is reserved” is virtually identical to the Spanish “es reservado.” Nevertheless, those completing the scale in English are lower (p = .07) across score levels than when completing the scale in Spanish.

(1999), where personality can simultaneously show continuity and change; an example would be a person who becomes more conscientious as he ages but retains his rank in the group because most people become more conscientious as they age (Srivastava et al., 2003).

We have interpreted the findings in terms of CFS. However, an alternative explanation would be that language use was confounded with developmental changes; for example, perhaps some of the bilinguals spent some significant part of their early lives in Spanish-speaking environments and then, later, became bilingual through the learning of English. If this were true, the fact that a participant has one personality in one language and another personality in the other language would not so much be a function of culture as it would be a function of age-related personality differences (Srivastava et al., 2003); in other words, their responses in Spanish would reflect their childhood personality and their responses in English would reflect their adult personality. Three facts argue against this interpretation. First, this explanation would not explain why the shifts are in the direction of cultural prototypes. Second, this explanation would predict that the culture-related personality shifts should be consistent with age-related shifts for all traits, not just some of them; however, the language-dependent personality shifts documented here are consistent with the age-related shifts in for just of the some personality traits and not others. Third, as noted above, the participants underwent stringent tests for bilingualism, ensuring that both lan¬guages were still actively used. In Studies 2 and 4 we specifically asked participants to indicate the percentage of time they were currently using Spanish and English; on average participants used Spanish in 34% (SD = 24%) and 32% (SD = 19%) of their daily interactions for Studies 2 and 4, respectively. These findings indicate that although participants were actively involved in an English-speaking country they also maintained contact with their Spanish-language, thereby arguing against the possibility that language use was confounded with developmental stage.

The finding (from Study 1) that Americans are higher than Mexicans in Extraversion and Agreeableness—and that similar cross-language differences are found in Spanish-English bilinguals (from Studies 2 to 4) may seem to be inconsistent with cultural concepts such as simpatia (e.g., value for smooth and pleasant relationships, expressing positive emotions, Triandis et al., 1984) and collectivism (e.g., group-oriented, emphasis in harmonious interpersonal relationships, conformity, Markus & Kitayama, 1991), which are supposed to be higher in collectivist cultures such as Mexico. For example, research has shown that Mexican Americans value “simpatia” more strongly than Anglo-Americans do (Marin & Marin, 1991). Furthermore, Mexican Americans tend to be more collectivist than European Americans (Freeberg & Stein, 1996). Why then do Americans and bilinguals using English score higher in Extraversion, Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness than Mexicans and bilinguals using Spanish? Two possible mechanisms shed light on this enigma.

First, the apparently surprising findings become less surprising when one examines the specific facets that comprise the broad five factors. Specifically, the observed differences might be driven by unusually high scores on specific facets such as assertiveness (Extraversion), achievement (Conscientiousness), and ‘superficial’ friendliness (Agreeableness), traits that are related to individualist cultures, where independents selves are promoted. Markus and Kitayama (1991) describe the independent self as emphasizing directness in communication, being unique and expressing the self, all of which are related to the assertiveness found in Extraversion. The independent self also enjoys making reference to its own abilities, attributes, and goals, all of which would be manifested in terms of high scores on the achievement facet of conscientiousness. According to Markus and Kitayama, the independent selves also regulate their behavior when interacting with others, driving agreeable scores higher. In short, the combination of being extraverted, agreeable, and conscientious could underlie the expression of an independent self, which characterizes

American culture (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Along these lines, it is worth noting that Extraversion has variously been labeled Dominant-Initiative; Social Activity; Outgoing, Social Leadership; Agentive; and Dominance (see, John & Srivastava, 1999). These labels better convey the fact that, despite the folk understanding of its common label, Extraversion reflects assertiveness (a value emphasized in individualist cultures such as the US) rather than emotional expressiveness (value emphasized in collective cultures, such as Mexico). Unfortunately, the BFI does not include Big Five facet scales so it was not possible to test this explanation empirically in the present samples.

The second potential explanation for the pattern of findings is that the relatively high Extraversion, Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness scores in Americans and English-speaking bilinguals were driven by self-enhancement tendencies. There are two potential paths leading to self-enhancement in these samples, one direct and the other indirect. The direct path to self-enhancement has been well documented in European Americans (Heine, Lehman, Markus, & Kitayama, 1999; Robins & John, 1997) and is more frequent in individualistic cultures than in collectivist cultures (Heine & Lehman, 1997). Markus and Kitayama (1991) suggested that in collectivist societies, where an interdependent self is promoted, there is less need for positive self-evaluation, and less value placed on personal attributes. Accordingly, the CFS phenomenon in bilinguals could be triggered by an interplay of a self-enhancing personality (characteristic of individualistic American, English-speaking culture) with a self-effacing personality (characteristic of collectivist Mexican, Spanish-speaking culture).

The indirect path to self-enhancement is based on the finding that agreeable people tend to provide positively biased self-views (Grimm & Church, 1999); that is, Agreeableness correlates positively with the use of self-enhancement tendencies (Paulhus & John, 1998). As noted above, when primed by the English language, participants become more agreeable; one of the effects of becoming more agreeable could be to provide positively enhanced self-views. Both the direct and the indirect paths to self-enhancement would lead to Americans and bilinguals using English to have more evaluative positive self-views than those held by Mexicans and bilinguals using Spanish. However, our findings showed only mixed evidence for self-enhancement in Americans and bilinguals speaking English; this group did indeed have higher scores on Extraversion, Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness, but the self-enhancement effects for Openness and Neuroticism were mixed and weak. A self-enhancement interpretation would have to explain why participants should enhance on some evaluative traits but not others. Without such an explanation, the current findings argue against a general self-enhancement interpretation.

5.1. Implications for future research

These findings have several implications for future research. First, future studies should examine CFS using narrower personality constructs. This would permit us to test whether personality shifts are the result of specific facets, such as abnegation and assertiveness. Second, research should examine the extent to which these differences identified in self-reports extend to observer judgments. Are bilinguals perceived as more extraverted, agreeable, and conscientious when they speak in English rather than Spanish? Third, future studies should examine emotional expressiveness, a trait purported to be characteristic of collectivist cultures. Fourth, future research should extend these CFS personality effects to other types of Spanish-monolinguals (e.g., Colombian, Peruvian, Chilean, etc.) and biculturals (e.g., Colombian American, Peruvian American, Chilean American, etc.) in the US and in other parts of the world. Note that in this study, our stringent tests of bilingualism resulted in a relatively small sample of bilinguals in Mexico so we could not test the CFS phenomenon in biculturals living in Mexico. Fifth, future studies should examine the effects of acculturation on CFS. Do bilinguals who are more acculturated to the US have a greater (or lesser) shift of personality when they change languages? Does bilinguals' ethnic self-identification mediate personality shifts? Finally, although truly bilingual samples are hard to get, future research should focus on testing these effects in large samples, especially in populations that were underrepresented in this research (e.g., Mexican-bilinguals living in Mexico). Together, such work will provide a more nuanced understanding of both the basic effects and mechanisms demonstrated in this research.

6. Conclusion

This investigation provides support for the CFS phenomenon (Hong et al., 1997, 2000). This phenomenon reflects the tendency of bicultural individuals (i.e., people who have internalized two cultures, such as bilinguals) to change their interpreta-tions of the world, depending upon their internalized cultures, in response to cues in their environment (e.g., language, cultural icons). The results from the present series of studies suggest that CFS can be primed with something as subtle as the language, and can affect not only their attributions or values, but also their personality.

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Seminar 8

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Multiculturalism and interculturalism: redefining nationhood and solidarity

Riva Kastoryano

Abstract

Theoretical and normative approaches regarding the question of diversity and integration, such as multiucluturalims and interculturalims compete in an attempt to redefine citizenship and nationhood. Most analyses have been single-theory-oriented, leading to multiple, contested and controversial interpretations of integration and democratic public spaces.

Transnationalism raises the question of the limits of national public space and extends the concept of cultural integration beyond borders challenging the normative theories of multiculturalism and interculturalism bounded to national societies. Whatever the ideology and objective in the understanding of integration, states are confronted today with the

transnational actions of activists who try to bypass states in order to reach a global perspective of their identification and action. Solidarity beyond borders involves a multilevel interaction between home and host countries and leads the states to develop strategies of integration – territorial and non-territorial – as a way of including identity issues developed in a minority situation into their political strategy to "re-territorialize" them. The objective then is to counter non-territorial solidarity expressed in global religious terms, mostly virtual, diffused by the Internet, which attracts the young generation, urging them to reject any or all national identification, to develop a new pride, a sense of community based on a global identification.

Introduction

Theoretical and normative approaches regarding the question of diversity and integration compete in an attempt to redefine citizenship and nationhood. Multiculturalism, the most controversial, defined as the "politics of recognition" by Taylor (1994), has connotations of "tribalism" and "groupism" (Brubaker, 2002) and is perceived as a challenge to national unity. For Modood (2017), multiculturalism is the extension of the concept of national citizenship and of nationalism, and he suggests a "multicultural nationalism" as a way "to accommodate British Asian Muslims political assertiveness". On the opposing side, the concept of interculturalism, according to Zapata-Barrero (2017), is "post multiculturalist". It is "contact based" leading to a "mutual belonging" of nationals and non-nationals and to a "civic practice and citizenship".

Both multiculturalism and interculturalism were developed in Canada as a result of the linguistic confrontation between French and English and the broader debates on a bicultural society. The official definition of multiculturalism by the Royal Commission on Multiculturalism gave political legitimacy to the concept through the constitutional definition of multiculturalism used in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. This view was officially accepted as the fundamental characteristic of the Canadian State. In 2008, Taylor and Bouchard reported on the public perceptions regarding multiculturalism. They suggested interculturalism as a model of integration for the province of Québec and multiculturalism for Canada. Interculturalism, a "new formula of coexistence" (Bouchard, 2011) is designed to bring a dynamic perspective to the "defined national identity". The argument is based on the importance of a dialogue among cultures as a basis for reciprocity, which leads to a cohesive society where solidarity includes the majority as well as the minority. In its definition, interculturalism is thus opposed to the recognition of separate groups' assertiveness in the public sphere commonly attributed to multiculturalism.

Concepts and contexts

Similar situations entail recourse to concepts that, used in different national contexts, require new definitions. In Europe, the Council of Ministers approved the White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue in 2008, which declares interculturalism as the basis for a European identity. This sentiment is reflected in the official motto "unity in diversity". The idea is to combine the pluralistic and complex sense of belonging among individuals, groups, and peoples in order to construct a political identity that is purportedly European, or rather, to arouse identification with Europe as a new political space of action and demands. In different European countries multiculturalism corresponds to various situations according to the structure of the state and its recognition of regional and linguistic particularities. According to Kymlicka's (1995) typology there are multinational states (states that are constituted of national entities that are defined in terms of language and territory, such as Spain, Belgium, Switzerland) and polyethnic states (with several ethnic communities born from immigration). In this latter category are France, Germany, the Netherlands where an important issue pertains to the settlement of post-colonial migrants – the majority are of Muslim origin – and their mode of integration, including the expression and organization of collective identities, their claims for representation and recognition, the role of religion, and the increasing influence of diasporic networks and the transnational politics of their home countries. In the public debate, multiculturalism marks the shift from temporary economic immigration to the permanent presence of immigrant populations. In Germany, it has become a way of making public opinion and politicians aware that “foreigners are here to stay”. In France, concerned with a democratic society governed by equal rights, discourses on a “multicultural society” elaborate on a democratic society governed by equal rights and ultimately attempt to augment public opinion for diversity as an inherent fact in any democratic society. In both countries Germany and France, multiculturalism acknowledges diversity and develops a narrative and a policy of integration that considers migrant as co-citizens.

Despite different narratives and normative perspectives, European countries have gradually converged on a sort of “applied multiculturalism”, regarding urban policy, education, and “politics of difference.” In France, the politics of difference involves the recognition of voluntary associations and their activities based on collective interest expressed in terms of identity. Empirical studies show that voluntary associations’ activities can be ranged from community building to individual social mobility (Kastoryano, 2002). On the other hand, a comparative study in Europe shows that integration policies promoting multiculturalism have not improved the economic situation for immigrant populations. In fact, they have contributed to their cultural and political marginalization (Koopmans, 2010). This conclusion is contradicted by a comparative study of nineteen European countries that demonstrates the positive effects of multiculturalism policies, especially on migrants’ political participation (Kesler & Bloemraad, 2010).

Great Britain is the European country where the normative value of the concept of multiculturalism is most elaborated. In 2000, Parekh published The Future of Multi-ethnic Britain, which expressed his hope of seeing a Britain that would simultaneously respect equality, difference, individual freedom and community cohesion: “Britain should develop both as a community of citizens (the liberal view) and a community of communities (the pluralist view).” For Modood (2012), multiculturalism is based on the democratic values of liberty, equality, and fraternity and unity. Arguing against the assimilationist approach because of its defense of a historical national homogeneity, he believes that multiculturalism considers migrants as co-citizens within a pluralism in which all identities are respected. Moreover, political strategies that move in this direction in order to reshape the understanding of Britishness. Yet again in Britain, the 2001 Cantle Report denounced the “parallel lives” created through multiculturalism and pushed for a “new framework for race and diversity based on interaction and positive values for diversity” (Cantle, 2001). A “narrative” of “community cohesion” defended by interculturalism (Cantle, 2012) has been intertwined with the “normative” theory of multiculturalism and its political polices and outcomes.

Zapata Barrero (2017) maintains the normative strength of multiculturalism through his emphasis on equality. Interculturalism is also concerned with the inclusion of groups since they constitute a “collective resource for the benefit of the collectivity”. It suggests therefore a “reformulation of the common public culture in terms of community cohesion”, promotion of solidarity, and of a common public culture placing diversity in its center. He argues that such an approach fills what multiculturalism seems to have underestimated: “contact and dialogue, and interpersonal relations between people from different backgrounds, including nationals and citizens.” This claim implies that multiculturalism has led to the fragmentation of society into communities turned inward in their identity and distinct from the political community. Interculturalism, considered as a “post-multicultural period” by Zapata-Barrero, becomes an instrument to facilitate a sense of mutual belonging as defended by the Intercultural Cities Program of the Council of Europe (2008).

Modood (2017) regrets the lack of “academic engagement” and theoretical foundations of the concept and argues that interculturalism is essentially a variant of multiculturalism. He argues also that, contrary to what interculturalists pretend, dialogue among groups has always been at the heart of multiculturalism (Meer & Modood, 2012) and the most important aspect of the “politics of recognition” is “building a relationship of trust”; a value that interculturalists cannot neglect, since it is hard to conceive communication, dialogue and solidarity without trust. Is interculturalism misrepresenting multiculturalism as Modood claims?

It is difficult to draw normative boundaries between these two a priori opposing concepts. For Modood (2017), the central normative claim is that citizenship and national identity must be remade to include group identities that are important to minorities as well as majorities. He argues that “this is double-aspected: the right to recognition of difference, to distinct cultural needs and provision but also the right to be included, to full membership, which includes the sharing of the national-public space or culture and in the sharing to remake it”. He suggests a “multicultural nationalism” that is only civic in nature because it is based on the recognition of groups rejecting membership as ascriptive, as well as the concept of “Otherness that refers to Ethnicity”. French republican rhetoric couldn’t agree more. Zapata-Barrero (2016) sees interculturalism as fostering intercultural citizenship, and consequently it is seen as an important driver for a socialization process, of culture-making. Diversity is then an advantage and a resource to promote solidarity and reframe a common public culture.

What is the difference between a multicultural nationalism and intercultural citizenship - both aim for a civic public space leading to a new dynamic of national identity - other than a narrative difference? The problem that emerges in the elaboration of both concepts is the use of categories. Modood acknowledges the normative significance of the majority, emphasized by interculturalists, but also stresses a “new majority” that would not be the predominant group. Would that majority be “recognized” on an equal basis with other groups that claim state recognition and representation in order to achieve equality? How do we imagine a majority without the historical process of a nation building and the pressure for defining a national identity? Despite the idea of a common past, national identity, similar to all identities, is redefined according to the expectations of the social groups constituting it as its relation to other nations. Would the influence of internal and external dynamics bring the majority – an important part of the historical formation of the state as well – to the same level as minority groups claiming state recognition? Does equal citizenship, on the basis of rights and duties, erase the historical trademark of the majority?

Multiculturalism as history in the making requires new compromises and negotiations among states and groups (Kastoryano, 2002). The terms of the compromise take into consideration the dynamics in the definition of national identity, but it is difficult to imagine that the majority will be a group as any group looking for equal recognition. As for the elaboration of interculturalism, what does Zapata-Barrero (2017) mean when he defines the concept as “contact base communication and relationship among people from different backgrounds, including national citizens”? A distinction between “national citizens” and “other citizens” contradicts the very understanding of civic citizenship and the principle of equality. Multiculturalism is not only about “the inclusion of immigrants into the mainstream by respecting their differences” and “the protection of their rights”, but it also relates to all discriminated groups because of their difference (Phillips, 2007). The confusion comes from legal, categorization such as citizen and immigrant, national and non-national, citizen and non-citizen, and representations of “Otherness” in which immigrants are placed. Such categories are likely to maintain “identity boundaries” even though “the added value” of interculturalism, according to Zapata-Barrero, is communication and the importance of a civic national narrative.

Such a categorization refers to the multiculturalism debate developed after 9/11, as asserted by Zapata-Barrero (2017), the Muslim population as an explicit target. The use of the concept has shifted then from the political, cultural and social sphere to the sphere of values, with regard to liberalism, and questions the "democratic defense of cultural diversity within a universalist perspective". He also stresses that the successive terrorist attacks of the early 2000's have associated the term with security issues and placing Islam at the center of concerns. According to Kymlicka (2012), the regression, of multiculturalism is due to perceived threats hanging over border security, human rights and economic prosperity. To ensure its success, ethnic relations must be "desecuritized." That should also be the success of interculturalism.

Interculturalism: an idea, a policy or a narrative?

In Europe, the interculturalist narrative is, "a policy narrative that existed in earlier practice." Zapata-Barrero (2017) gives the example of Barcelona that, in 1997, opted to call its policy "intercultural as a result of dissatisfaction with the existing multicultural/assimilationists models in Europe", a policy that focused from the beginning "on promoting contact rather than separation". In France, the "idea" was expressed as "intercultural policy" in the 1970s and was a part of education policy focused on the "value of reciprocity and exchanges." This policy has led to a "political measure to install positive interaction and comprehension among students from different cultures" (Kerzil, 2002), along with what was called then "classes of integration" for the children of immigrants. In 1973, the introduction of a social policy called "intercultural education" was described as a way for "French children to learn about other cultures in order to live better together". The intercultural educational policy appears as a sort of pragmatic policy of "mutual acceptance at school and in the neighborhood". However, research based on the experience show that the policy was limited in practice to "everyday diversity" and faced problems of accomplishment.

The school as a site of intercultural policy was obviously not a coincidence. It was also not a coincidence when the school was involved in the 1989 the site of the headscarf affair that shook French society. Political and academic debates focused precisely on the function of the school as the institution that most clearly embodies the "national ideology". Was the affair a sign of the failure of "intercultural education" policy – a policy that referred to food, language, history of the country of origin, and "everyday diversity" – but did not take into consideration religion as a part of "cultural difference"? The headscarf affair not only showed the limits of intercultural education policy, but also situated secularism – laïcité – at the core of the French Republic as its fundamental value alongside a discourse on individual liberty, religious freedom, human rights, and the emancipation of women. Nevertheless, the never ended defining "cultural difference" in terms of religion, Islam, perceived as a permanent difference, contradicts integrative value of laïcité. Laïcité, as a constitutional value and as a principle representing the neutrality of the state regarding religion, could have been the basis for equal representation and recognition of all faiths (Art. 2 of the Constitution) instead of emerging against Islam as an "official religion of France." It seems that laïcité has missed its chance to truly be a universal principle through the incorporation of Islam into the public space, a religion that has been outside the history of the relationship between church and state that shaped French national character.

