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TRADE AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE USSR (LATE 70's – EARLY 1980's)

The article is devoted to the study of main directions, problems and achievements of British-Soviet relations in economic and commercial field in the late 70's – early 80's of XX century. The author managed to define features of trade and economic relations between Great Britain and the Soviet Union in the context of growing geopolitical tension in the world in the late 1970's – early 1980's; confrontation between the member states of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization. It notes that cooperation between the countries in this period has been mutually beneficial, but not stable due to: a negative Margaret Thatcher's attitude towards socialist system of the Soviet Union at the beginning of her premiership; aggressive Soviet policy towards Afghanistan and Poland and as a result the 'boycott' of the Moscow Olympic games in 1980 by Great Britain, the economic sanctions of the West against the Soviet Union. It was emphasized that negative consequence of such an international policy was a slow growth in trade between Great Britain and the Soviet Union. However, stated further bilateral meetings, meetings, negotiations, seminars of British and Soviet working groups, the signing of several important contracts in order to outline ways to increase productivity and efficiency trade-economic and scientific-technical cooperation between the two countries.

Key words: United Kingdom, Soviet Union, bilateral cooperation, trade and economic relations.

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A POLITICAL HISTORY OF POLISH-UKRAINIAN RELATIONS DURING THE INTERWAR YEARS (1917–1939)

This article describes the main events that influenced the development of relations between the western Ukrainians and the Ukrainian National Republic on the one hand and Poland on the other. The Ukrainian situation in the restored Polish state, particularly in its South-Eastern provinces of Galicia, Volyn and Chełm. The author highlights the political and socio-economic context of these events. The Warsaw Agreement of 1920 is drawn attention to as well as the circumstances of the Petliura-Pilsudski union and Riga Peace Treaty in which Galicia was annexed. The situation of the Ukrainian minority in the Polish state is expanded on, especially after the enactment of the language laws and the land reform in 1925. The relationship between the attempts of the Ukrainians to gain independence, the 1930 Pacification and the creation and activities of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists is explained. Attention is also paid to the analysis of different political concepts of Ukrainians that existed in the Polish political thought. The Polish nationalist camp, the so-called National Democrats led by politicians such as Roman Dmowski and Stanisław Grabski, was against the idea of cooperating with Ukraine in 1919–1921 and later not only refused Ukrainians to exercise their fundamental national requirements but treated the idea of a Ukrainian nation with contempt. The attitude of the central and left forces were often loyal to Ukrainians since Józef Piłsudski's personal experience knew the negative effects of violent Russification and therefore was not a unequivocal supporter of violent Polonization. And even though this camp was not against the implementation of the Ukrainian national idea as such, but the fate of the Ukrainian question and the Ukrainian minority in the Second Polish Republic was only to be put forward through the interests of the Polish state, exclusively through its territorial integrity. The author also examines the international aspects of the Ukrainian question in Polish debates, as well as the place of this subject in the League of Nations.

Key words: Poland, Ukraine, Second Polish Republic, League of Nations, Ukrainian minority, Piłsudski, Petliura, Grabski, Dmowski, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists.

The events of the First World War affected the western Ukrainians who joined the UPA during the Second World War. After World War One, it was the actions of these Ukrainians that began the process of Ukrainian national consciousness and identity. In order to better understand

Ukrainian disillusionment towards the Polish state, one must first understand the political and military history of that particular territory. The actions of the Polish state (and its politicians) influenced the political ideologies of intellectual Ukrainians who were drawn toward an extremist Nationalist

platform. Similarly, the actions of Ukrainian politicians (and the Ukrainian Galician Army) were just as important for the formation of a separate Ukrainian identity which was fostered during the interwar years. Western Ukrainians are examined because the majority of UPA members came from this region and share common experiences prior to the war which links them together in a territorial space. Eastern Ukrainians were influenced by different political ideologies and experienced differing incidents which changed their national identity from their western brethren. The political conduct of western Ukrainians and Polish officials need to be examined before a social history can be written about the western Ukrainian experience.