Laïcité is an element of national history related to the institutional setting of religion and its contextual accommodations. The separation of church and state confers institutional legal status on the Catholic clergy, the Protestants of the National Federation of Protestant Churches of France, and to the Jews governed by the Consistory created under Napoleon. With Islam as an emerging religion, the extension of institutional recognition for equal representation has been defined as a pluralist promotion of diversity. Furthering multiculturalism for Modood (2017) is to extend the privileges of the Church of England, an "institutional figure of England's and British national identity", to other faiths in order to achieve a multicultural nationalism. Non-denominational state schools should also include compulsory religious education of all faiths as a part of a national curriculum. It seems that two different national histories, different relationships between Church and State, lead to different perspectives of equal representation of religion within the institutional settings of each nation, and the understanding of the public sphere (see also Wimmer & Schiller, 2003).

While multiculturalism focuses on a national level questioning the national identity, interculturalism emphasises the local level because of the geographical and physical proximity among groups that facilitate dialogue and exchanges. Such an assumption suggests a social link between separate communities settled in one locality. But the social reality of concentrated and/or segregated neighborhoods, ghettos, or banlieues in France, or Londonistan in London, or Kreutzberg in Berlin, shows that these urban settings have become spaces of tensions among communities. Ethnic grouping in these neighborhoods reflects the failure of integration policies and urban policies, an evolution that nourishes the discourses on the failure of multiculturalism but not guarantee the success of interculturalism.

Challenge to multiculturalism and to interculturalism: transnational nationalism

The greatest challenge to the current debate on multiculturalism and interculturalism as a set of policies is the power of transnationalism. On a macro and/or micro level, both, multiculturalism and interculturalism are developed as a theory, a narrative and political paradigm in response to the management of cultural diversity within the nation-state in order to redefine citizenship, nationhood, as well as local and national solidarity. Transnationalism, however, has been developed as an experience of migrants and minorities, settled in different national societies interacting with each other beyond borders. Increasing mobility and the development of telecommunication technologies have intensified such trans-border relations and mobilizations, and have participated in the elaboration of a transnational solidarity and identification. Such an evolution is the result of intense and complex ongoing ties that migrants uphold with their country of origin and the cultural, social, economic, political and ideological transfers that occur between the departure and the receiving country and beyond. These multiple levels of participation are perceived as a challenge to the founding principles of nation-states with regard to territoriality, citizenship, and membership to a single political community.

Transnationalism brings to light multiple membership and multiple loyalties – crystallized around dual citizenship – which becomes for immigrants a way to maintain an identity rooted in the home country. Citizenship becomes then an entitlement within the country of residence. This development is used to form "diaspora politics" as a means to maintain the loyalty of the citizens "abroad" as well as to extend its power beyond territories. Turkey and Morocco, where national and religious identities are combined are the most active in such transnational politics. The main objective is to oppose the strategy of international organizations that promote global Islam by re-territorializing and re-nationalizing their belonging expressed in terms of religion and to control the citizenry and loyalty abroad as a resource for the transnationalization of the state (Kastoryano, 2016).

Home states attempt to influence integration of the state (both states) and transnational communities into a global space as a way to compete with transnational communities in their engagement of the process of globalization. States also attempt to control transnational actions, which by definition intend to bypass the state. Transnational politics reflect therefore the changes in the "paradigms of integration" as formulated by Zapata-Barrero (2017), and the perception of migration, linking increasingly the question of identity and participation to the question of security. Receiving countries are driven to collaborate with home countries to ensure migrant integration.

In this configuration, politics of integration are not a single-state policy. States (home and host) cooperate for integration to ensure re-territorialization of globalized identities with transnational action. In the case of transational Islam, these actions are promoted by international organizations through images, symbols and speeches, founded on a religious and/or ideological identification. As for Muslims in Europe, they express their attachment to the country of settlement in terms of citizenship and rights. They express also their loyalty to the country of origin in terms of emotions and identity. Being a "Muslim minority in Europe" has created a new "imagined global diaspora" and that brings a third dimension based upon a religious identification that is transnational both in essence and definition, and which goes beyond Europe. Werbner (2002) shows how "imagining their different diasporas, local Pakistani tended to position themselves imaginatively as the heroes of global battles", and argues that "diasporas are transnational communities of co-responsibility". In an "imagined global diaspora" where individuals and groups and transnational communities are connected in global networks, the traditional diaspora loses its territorial bases, in which home is an imagined place to express precisely "co-responsibility" without a territorial reference as "home", more over so for the younger generation who has an abstract image of the home country of their parents.

Thus, transnational politics of both communities and states create new configurations of nation and nationalism, of territory and power, in globalization. Communities, based on cultural, ethnic, and religious identifications and recognized by states that increasingly rely on transnational solidarities have sparked new upsurges of nationalism. States on the other hand expand their nationalism to maintain the "power" of incorporation and citizenship, in order to re-territorialize identities here and/or there.

The multiplicity of identities – national, religious, ethnic or linguistic – that are fragmented yet represented in such a structure, is "re-centralized" in a non-territorial way around a rhetoric of mobilization. The internal diversity of the transnational community is "re-centered" also around norms and values diffused by European supranational institutions and through the process by which these same institutions give the diversity a legitimacy on the international stage. Such legitimacy is driven via an inclusive discourse developed by transnational activists founded on human rights and the fight against racism or any other form of social, political and cultural exclusion. The same diversity is "re-centered" also around being a Muslim minority to provide a basis for a narrative of belonging to a global Muslim community, which is then re-interpreted in such a way as to reframe all the internal diversity into an "imagined transnational community", or an imagined global diaspora, or even an imagined global nation that defines itself as a cultural nation. The unity of the transnational community is sustained by the desire to belong to a "people" through a process of nominal appropriation of its actions and discourses, a sense of participation in its "destiny".

Although transnational communities have emerged as a logical next step to cultural pluralism and to identity politics, the recognition and representation of groups has led them at the same time, to redefine solidarities on a transnational level with new subjectivities, accompanied by the imagined geography of the "transnational nation" (Kastoryano, 2007). Its territorial frontiers are not disputed. On the contrary, its non-territorial borders follow the web of formal and/or informal networks transcending the boundaries of national territories and engendering a new means of invisible and unenclosed territorialization. This development also produces a political community in which the individual's actions inside the network become axioms of a transnational non-territorial nationalism that seeks to strengthen itself by employing discourses, symbols, images, and objects.

The development is inscribed in a global space that does not translate but rather produces an identity and generates a mode of participation across borders, as shown by the engagement of actors in the consolidation of transnational solidarities through action, and mobilization. By reflecting on the state "deficiencies" regarding human rights or citizenship, the actors seek to channel the loyalty of individuals from a territorialized political community towards a non-territorialized political community to redefine the terms of belonging and allegiance to a "global nation". This global nation finds comfort in the rhetoric of diffused unity thanks to modern technology, producing a single language – images – or a single langue such as English as a medium of participation in internet sites and email exchange. Regarding Islam on the Internet, see the work of (Roy, 2006). It is expressed both on an everyday basis and in long-term political goals; it is developed in different domains and territories - real or symbolic - trying to re-establish social relations and a common identification. This identification is seen in the violence perpetrated in the name of a cause that directly or indirectly affects an Islam which is perceived as a "global victim", an image reinforced by the rhetoric of Western humiliation and domination and propounded by what Leiken (2012) calls "Angry Muslims".

Such an evolution challenges the multicultural nationalism "imagined" by Modood (2017). Transnational nationalism focuses on an "invented", abstract identification with an "imagined global community" fuelled by external events such as wars, conflicts in other countries, and colonial relations yielding to an expression of local and transnational autonomy. Diaspora politics of home states, in their objective to re-territoiralize globalized identities, come to "re-ethnicize" them, which in return affects their attitudes in the country of settlement. It would be interesting to empirically determine how transnational actors perceive multiculturalism and how diaspora politics affects their involvement in multiculturalism as policy and as a discourse. In any case, opposition to normative multicultural nationalism and the emergence of an "imagined" transnational nationalism, old fashioned, ethno-cultural nationalism, renamed populism, started to proliferate all over Europe. Their rhetoric, political program, and capacity to mobilize public opinion nourish exiting discourses on the failure of multiculturalism and revitalize state nationalism based on the protection of territorial boundaries and national identity. The "return" of nationalism in certain European countries has used the migrants' crises attributing migrants and/or asylum seekers a transnational solidarity perceived as a threat to national sovereignty and even though the phenomenon has nothing to do with transnational networks and group membership.

How do transnational practices of individual and groups affect interculturalism and its focus on dialogue and the mutual belonging on local level? Zapata-Barrero (in press) sees in these two phenomena an overlapping situation. A group involved in transnational action and mobilization, that sees in transnationalism an "identity refuge," may or may not communicate with other groups. This perspective involves two levels of analysis which are in fact interconnected, and two interdependent modes of identification: local (territorial) and global or transnational (non-territorial). The juxtaposition of communities as a source of tension in some localities might not create an identification with "the place" because of the strength of transnational networks.

These are empirical questions. They require a field work to see how the spiraling of violence in the Middle East, the 9/11 (11 September 2001) attacks, the wars in Iraq and Syria, and many other international events that have contributed to producing both heroes and victims among the young, influence their speech and their action as a sort of de-territorialized revenge that is localized in urban areas. Violence also allows a form of territorialized and ethicized collective expression to develop, re-centering the diversity of the de-localized population around new subjectivities nourished by unifying discourses that seek to re-define solidarity and build a coherent whole. These references produce an identity that is not linked to the immediate space but to a non-territorial community, which becomes a refuge for a young generation that is looking for a cause and identification in action. The process gives rise to the formation of a transnational identity as inspiration for political action and as an instrument for cultural and religious purposes beyond national borders. Only empirical research will show individual and group dynamics, as well as international influences that will affect both multiculturalism and interculturalism. The question is how "diaspora politics" of home countries and/or international organizations and their local level networks confront, cooperate, or compete with urban politics and the management of diversity? An empirical approach can help to clarify the nature of relations among multiple, overlapping and conflicting conceptions of cultural integration and then develop a normative approach.

Conclusion

The management of diversity has led to the normative theories of multiculturalism, interculturalism, inspired by Canadian political theory and by Canadian reality. Transposed into European context, each approach has its own conception of national unity, equality and solidarity. Most analyses have been single-theory-oriented, leading to multiple, contested and controversial interpretations of integration and democratic public spaces.

Transnationalism raises the question of the limits of national public space and extends the concept of cultural integration beyond borders challenging the normative theories of multiculturalism and interculturalism bound to national societies. Whatever the ideology and objective in the understanding of integration, states are confronted today with the transnational actions of activists who try to bypass states in order to reach a global perspective of their identification and action. Solidarity beyond borders involves a multilevel interaction between home and host countries and leads the states to develop strategies of integration – territorial and non-territorial – as a way of including identity issues developed in a minority situation into their political strategy to "re-territorialize" them. The objective then is to counter non-territorial solidarity expressed in global religious terms, mostly virtual, diffused by the Internet, which attracts the young generation, urging them to reject any or all national identification, to develop a new pride, a sense of community based on a global identification.

Transnationalism engenders a distinct sense of non-territorial nationhood and generates confrontations among multiculturalist and interculturalist perspectives. They all give rise to arguments and policies that reinforce the new classical version of state nationalism. One of the challenges of globalization is to find a new source for new normative theories with regard to diversity.

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What is Wrong with Multiculturalism? A European Perspective

Kenan Malik

It is somewhat alarming to be asked to present *the* European perspective on multiculturalism. There is no such beast. Especially when compared to the Canadian discussion, opinion in Europe is highly polarised. And mine certainly is not *the* European perspective. My view is that both multiculturalists and their critics are wrong. And only by understanding why both sides are wrong will we be able to work our way through the mire in which we find ourselves.

Thirty years ago multiculturalism was widely seen as the answer to many of Europe's social problems. Today it is seen, by growing numbers of people, not as the solution to, but as the cause of, Europe's myriad social ills. That perception has been fuel for the success of far-right parties and populist politicians across Europe from Geert Wilders in Holland to Marine Le Pen in France, from the True Finns to the UK Independence Party. It even provided fuel for the obscene, homicidal rampage last year of Anders Behring Breivik in Oslo and Utøya, which in his eyes were the first shots in a war defending Europe against multiculturalism. The reasons for this transformation in the perception of multiculturalism are complex, and at the heart of what I want to talk about. But before we can discuss what the problem is with multiculturalism, we first have unpack what we mean by multiculturalism.

Part of the problem in discussions about multiculturalism is that the term has, in recent years, come to have two meanings that are all too rarely distinguished. The first is what I call the lived experience of diversity. The second is multiculturalism as a political process, the aim of which is to manage that diversity. The experience of living in a society that is less insular, more vibrant and more cosmopolitan is something to welcome and cherish. It is a case for cultural diversity, mass immigration, open borders and open minds.

As a political process, however, multiculturalism means something very different. It describes a set of policies, the aim of which is to manage and institutionalize diversity by putting people into ethnic and cultural boxes, defining individual needs and rights by virtue of the boxes into which people are put, and using those boxes to shape public policy. It is a case, not for open borders and minds, but for the policing of borders, whether physical, cultural or imaginative.

The conflation of lived experience and political policy has proved highly invidious. On the one hand, it has allowed many on the right – and not just on the right – to blame mass immigration for the failures of social policy and to turn minorities into the problem. On the other hand, it has forced many traditional liberals and radicals to abandon classical notions of liberty, such as an attachment to free speech, in the name of defending diversity. That is why it is critical to separate these two notions of multiculturalism, to defend diversity as lived experience – and all that goes with it, such as mass immigration and cultural openness – but to oppose multiculturalism as a political process.

To make my case I want to begin by questioning three myths of immigration. Three myths at the heart of the discussion about multiculturalism. Three myths created by the confusion I have just described. Three myths that have also helped maintain that confusion. The first is the idea that European nations used to be homogenous but have become plural in a historically unique fashion. The second claim is that contemporary immigration is different to previous waves, so much so that social structures need fundamental reorganization to accommodate it. And third is the belief that European nations have adopted multicultural policies because minorities demanded it. Both sides in the multiculturalism debate accept these claims. Where they differ is in whether they view immigration, and the social changes it has brought about, as a good or as an ill. Both sides, I want to suggest, are wrong, because these three premises upon which they base their arguments are flawed.

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The claim that European nations used to be homogenous but have been made diverse by mass immigration might appear to be common sense. In fact, most European nations are in fact *less* plural now than they were, say, a hundred years ago. The reason we imagine otherwise is because of historical amnesia and because we have come to adopt a highly selective standard for defining what it is to be plural.

Consider France. At the time of the French Revolution, less than half the population of France spoke French. The historian Eugene Weber has shown how traumatic and lengthy was the process of what he calls 'self-colonisation' required to unify France and her various populations. These developments created the modern French nation. But they also reinforced in the elite a sense of how alien was the mass of the population. Here is the Christian socialist Phillipe Buchez addressing the Medico-Psychological Society of Paris in 1857:

> Consider a population like ours, placed in the most favourable circumstances; possessed of a powerful civilisation; amongst the highest ranking nations in science, the arts and industry. Our task now, I maintain, is to find out how it can happen that within a population such as ours, races may form – not merely one but several races – so miserable, inferior and bastardised that they may be classed below the most inferior savage races, for their inferiority is sometimes beyond cure.

One only has to read the novels of Émile Zola or the works of Count Arthur Gobineau, one of the leading racial scientists of his day, to recognize how widespread was this sentiment.

The social and intellectual elite in France, far from viewing their nation as homogenous, regarded most of their fellow Frenchmen not as 'one of us', but as racial alien, and so inferior that they stood below the 'most inferior savage races' and were 'beyond cure'.

In Victorian England, too, the elite viewed the working class and the rural poor as the racial Other. A vignette of working-class life in the *Saturday Review*, a well-read liberal magazine of the era, is typical of English middle-class attitudes:

> The Bethnal Green poor… are a caste apart, a race of whom we know nothing, whose lives are of a quite different complexion from ours, persons with whom we have no point of contact… Slaves are separated from whites by more glaring marks of distinction; but still distinctions and separations, like those of English classes which always endure, which last from the cradle to the grave, which prevent anything like association or companionship, produce a general effect on the life of the extreme poor, and subject them to isolation, which offer a very fair parallel to the separation of the slaves from the whites.

Modern Bethnal Green is not home to warehousemen or costermongers, but lies at the heart of the Bangladeshi community in East London. Today's 'Bethnal Green poor' are often seen as culturally and racially distinct. But only those on the fringes of politics would compare the distinctiveness of Bangladeshis to that of slaves. The sense of apartness was far greater in Victorian England than it is contemporary Britain. And that's because in reality the social and cultural differences between a Victorian gentleman or factory owner, on the one hand, and a farmhand or a machinist, on the other, were much greater than those between a white resident and one of Bangladeshi origin living in Bethnal Green today.

However much they may view each other as different, a 16-year-old kid of Bangladeshi origin living in Bethnal Green, or a 16-year-old of Algerian origin living in Marseilles, or a 16-year-old of Turkish origin living in Berlin, probably wears the same clothes, listens to the same music, watches the same TV shows, follows the same football club as a 16-year-old white kid in that same city. The shopping mall and the sports field, the TV and the iPod, have all served to bind differences and create a set of experiences and cultural practices that is more common than at any time in the past.

There is nothing new, then, in plural societies. From a historical perspective contemporary societies, even those transformed by mass immigration, are not particularly plural. What is different today is the *perception* that we are living in particularly plural societies, and the perception of such pluralism in largely cultural terms. The debate about multiculturalism is a debate in which certain differences (culture, ethnicity, faith) have come to be regarded as important and others (such as class, say, or generational), which used to be perceived as important in the past, have come to be seen as less relevant. Why this has happened I will come to later.

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The second myth I want to challenge is the claim that contemporary immigration to Europe is different, and in some eyes less assimilable, than previous waves. In his much-lauded book *Reflections on a Revolution in Europe* the American writer Christopher Caldwell suggests that prior to the Second World War, immigrants came almost exclusively from other European nations, and so were easily assimilable. ‘Using the word immigration to describe intra-European movements’, Caldwell suggests, ‘makes only slightly more sense than describing a New Yorker as an “immigrant” to California’. According to Caldwell, prewar immigration between European nations was different from postwar immigration from outside Europe because, ‘immigration from neighboring countries does not provoke the most worrisome immigration questions, such as “How well will they fit in?” “Is assimilation what they want?” and, most of all, “Where are their true loyalties?”.’

In fact, those were the very questions asked of European migrants in the prewar years. In 1903, the British Royal Commission on Alien Immigration expressed fears that newcomers were inclined to live ‘according to their traditions, usages and customs’ and there were fears that there might be ‘grafted onto the English stock… the debilitated sickly and vicious products of Europe’.

Britain’s first immigration law, the 1905 Aliens Act, was designed primarily to bar European Jews, who were seen as unBritish. The Prime Minister, Arthur Balfour, observed that without such a law, ‘though the Briton of the future may have the same laws, the same institutions and constitution… nationality would not be the same and would not be the nationality we would desire to be our heirs through the ages yet to come.’

In France, nearly a third of the population in the 1930s were immigrants, mostly from Southern Europe. Today we think of Italian or Portuguese migrants as culturally similar to their French hosts. Seventy years ago they were viewed as aliens, given to crime and violence, and unlikely to assimilate into French society. ‘The notion of the easy assimilation of past European immigrants’, the French historian Max Silverman has written, ‘is a myth’.

One of the consequences of postwar migration has been to create historical amnesia about prewar attitudes, just as it has created historical amnesia about the divided nature of European societies before such immigration. From a historical perspective, there is little that is unique about contemporary migrants, or in the way that host societies perceive them.

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The third myth that underlies much of the discussion of European multiculturalism is that European nations have become multicultural because minorities wished to assert their differences. The question of the cultural difference of immigrants has certainly preoccupied the political elites. It is not a question, however, that, until recently, has particularly engaged immigrants themselves.

Take Britain. The arrival in the late 1940s and the 1950s of large numbers of immigrants from India, Pakistan and the Caribbean, led to considerable unease about its impact upon traditional concepts of Britishness. As a Colonial Office report of 1955 observed, 'a large coloured community as a noticeable feature of our social life would weaken… the concept of England or Britain to which people of British stock throughout the Commonwealth are attached'.

The migrants certainly brought with them a host of traditions and habits and cultural mores from their homelands, of which they were often very proud. But they were rarely concerned with preserving cultural differences, nor thought of it as a political issue. What inspired them was the struggle not for cultural identity but for political equality. And they recognized that at the heart of that struggle was the creation of a commonality of values, hopes and aspirations between migrants and indigenous Britons, not an articulation of unbridgeable differences.

This is equally true of the group whose traditions, beliefs and mores are widely perceived to be most distinct from those of Western societies, and hence the group that is supposedly most demanding that its differences be publicly recognized: Muslims.

The patterns of Muslim migration have, in fact, been little different to that of other communities. The best way to understand it, as of much postwar migration to Europe, is in terms of three generations: the first generation that came to Europe in the 50s and 60s; the second generation that were born or grew up in the 70s and 80; and the third generation that has come of age since then. This is, I know, a somewhat crude characterisation, but it is also useful to have a broad-brush understanding of the changing relationships between migrants and European societies. The illustrations I am giving come primarily from Britain. But the structure applies to immigration to other European countries too.

The first generation of Muslim immigrants to Britain, who came almost entirely from the Indian subcontinent, were pious in their faith, but wore it lightly. The British writer and theatre director Pervaiz Khan, whose family came to Britain in the 1950s, remembers his father and uncles going to the pub for a pint. 'They did not bring drink home', he says. 'And they did not make a song and dance about it. But everyone knew they drank. And they were never ostracised for it.' No woman wore a hijab, let alone a niqab or burqa. His family 'rarely fasted at Ramadan', Khan says, 'and often missed Friday prayers. They did not boast about it. But they were not pariahs for it. It is very different from today.'

Khan's experience was not unusual. My parents were very similar. And those of most of my friends. Their faith expressed for them a relationship with God, not a sacrosanct public identity. Islam was not, in their eyes, an all-encompassing philosophy.

The second generation – my generation – was primarily secular. I am of a generation that did not think of itself as 'Muslim' or 'Hindu' or 'Sikh', or even often as 'Asian', but rather as 'black'. Black was for us not an ethnic label but a political badge. The 'Muslim community', in the sense of a community that defined itself solely, or even primarily, by faith did not exist when I was growing up. Neither did the Sikh community, or the Hindu community.

Unlike our parents' generation, who had largely put up with discrimination, we were fierce in our opposition to racism. But we were equally fierce in our opposition to religion and to the traditions that often marked immigrant communities. Religious organizations were, in my youth, barely visible. The organizations that drove migrant communities were primarily secular, often socialist: the Asian Youth Movements, for instance, or the Indian Workers Association.

It is only with the generation that has come of age since the late 1980s, that the question of cultural differences has come to be seen as important. A generation that, ironically, is far more integrated than the first generation, is also the generation that is most insistent on maintaining its 'difference'. That in itself should make us question the received wisdom about how and why multicultural policies emerged.

The shift in the meaning of a single word expresses the transformation I am talking about. When I was growing up to be 'radical' was to be militantly secular, self-consciously Western and avowedly left-wing. To be someone like me. Today 'radical' in a Muslim context means the very opposite. It describes a religious fundamentalist, someone who is anti-Western, who is opposed to secularism.

What I have said of Britain is true also of other European countries, Germany, for instance, or France. The irony in France is that, for all the current hostility of the French state to Islam, and to public displays of Islamic identity, such as the burqa, for most of the postwar years, while migrant workers were defiantly secular, successive governments regarded such secularism as a threat and attempted to foist religion upon them, encouraging them to maintain their traditional cultural identities. Paul Dijoud, minister for immigrant workers in the 1970s government of Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, declared that 'The right to a culture identity allows the immigrant, despite his geographical distance, to stay close to his country.' The government sought in Islam 'a stabilizing force which would turn the faithful from deviance, delinquency or membership of unions or revolutionary parties'. When a series of strikes hit car factories in the late seventies, the government encouraged employers to build prayer rooms in an effort to wean immigrant workers, who formed a large proportion of the workforce, away from militant activity.

The claim that minority communities have demanded that their cultural differences be publicly recognized and affirmed is, then, historically false. That demand has emerged only recently. The myth that multiculturalism was a response to minority demands gets cause and effect the wrong way round. Minority communities did not force politicians to introduce multicultural policies. Rather, as I shall show later, the desire to celebrate one's culture identity has itself, in part at least, been shaped by the implementation of multicultural policies.

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The three myths I have talked about are important because they underlie so much of the discussion of immigration and multiculturalism in Europe, and shape both sides of the debate. Having hopefully laid them to rest, I want now to rethink both multiculturalism and the criticism of it. And to begin to do that by looking at how multicultural policies historically have developed.

This is, however, not a single story. Throughout Europe, multicultural policies have developed in response to mass immigration. But they have done so in different ways. Britain and Norway, Sweden and Germany, Holland and Denmark – every country has its own specific multicultural history to tell. What I want to do, therefore, is to look at two contrasting histories – that of Britain and Germany – to understand what these histories have in common despite their differences.

Let us begin in Britain. While the question of cultural differences preoccupied the political elite in the 1950s and 1960s, it was not one, as I have already suggested, that particularly troubled immigrants themselves. What preoccupied them was not the desire to be treated differently, but the fact that they were treated differently. Racism and inequality, not religion and ethnicity, were, for them, the key issues.

Throughout the Sixties and Seventies, four big issues dominated the struggle for political equality: opposition to discriminatory immigration controls; the struggle against workplace discrimination; the fight against racist attacks; and, most explosively, the issue of police brutality.

These struggles politicised a new generation of black and Asian activists and came to an explosive climax in the riots that tore through Britain's inner cities in the late Seventies and early Eighties. The authorities recognized that unless black communities were given a political stake in the system, their frustration could threaten the very stability of British cities. It was against this background that the policies of multiculturalism emerged.

Local authorities in inner city areas pioneered a new strategy of making black and Asian communities feel part of British society by organising consultations, drawing up equal opportunity policies, establishing race relations units and dispensing millions of pounds in grants to minority organisations. At the heart of the strategy was a redefinition of racism. Racism now meant not simply the denial of equal rights but the denial of the right to be different. The old idea of British values or a British identity was defunct. Rather than be expected to accept British values, or to adopt a British identity, different peoples should have the right to express their own identities, explore their own histories, formulate their own values, pursue their own lifestyles.

Scepticism about the idea of a common national identity arose in part from cynicism about the idea of 'Britishness'. There was widespread recognition among blacks and Asians that talk about Britishness was a means not of extending citizenship to all Britons, whatever their colour and creed, but of denying equal rights to certain groups. But the new strategy did not simply challenge old-fashioned ideas of Britishness. It transformed the very meaning of equality. Equality now meant not possessing the same rights as everyone else, despite differences of race, ethnicity, culture or faith, but possessing different rights, because of them.

In 2000, the Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain, chaired by the philosopher Bhikhu Parekh, published its report that famously concluded that Britain was a 'community of communities' in which equality 'must be defined in a culturally sensitive way and applied in a discriminating but not discriminatory manner'. The Parekh report has come to be seen as defining the essence of multiculturalism. But the arguments at its heart had emerged out of the response, two decades earlier, to the inner city riots. The consequences of these arguments I will come to later. But first I want to turn to the question of multiculturalism in Germany.

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Germany's road to multiculturalism was different to Britain's, though the starting point was the same. Like many West European nations, Germany faced an immense labour shortage in the postwar years and actively recruited foreign workers. Unlike in Britain, the new workers came not from former colonies, but initially from Italy, Spain and Greece, and then from Turkey. And these workers came not as immigrants, still less as potential citizens, but as 'guest workers', who were expected to return to their country of origin when no longer required to service the German economy.

Over time, however, immigrants became transformed from a temporary necessity to a permanent presence. This was partly because Germany continued relying on their labour, and partly because immigrants, and more so their children, came to see Germany as home. But the German state continued to view them as outsiders and to refuse them citizenship. There are nearly 4 million people of Turkish origin in Germany today. Barely half a million have managed to become citizens. Nor is it just first-generation immigrants who are denied citizenship; their German-born children are excluded too.

Instead of creating an open society, into which immigrants were welcome as equals, German politicians from the 1980s onwards dealt with the so-called 'Turkish problem' through a policy of multiculturalism. In place of citizenship and a genuine status in society, immigrants were 'allowed' to keep their own culture, language and lifestyles. The consequence was the creation of parallel communities. The policy did not so much represent respect for diversity as provide a means of avoiding the issue of how to create a common, inclusive culture.

First-generation immigrants were often secular, and those that were religious wore their faith lightly. Today, almost a third of adult Turks in Germany regularly attend mosque, a far higher rate than among Turkish communities elsewhere in Western Europe, and higher than in most parts of Turkey. First-generation women almost never wore headscarves. Many of their daughters do. Without any incentive to participate in the national community, many did not bother learning German.

At the same time as Germany's multicultural policies encouraged immigrants to be at best indifferent to mainstream German society, at worst openly hostile to it, they also made Germans increasingly antagonistic towards Turks. The sense of what it meant to be German was in part defined against the values and beliefs of the excluded migrant communities. And having been excluded, it has become easier to scapegoat immigrants for Germany's social ills. A recent poll showed that more than a third of Germans think that the country is 'over-run by foreigners and more than half felt that Arabs were 'unpleasant'.

In Germany, the formal denial of citizenship to immigrants led to the policy of multiculturalism. In Britain, the promotion of multicultural policies led to the de facto treatment of individuals from minority communities not as citizens but simply as members of particular ethnic groups. The consequence in both cases has been the creation of fragmented societies, the alienation of many minority groups and the scapegoating of immigrants.

The story I have told so far is of a Europe that is not as plural as many imagine it to be, and of immigrants less assertive of their cultural identities than they are claimed to be. Multicultural policies emerged not because migrants demanded them, but primarily because the political elite needed them to manage immigration and to assuage anger created by racism.

Why, then, have we come to imagine that we are living in particularly plural societies, in which our cultural identities are all-important? The answer lies in a complex set of social, political and economic changes over the past half century, changes that include the narrowing of the political sphere, the collapse of the left, the demise of class politics, the erosion of more universalist visions of social change. Many of these changes helped pave the way for multicultural policies. At the same time, the implementation of such policies helped create a more fragmented society. Or, to put it another way, multicultural policies have helped create the very problems they were meant to have resolved. I want to demonstrate this through two examples. The first is a riot in Britain, of which you may not have heard, the second a cartoon crisis in Denmark, about which everyone has heard.

In 1985, the Handsworth area of the English city of Birmingham was rocked by riots. Blacks, Asians and whites took to the streets in protest against poverty, unemployment and, in particular, police harassment. In the violence that followed, two people were killed and dozens injured. It was almost the last flicker of the Eighties inner city conflagrations.

Twenty years later, in October 2005, another riot erupted in the area. This time the fighting was not between youth and police but between blacks and Asians. An unsubstantiated – and almost certainly untrue – rumour that a Jamaican girl had been raped by a group of Asian men, led to a weekend of violence between the two communities, during which a young black man was murdered.

Why did two communities that had fought side by side in 1985 fight against each other 20 years later? The answer lies largely in the policies introduced by Birmingham Council after the original riots. In response to those riots, the Council proposed a new political framework for the engagement of minority communities. It created nine so-called Umbrella Groups, organizations based on ethnicity and faith that were supposed to represent the needs of their particular communities while aiding policy development and resource allocation. These included the African and Caribbean People's Movement, the Bangladeshi Islamic Projects Consultative Committee, the Birmingham Chinese Society, the Council of Black-led Churches, the Hindu Council, the Irish Forum, the Vietnamese Association, the Pakistani Forum and the Sikh Council of Gurdwaras.

Birmingham Council's policies were aimed at drawing minority communities into the democratic process. The trouble was, there was precious little democracy in the process. The groups themselves had no democratic mandate, and indeed no mandate at all. After all why should the Council of Black-led Churches presume to speak for the needs and aspirations of African Caribbeans in Birmingham? Why should all Bangladeshis be represented by an Islamic organisation, or all Sikhs by the gurdwaras? And indeed what is *the* Bangladeshi community or *the* Sikh community and what are its needs and aspirations?

Imagine if the council had set up a 'White Forum' to represent the needs of the white community in Birmingham. Could such a group have represented the interests of all white people in the city? Clearly not. Why should we imagine that Bangladeshis or Sikhs or African Caribbeans are any different?

This points up a paradox in the multicultural vision. The starting point of multicultural policies is the acceptance of societies as diverse. Yet, there is an unstated assumption that such diversity ends at the edges of minority communities. Birmingham council's policies, like much multicultural policy, treated minority communities as homogeneous wholes, ignoring conflicts within those communities. As the council's own report put it,

> The perceived notion of the homogeneity of minority ethnic communities has informed a great deal of race equality work to date. The effect of this, amongst others, has been to place an over-reliance on individuals who are seen to represent the needs of the whole community and resulted in simplistic approaches toward tackling community needs.

Multicultural policies, in other words, have not responded to the needs of communities, but have helped create those communities by imposing identities on people. And they have created communities by ignoring internal conflicts – conflicts that arise out of class, gender and intra-religious and other differences. What multicultural policies do is empower not minority communities, but so-called 'community leaders', who achieve power not because they represent their community but because they have a relationship with the state.

At the same time as they ignored conflicts within minority communities, Birmingham's policies created conflicts between them. As one academic study of Birmingham's policies observes,

> The model of engagement through Umbrella Groups tended to result in competition between black and minority ethnic communities for resources. Rather than prioritising needs and cross-community working, the different Umbrella Groups generally attempted to maximise their own interests.

Once political power and financial resources became allocated by ethnicity, then people began to identify themselves in terms of those ethnicities, and only those ethnicities.

Imagine that you are a secular Bangladeshi living in Birmingham. You don't think of yourself as a Muslim, you may not even think yourself as Bangladeshi. Over time, however, you come to see yourself in those terms, not just because those identities provide you with access to power, influence and resources, but also because those identities possess a social reality through receiving constant confirmation and affirmation. It is how you are seen; so it is how you come to see yourself. You come to fear and resent African Caribbeans and Sikhs and the Irish, partly because they are competitors for that pot of council largesse and power, and partly because the rules of the game are that your identity has to be affirmed as distinctive and different from the identities of other groups. Being Muslim also means being not-Irish, not-Sikh and not-African Caribbean.

The consequence is what the great Indian-born economist Amartya Sen has called ‘plural monoculturalism’ – policy driven by the myth that society is made up of a series of distinct, homogeneous cultures that dance around each other. And policy makes such a segmented society a reality. The result in Birmingham was to entrench divisions between black and Asian communities to an extent that sparked inter-communal rioting.

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Not only have multicultural policies entrenched the idea of homogenous communities, with disastrous consequences. They have also enabled the most conservative figures to be seen as the authentic voices of those communities.

Consider, for instance, the controversy over the Danish cartoons. We all know what happened. A Danish newspaper, *Jyllands-Posten*, published a series of inflammatory cartoons depicting the Prophet Mohammed. Islam forbids the depiction of the Prophet. So millions of Muslims worldwide were enraged to the point of violence.

Except it never happened like that. For a start, there is no universal Islamic prohibition on the representation of the Prophet. It was, in fact, common to portray him until comparatively recently. A number of Islamic, especially Shiite, traditions continue to accept the pictorial representation of Muhammed.

Shortly after *Jyllands Posten* published the cartoons, the Egyptian newspaper *Al Fagr* reprinted them. They were accompanied by a critical commentary, but *Al Fagr* did not think it necessary to blank out Muhammad’s face, and faced no opprobrium for not doing so. Egypt’s religious and political authorities, even as they were demanding an apology from the Danish Prime Minister, raised no objections to *Al Fagr*’s full frontal photos.

So, if there is no universal prohibition to the depiction of Muhammad, why were Muslims universally appalled by the caricatures? They weren’t. And those that were driven by political zeal rather than by theological fervour. The publications of the cartoons in September 2005 caused no immediate reaction, even in Denmark. Journalists, disappointed by the lack of controversy, contacted a number of imams for their response. Among the first was Ahmed Abu Laban. He seized upon the cartoons to transform himself into a spokesman for Denmark’s Muslims. Even so, it took more than four months of often hysterical campaigning, and considerable arm-twisting by Saudi diplomats, to create a major controversy.

Why did journalists contact Abu Laban in the first place? His Islamic Society of Denmark had little support. Out of a population of 180,000 Danish Muslims, fewer than a thousand attended the Society’s Friday prayers. He was, however, infamous for his support for Osama bin Laden and the 9/11 attacks. From a journalistic viewpoint, it made sense to get a quote from someone so controversial. But politically, too, it made sense.

Western liberals have come to see figures like Abu Laban as the true, authentic voice of Islam. The Danish Muslim MP Nasser Khader tells of a conversation with Toger Seidenfaden, editor of *Politiken*, a left-wing newspaper highly critical of the caricatures. ‘He said to me that cartoons insulted all Muslims’, Khader recalls. ‘I said I was not insulted. He said, “But you’re not a real Muslim”.’ In liberal eyes, in other words, to be a real Muslim is to find the cartoons offensive. Once Muslim authenticity is so defined, then only a figure such as Abu Laban can be seen as a true Muslim voice.

The myths about the Danish cartoons – that all Muslims hated the cartoons and that it was a theological conflict – helped turn Abu Laban into an authentic voice of Islam, and to silence other voices. At the same time Abu Laban's views seemed to confirm the myths about the Danish cartoons.

The question at the heart of the Danish cartoon controversy is not simply '*what* is offensive?' but also '*who* decides what is offensive?' In other words, 'Who speaks for the community?' Abu Laban or Nasser Khader? That is also the question at the heart of many of the flashpoints about 'offensiveness', from the global confrontation over Salman Rushdie's *The Satanic Verses* to the local struggle over Sikh writer Gurpreet Kaur Bhatti's play *Bezhti* which was forced off stage in 2005 by Sikh activists in Birmingham who objected to it.

The issue of free speech and the giving of offence has become central to the multiculturalism debate. Speech, many argue, must necessarily be less free in a plural society. For such societies to function and be fair, we need to show respect for all cultures and beliefs. And to show respect for all cultures and beliefs requires us to police pubic discourse about those cultures and beliefs, both to minimise friction between antagonistic cultures and beliefs, and to protect the dignity of those individuals embedded in them. As the sociologist Tariq Modood has put it,

> If people are to occupy the same political space without conflict, they mutually have to limit the extent to which they subject each others' fundamental beliefs to criticism.

One of the ironies of living in a plural society, it seems, is that the preservation of diversity requires us to leave *less* room for a diversity of views.

Leaving aside the question of whether there is anything morally wrong with giving offence (and I don't believe there is), the problem with this line of argument is that what is often regarded as offence to a community is in reality a debate within that community. That is why so many of the flashpoints over offensiveness have been over works produced by minority artists – not just Salman Rushdie and Gurpreet Kaur Bhatti, but also Hanif Kuresihi, Monica Ali, Sooreh Hera, Taslima Nasrin, MF Hussain, and so on.

Take the Rushdie affair. Neither Rushdie nor his critics spoke for the Muslim community. Each represented different strands of opinion in that community. Rushdie gave voice to a radical, secular sentiment that in the 1980s was deeply entrenched. Rushdie's critics spoke for some of the most conservative strands. Their campaign against *The Satanic Verses* was not to protect Muslim communities from unconscionable attack from anti-Muslim bigots, but, rather, to protect their own privileged position within those communities from political attack from radical critics, to assert their right to be the truev oice of Islam by denying legitimacy to such critics. And they succeeded at least in part because secular liberals embraced them as the 'authentic' voice of the Muslim community.

Just as Abu Laban was seen as an authentic Muslim and Nasser Khader as not a proper one, so Rushdie's critics were seen as authentic Muslims and Kaur Bhatti's critics as proper Sikhs, while Rushdie and Kaur Bhatti themselves were regarded as too Westernized, secular or progressive to be truly of their community. The consequence is that the most conservative voices are often seen as the authentic representatives of those communities, while the progressive voices get marginalized.