With the collapse of the Russian Empire in 1917, the Ukrainian People's Republic (UNR) was created. A dispute arose between the UNR and the newly founded state of Second Polish Republic over the distribution of territory. Both countries – Ukraine under Symon Petliura and Poland under Jozef Pilsudski — eventually ended up uniting and fighting a war against Bolshevik Russia. The main area of contention for both Poland and Ukraine was eastern Galicia and Volhynia. Both nationalities believed that the area was in their respective political zone of influence. Poland was interested in the area first, because of a claim to 'historical rights' based on those that existed with the Polish-Lithuanian Kingdom of the 1700's and second, because of the petroleum oil wells in the southern region of Eastern Galicia [1]. Ukraine, on the other hand, had numerical superiority within the region that could not be denied. In a report sent to President Wilson by the American Intelligence Section on 21 January 1919, it was pointed out that in eastern Galicia, 'the Ukrainians... outnumbered the Poles two to one' [2]. The question at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 then became: who has the right to western Ukraine – those proclaiming national self-determination or those who have a territorial and economic interest in the area? This issue became even more acute when the Ukrainian-Polish war broke out in 1918. The Entente (the Western Allies which included France, Great Britain and the United States of America) wanted all fighting to cease before any treaty could be made in relation to the contested region.

Polish-Ukrainian antagonisms, however, were pushed to the background in 1919 when Bolshevik Russia invaded the UNR and threatened the newly created SPR. In fact, the two nations formed an alliance against the Bolshevik threat. At the beginning of the Allied offensive against Bolshevik Russia in 1919, Ukrainians began to doubt their Polish allies. Numerous issues arose which could not be ignored. For example, Polish garrisons in eastern Galicia began stealing rather than requisitioning items from the Ukrainian peasants and began terrorizing the countryside [3]. The Warsaw Agreement was reached by Ukraine and Poland in April 1920 which recognized the political existence of the UNR, established frontiers and ensured national-cultural rights for the two minorities within both countries [4]. A military convention between Poland and Ukraine was also signed on 24 April 1920 which united the two armies in their fight against the Bolsheviks. The Ukrainian government pledged food supplies to the Polish military while the Supreme Command of the Polish armies pledged arms, ammunition, equipment and uniforms to the Ukrainians. The Poles did have a stronger bargaining hand due to their large military size and were allowed to requisition any necessary food from the Ukrainian peasants within the occupied territories; the Ukrainians, on the other hand, were allowed to keep the 'entire railroad spoil, except armoured trains taken in battle, and other military booty' [5]. The agreement itself came under scrutiny as soon as it

was signed: it was unclear whether it was intended to be 'a gentlemen's agreement' between Pilsudski and Petliura (the leaders of their respective republics) or whether it amounted to Poland's recognition of Ukraine's right of self-determination. The first paragraph of the Warsaw Convention stated that the SPR was 'recognizing the right of Ukraine to independent political existence' though only as 'headed by the Supreme Military Commander Symon Petliura' and no one else [6]. The agreement itself became null and void after Poland signed the Treaty of Riga with Bolshevik Russia in 1921 which partitioned Ukraine between a Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and Poland. The Warsaw Treaty had encouraged Ukrainians to believe that, after the war with Bolshevik Russia, they would attain independence; however, the attitude of the key political figures, most notably that of Stanislaw Grabski and Roman Dmowski, clouded that optimism.

During the war against Bolshevik Russia, Petliura began to have some grave misgivings over the new alliance. His letters to Pilsudski went unanswered and his frustrations with Pilsudski's silence came to the foreground on 24 July 1920 when he wrote a letter which confirmed that none of the material promised by Poland had been delivered to the Ukrainians. He also complained that the Polish army had done nothing to assist in the Ukrainian's battle against the Bolsheviks. The letter concluded with a stern proclamation that if Petliura did not receive a reply from Pilsudski regarding these matters, he would treat the agreement as void and be forced to take further action against the Poles [7]. It was at the moment that the Bolshevik army advanced some thousands of kilometres within reach of Warsaw that the alliance between the Ukrainians and Poles was tested. The Polish State Defence Council decided to try to argue for peace with Russia and began preliminary talks at Minsk. However, before any real decisions could be made, Pilsudski advanced eastward on 16 August 1920 and eventually overtook Minsk itself on 5 October. With this drive east, the UNR along with their Polish allies countered the Russian offensive in the south-east, eventually defeating the Soviet Twelfth and Fourteenth armies and establishing a new front line along the Zbruch River on 18 September [8]. As the Ukrainians were fighting the Bolsheviks, the Poles were sitting down in Riga to discuss peace terms. These terms excluded the Ukrainian National Republic delegations and were headed by Stanislaw Grabski. During the negotiations, both the Polish and Soviet delegations spoke of their need for ethnographic boundaries. As a result of Grabski's theories of Ukrainian inferiority based on a lack of historical freedom, eastern Galicia, Polissia and Volhynia were incorporated within the Polish Republic. Grabski justified countering the Warsaw Treaty due to his belief that it was nothing more than a private agreement between personal friends because it was not ratified by the Polish Parliament [9]; thus, any loyalty towards Ukraine during the peace talks was out of the question.