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Having explored the problems of multiculturalism, I want briefly to look at the criticisms of multiculturalism. Much of that criticism is undoubtedly driven by racism, bigotry and sheer hatred for the Other. Nowhere is this more savagely evident than in the case of Anders Behring Breivik, the Norwegian mass murderer.

Many feel that faced with a monster like Breivik, we must close ranks and defend that which he wishes to destroy. It is a version of an argument that has gained ground as rightwing leaders, from Germany's Angela Merkel to Britain's David Cameron to former French President Nicolas Sarkozy, have in recent years become more fiercein their criticism of multiculturalism. It is an argument that misunderstands both multiculturalism and Breivik's hatred. The real target of Breivik's assault is not so much multiculturalism as immigrants, immigration and diversity.

The problem with multiculturalism, I have suggested, is that in putting people in ethnic boxes it undermines diversity. I am critical of multiculturalism precisely because I want to defend diversity. Breivik, however, does not oppose multiculturalism because he wants to defend diversity. Rather, he opposes diversity because he wants to put people into cultural boxes, in his case primarily labeled 'Christian' and 'Muslim'. In his twisted, fantasy world the presence of Muslims in the Christian box pollutes and defiles it and needs to be eliminated.

Few but the most psychopathic have any sympathy for Breivik's homicidal frenzy. Yet, many agree with his intellectual assault. The idea that 'Christian Europe' is under threat, that Muslim immigration amounts to an invasion, and that 'Western civilization' is facing collapse finds a widespread hearing. In a television debate during the French Presidential elections, Nikolas Sarkozy called for a restoration of border controls and passport checks in order 'to defend a European civilization'. Christopher Caldwell, whose work I mentioned earlier, suggests that Islam has 'broken' the fundamentals of the European tradition, 'not enhancing or validating European culture', but 'supplanting it'. In his polemical screed *America Alone*, the Canadian journalist Mark Steyn talks of the Madrid train bombings and of 7/7 attacks on the London transport system as the 'opening shots of a European civil war' that will lead to 'societal collapse', 'fascist revivalism' and a never-to-return journey into 'the long Eurabian night'.

Such ideas draw their power from a vision of a world torn apart by a 'clash of civilizations'. An idea first popularized by the American political scientist Samuel Huntingdon a decade before 9/11, it has, for many, come to define the decade after.

What is striking about these two approaches – multiculturalism, on the one hand, the clash of civilizations, on the other – is how much they have in common. It is true that there is little love lost between multiculturalists and clash of civilization warriors. The former accuse the latter of pandering to racism and Islamophobia, while the latter talk of the former as appeasing Islamism. Beneath the hostility, however, the two sides share basic assumptions about the nature of culture, identity and difference. Both view the key social divisions as cultural or civilizational. Both see cultures, or civilizations, as homogenous entities. Both insist on the crucialimportance of cultural identity and on the preservation of such identity. Both perceive irresolvable conflicts arising from incommensurate values.

It's not just multiculturalists and clash of civilizational warriors who draw upon these themes. The far right, too, in recent years, has increasingly, in public at least, swapped the old language of biologicaldifference, for the new idiom of *cultural* identity. At the heart of the far right and populist assault on multiculturalism is a defence of 'my culture', 'my history', 'my tradition'.

Listen to the language that Breivik employs. Multiculturalism, he told his trial, is a 'hate ideology'. He lamented its 'deconstruction of European cultures and traditions', and saw himself as acting 'in defence of my culture and of my people'. This is precisely the language of culture and identity that multiculturalism has done so much to foster in recent years.

If the far right has appropriated the language of pluralism, many pluralists have slipped into the idiom of exclusion. The late Isaiah Berlin was probably the pre-eminent philosopher of modern pluralism, hugely influential, not least on that torchbearer of Canadian liberalism, Michael Ignatieff. Shortly before his death Berlin was interviewed by the political philosopher Steven Lukes. Was it possible, Lukes asked, for peoples of different cultures to live together?

'When you have two peoples of different origins and cultures', Berlin replied, 'it is difficult for them to live together in peace… it is quite natural that each side should think that they cannot lead free lives in an integrated society if the others are there in quantity.' Black immigration to Western Europe, he added, was 'a problem' because 'cultures which have grown up with no contact with one another have now collided'.

Berlin is not alone in making a multiculturalist case for 'keeping them out'. Will Kymlicka, who gave this lecture four years ago, has perhaps inherited Berlin's mantle as the most important and cogent philosopher of multiculturalism, a highly subtle thinker, and an unswerving liberal. In his book *Multicultural Politics,* Professor Kymlicka makes a case for the right of cultures to protect their unique characters from changes wrought from the outside. 'It is right and proper', he argues, 'that the character of a culture changes as a result of the choices of its members'. But 'while it is one thing to learn from the larger world', he insists, it is quite another 'to be swamped by it'.

That is a telling phrase. For the fear of being 'swamped' has long been a rightwing trope, used to whip up fears about immigration. It's at the heart of the current hysteria about Islam. Professor Kymlicka is liberal to his bones, resolutely hostile to the arguments against immigration and Islam. Yet, once it becomes a matter of political principle that cultures should not be swamped by outsiders, then it is difficult to know how one could possibly resist the anti-immigration arguments of the right.

The irony of the polarised debate in Europe is that the assault on multiculturalism is all too often pursued through the language of multiculturalism. Perhaps the biggest indictment of multiculturalism is that it has transformed racism into another cultural identity.

* * * * *

I began this talk by distinguishing between the idea of diversity as lived experience and that of multiculturalism as a political process. I want to end this talk by returning to that distinction.

The real failure of multiculturalism as a political process, it seems to me, is its failure to understand what is valuable about diversity as lived experience.

When we say that we live in a diverse society, what we mean is that it is a messy world out there, full of clashes and conflicts. And that is all for the good, for it is out of such clashes and conflicts that cultural and political engagement emerges. Diversity is important, not in and of itself, but because it allows us to break out of our culture-bound boxes, by engaging in dialogue and debate and by putting different values, beliefs and lifestyles to the test.

But the very thing that is valuable about diversity – the cultural and ideological clashes that it brings about – is the very thing that many people fear. And that fear takes two forms. On the one hand, you have the nationalist sentiment: immigration is undermining the national fabric, eroding our sense of Britishness or Frenchness or Germanness. And on the other you have the multicultural argument: diversity is good, but it has to be policed to minimise the clashes and conflicts and frictions it brings in its wake.

To say that clashes and conflicts can be good does not mean, of course, that every clash and conflict is a good. Political conflicts are often useful because they repose social problems in a way that asks: ‘How can we change society to overcome that problem?’ We might disagree on the answer, but the debate itself is a useful one.

Multiculturalism, on the other hand, by reposing political problems in terms of culture or faith, transforms political conflicts into a form that makes them neither useful nor resolvable. Multicultural policies both constrain the kinds of clashes of opinion that could prove politically fruitful, and unleash the kinds of conflicts that are socially damaging. They transform political debates into cultural collisions and, by imprisoning individuals within their cultures and identities, make such collisions both inevitable and insoluble.

The lesson of Europe, it seems to me, is that if we want to preserve diversity as lived experience, we need also to challenge multiculturalism as a political process.

Seminar 9

Huggler, J. (2018). Row over 'sexist' German national anthem. *The Telegraph*. 5 March 2018. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/03/05/row-sexist-german-national-anthem/

Row over 'sexist' German national anthem

Justin Huggler

Germany is facing calls to remove the word “fatherland” from its national anthem — but not because of any perceived nationalist overtones or links to the Nazi era.

Instead feminists are calling for the word to be removed because they say it is sexist. In a letter to staff leaked to the German press, the government’s equal opportunities commissioner called for the anthem to be made gender neutral. "Why don't we make our national anthem gender sensitive?” Kristin Rose-Möhring wrote in the leaked letter. “It wouldn't hurt, would it?” She suggested the word “fatherland” be replaced with “homeland”, and also called for the word “brotherly” to be changed to “courageous”.

But the German national anthem is not likely to be changed any time soon. Angela Merkel, who despite being the most powerful woman in the world has publicly declared she is no feminist, dismissed the proposal. “The chancellor is very happy with our nice national anthem as it is in its traditional form and doesn’t see any need for change," her spokesman said.

The Deutschlandlied is already one of the most heavily edited national anthems in the world. The original words were written by the poet August Heinrich Hoffmann in 1841, but since 1945 only the third verse has been sung, with the other two considered inappropriate.

The first verse which famously begins “Deutschland, Deutschland über alles” originally referred to attempts to unify separate principalities into a single country. But after being appropriated and used as propaganda by the Nazis, it is considered taboo in modern Germany — so much so that the US Tennis Association issued a hasty apology after playing it by mistake in last year’s Fed Cup tournament.

It is doubtful Ms Rose-Möhring would approve of the second verse, which was dropped for somewhat earthier reasons. It begins “German women, German loyalty, German wine and German song” and goes on to sing the praises of German wine and women at length — though it does not mention German beer for some reason.

The only remaining verse opens with the less controversial “Unity and justice and freedom for the German fatherland”, which has come to be an unofficial German motto.

Germany is not the first country to face calls to make its national anthem gender neutral. Canada’s senate earlier this year voted to change the words of O Canada from “True patriot love in all your sons command” to “in all of us command”. Justin Trudeau, the Canadian prime minister, hailed the move as “a significant sign of equality”.

Buncombe, A. (2018). Justin Trudeau interrupts a woman to mansplain 'mankind'. Independent. 06 February. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/justin-trudeau-mankind-mansplaining-peoplekind-canada-pm-a8197776.html

Justin Trudeau interrupts a woman to mansplain ‘peoplekind’

Andrew Buncombe

Justin Trudeau, the Canadian leader who has declared himself a feminist and oversees a cabinet half-filled with women, has found himself in hot water after he interrupted a young woman to tell her to use the word “peoplekind” rather than mankind.

The Canadian Prime Minister was hosting a Q&A session at MacEwan University in Edmonton, when a young woman from the World Mission Society Church of God, a feminist church founded in South Korea, stood to ask a question about volunteering. The unidentified woman asked Mr Trudeau whether the Canadian government could ease regulations that limit volunteering with religious organisations. “So, that’s why we came here today to ask you, to also look into the policies that religious charitable organisations have in our legislation so that it can also be changed because maternal love is the love that’s going to change the future of mankind,” she said, according to the *Toronto Sun*.

Mr Trudeau stopped her and said: “We like to say peoplekind, not necessarily mankind because it’s more inclusive.”

The woman reportedly took the Prime Minister’s intervention in good spirits and replied: “There we go, exactly.”

But Mr Trudeau, 46, was more than gently mocked on social media where he was accused of mansplaining. Moreover, he was truing to mansplain the meaning of mankind.

The Canadian leader has been one of the most outspoken male leaders for pushing for gender equality, at least in terms of optics. Last year, he wrote an essay in *Marie Claire* in which he said “our sons have the power and the responsibility to change our culture of sexism”.

Last month, speaking at Davos he said: “MeToo, TimesUp, the Women’s March, these movements tell us that we need to have a critical discussion on women’s rights, equality and power dynamics of gender.”

He added: “Sexual harassment for example, in business and in government, is a systemic problem and it is unacceptable. As leaders we need to recognize and to act to show that truly time is up.”

Cahill, S., Cathail, S.O. (2007). The Politics of the Irish Language Under the English and British Governments. The Proceedings of the Barra O Donnabhain Symposium, 2007. https://as.nyu.edu/content/dam/nyu-as/irelandHouse/documents/0111-0126_PoliticsOfTheIrishLanguage.pdf

The Politics of the Irish Language Under the English and British Governments

Sean Cahill
Sean O Cathail

There is a strong connection between the Irish Gaelic language revival and politics.[1] In the nineteenth century, Douglas Hyde, leader of die Gaelic League *(ConradhnaGaeilge)*, portrayed Gaelic as the *sine qua non* of Irish national identity. Hyde argued that Ireland's native language represented its strongest andperhaps sole legitimate claim to nationhood. Berating die Irish for abandoning the language, he wrote:

> I wish to show you diat in Anglicising ourselves wholesale we have dirown away widi a light heart die best claim we have upon the world's recognition of us as a separate nationality. What did Mazzini say? What is Goldwin Smith never tired of declaiming? What do the *Spectator* and *Saturday Renew* harp on? That we ought to be content as an integral part of the Linited Kingdom because we have lost the robes of nationality, our language and customs. It has always been very curious to me how Irish sentiment sticks in this halfway house — how it continues to apparently hate the English, and the same time continues to imitate them; how it continues to clamour for recognition as a distinct nationality, and at the same time throws away with both hands what would make it so.[2]

The centrality that Hyde accords to die language in Irish claims to nationhood is typical of the rhetoric of turn of the century cultural nationalism. It's also interesting that those opposed to Irish autonomy and claims to nationhood posit the weakened state of the language as central to their delegitimizing claims. Clearly Gaelic, though demographically and even culturally peripheral at this point in time, was symbolically central in debates over the political future of Ireland.

In the north of Ireland during and since "The Troubles," there has been a strong connection between republicans and the Gaelic revival. We're familiar with the joke, from die time when there were many republicans in prison: "Maybe Gaelic will die in the *Gaeltacht*, but it will survive in die gaoltacht." ("Gaol" is die Irish-English spelling for "jail.") Sinn Fein activist Padraig O Maolcraoibhe explains that for republican prisoners "stripped of everything" — including their clothes during the push for political prisoner status — "they realized that the most Irish thing they had was their Irish language. Learning it, speaking it all day, was a way of resisting, of asserting your identity."[3] Sinn Fein President Gerry Adams argued "that the restoration of our culture must be a crucial part of our struggle and that the restoration of the Irish language must be a central part of the cultural struggle," echoing the view of republican activist and Trinity College Professor Mairtin O Cadhain that "the reconquest of Ireland will begin with the reconquest of the Irish language."[4]

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1 It's a great honor to speak at Glucksman Ireland House at the Barra O Donnabhain Symposium. I read Barra's wonderful articles in the *Irish Echo,* and I learned with him in Esopus, New York, with *Daltat na Gaeilge.* He was a gentleman. And I am thankful to Padraig O Ceartiill, my teacher at New York University for sis years now.

2 Douglas Hyde, 1894, quoted in Aodan Mac Poilin, "Plus Cm Change: The Irish Language and Politics," *The Itish Language in Northern Ireland,* ed. Aodan Mac Poilin (Belfast: Ultach Trust, 1997), 35—36.

3 *Padraig O Maolcraoibhe,* The Role of *I* montage in Irelands CulturalReriral *(Belfast: Sinn Fein, 1984), 9, cited in Tony Crowley,* The Polities of Language in Ireland, 1366—
1922: ,1 *Sourcebook* (New York: Routledge, 2000), 7.

4 Gerry Adams, *The Politics of Irish Freedom* (Dingle, Co. Kerry: Brandon Books, 1987), 143-144, cited in Crowley, *The Politics of Language in Ireland,* 7.

The Gaelic revival is centered in republican areas of the north. Drive around west and north Belfast and you will see several murals depicting literary and mythic figures with inscriptions in Gaelic. One mural in Ardoyne depicts a teacher and students at a hedge school — the illegal schools held in the fields to circumvent the Penal Laws banning education for Catholics — with die inscription *"Labhair an teanga Gaeilge Horn*," or "Speak the Gaelic language with me." Gaelic language street names placed there by residents often demarcate nationalist, mostly Catholic neighborhoods. Llntil recently, soldiers, police and/or unionists would paint-bomb these signs. A republican slogan is *"Tiotfaidh ar la*" — "Our day will come." Gaelic has long been associated with republican, or at least nationalist, politics.[5] Many decry die politicization of Gaelic, particularly by republican leaders. One Protestant learner said,

> Every time [Gerry Adams] opens his mouth he puts a nail in die coffin of die language for die Prods. I know a guy... who's really interested in Irish, and the other day Gerry Adams said somediing in Irish and he says, "That's it." He's finished... they're using the Irish language, they're *abusing* it... It's used in die jails! All the political prisoners in die jails have Irish. They're taking it and making it their own.[6]

The political experiences of Gaelic are often pushed into the background due to a desire to encourage as many as possible, including Protestants (some of whom are nationalists) and unionists, to learn the language. With just a few tens of thousands of native speakers left in the world — many living in Britain or the LIS. due to the lack of jobs in their economically peripheral home regions — those seeking a revival of Gaelic attempt to construct as broad a tent as possible. It is also important to view Irish Gaelic as the heritage of all people in Ireland, and to acknowledge, as Padraig O Snodaigh, the central role Protestants played in die preservation and study of Gaelic from die late eighteenth through early twentieth centuries.[7]

While proponents of Gaelic should encourage its learning by Unionists and Protestants, full depoliticization is amnesic and ahistorical. It's important to acknowledge the role of British policy toward Irish Gaelic in order to understand the role of language in the formation of Irish identity, as well as to articulate affirmative proposals that die British government should take to reverse the cumulative damage its policies have caused. As one Belfast human rights group notes,

> There has been great play made of die fact that the language has been politicized by nationalists. This thesis, however, refuses to acknowledge that it was the experience of invasion which first politicised die language when its eradication was seen as a political objective by the colonizers.[8]

For more than six centuries, British policy in Ireland has aimed at the destruction of the Irish Gaelic language.[9] British repression of Gaelic continued into the contemporary period, where "until recently, the practice of the British State in Northern Ireland towards the use of the Irish

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5 In general, republicans are Irish people who are willing to take up arms to liberate Ireland from British rule, while nationalists support achieving British withdrawal and reunification of the country through nonviolent means. However, some republicans are pacifists and oppose violence. Similarly, unionists are usually those supporting British rule in Northern Ireland who oppose paramilitary violence, while loyalists are supporters of union with Britain who are often willing to use violence not only against republicans, but also against Catholics in general. Again, this distinction can get blurred, as some mainstream unionists have no problem with unjustified state violence against nonviolent nationalist protesters, and make statements that incite and justify loyalist violence.

6 Gordon McCoy, "Protestant Learners of Irish in Northern Ireland," in *The Irish Tanguage in Northern Ireland* ed. Aodan Mac Poilin (Belfast: LTltach Trust, 1997), 161.

7 Padraig O Snodaigh, *Hidden Ulster: Protestants and the Irish Language* (Belfast: Lagan Press, 1995)

8 Committee on the Administration of Justice, Staid agiis stddas na Gaeilge i *dtuaisceart na hEireann:* The UK Government's approach to the Irish language in light of the European Charter for Pjegional orMinotity Languages (Belfast: Committee on the Administration of Justice, 1993), 7.

9 Irish Gaelic is a Celtic language closely related to Scots Gaelic and Manx Gaelic. The word for the language in Irish Gaelic is "Gaeilge." In Ireland today most refer to the language as "Irish," while students in the U.S. use both "Irish" and "Gaelic" interchangeably. In this paper for, the sake of clarity, I will refer to the language as "Gaelic."

language was at best simply negative and at worst actively hostile."[10] By and large, from 1366 through the late nineteenth century British colonial rulers "argued precisely for the extermination of the Irish language as part of a larger political project."[11] Today I will speak about the politics of English and British laws toward Irish Gaelic from the fourteenth century up until the present.

Not all English and British policies have been uniformly anti- Gaelic. British and British-identified Protestant missionaries in the Irish Bible Society printed the Old and New Testaments in Gaelic. Queen Elizabeth I allegedly expressed an interest in learning Gaelic during the plantation of Munster Province (Cuige Mumhan) and was presented a primer to aid her education.[12] But these were exceptions to the rule. During the twentieth century the British state in Northern Ireland wavered between outright repression in times of armed conflict (the Troubles of 1969 to the late 1990s) and malign neglect in times when conflict was largely suppressed (the 1920s through the late 1960s).

Politicization and Depoliticization: Gaelic as a Sign of Disloyality

The Statutes of Kilkenny in 1366 commanded that "if any English, or Irish living among the English, use the Irish language amongst themselves, contrary to this ordinance, and thereof be attainted, his lands and tenements, if he has any, shall be seized into the hands of his immediate lord..." This ban on the Irish language was accompanied by an anti-miscegenation law[13] A later law required Irishmen to take on English surnames or forfeit property.[14]

A 1536 missive from Henry VIII to the colonial rulers of the port city of Galway ordered that "every inhabitant within said town endeavor themselves to speak English" and teach it to their children. Galwegians were warned to "fail not to fulfill this, our commandment, as you tender our favor, and would avoid our indignation and high displeasure."[15] A British statute issued the following year blamed the Irish people's attachment to Gaelic as the main cause of their "certain savage and wild kind and manner of living." This statute implied that it was attachment to Gaelic language and traditional Irish styles of dress which made the Irish people consider themselves part of a separate country from the English colonists, when in fact they were all British.[16]

For five centuries a constant of British discourse on Gaelic has been the claim that speaking in Gaelic is a sign of disloyalty, and that loyal subjects should only speak English. The 1537 act portrayed the exclusive use of English as the only choice for "His Highness's true and faithful subjects." Gaelic speakers were by definition disloyal by virtue of their use of the Gaelic tongue: "whosoever shall... not... use... the English tongue, his Majestie will reporte them in his most noble heart as persons that esteeme not his most dread lawes and commandements... "[17] Parents were ordered to speak only English with their children, and to not let them be around Gaelic speakers. This was not the first statute to imply that Gaelic speakers were a source of infection. Later statutes would be more explicit in this claim.

Irish Gaelic as Contagion, English as Purity

Another constant theme of English and British constructions of Gaelic is that it is a contagion that infects the English or Irish children who should become more like the English. This dates

10 Crowley, The Politics of Language in Ireland, 9.

11 *Crowley,* The Polities of Language in Ireland, 2.

12 *Crowley,* The Polities of Language in Ireland, 2.

13 *Crowley,* The Polities of Language in Ireland, *15.*

14 !465 Statute, *excerpted in Crowley,* The Polities of Language in Ireland, *16.*

15 *S.P. Hen.* I *III* Henry VIII to the Town of Galway, 1536, excerpted in Crowley, 20.

16 *Skit Ire.* An Act for the English Order, Habit and Language, 1537, reprinted in Crowley, *The Politics of Language in Ireland* 21.

17 *28 Henry VIII c. 15, cited in }oep Leerssen,* Mere Irish and Fior-Ghael: Studies in the Idea of Irish Nationality, its Development and Lite ran[1] Expression Prior to the Nineteenth Centun[1] *(Cork: Cork University Press, 1996), 39.*

back at least to the 1366 Statute of Kilkenny, which expressed alarm that most descendents of Anglo-Norman settlers had been assimilated into the Gaelic-speaking majority. Two centuries later Speaker of the English Parliament James Stanihurst called for a "reformation" of habits among the Irish, "to breed in the rudest of our people, resolute English hearts." He made explicit the claim that English purity was threatened with infection by Gaelic speakers:

> Babes from their Cradles should be inured under learned School-masters, with a pure English tongue, habit, fashion, discipline; and in time utterly forget the affinity of their unbroken borderers, who possibly might be won by this example, or at least wise lose the opportunity, which now they have, to infect others.[18]

A sixteenth century history of the English settlement of Ireland credited the colonization of the English "pale" around Dublin with the "supplanting]" of "rudeness" and "rebellion" with "civility" and "loyalty." However, the author warned that die Irish weed had encroached back into the English garden. As noted, unlike the Anglo-Norman conquerors, their descendents were less vigilant against the encroachment of Gaelic, and most "Old English" by this time spoke Gaelic as their native and daily language:

> The Irish language was free denizened in the English pale: this canker took such deep root, as the body that before was whole and sound, was by little and little festered, and in manner wholely putrified.[19]

Attacks on the people, Culture and Religion

Mass murder and other tactics of ethnic cleansing were tools used repeatedly by the English in Ireland at least through the seventeenth century Describing the repression of the Desmond uprising of the 1580s against the English plantation of Munster, Sir William Pelham reported, "We consumed with fire all the habitations and executed the people wherever we found them."[20] In the wake of the Munster campaign, Sir Henry Sidney wrote the King in 1585 explaining how Ireland might once and for all be conquered and pacified: "All brehons [judges], carraghes, bards, rhymers, friars, monks, Jesuits, pardoners, nuns, and such like, to be executed by martial law... Irish habits for men and women to be abolished, and the English tongue to be extended..."[21] Following the Irish uprising against British settlement in 1641 British forces implemented a brutal attack that targeted the native Irish people as well as their distinctive religion and language. Following an eleven-year scorched earth war that involved the destruction of most food crops, the Physician-General of the English army estimated that 500,000 Irish, or about one third of the population, had been killed "by the sword, plague, famine, hardships and banishment."[22] English army commander Sir Charles Coote ordered his men to kill all Irish adults as well as children "more than a span long." When some of his officers objected, Coote is said to have replied, "Kill the nits and you will have no lice."[23] In 1653 the English Parliament ordered the transplantation of all Irish from Ulster, Leinster and Munster provinces to the most agriculturally barren province, Connacht, except for those who could prove loyalty to parliament over the king. Failure to comply by May 1, 1654 was

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18 1570 oration, excerpted in Crowley, *The Po/itics of Tanguage in Ireland,* 28.

19 Gaelic was a "ringworm" bringing about "this present ruin and decay" The Irish were "rude" and "blunt" people who "prattled" and "gagged" their own native language, with its borrowed "motheaten Latin word[s]" (Richard Stanihurst, 1577, excerpted in Crowley, *The Politics of Tanguage in Ireland*' 31—37). Contagion metaphors were also used to describe Catholicism. One early-seventeenth-century pamphleteer wrote that ".. .the people are daily seduced, infected and perverted by Jesuites, Seminaries, and other runnagate Priests the ministers of Antichrist, wherewith the Country doth swarme..." (Rich, 1609, cited in Leerssen, *Mere Irish and Fior-Ghael,* 54).

20 211 M. E. Collins, *Conquest and Colonisation* (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1969), 44.

21 Henry Sidney, 1585, excerpted in Crowley, *The Politics of Language in Ireland,* 38.

22 Peter Berresford Ellis, *Hell or Connaught! The Cromwellian Colonisation of Ireland 1652-1660* (Belfast: The Blackstaff Press, 1975), 9.

23 Sean O'Callaghan, *To Hell or Barbados: The Ethnic Cleansing of Ireland* (Dingle, Ireland: Brandon, 2001), 45; Ellis, *Hell or Connaught,* 19—20.

punishable by death.[24] Between 50,000 and 100,000 Irish, many women and children, were sent as slaves and indentured servants to the Caribbean.[25]

Physical attacks on the Irish people were accompanied by attacks on Catholicism and Gaelic; as Daniel Corkery reflected, “Irish did not die at the top. It was killed at the top when its institutions, practically one and all, were destroyed.”[26] The 1695 Act to Restrain Foreign Education banned “papists” from teaching or sending their children to the European continent to study, as some Irish had done in the seventeenth century. Irish Catholic-run schools were explicitly linked in the statute to the spreading of disloyalty and linguistic difference:

> Whereas it is found by experience that tolerating and conniving at papists keeping schools or instructing youth in literature, is one reason of many of the natives of this kingdom continuing ignorant of the principles of true religion, and strangers to the scriptures, and of their neglecting to conform themselves to the laws and statutes of this realm, and of their not using the English habit and language, to the great prejudice of the public weal thereof... no person whatsoever of the popish religion shall publicly teach school, or instruct youth in learning, or in private houses teach or instruct youth in learning within this realm from henceforth.. ,[27]

This penal law led to the growth of illegal “hedge schools” throughout Ireland, where Irish youth were taught in all subjects, including Gaelic and often Latin, Hebrew, and Greek, as well.[28] Other efforts at eradicating or at least weakening the status of Irish Gaelic include the 1737 Administration of Justice Act, which mandated English only in Irish courts.

In the 1830s attempts to teach Irish youth in the English language were largely unsuccessful until the introduction of the English-only national schools, many run by English-speaking Catholic clergy trained at Maynooth. One clergyman who supported Gaelic bemoaned the national schools as “the graves of the national language.”[29] By the early nineteenth century a majority of the Irish still spoke Gaelic as a native language, and perhaps a million were monoglots. But significant shifts in public consciousness had taken place. Irish laborers who spoke some English were often paid more by English and Anglo-Irish landlords than monoglot Gaelic speakers.[30] The demands of emigration to England or North America — increasingly an attractive alternative given the abject poverty and misery in which most Irish lived — and the internalization of dominant attitudes led many Irish to abandon the language in the nineteenth century.

The national school curriculum explicitly associated education with speaking English, and ignorance with speaking Gaelic or other Celtic languages:

> The island of Great Britain, which is composed of England, Scotland, and Wales, and the Island of Ireland, form... the British Empire in Europe. The people of these islands have one and the same language (all at least who are educated).. .[31]

The Great Hunger *{AH Gorta Mot)* of 1845—1849 dealt a devastating blow to Gaelic. A disproportionate number of the 1 to 1.5 million who starved were Gaelic-speaking. The “famine” also evoked a mass exodus of emigrants to England, Scotland, and North America,

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24 Ellis, *Hell or Connaught!,* 116—117.

25 O’Callaghan, *To Hell or Barbados,* 81—86; Ellis, *Hell or Connaught!,* 149—154.

26 Daniel Corkery, *The Fortunes of the Irish Language* (Cork: Mercier Press, 1968).

27 *Stat. Ire.,* An Act to Restrain Foreign Education, 1695, reprinted in Crowley, *The Politics of Language in Ireland,* 90—91.

28 Robert James Scally, *The End of Hidden Ireland: Pjebellion, Famine, and Emigration* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 143.

29 *Crowley,* The Politics of Language in Ireland, *134.*

30 ibid.

31 *Scally,* The End of Hidden Ireland, *151.*

primarily from the poorest regions in Ireland's west and south who were the most likely to speak Gaelic and the most vulnerable to the effects of the Great Hunger and the evictions that forced so many to die or flee. Emigration increasingly became the norm and learning English was an economic imperative.

In addition to killing or driving out over two million mostly Gaelic-speaking Irish peasants, *An Gorta Mor* also destroyed the culture and traditions of the Gaels. One resident of *BJnn na Feirste,* still a strong Gaeltacht region in west central Donegal, observed:

> Fun and pleasurable past-times fell by the wayside. Poetry and music/singing and dancing stopped. The people lost and they forgot everything, and when life improved in other ways those things never returned to the way they were. The hunger killed everything.[32]

Ulster unionists viewed the emergence of the Gaelic League with suspicion and hostility. Some attacked Gaelic League members in Banbridge upon their return from their annual *feis,* or conference, in 1905.[33] Nevertheless, native speakers of Irish Gaelic survived in the glens of Antrim, in South Armagh, and in Tyrone. According to Padraigin Ni Uallachain, the last native speaker in the six counties, Mick McCrink, died in 1977 in Dromintee, County Armagh.

At the founding of the Northern Irish state in 1920, one in four public elementary schools under Catholic management taught Gaelic as a subject. Nearly a third of the secondary public schools under Catholic management had at least one Gaelic teacher.[34] But an assault on funding for teaching Gaelic was launched in 1921. Concurrent with the launch of this assault was the removal of the language question from the Northern Ireland census of 1926.[35]

By 1942 the Northern Irish government had withdrawn funding and recognition for the teaching of Gaelic itself and for Irish-language teacher training colleges. The number of students studying Gaelic dropped by 70 percent in the 1920s, and by the early 1940s no students were studying it through state-funded schools. Irish medium education did not re-emerge in Northern Ireland until 1971. Unionist politicians denounced support for "the so-called Irish language" as a waste of time and money. Gaelic was associated with political disloyalty, and dismissed as dead, dying, and as a "foreign language" of far less value than French or other major foreign languages. One unionist senator portrayed the teaching of Gaelic as part of a republican plot to drive English speakers out of Ireland. Unionists portrayed the token funding for a small number of Gaelic teachers as "forcfing] it on the people against their wish" and "forcfing] it down the throats of Ulster Loyalists."[36] James Craig, the first Prime Minister of Northern Ireland (1921-1940), lectured a nationalist member of the provincial parliament who criticized the defunding of the language:

> What use is it to us here in this progressive, busy part of the Empire to teach our children the Irish language? What use would it be to them? Is it not leading them along a road which has no practical value? We have not stopped such teaching... We have stopped the grants simply because we do not see that these boys being taught Irish would be any better citizens...[37]

From the 1930s into the contemporary period, "Irish was grudgingly tolerated as a foreign language within the education system but, unlike other languages, was subject to periodic abuse

32 Hunger, *79.*

33 Liam Andrews, "The Very Dogs in Belfast Will Bark in Irish: The LTnionist Government and the Irish Language 1921—1943," in *The Irish Language in Northern Ireland,* ed. Aodan Mac Poilin (Belfast: Ultach Trust, 1997), 53.

34 Andrews, "The Very Dogs in Belfast," 55.

35 Committee on the Administration of Justice, Staid agus staddas na Gaeilge i dtuais- ceart na hEireann, 6.

36 Committee on the Administration of Justice, Staid agus stddas na Gaeilge i dtuais- ceart na hEireann, 71-73.

37 *Committee on the Administration of Justice,* Staid agus stadas na Gaeilge i dtuais- ceart na hEireann, *82—83.*

from Unionist politicians."[38] A 1949 Northern Ireland law prohibiting the erection of street signs in Gaelic was not repealed until the 1990s. During the mass internment launched in August 1971, Gaelic language activists were caught up in the sweep of most politically active nationalists in the North. Unionist politicians periodically denigrate Gaelic, as unionist Belfast City Councilor Sammy Wilson did more than a decade ago when he referred to it as "a leprechaun language."[39] ' Six years ago another unionist councilor, Jim Shannon, called Gaelic "a dead language for a dead people" in an interview with the nationalist *Irish News.*[40] In 1989 Northern Ireland's Education Minister warned parents against choosing Gaelic over another European language like French or Spanish: "Parents who choose to have their children take Irish instead of one of them, at a time when the importance of the European dimension is growing, should think carefully about the future consequences of such a decision."[41] Less than a decade ago, the Belfast City Council still prohibited speaking in Gaelic, and to this day speaking Gaelic in elected bodies throughout the North can evoke angry interruptions from unionist politicians.[42]

Such views are still widespread among unionists. Following an Ulster Television news item[43] on Britain's failure to allow residents of the six counties access to *Telefts Ha Gaeilge* (TG4), a Gaelic television station produced in the Connemara *Gaeltacht,* unionists posted the following comments on UTV's website:

> "What is the point of teaching Irish in Northern Ireland? It would be a waste of time. No one will ever have use for it. French is the main second language taught in N.I. schools so what is the point of changing tilings, [sic] Irish would be as much use as Japanese so whats [sic] the point of wasting money on something that isnt [sic] that important, [sic]" — Ballysillan Loyalist from North Belfast
>
> "I believe Irish should be left only to those who wish to learn it & should not be foisted on most people who couldn't give a fiddlers." — R.B. from Belfast
>
> "Learning Irish is about as important as a course in Klingon or Esperanto. Keep Irish Republic TV stations in their own country — not ours!!" — Andrew from Yorkshire, England
>
> "Useless foreign language TV stations like TG4 should be jammed out of the UK airwaves." — A.H. from Enniskillen, Northern Ireland
>
> "Why should you lot get this station!? you want it — go down south, enough money is being wasted on you! Look at the money wasted on putting up irish signs in hospitals – when it could have went [sic] on more beds etc. Also, how did you all cope before Sinn Fein/IRA started to bring the Irish Language into all arguments? I am sure you found your way around our hospitals." — Loyalist from Ulster

At the outset of the twenty-first century, unionist and English commentators are still echoing themes deployed in the Northern Irish parliamentary debates of the 1920s and 1930s, and centuries ago by English statutes and English observers of Ireland: Gaelic is useless; a ridiculous, outdated anachronism; a waste of scarce resources; a foreign language; equivalent to made-up, fictional languages; linked to republican traitors; a source of political division and strife; an oppressive attempt to shove something down our throats.

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38 Andrews, "The Very Dogs in Belfast," 87.

39 Sammy Wilson in *The Irish News,* 3 November 1987.

40 September 25,1996 *Irish News,* cited in Mac Poilin, "Plus (Ja Change," 31.

41 *Committee on the Administration of Justice,* Staid agus stadas na Gaeilge i dtuais- ceart na hEireann, *29.*

42*43 Committee on the Administration of Justice,* Staid agrn /.idda/, na Gaeilge i dtuais- ceart na hEireann, *33*

43 "Plea over Irish-language TV channel," UTV Headlines, 30 October 2002 online at http://www3.u.tv/news/localNews/index.asp?pt=n&id=25047&sel=l&&s el2=l&comment=2&local=l accessed 9 September 2008). "Ulster Television" became "UTV" in 2006.

The Future

Over the past three decades Northern Ireland has experienced a resurgence of Irish language learning and use, particularly in the mostly Catholic nationalist community. About one in three northerners speaks the language, some 15,000 of them fluently and many on a daily basis.[44] Although many Protestants and even some unionists study Gaelic, for most *Gaelgeoiri* (nonnative speakers) this revival is deeply rooted in experiences of Irish nationalist identity and an understanding of the history of British repression of the language as a tactic of colonial rule. By signing the 1998 Good Friday Agreement and by ratifying the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages in 2001 after a nine year delay, Britain committed itself and the government of Northern Ireland to taking affirmative steps to promote Irish Gaelic through education, judicial and administrative authorities, media, cultural activities, economic and social life, and transfrontier exchanges.[45]

The British government almost enacted the Irish Language Act in the winter of 2007, as was agreed upon in the St. Andrew's Agreement in Scotland in November 2006. The Irish Language Act would make Irish Gaelic and official language in the six counties at a level equal to English. But, unfortunately, some unionists oppose the act. For example, LUster Llnionist Party Member of the Legislative Assembly (MLA) Michael McGimpsey said the act was not needed. Gregory Campbell of Derry, the MLA for the Democratic Llnionist Party (DUP), warned in May 2007 that they would veto any enacting legislation unless equivalent status is given to Ulster Scots: "It is my view that the party will not introduce or allow this. It's more about cultural equality than the introduction of the Irish Language Act. As things stand at the minute, Ulster-Scots is underfunded in comparison to the Irish Language. It is about making up [the funding gap] for Ulster-Scots rather than extending die Irish language."[46] London extended the review period for the Irish Language Act through June 2007. As the French say, "the more things change, the more they stay the same." However, in spring 2007, the world watched as Gerry Adams and DUP leader Ian Paisley sat together and agreed to create a local assembly. Adams spoke at this press conference in both English and Irish. Five years ago, when Adams spoke Irish in the Stormont assembly, Paisley and others from his party erupted in shouts. This time, Paisley listened quietly. As of early summer 2007, the north is relatively quiet, the local power-sharing government is up and running, and Martin McGuinness and Ian Paisley are working together. After 600 years, at last, we are making progress!

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44 Diarmait MacGiolla Chriost, "Planning Issues for Irish Language Policy: An Foras Teanga' and T ioi it MU' Teanga,' " 2000, at http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/lan- guage/macgiollachriost00.htm.

45 *European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages,* Strasbourg, 5.xi.l992, available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/ 148.htm. The inclusion of blister Scots as a language on par with Irish Gaelic in the 1998 Good Friday Agreement attests to the centrality of language to identity and the zero-sum game nature of Northern Irish politics. See Mac Giolla Chriost, "Planning Issues for

46Irish Language Policy," where he raises this as a possibility believed by many in the north: "The relatively short distance between English and Ulster-Scots causes many not to recognize the latter as a language at all, but to regard it as a degenerate variation of English." Most linguists view Ulster Scots as a dialect of lowlands Scottish English, which never gained the cultural power that the London dialect of English did. Nationalists and Irish Gaelic speakers also note that government-funded services in Ulster Scots, offered to make similar services in Irish Gaelic more palatable to unionists, have had hardly any takers. Unionists' insistence that any gain for Irish Gaelic be accompanied by an analogous gain for Ulster Scots attests to unspoken assumptions about the role of the English language in Ireland today.

46 "DUP 'will veto Irish language act,'" *Irish Times,* 5 May 2007.

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Icelandic language battles threat of 'digital extinction'

Jon Henley

Iceland's mother tongue and cultural identity is drowning in an online ocean of English

Unlike most languages, when Icelandic needs a new word it rarely imports one. Instead, enthusiasts coin a new term rooted in the tongue's ancient Norse past: a neologism that looks, sounds and behaves like Icelandic.

The Icelandic word for computer, for example, is *tölva*, a marriage of *tala*, which means number, and *völva,* prophetess. A web browser is *vafri*, derived from the verb to wander. Podcast is *hlaðvarp,* something you "charge" and "throw".

This makes Icelandic quite special, a language whose complex grammar remains much as it was a millennium ago and whose vocabulary is unadulterated, but which is perfectly comfortable coping with concepts as 21st-century as a touchscreen.

But as old, pure and inventive as it may be, as much as it is key to Icelanders' sense of national and cultural identity, Icelandic is spoken today by barely 340,000 people - and Siri and Alexa are not among them.

In an age of Facebook, YouTube and Netflix, smartphones, voice recognition and digital personal assistants, the language of the Icelandic sagas – written on calfskin between AD1200 and 1300 – is sinking in an ocean of English.

"It's called 'digital minoritisation'," said Eiríkur Rögnvaldsson, a professor of Icelandic language and linguistics at the University of Iceland. "When a majority language in the real world becomes a minority language in the digital world."

Secondary school teachers already report 15-year-olds holding whole playground conversations in English, and much younger children tell language specialists they "know what the word is" for something they are being shown on the flashcard, but not in Icelandic.

Because young Icelanders in particular now spend such a large part of their lives in an almost entirely English digital world, said Eiríkur, they are no longer getting the input they need to build a strong base in the grammar and vocabulary of their native tongue. "We may actually be seeing a generation growing up without a proper mother tongue," he said.

The language has survived major foreign inputs in the past, under Danish rule for example. The impact of English, however, "is unique in scale of impact, intensity of contact, speed of change", Eiríkur said. "Smartphones didn't exist 10 years ago. Today almost everyone is in almost full-time contact with English."

The range and volume of English readily accessible to Icelanders has expanded exponentially, most of it more relevant and more engrossing than ever before, said Iris Edda Nowenstein , a PhD student working with Eiríkur on an exhaustive three-year study of the impact of digital language contact on 5,000 people.

"Once, outside school you'd do sport, learn an instrument, read, watch the same TV, play the same computer games," she said. "Now on phones, tablets, computers, TVs, there are countless games, films, series, videos, songs. You converse with Google Home or Alexa. All in English."

English may not be the enemy – in principle, multilingualism is obviously a good thing – but its sheer weight and variety online are overwhelming, Nowenstein said. Nor is Icelandic alone. As many as 21 European languages are potentially at risk of “digital extinction”, according to research.

Icelandic’s relatively few speakers are also unusually proficient in English and enthusiastic early adopters of new technology. “The obvious worry is that young people will start to say: ‘Okay, so we can’t use this language abroad. If we’re not using it much in Iceland either, then what’s the point?” Eiríkur asked.

In what amounts to a perfect storm for such a small language, it is also under siege in the real world. The wild north Atlantic island welcomed almost two million foreign visitors last year, four times the 2008 figure, and immigrants now make up 10% of the population, a five-fold increase in two decades.

Mostly EU workers on short-term contracts in fish-processing or tourism, new residents rarely need to master Icelandic, with its three genders, four cases and six verb forms. In the bars, restaurants and shops of downtown Reykjavík, it can be a struggle for locals to get served in their native language.

Online, however, is the biggest concern. Apart from Google – which, mainly because it has an Icelandic engineer, has added Icelandic speech recognition to its Android mobile operating system – the internet giants have no interest in offering Icelandic options for a population the size of Cardiff’s.

“For them, it costs the same to digitally support Icelandic as it does to digitally support French,” Eiríkur said. “Apple, Amazon … If they look at their spreadsheets, they’ll never do it. You can’t make a business case.”

Where Icelandic versions do exist, said Nowenstein, they are not perfect. “You can switch Facebook to Icelandic, but it’s not good at dealing with cases,” she said. “So people get fed up with seeing their names in the wrong grammatical form, and switch back to English.”

Max Naylor, a UK academic also involved in the study, said he had emailed and written to Apple several times but had never received a reply. “We’re not expecting a fully-functioning operating system, but the hope is that they will at least open themselves up to collaboration,” he said.

The Icelandic government is setting aside 450m krónur (£3.1m) a year over the next five years for a language technology fund it hopes will produce open-source materials developers could use, but the challenge – from apps and voice-activated fridges to social media and self-driving cars – is immense.

Icelandic has survived almost unscathed for well over 1,000 years, and few experts worry it will die in the very near future. “It remains the majority, official language of a nation state, of education and government,” Nowenstein said.

“But the concern is that it becomes obsolete in more and more domains, its use restricted, so it’s second best in whole areas of people’s lives. Then you worry about Icelanders understanding much less, for example, of their cultural heritage.”

In the meantime, Naylor said, literacy rates among Icelandic children are falling as their vocabulary shrinks. “You could soon have a situation where Icelanders will be native in neither Icelandic or English,” he said. “When identity is so tied up with language … it’s hard to know what that will mean.”

Seminar 10

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Language and Religion

Webb Keane

1 Introduction: ''Religious Language'' as an Anthropological Topic

Despite long-standing interest in subjects such as ritual speech, oratory, magic, myth, exorcism, divination, possession, oaths, prophecy, and more recently, textuality, reading, and performativity, ''religious language'' *per se* has not been a commonly recognized anthropological topic (one exception is Samarin 1976). But taken as the intersection of the studies of religion and language, it can bring insight into key questions that have usually been treated from more restricted perspectives. Religious contexts can be especially revealing for the study of linguistic form and action since they can involve people's most extreme and self-conscious manipulations of language, in response to their most powerful intuitions about agency.

For the purposes of this chapter, I propose that an anthropological study of ''religious language'' concerns linguistic practices that are taken *by practitioners themselves* to be marked or unusual in such a way as to suggest that they involve entities or modes of agency which are considered by those practitioners to be consequentially distinct from more ''ordinary'' experience, or situated across some sort of ontological divide from something understood as a more everyday ''here and now.''[1] This definition aims to take indigenous perceptions as a guide, without foreclosing the possibility of comparison and generalization. I argue that religious language practices exploit a wide range of the formal and pragmatic features of everyday language in ways that help make available to experience and thought the very ontological divides to which they offer themselves as a response. These practices can assist the construction of forms of agency that are expanded, displaced, distributed or otherwise different from – but clearly related to – what are otherwise available.

This approach does *not* presuppose belief, since it starts from the existence of signifying practices rather than pre-existing concepts. Many religious traditions have little interest in either individual belief or public statements of doctrine (Asad 1993; Needham 1972), and may accept differences of interpretation as long as practices themselves remain consistent. Moreover, even religions that do stress belief may still object to the subordination of material practices to inner states. For instance, Blaise Pascal insisted, ''The external must be joined to the internal to obtain anything from God, that is to say, we must kneel to pray with the lips, etc., in order that proud man, who would not submit himself to God, may be now subject to the creature. ... [To] refuse to join [externals] to the internal is pride'' (no. 250, 1958: 73).

Such ''externals'' as ritual have been the stuff of ethnography. One recent theory of religion asserts that ''the sacred, the numinous, the occult and the divine'' are all ultimately generated in ritual (Rappaport 1999: 23). This reflects a common anthropological view that

[1] On the problem of defining ''religion'' see Asad 1993; Smith 1982. By ''ontological divide'' I mean that practitioners understand the difference to be a qualitative one, as between kinds of things, rather than, say, simple spatial distance. The distinction is not, of course, always clear – the lines separating elders, ancestors, and deities may be quite blurred indeed. For the linguistic mediation of agency see Ahearn (2001), Duranti (this volume).

to count as ‘‘religion’’ something must take forms that can be shared and reproduced as sociological realities (Geertz 1973). That is, religion is approached in its modes of ‘‘semiotic mediation,’’ the ways in which social relations, cultural meanings, even subjective experience, are not just transmitted by signs but are constrained, made available for embodiment and circulation, and transformed by them (see Lee 1997; Urban 1996).

The approach taken here presupposes that people have some intuitions, or language ideologies (see Kroskrity 2000 and this volume), about distinctions of markedness among different linguistic forms and practices. As Roman Jakobson suggested for poetics (1960), since religious language practices may involve practitioners’ heightened awareness of language (among other things), they offer analysts insight into that awareness and its linguistic and, by extension, conceptual and social consequences. Although such intuitions presumably involve cognitive input (Boyer 1993), the best evidence suggests that their concrete realizations are irreducibly mediated by specific cultural, social, and historical formations.

2 Religious Language as Action: From Game to Performative

An important theological question in several monotheistic traditions has been how words, which normally denote objects of experience, could have meaning when applied to a God who transcends experience. The question tends to assume that the primary function of language is to denote entities and say something about them. One response has been to focus on linguistic functions other than denotation. For instance, words that are apparently statements about God could actually be affirming the speaker’s faith. This led many Western theologians to concepts that have been foundational for contemporary linguistic anthropology, Ludwig Wittgenstein’s ‘‘language game’’ (1953) and J. L. Austin’s ‘‘performative’’ (1962) (see Duranti, this volume). Wittgenstein claimed that different language games are governed by their own, distinct conventions. One would not hold a sonnet, shaggy-dog story, instruction manual, scientific proof, declaration of love, or memorized liturgy to identical standards of verifiability or sincerity. As Bronislaw Malinowski (1935) suggested, when Trobriand magic spells include semantically opaque speech, the resulting ‘‘coefficient of weirdness’’ shows that their ‘‘context of action’’ is distinct from that of other verbal acts.

The notion of language games drew attention to the interactive, socially conventional, and multi-functional character of speech practices. But it fell short of explaining their authority, specific forms, or how they change. Many students of religion turned to Austin’s account of speech acts or performativity. Austin observed that certain expressions, such as ‘‘I hereby do thee wed,’’ when spoken under certain conditions, serve not to make statements about things, but to effect changes in a state of affairs, such as transforming two persons into husband and wife. He eventually suggested that *all* statements have a performative (or ‘‘illocutionary’’) dimension.

The idea of the performative seemed to offer a way of understanding how talk ‘‘about’’ God could be doing something else. But if such talk is really performative, why should its linguistic forms have *looked* so much like an assertion as to have given rise to that mistaken impression (see Keane 1995)? After all, affirmations of faith take many forms such as words addressed *to* rather than *about* God, bodily gestures (Mahmood 2001), or semantically opaque utterances like mantra (Staal 1990). The role of explicit belief statements in certain traditions requires analysis of ‘‘language ideology,’’ to which I will turn below.

In a different line of development, some anthropologists (Ahern 1979; Rappaport 1990; Tambiah 1979) took a cue from the fact that Austin’s key examples are rituals. They suggested that the specific nature of ritual efficacy is performative, its results being due to the social convention that a certain form constitutes a certain action. The logical necessity linking act and consequence is like that between saying ‘‘I promise’’ under the right conditions, and the making of a promise. The saying *is* the making of a promise.

The performative approach to ritual seemed useful in explaining several things about ritual. One is that by removing its efficacy from the domain of physical causality, ritual escaped the accusation of being bad science, of trying to accomplish material results (such as making rain) on the basis of faulty premises (the magical power of words). Another is that the emphasis on conventionality fits the empirical observation that actors often consider it important that they themselves did not invent the ritual. As in many traditions, ritualists in Sumba, Indonesia, insist that ‘‘there are no longer any who really know’’ the rites, for the living are merely ‘‘new lips and new eyes’’ who did not create the ancestral words but just follow the traces of ‘‘Lord’s tracks in the twigs, Lady’s cutting-marks on the stump’’ (Keane 1997b). The poetic structure of their ritual speech and the highly salient pragmatic norms governing its performance reinforce the sense that these words are independent of their speakers, and that this contributes to their power. Finally, the conventionality of performatives seemed to justify the common ritual emphasis on repetition of forms. Adherence to a certain form (such as the parallelisms in the Sumbanese couplets just quoted, or, in English, a ‘‘hereby’’ in a proclamation) can help determine that a given utterance is a token of a certain performative type.

But the performative approach is also subject to an important criticism. In many cases, the practitioners themselves do not see their rituals as achieving their effects simply by convention. They may, for instance, be concerned with influencing the spirit world through emotional effects or magical causality (Gardner 1983). Some further explanation is required of how practitioners commonly define ritual as having special powers, or as able to bring about social interaction with extra-ordinary agents.

2.1 Ritual as authoritative action

If language games and performativity concern the logic of symbolic action, anthropology has increasingly been interested in its relation to power. The observation that participants in ritual can experience its regimentation of vocal and bodily movements as an external force was, of course, central to Emile Durkheim’s (1915) account of its function in creating social solidarity. Similarly, as Gladys Reichard (1944) proposed of Navaho prayer, poetic patterning has ‘‘compulsive force,’’ and linguistic anthropology has long tried to specify the emotional and social effects of ritual’s formal properties more broadly (Duranti 1994: chapt. 4; Irvine 1989).

Maurice Bloch (1989 [1974], 1975) looked at several dimensions of structure to explain the distinctive character of ritual authority. He defined ritual in terms of its formality and repetitiousness, understood these to be markedly apart from the norms of everyday interaction, and looked to them for its special power. Since ritual, as he defines it, severely restricts the participants’ choices of intonation, vocabulary, syntactic forms, and acceptable illustrations (such as scriptural or mythological allusions), it wields what he claims is necessarily a highly impoverished kind of propositional language. Therefore he concludes that ritual cannot primarily function to make statements. Rather, it is coercive: once participants have entered the ritual frame, they are committed to a pre-ordained sequence of events. The only alternative is the extreme act of rejecting the very premises of the ritual. Moreover, this coercion is all the more effective in so far as it tends to operate beneath the level of individual awareness, and includes the pressures of ordinary politeness norms – that to interrupt or speak in the wrong register, for instance, is vulgar or insulting.

In contrast to many ‘‘language-game’’ theorists, therefore, Bloch did not simply situate ritual as one game alongside, and neutral with respect to, others. Ritual words gain their power to suppress ‘‘reality’’ by being detached from context and from any association with the particular speaker. This makes it possible for the ritualists to speak on behalf of experience-distant entities, such as impersonal ancestor spirits.

Bloch drew criticism for too directly associating form with a particular social function. Judith Irvine (1979) showed that the word ‘‘formality’’ often conflates a wide range of meanings which do not necessarily correlate, and may even work at odds with one another.

She argued that our analytic vocabulary must distinguish among at least four kinds of formality: increased code structuring, heightened cooccurrence rules, invocation of positional identities, and the emergence of a central situational focus. In particular, the structuring of linguistic code is relatively independent of the other three aspects of formality, which are more sociolinguistic and pragmatic in character. Moreover, in any empirical instance, local ideologies play a crucial role in mediating any actual social consequences of ritualization. Form alone is not fully determinative.

The high formality of poetic structure and interactive norms in Sumbanese ritual genres, for instance, can undermine rather than simply reinforce the smooth workings of hegemonic authority, fostering the participants' sense that ritual actions involve grave risks (Keane 1997b). The sense of risk operates at several levels. Foregrounding the rule-governed character of ritual implies that errors in performance can bring dangerous consequences. Tight constraints on interaction imply that the spirits themselves are difficult to reach, and potentially dangerous. The sense of risk makes palpable two things. First is the effort needed to communicate across an ontological gap; second, that such communications face inescapable potential for pragmatic and semantic slippage. Since ritual forms are seen to have an existence independent of their users, they can never be fully under their control. Even the most knowledgeable elders must insist that they possess only fragments of the ritual – or risk being stricken down by spirits for their presumption. In cases like this, there seems to be a positive correlation between a highly formalistic understanding of ritual and the relative lack of stable human authority.

3 Ritual as a Speech Genre

The development of the ethnography of speaking (Gumperz and Hymes 1964; Bauman and Sherzer 1974) helped direct attention to speech genres (Bakhtin 1986; Briggs 1988). Genre is ‘‘one order of speech style, a constellation of systemically related, co-occurrent formal features and structures that serves as a conventionalized orienting framework for the production and reception of discourse’’ (Bauman 2001: 79). Ritual can thus be situated in a multi-dimensional field rather than at one end of a line ranging from formal to not-formal. A given genre, such as liturgical chanting, will share some but not all features with others, such as oratory (Bloch 1975) or poetry (Leavitt 1997). Part of ritual's distinctive power, then, might derive from the complex of such linking and distinguishing features articulating it with its verbal surroundings. In this context even highly rule-governed ritual forms turn out to provide more creative resources than might be apparent when viewed in isolation (Gill 1981).

This observation draws support from the growing interest in less obviously formalized activities, such as Muslim sermons on cassette, a moment of evangelical ‘‘witnessing’’ in a conversation, or charismatic Catholic social gatherings, which show that ritual actively contrasts with and borrows from other genres. This weakens any claims about the necessary effects of form on authority, since ritual actions depend on their relation to what happens outside the ritual frame. A televised jeremiad by Jerry Falwell (Harding 2000; cf. Crapanzano 2000; Meigs 1995), spoken in the context of American traditions of religiously inflected political oratory, may have much greater relevance than in societies where political rhetoric has been more secular. Verbal productions that in Taiwan might index a state of potentially benevolent spirit possession would in Canada be likely to lead to a diagnosis of mental illness – even in Taiwan they may end up socially classified as madness (Irvine 1982; Wolf 1990; Wilce, this volume). Moreover, since genres must be identifiable by features that exist independent of any particular context (Bauman 2001), ritual genres are inherently vulnerable to being quoted, parodied, performed insincerely, reframed as art forms, and so forth. The fact that in themselves semiotic forms such as word morphology, poetic structure, or the pragmatic sequence cannot guarantee particular intentions or effects has also been a perennial source of difficulty and reformist efforts within many religious traditions.

3.1 Form and function in ritual speech genres

Ritual speech commonly displays a degree of repetition and elaboration far out of proportion to any obvious propositional requirements. For example, one typical Sumbanese prayer sequence involving two speakers and taking about 113 lines of verse might be reduced to this: ‘‘we are following the rules, so please accept this offering and hear our words’’ (Keane 1997b: 122–4). Couplets such as

followed path there	*lara liya*
for horses to follow	*pali waingu jaraya*
going the Laboyan way	*ta pali Laboya*
crossing trail there	*ada palaya*
for people to cross	*papala waingu tauya*
crossing the Wanukakan way	*ta papala Wanukaka*

(Keane 1997b: 103) amount to ‘‘we are performing a ritual properly.’’ These are instances of the framing function (Bateson 1972) that can, in principle, be achieved by any linguistic property, such as esoteric vocabulary or unusual intonation, that marks off a stretch of discourse from its surround.

A frame is ‘‘indexical,’’ that is, it points out something in the immediate context – indicating, for instance, ‘‘this, now’’ is a ritual (Hanks 1990; Peirce 1955; Silverstein 1976). It is thus ‘‘metapragmatic’’ (Silverstein 1993), saying something about the linguistic act being undertaken. But indexes alone merely point to the presence of something and cannot themselves offer any information about it. Some acts, such as ‘‘I hereby do thee wed,’’ use explicit metapragmatic verbs (‘‘to wed’’) to state what they are doing. Commonly, however, more guidance from semiotic form is needed, such as iconism or resemblance (Jakobson 1990). For instance, because the strongly dualistic couplet forms just quoted manifest a Sumbanese aesthetic of completeness and balance, they are iconic of the desired ritual outcome – sacred wholeness – without actually denoting it. And, over the course of the ritual, speakers’ utterances tend increasingly to take strict parallelistic form. This is one example of how changes in linguistic form may realize the progression of the ritual action by resembling it, an instance of a ‘‘metapragmatic icon’’ (Silverstein 1981).

The observation is significant because it goes beyond imputing the effects of ritual simply to convention, to show they can derive from formal properties as they unfold in real time. For example, rituals may display increasing depersonalization over the course of the event (Bloch 1989 [1974]; Kuipers 1990). Indexes of the present time, place, or participants such as personal pronouns may be progressively eliminated, with poetic formulae, prosodic regularity, and other regimentations of discourse becoming more stringent, such that the participants come increasingly to speak not as individuated, complex, politically interested, and temporally finite parties, but as more abstract, disinterested, and timeless elders or spirits. The outcome is due not wholly to convention or conscious intention but to subliminal effects of linguistic and pragmatic forms.

Indexes and metapragmatic icons can make use of a wide range of linguistic properties in mutually reinforcing ways. For instance, the appearance of phonological or morphological forms markedly different from those found in colloquial speech may be taken by participants to be an irruption of divine speech. Entire stretches of discourse may take on greater poetic structuring, or shift their tense markings, reinforcing the intuitive sense that, as in the case of Zuni prayer, the words are being repeated exactly ‘‘according to the first beginning’’ (Bunzel 1932: 493).

Regardless of the varying conscious intentions of ritual performers, the properties of ritual speech tend to mark it as different from more ‘‘ordinary’’ ways of using language. But the examples of metapragmatic iconism imply that there are more specific functions involved in these marked forms than the mere framing as ‘‘ritual.’’ This may help explain the recurrence of certain features in ritual speech across the ethnographic record. John Du Bois (1986) identified some of these as follows:

- use of a ritual register
- archaistic elements
- elements borrowed from other languages
- euphemism and metaphor
- semantic opacity
- semantic-grammatical parallelism
- marked voice quality
- stylized and restricted intonation contours
- unusual fluency of speech
- gestalt knowledge
- personal volition disclaimers
- avoidance of first and second person pronouns
- speech style attributed to ancestors
- use of mediating speakers

Some of these are mutually determined. Fluent speaking style and gestalt knowledge, for instance, can both result from learning entire texts as seamless, and sometimes semantically opaque, wholes. Overall, however, these features must be understood as bearing what Wittgenstein called family resemblances, in so far as they do not constitute necessary and sufficient conditions for membership in a set, but form linked clusters such that no single member of the family need possess every feature. But viewing this cluster in terms of pragmatic functions and semiotic characteristics may offer a way of widening our scope from ritual speech to religious language practices more generally.

4 Religious Language as Altering Conversational Assumtions

As the concept of the metapragmatic icon suggests, rituals may derive some of their efficacy by linking formal properties to expected outcomes. One comparative question that arises, then, is whether there is something that motivates this common feature of ritual speech across the ethnographic spectrum. I have suggested that religious language commonly helps make present what would otherwise, in the course of ordinary experience, be absent or imperceptible, or makes that absence presupposable by virtue of the special means used to overcome it. In pragmatic terms, ritual suspends certain presuppositions of ordinary interaction, such as the assumption that one's interlocutors can see and hear one, that they share one's language, and that the relevant shared context and conversational goals are unproblematic (Grice 1975). The special character of interaction across an ontological gap is made explicit in the question posed by some prayers of the Berawan of Indonesia (Metcalf 1989), ‘‘where are you spirits?’’

Face-to-face interactions commonly build up an indexical ground, a emergent consensus among the participants about the nature of the shared here-and-now that forms the center of their conversation. Much interactive work is devoted to coordinating speakers (see Keating and Egbert, this volume; Bailey, this volume) and determinating the relevant context and the identities of the participants (Duranti and Brenneis 1986; Mannheim and Tedlock 1995). The outsider to the conversation may not know whether ‘‘we,’’ at the moment, includes, for instance, only those people within earshot, all Canadian citizens, or the dead ancestors, whether ‘‘now’’ contrasts with yesterday, the era before feminism, or the afterlife (see Urban 1996), but what Erving Goffman called ‘‘ratified participants’’ (1981) normally come to some consensus very quickly. In contrast to such default assumptions, many of the formal properties of ritual speech play down the indexical grounding of the utterances in the immediate context. As Goffman (1967, 1981) observed, problems in coordination during ordinary conversation may be clues to trouble with, or new threats to, participants' identities and their sense of shared assumptions. In some religious contexts, however, it may be precisely the function of language to raise questions like ‘‘what's going on here?’’ and ‘‘who's speaking now?’’

4.1 The dialectics of text and context

Forms that decontextualize discourse help create a perception that certain chunks of speech are self-contained, belong together, and could be reproduced in different contexts without substantive consequences for the discourse itself. This results in what has been called a ‘‘decentering of discourse’’ through ‘‘entextualization,’’ the process of foregrounding its text-like properties, and the sense that it is relatively context-independent (Silverstein and Urban 1996). The words will seem to come from some source beyond the present situation in which they are being spoken and heard. Often the speakers seem to others or even themselves to have relatively little volition in producing their speech. They may be supposed, for instance, to be speaking exactly as the ancestors did, as the spirits who possess them dictate, or as has been written. The textual character of scripture can support the trans-contextual efforts of some Christians to find Biblical prototypes for every aspect of life (Harding 2000; Stromberg 1993). Effects of linguistic form are likely to seem especially persuasive and realistic because they are not derived from explicit doctrines, which one might doubt or deny, but seem to come directly from experience.

The decentering of discourse is one moment in a larger set of dialectical processes that also include the centering or contextualizing of discourse, which stress the relatively objective and subjective experiences of language. On the one hand, language is associated with the experience of inner speech and speaker’s intentionality. On the other hand, it consists of pre-existing forms that one has learned from others, and, in addressing and being addressed, remains ‘‘on the borderline between oneself and the other’’ (Bakhtin 1981: 293; see also Benveniste 1971; Mead 1934; Vygostky 1978).

Taken as objectified forms, language has been an important target of religious critiques. One, stressing the propositional function, is that human language is an innately limited imposition on the ineffable or infinite, a position developed, for example, by Buddhism (Go´mez 2000), some Christian mystics (Katz 1992), and Jewish Kabbalah (which treats scriptural language as divine emanation – but its communicative function as merely human (Scholem 1969)). The other, more sociolinguistic, is that language is inescapably implicated in politics or social vanities, as claimed by early Quakers (Bauman 1983). The latter critique in particular has tended to be associated with an emphasis on (apparently) plain or spontaneous speech, and language ideologies that stress the subjective intimacy of inner speech, and the norm of sincerity (Keane 1997c, 2002; Robbins 2001).

4.2 Reported speech

Suspicions of language in some religious traditions focus on the very same linguistic and pragmatic properties that other traditions may seek to exploit. To the extent that religious practices respond to or contribute to the perception of an ontological gap contrary to the assumptions of ordinary interaction, they may be prone to draw on the decentering and recentering possibilities of entextualization processes. For religions ‘‘of the book,’’ the very existence of a written scripture is often taken as evidence for claims to an authority that transcends any particular context, and provides semiotic grounds for their intuitive verification. But the same decontextualizing objectivity may become the target of reformers and critics who seek unmediated access to divinity (Bauman 1983; Keane 1997c).

Compelling examples of the dialectic of recontextualization are found in the use of scriptures among contemporary Christians. Certain parts of scripture, such as Christ’s Sermon on the Mount or the Lord’s Prayer, are taken by many believers to reproduce words that were originally spoken in a particular context. Circulating in textual form, the words are now available for broad dissemination. Indeed, some believers take a capacity for wide circulation found, for example, in videotaped sermons, as evidence of the divinity of words even when they are not themselves sacred scripture (Coleman 2000; cf. Besnier 1995).

As they circulate, entextualized words are subject to recontextualization, as, for example, they are performed, read out loud, quoted, alluded to, or made the objects of silent meditation. The formal means by which words are introduced into new contexts have significant implications for the imputed relations not only between text and context, but also between different participants in the event (Boyarin 1993). Direct quotation, in which the words are supposed to retain the forms of the original utterance, tends to sharpen the distinction between the quoter and the person quoted. According to Vološinov, ‘‘The stronger the feeling of hierarchical eminence in another's utterance, the more sharply defined will its boundaries be, and the less accessible will it be to penetration by reporting and commenting tendencies from outside’’ (1973: 123). In contrast, indirect quotation, in which the original words are rephrased, permits the person doing the quoting to interpret the original words and their intended effects from the perspective of the subsequent context (Lucy 1993). As a result, direct quotation is often felt to be more deferential to the original speaker, since it does not impose an interpretation or mingle voices (Hanks 1996; Urban 1989).

Linguistic form alone, however, does not fully determine the nature of the relationship between quoter and quoted source, for under some ideological interpretations, direct quotation can come to identify the two. Naomi Janowitz (1989) argues that the words of some Jewish mystical texts were supposed to be identical to those sung by angels, so the human reciting them joins the angelic chorus. Similar efforts to eliminate the distinction between quoting context and quoted original are found in some Buddhist meditation practices that aim at the internalization of texts such that the meditator identifies with their divine source (Gómez 2000). For many Christian fundamentalists the process of becoming saved is inseparable from the ongoing penetration of their everyday speech by scripture (Harding 2000; Stromberg 1993). Citations can become so thoroughly part of the speaker's consciousness as to lose at least some of their character as quoted text and become difficult to separate from the speaker's ‘‘own words.’’

4.3 Participation roles

Ways of reporting speech commonly express aspects of the relations among participants in a speech event or text. Quotation indexes the participant role of ‘‘animator.’’ In Goffman's (1981) terminology, conversational roles can be analyzed into principal, who bears responsibility for what is said, author who formulates the words, animator who utters them, proximal addressee of the utterance, target to whom the words are ultimately directed, and overhearer. Sumbanese rituals institutionalize such distinctions, as speakers pray and orate on behalf of silent sponsors, animating couplets whose ultimate authorship is attributed to ancestors, but whose selection and sequence must be determined by a different ritual specialist. The speakers address these words to yet other ritualists (the proximal addressees) thus casting both spirits and humans as overhearers, the former also being ratified as targets, and, overall, creating a manifestly supra-individual ‘‘speaker’’ (Keane 1997b).

The distinction between author and animator encompasses a wide range of possible relationships. Responsibility for words can range from a sharp hierarchical distinction between author and animator, to some degree of co-authorship or ambiguity (Duranti and Brenneis 1986). Early Islam apparently did not differentiate between the authority of words spoken by God and those spoken by the Prophet Muhammed (W. Graham 1977). In the Qur'an, God's words appear as reported speech, and so are also the Prophet's words, as he is their animator. But Muhammed also animates prophetic speech of which he is the author – although its principal remains the divine source of his inspiration. Eventually, however, it became theologically important to distinguish prophetic speech from direct revelation, sharpening the boundary between reported speech and its frame, and thus between animator and author. This placed the original prophecy and its divine author at a greater remove from historical events, in order to accentuate the otherworldliness of the divinity and prevent the deification of the prophet.

Often what is at stake in the precise distinction between author and animator is the degree of agency, authority, and responsibility a performer is willing or permitted to assume. As Sumbanese ritualists would insist, powerful words come from absent authors. The forms of reported speech help make such distance (or its reverse) presupposable. In Lowland South America, narrators may gradually shift the extent of their identification with the protagonists in the myth they are narrating, positioning themselves either as commentators on absent spirits or as the spirit itself, bringing the otherworld into the present (Urban 1989; see also L. Graham 1995). Such ‘‘breakthroughs into performance’’ (Hymes 1981) are crucial for the capacity of religious practices to transform their contexts.

Even subtle alterations in speaking role can be crucial. For example, evangelical Protestants often describe their conversion as a call to witness, testify, or preach to others (Titon 1988; Peacock and Tyson 1989). Notice that this may not involve any particular change in belief itself – the individual may have subscribed to the same doctrines before and after being ‘‘saved.’’ Rather, in such cases, full conversion consists in taking on a specific kind of authority – being transformed, as Susan Harding (2000) puts it, from a listener into a speaker, with a greater responsibility for and even authorship of words.

Bakhtin identified heteroglossia, or the capacity for coexisting linguistic styles to index multiple social identities, as pervasive in everyday speech. Many religious practices systematically take advantage of this capacity to alter the salient identities and relationships among authors and animators over the course of a performance. As the participant roles taken on by performers change, they index the absence, presence, or emergence of divine or spirit participants. The progressive transformation of these indexes is itself iconic of the transformation being effected by the religious event, for example the gradual appearance and then departure of the Quaker’s Inner Light, the Pentecostal’s glossolalia or speaking in tongues, the ritualist’s ancestral spirit, or a shaman’s spirit familiar. In contrast to more intellectualist and conventionalist aspects of ritual, the power of such semiotic forms seems to lie in the sense of realism they create by their direct availability to the senses and intuitions of participants and witnesses.

In general, where relatively egalitarian relationships prevail, the living may be expected to speak to the spirits in their ‘‘own’’ voices (Metcalf 1989), that is, as simultaneously author, animator, and principal. But in taking on individual agency, these speakers also expose themselves to the risks that attend interaction with spirits. In a less egalitarian situation, divine inspiration may provide speakers with an acceptable voice for public speaking that would not be available were they taken to be the authors of their own words (Lawless 1988; Lewis 1971).

Such examples show imputed authorship to have creative effects, by making available to speakers an identity or a relationship to some special agent. This is an instance of the broader point, that one widespread effect of religious language is the creation or extension of agents and forms of agency beyond what is commonly available in unmarked interaction. It is also one reason why ‘‘religious’’ speech has often been appropriated in ‘‘political’’ ways.

5 Intentions and the Identity of the Actors

The denial or displacement of individual intentionality can occur at several levels, from explicit propositions to the implications of linguistic form and the pragmatics of participation. The analysis of participant roles is only one instance of the collaborative and distributed nature of linguistic intentionality (Duranti 1993) and responsibility (Hill and Irvine 1993). Many of the effects of religious language can be better understood as expanding the presumptive speaker above the level of the individual, or, conversely, distinguishing among different voices below that level, emanating from a single body (Irvine 1996).

The distinctions among participation roles are of particular significance in many religious activities, given that the character and even the very presence of some participants is not guaranteed or readily determined by immediate observation, and that often the focus of the activity is the transformation of the identity of human actors, making present and bringing into engagement non-human ones. Therefore religious practices often elaborate on these distinctions to develop or respond to the purported nature, powers, and responsibilities of both practitioners and the entities with which they are interacting. In many cases where the authorship, performance, and responsibility for speech is distributed among different actors, it might be most accurate to describe the result as the creation of a supra-individual speaking subject (Keane 1997b). The reverse is also possible, the combining of distinct roles in a single bodily individual. As American folk preachers come to be ''filled with the spirit,'' their performances display emergent features such as highly rhythmical, repetitive utterances, marked vocabulary, and gasping and shouting (Pitts 1993). When these are taken to index the individual's loss of personal control in favor of a divine agent, they verge on ''possession,'' although this definition depends on local categories and participants' willingness to ascribe them in a given case (Irvine 1982). More generally, spirit possession (Boddy 1994) and glossolalia (Goodman 1972; Samarin 1972) involve both a deity and a human being using the same body but speaking in different voices, marked by contrasting prosodic and paralinguistic features, and sometimes distinct linguistic codes.

5.1 Objectifications of language and the construction of agency

The formal properties of highly ritualized performances often play down the agency of the living human participants in favor of powers ascribed to other entities. The social results may vary from the reinforcement of hierarchies to the making available of ''other'' voices that marginal or subaltern speakers may appropriate to subversive effect. In general, the formal means by which different religions propose to interact with their respective otherworlds can be diagnostic of their basic assumptions about the nature of the beings to be found there, as well as of living humans themselves. To this extent, linguistic practice may reflect ontological assumptions. For example, some beings do not require deference. Ruth Bunzel (1932: 618) claimed that in praying, Zuni ''do not humble themselves before the supernatural; they bargain with it.'' This is strikingly different from Calvinists who try to avoid implying by their words that they could actually influence God (Keane 1997c). And these both differ from forms of address that beseech or flatter (Calame-Griaule 1986) or influence by displaying the speaker's esoteric knowledge about the spirit addressee (Sherzer 1990). Modernist or reformist movements may place a great emphasis on cultivating sincere speaker intentionality, as in the demand that prayer be spontaneous. But even when highly scripted texts are followed, as in the daily prayers of Muslims, reformers may insist that the speakers utter them with ''powerful depictive imagination'' (Bowen 1993: 84). One may not be able to detect simply on the basis of speech forms whether the ideological emphasis is on personal intention or divine inspiration. In this respect, religious language does not necessarily reflect prior beliefs. Doctrine can be in tension with and even be constrained by linguistic practice.

The emphasis on sincere intentions usually manifests language ideology that privileges individual interiority (Keane 2002). The encounter between this ideology and actual linguistic activities can have interesting consequences. For example, Swedish Evangelicals expect conscious individual intentions to be the source of human linguistic expressions. Therefore, when people under stress utter words they claim not to have intended, they assume that divine agency is at work (Stromberg 1993). Similarly, Catholic Charismatics tell rounds of stories that, like many group conversations, tend to develop a thematic unity over time. In light of their assumption that speech derives from individual volition, they find the unintended emergence of this collective unity to be inexplicable without divine intervention (Szuchewycz 1994; cf. Csordas 1997). Language ideology is crucial to the interpretation of discursive forms. The action being performed by a rite is, in principle, not created anew by the performers. Its efficacy depends on being accepted as an instance of something that can be repeated, and that cannot be derived solely from the speaker's intentions. One reason that some ritualists insist they are merely following the procedures laid down by ancestors is precisely to stress that link, forged by linguistic means, between an absence of intentionality on their part, and efficacy due to more distance powers. More generally, religious uses of language often work to suppress, constrain, deny, or otherwise displace what in other contexts might be intentions imputed to the immediate speakers (divination possibly presenting an extreme case; see Du Bois 1993).

6 Conclusion: Form, Function, and Mediation

Perhaps the single most important and widespread effect of the various formal and pragmatic devices by which religious language is distinguished from more unmarked language practices is the transformation of intentionality and agency. This claim, however, is not intended to reduce the phenomena to a single ‘‘explanation,’’ if only because of the emphasis on language as a component of social practice. Being by their very nature heterogeneous, social practices include elements that are subject to determinants and constraints operating at distinct structural levels or domains (Bourdieu 1977). Where religious doctrines exist, for example, they can only become real to the extent that there exist concrete semiotic practices by which they can be enacted, embodied, experienced, and transmitted. But those practices will be subject to such factors as logistics, aesthetics, economics, or prior history, that are independent of the logical, political, or emotional demands of and constraints on doctrine itself. Their push and pull must be understood within what could be called an economy of language practices and ideologies. Even textual forms as relatively autonomous, portable, and durable as written scriptures depend for their persistence and power on social dynamics surrounding contextualization and entextualization. Religious language is subject to the constraints imposed both by linguistic principles and by the practical requirements of action or performance, and its interpretation is subject to negotiation. Formal features of language do not achieve their effects alone or automatically.

Religious practices therefore require an appreciation of mediation in at least two respects. First, beliefs are mediated by the linguistic forms and practices through which they are remembered, transmitted, and made available for acts and reflections. The semiotic forms of those practices may constrain the production of beliefs and give direction to their transformations, as, for example, when fundamentalists draw conclusions from texts or reformers rebel against liturgies. Even a bald statement of faith depends on local conventions for expressing ‘‘beliefs’’ in the form of propositions, and for their hearers’ acceptance of them as a recognizable and sensible activity. Second, those linguistic forms are not fully deterministic but are subject to reinterpretations within particular social and historical circumstances. As the historical adaptability of scriptures and liturgies suggests, form may persist while function or interpretation changes (e.g. Keane 1995).

From the first point it follows that close attention to language is required for any ethnographer who wants to gain insight into what people ‘‘believe,’’ or even identify ‘‘who’’ the actors are in any particular situation – neither the invisible spirits presupposed by some acts nor the collective entities entailed by others may be immediately apparent to the external observer. It follows from the second point that linguists must bear in mind the importance of the social field for the interpretation of linguistic form in its ethnographic realizations. This means that we not attempt to reduce pragmatic function to linguistic form, conflate practice with some prior social function, reduce either form or function to cognitive determinants, or otherwise foreclose the role of social dynamics. Any account of social action requires attention to its semiotic mediation. And, conversely, any account of the effects of linguistic form in actual settings requires analysis of their social mediation.

NOTE This chapter develops some of the arguments made in an earlier form, with more detail, in Keane 1997a. I have benefited from conversations with Luis Go´mez and the participants in the Michicagoan Linguistic Anthropology Faculty Workshop, and especially Judith Irvine and Robert Scharf for comments on the manuscript, and Alessandro Duranti for his sure editorial hand.

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Conclusion

David Crystal

This book was conceived and partly written BC (before coronavirus), and partly during the crisis (evidenced by mentions in the chapters on *Interaction, Institutions,* and *Education),* and will be read PCE (Post-COVID Era) in a world that is already being described as a ‘new normal’. If this proves to be the case, then many of the insights intQ religious discourse presented in this book will provide a basis for the new interpretations that will one day prove to be necessary.

Linguistics is used to ‘new normals’. Indeed, a recurring theme in this book is the way linguistic paradigms of enquiry have shifted over relatively short periods of time, from diachronic to synchronic in the early decades of the twentieth century, from formal structure to social context in the later decades, and from description to explanation as the new millennium approached and the field of pragmatics added a fresh perspective to the study of discourse. This latter topic is especially important. It comes to the fore in Lu and Shurma's chapter on *Rituals,* with its use of the notion of pragmemes to throw light on the choice of language formulae in rituals, but it surfaces in several other chapters:

- in relation to gesture (Turner, *Multimodality*): ‘gestures ... serve pragmatic functions, highlighting key areas of the message and direct the hearer's attention to particular elements that the speaker deems important’;
- in relation to translation (Wilson): ‘an understanding of translation is only as good as the linguistic and pragmatic theory in which it is embedded’;
- in relation to inter-religious dialogue (Wolf): ‘Another area that has so far been under-

researched is the application of Pragmatics categories to analyses of inter-religious language'. It lurks beneath the surface in the others, even though they may not explicitly use the term. All the writers in this book invite us, in one way or another, to ask the question 'Why is religious language the way it is?'; and pragmatics, as a branch of linguistics, evolved to focus on exactly that.

As with every other theoretical concept addressed in this book, pragmatics has several definitions. Mine is as follows (Crystal, 2020, and elsewhere): 'the study of the choices people make when they use language in particular situations, the reasons for those choices, and the effects that those choices convey'.

This definition helps to explain the many approaches to be found within the subject. The content listings of any two textbooks on pragmatics can look very different: some focus on a description of the choices themselves (as in stylistics), some on the reasons (as in psycholinguistics, with such notions as intention and relevance prominent), and some on the effects (relating formal features to such social variables as age, gender, role, class, and occupation). The notion of situation has also to be explicated, for it includes synchronic and diachronic (historical) dimensions, the latter involving change that is both long term (such as, in the present context, the differences between the English of the King James Bible and that of the present day) and short term (such as the switch from Latin to the vernacular in Roman Catholic liturgy in the second half of the twentieth century).

The study of religious discourse within linguistics hovers somewhat uncertainly above all these facets, and its character has changed over the years, reflecting the academic fashions of the time. In the 1960s, the focus was descriptive: what formal features identify religious language? A generation later and the focus had shifted to the social function of these features. I reflect this shift myself in two papers on the language of liturgy in Roman Catholic and Anglican settings, one written in 1964, called 'A liturgical language in a linguistic perspective' and one 25 years later called 'A liturgical language in a sociolinguistic perspective' (see References). In the first, the focus was solely on the syntax (word order), morphology (word structure), lexicon, phonology (sound system), and graphology (orthographic system) of the genre. In the second, the focus was on the functions that these features convey, using the kinds of categories that today are very familiar (and reflected in some of the chapter headings in this book): to convey information, signal identity, express emotion, initiate changes of state (performatives), sanction historical traditions, facilitate thought, maintain community rapport, and provide aesthetic appreciation. In the interim, of course, the formal features had themselves changed, with new translations and liturgical practices altering the norms in both denominations.

There is plenty to describe in religious discourse, for the phonology (especially the prosody: Hammond, 2015), grammar, and lexicon of this variety makes it one of the most distinctive in any language, as is evident when samples from different genres are stylistically compared (as in Crystal and Davy, 1969). Such descriptions, however, have inevitably been partial and selective, exploring only certain kinds of texts, or certain time periods. Also, most of the published accounts in those days focused on English, with only occasional reference to other languages. Rare indeed to see a description of religious discourse in a language from outside the Indo-European family (an exception is the collection of papers in Samarin (1976), where we find Telugu, Hebrew, Zuni, and other languages comfortably co-existing).

Those days? These limitations are still being felt, as illustrated by comments in the present book:

- on the study of sacred texts (Vermeulen): 'very few studies actually focus on the language of the text as their main topic';
- in the context of trans-languaging (Wolf): 'questions that concern the original religious texts in Hebrew, Greek, Arabic, and Aramaic are often written about in English. More attention could be paid to how these ancient languages and the way they are used in a given context affects our ability to engage in dialogue across languages';

- in relation to conceptual metaphor (Richardson): ‘not enough focus is given to how particular conceptualizations are affected when they are expressed in English rather than the original source language’.

The dominance of English is clearly a concern, voiced in several contributions, such as Dorst:

> it is not uncommon in both publications and conference presentations on metaphor (in any text type) to present only idiomatic English examples without the original language data and any kind of intermediate gloss translation ... Studies on metaphor in Islam, Judaism, Hinduism and other spiritual schools of thought may not reach the centre of metaphor scholarship - as published in A-joumals and presented at large international conferences - if these researchers are not working with English data or publishing in English.

When it comes to ‘future directions’, a stronger comparative linguistic presence in the study of religious discourse has to be a priority. But even within English, there is evidently much to be done by way of description. A comparative stylistic perspective is needed here too, as illustrated in Wilson: ‘the translator of religious discourse needs to focus on how religious language works, which will involve investigation into how religious language differs from other kinds of language use’. It is inherent in the notion of diglossia, addressed in Rosowsky’s chapter on *Community,* where we encounter different varieties of English whose linguistic relationship warrants further investigation (the devil lies in the detail - here, what is involved in ‘might vary slightly’): ‘in Anglican English-speaking congregations, a particular religious register of Standard English arguably prevails in sermons, hymns and in other domain-specific genres. This register’s linguistic proximity to Standard English might vary slightly from one context to another but no one experiences it as an incomprehensible or alien variety’. It is there again in Turner, which argues for a multimodal analysis of ritual: ‘how spiritual belief is conveyed, not only linguistically but through a conjunction of other modes such as movement, gesture, posture, sound, and image’. It also has a diachronic dimension, as pointed out in Warner in relation to the notion of interdiscursivity: ‘the construction of meaning does not happen in isolation but in relation to prior texts and the ever-evolving social influences of culture and ideology’.

Above all, hypotheses about religious discourse need to be tested - not only by the use of case studies, well illustrated in this collection, but by the use of corpora. In a sense, corpora have always been with us - any collection of sacred texts can be viewed as a corpus - but the kinds of corpus now routinely available in linguistics allow fresh kinds of investigation, as seen in several chapters of this book: the use of keywords (S. Pihlaja) or collocations (Lu and Shurma, Richardson), and above all in Dorst, where we see how a theoretical notion (conceptual metaphor) can be tested against a corpus of actual discourse. The author concludes: ‘We need a better understanding of what real believers do with metaphors in actual discourse - what these metaphors mean to them and how they adapt and shape the metaphors’ meaning in line with their cultural values and expectations, personal experiences and communicative purposes’. The role of a corpus is critical here. Individual intuitions can generate hypotheses a-plenty, but only a present-day corpus can test them. (That temporal adjective is important: early twentieth-century corpora contained only a few million words, whereas corpora such as the Bank of English mentioned in Chapter 14 have billions.) And the testing needs to be global, especially when we are dealing with a domain of usage that claims universal relevance. Corpora such as the Corpus of Web-based English (GloWbE) will prove to be increasingly valuable in this connection (for a site giving details of corpora see the references: Mark Davies).

It would be satisfying if a study of an aspect of religious discourse could be called definitive. But the ever-present fact of language change militates against any such naivety. Experience teaches us that whatever religious discourse was like last year, it is likely to be different this year and to be different again next. This is a theme introduced at the very beginning of this book (Warner): ‘religion is very much a dynamic entity, and it is always changing through the ways that people experience it... Neither religion nor interaction are static entities, and this fact is what makes them both fascinating and challenging to study.' The point is taken up in other chapters, such as Rosowsky, where the notion of a 'linguistic repertoire' is challenged 'by conditions of rapid change in patterns of human mobility and modes of communication (including electronic ones)'. This chapter also draws our attention to an especially intriguing aspect of change: 'the growing use of English for devotional purposes, leading to an even greater variety of discursive interactions, modes and genres through which young people negotiate their religious and linguistic identities'. Once upon a time, linguistic change was thought to be a relatively slow-moving process. Not any more. The Internet has seen to that.

Online communication is another 'new normal'. Whether we call it 'electronic' (as in Rosowsky), 'computer-mediated' (as in relation to identity creation in Ringrow), 'digital' (as in B. Pihlaja), or by some other name - Netspeak, Cyberspeak, Netlish ... - the fact is that the arrival of this new medium of discourse has changed everything. From a world where language study focused routinely on only two major mediums of linguistic communication, speech and writing (I say 'routinely' so as not to forget the study of sign languages), within one generation we encounter a third, and the emergence of a new area of research, Internet linguistics (Crystal, 2011). Online discourse is different, in that it blends the two traditional modes (as when we *write* emails, but talk about having an email *conversation*) and offers novel communicative techniques (such as hypertext linking) and opportunities (email, texting, social media ...). It's not an exaggeration to say that all previous linguistic generalizations, based on analyses of traditional speech and writing, have to be reexamined to see whether they hold up in online situations. In some domains, there is little evident change (many Web pages are like any traditional piece of writing); in others, there is a more radical shift, as in the new conventions that characterize short-messaging services (such as texting abbreviations and Twitter hashtags). New stylistic varieties have emerged, such as blogging and instant messaging, and we see new trends in spelling, capitalization, and punctuation, along with a great deal of new vocabulary. And - as more than one Internet article has been headed - 'we ain't seen nothin' yet', for the online medium has hitherto been predominantly graphic, and we have yet to see the flowering and the linguistic consequences for discourse of 'voice over the Internet'.

All of this is being sensed by several contributors to this book. In Chapter 6, we read of 'the proliferation of rhetorical contact by a wider variety of rhetors on and via internet'; in Chapter 7, of the Internet as an 'agent of change ... where the translation of religious discourse flourishes', especially with the increased availability of major texts and online translation tools; and in Chapter 16, in relation to identity, where digital religious communities are seen alongside non-digital communities as 'a key area for linguistic researchers to explore, especially in terms of how language helps construct and maintain such communities, and how language conveys key beliefs and key identity markers'. These communities were once viewed as fairly stable, but in Chapter 3, we are given a different view, prompting the rethinking of linguistic repertoire as 'tied to membership in relatively stable speech communities': 'Instead, global conditions of migration and new communication technologies may allow (or constrain) participants in moving between various more or less shortterm group formations across the lifespan.' In Chapter 18, our attention is directed to sacred texts, where, despite the 'fragmentary and ephemeral' character of online reading, there are likely to be effects in terms of meaning production that need investigation, 'looking, for example, whether Jonah's experience in the fish results in another meaning for the text when read in a digital form'. The comparative issue arises again: 'Rereading may also differ in digital and non-digital contexts, such as whether the digital sacred text is read or rather listened too or viewed. Meaning construal work could also be affected, with the addition of background knowledge with hyperlinks, adding knowledge many readers do not have when reading a sacred text on paper.'

Also noted is the arrival of the cellphone (Rosowsky): ‘the now ubiquitous use of the mobile phone to access, download and store liturgical language resources ... allowing for liturgical language practice to be supported in an ever-increasing range of contexts and situations’. The point is explored in detail in the chapter on *Media* (S. Pihlaja), where the contributor points out that religious believers ‘now read their sacred texts on their phones, with apps providing them with personalised devotional readings or alerting them to the call to prayer or guiding them through mediation practices’. Avery important point follows: ‘Seeing a clear delineation between a person’s online and offline religious practices has become increasingly difficult and there is little reason to believe that in the short to medium term, the integration of technology in the day-to-day interaction of religious believers is likely to become less pronounced.’ The conclusion is inescapable:

> The analysis of media texts and the processes of mediatisation must therefore be central to any study of religious discourse, at least in understanding the contexts of interaction. As mobile technologies continue to proliferate and become increasingly integrated into the social world, the processes by which they change, manipulate, and adapt to individuals must be at the forefront of religious discourse analysis.

It is indeed going to be a brave new world, which has such media in it. It is not simply that the use of electronic technologies is becoming routine - as Rosowsky puts it, ‘a regular part of some acquisition practices with software, data projectors and iPads mediating the liturgical languages of various faiths’. Rather, there has been a shift: ‘the move from the communal experience to the individual one. Traditional liturgical language practices have centred on communal rituals and ceremonies. The move to an online religion experience has often resulted in a more private experience.’ Just as fundamental is the view we read in Lytra concerning ‘the increased significance of digital technologies in sustaining and transforming language use and in creating new religious practices and identity options’. We are encountering ‘the development of more individualised forms of religious expression and the concomitant fragmentation of traditional religious authority’, a development that raises questions regarding ‘what might count as authentic religious practice in the twenty-first century’ (Lytra, *Ethnography).* In the Post-COVID Era, as one might now say.

PCE. This is where I came in. COVID-19 is a perfect illustration of the rapidity with which the process of social, and thus linguistic, change can happen. It is already anticipated in Gao and Thondhlana, in the context of faith in education, where the writer suggests that one result of the crisis could be that religion ‘may play a more pronounced role in people’s lives’. Already, by June 2020, there were reports of shifts in behaviour as a result of the move to online events. In the world of literary festivals, for example, the Hay Festival, held every year in the small town of Hay-on-Wye in Wales, usually attracts a physical audience of several thousand, but online for the first time, as a result of lockdown, the audience was around half a million. Priests and ministers streaming services were also reporting an unexpected increase in daily attendance - something for which there was clear evidence in the attendance analytics - and articles were being written about the development of creative thinking to promote what is being called ‘home liturgy’ (as in Lamb, 2020). Communities have found new ways of coming together using such technologies as Zoom, with traditional liturgical practices, such as homilies, prayer groups, and hymn-singing, being given a novel online incarnation. I found myself engaged in just such a development, as a consequence of places of worship being in lockdown, that would have been inconceivable just three months before: constructing a website for an audio reading of liturgical texts (www.lectionaryreadings.com). The consequences for religious discourse are unpredictable and have yet to be explored. But it is already possible to see some of the linguistic issues.

Anyone who has taken part in a conversation or discussion group online will already have had experience of some of these issues. The crucial factor is the lack of simultaneous feedback - the listener vocalizations (*mhm, yeah, huh?),* body movements, and facial expressions that form an essential part of face-to- face conversation. Without these to give speakers a sense of how the interaction is going, they feel isolated and their speech is affected as a consequence. In a one-to-one interaction, such as via Skype, unpredictable time-lag alters the dynamic, leading to uncertain pauses and overlapping speech. In a multiparticipant setting, such as a Zoom room with gallery view, a speaker cannot maintain eye contact with the people in the various screens, turn-taking cues are either absent or need to be established artificially by the host (such as: if you want to speak, raise your hand), and there is the ever-present visual distraction of idiosyncratic movements and interruptions in the home settings - even auditory distractions, at times, if the participants' microphones aren't muted. To use a term from sociolinguistics, there is no *accommodation* - the feature of behavioural interaction that describes the way participants in a conversation influence each other (sharing accents, gestures, stances, choice of dress, and so on). Discourse situations involving unison speech - as when a congregation unites to speak a prayer - are especially affected.

An ethnographic study of the new situations, along the lines of the one reported in Chapter 3, would be of particular interest. In a setting where there is dialogue, what should the leader of worship do? Leave a pause for the isolated home participant to give the expected response? And if so, how long a pause? Speak the response aloud? And if so, at what speed? Play a recording of the response made by a reader? The issue is especially problematic for speakers who rely on vocal response, such as the formulae that elicit listener affirmations *{Amen! Alleluia!)* in some spontaneous sermons (Rosenberg, 1970). Correspondingly, in such settings how should isolated listener/viewers respond? In response to a greeting, such as 'The Lord be with you', what should they do? Say the response ('And with our spirit') out loud? Think it without vocalization? Ignore it? Some ministers say the response on behalf of the congregation. Some utter only the longer responses, leaving the short one- liners to 'speak for themselves'. There is great diversity of practice - inevitable in a new and rapidly evolving situation - and the long-term effects are not at all clear.

The same issues arise in relation to nonverbal behaviour (Chapter 5): if the celebrant gives a blessing, or some other gesture that would normally elicit a reaction from the participants (such as a bow, or the sign of the cross), how does the isolated viewer behave? And if a viewer intends to take part in an online service, what preparations would be made? As pointed out in Chapter 6, 'the material world remains a mediating force in any religious practice, organizing adherents' language use'. So which aspects of that world are to be replicated in the home environment? And does the substitution of these affect the nature of the religious experience? Will they stand or kneel as required? Will they position their body relative to the east? Will they make use of icons? And, to take an example that has been given linguistic expression in the neologism *upperwear* (that part of the clothing that can be seen on screen), will viewers 'dress up' for the occasion in the same way as they would when attending the event in person? One writer reported her experience (Jones, 2020): evident, people were already being advised not to shake hands or kiss, but to use some other gesture, such as a socially distanced namaste - a replacement that has been given a lot of publicity due to its increased use in political and other settings. What does an isolated viewer actually do, if the celebrant initiates it? Or will awareness of the problem mean that this kind of interaction is to be omitted? And if omitted, what is the effect on the viewer's overall sense of participation in the event? The closure of places of worship means that activities involving physical contact (such as the taking of communion, the use of water, or the sharing of an object such as a candle) are impossible - and even when these places reopen, there will be measures in place to maintain some sort of physical distancing, at least for the immediate future. What happens to the discourse at such moments? Discourse creativity can be the result. Traditional formulations may need to be adapted, or new prayers composed, to give participants a sense of presence in the truncated service.

The point is especially relevant when we consider the way these issues relate to young people, especially in religious situations where the average age of the worshippers is high. How is this generational gap to be bridged? The online encounter with religion will not in itself present young people with a problem, for this is their world. They are well used to an environment where the screen is central and books or other written texts are marginal. The problem is a pragmatic one: how to present religious discourse in such a way that it is intelligible and appealing. And who is to take responsibility for devising these fresh approaches? The senior members of a faith community are typically not in the best position to advise, for they grew up in a pre-Internet era, and for many, the new technology is alien. For them, books and traditional written texts are central and the screen is marginal. There may even be antagonism to the new medium - or to the language used within it, just as there was in the early 2000s, when text messaging received a largely negative response in the media (Crystal, 2008). And indeed there are challenging problems in working out ways in which the screen can be incorporated into situations of worship without disturbing the sanctity of the events. But the problems have to be faced, for they are not going to go away. The observation in Lytra applies: 'if as educators we wish to honour all children's languages, literacies, heritages and histories and we are committed to supporting and sustaining inclusive and pluralistic pedagogies then more attention needs to be given to children's religious practices and identities'. This now has to include a respect for their use of digital communication.

In a PCE world, everyone may find themselves becoming increasingly dependent on digital technology as a means of maintaining communication among a dispersed community or one which has been locked down. It will not be enough to explore what happens in public places of worship. As the editor says in his introduction to this book: 'Everyday interaction, where institutional discourse is worked out and used in real life, is harder to track and trace, but its position within religious belief is essential for understanding how religions emerge, develop, and change over time.' In the case of digital technology, there are well recognized issues of how to obtain reliable data without contravening considerations of privacy. We need much more information about the ways in which this technology can be used to best effect in the various domains of religious discourse in these circumstances, and - even more important - about the attitudes of worshippers to this technology. Although it's good to see moves in this direction (Pihlaja, 2018, Rosowsky, 2017), I sense a sequel, one day: *Analysing Online Religious Discourse.* I think that will probably solve it.

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