Pilsudski is a rather complex historical figure. Many Ukrainians see him in a negative light, while many Poles consider him their saving-grace from Bolshevik Russia. Some historians tend to call him a 'dictator' as a result of his political coup against the Polish Parliament in 1926 [10]. Unlike Petliura, whose mission was to create a democratic Ukrainian army and democratize the Ukrainian nation [11], Pilsudski had to contend with opposition in the form of the National Democrats of the far-right which was headed by Stanislaw Grabski and Roman Dmowski. Pilsudski wanted, in the crudest terms, a buffer state between Poland and Russia, and he intended for Ukraine to become that state. His program would have had a

federal-constitutional structure in which Ukrainians living within Poland would be guaranteed cultural minority rights and would be the basis of a strong relationship with Poland's newly independent neighbour. The National Democrats had other plans however. Their agenda was based on Grabski and Dmowski's theories on Polish racial superiority. Grabski believed that Ukrainians had no 'traditional historical self-awareness' due to a constant reign of Russian, Lithuanian or Polish empires. To him, the Ukrainian language was that of the peasant and Ukrainian literature was only in its infancy and recently civilized [12]. The Ukrainian political consciousness, he added, was created and fostered by the Austrians and Germans as an act against Polish interests. He insisted on ending 'this fascination with the "Ukrainian nation" and [Poles] must stop using terms such as "Ukrainian language", "Ukrainian school", "Ukrainian nationality"' [13]. He argued that complete Polonization of Poland's minorities had to be attained because they lived in the Second Polish Republic and the Second Polish Republic was a Polish state. All schools were to be taught in Polish and 'in the Polish nationalist spirit.' There was to be an increase in Polish trade, agricultural colonization and cultural work in order to assure the Polish nation that the area in the east was and has always been part of the Polish cultural hegemony [14]. Dmowski agreed with Grabski about the idea that Ukrainian politics were created and sheltered by Austria-Hungary and Germany. He argued that Austria 'fed the Ruthenian nationality' while the Germans just wanted to create a buffer state against Russia [15]. While this statement did have some element of truth – for the Austrians did certainly entertain Ukrainian political ideals during their reign and the Germans were determined to have some protection from Bolshevik Russia—he did not explain why the Rusyns who lived in eastern Galicia 'constantly stated their allegiance to the "Ukrainian nation"' [16]. Dmowski believed that, because the Entente gave eastern Galicia to the Polish Republic, it was now an integral part of the Polish state that would ultimately be the ideal Polish cultural-national territory. He ignored the fact that the majority of citizens living in the area did not want to be assimilated into Polish culture. Some Polish intellectuals disagreed with the National Democrats' opinion about their national minorities. Adolf Bochenski, a Polish writer and political columnist, warned the Polish government not to expect Ukrainians to give up the claims to their land so easily and not to force assimilationist policies. The best option, in his opinion, was to grant a Ukrainian autonomy with a guarantee to protect Polish citizens [17]. Unfortunately, the Polish Parliament did not take his opinions into consideration.

As one compares the National Democrats' policies towards the Ukrainian minority and Pilsudski's stance on the situation, there are several insightful aspects to note. Pilsudski's position was more humanitarian: he wanted to stand 'shoulder to shoulder' with his Ukrainian partners [18]. Polonization was not the ideal political route for him, mainly due to his own personal experience with forced cultural assimilation. Living in Lithuania during the last years of the Russian Empire, Pilsudski personally experienced the Russification attempt on the Empire's minorities. Pilsudski understood that forced assimilation tended to alienate that nationality against the ruling class and made them more determined to stay in contact with their cultural homeland [19]. Grabski, on the other hand, believed Polish security lay in a strict border policy in which land was to become the ultimate safety barrier. He believed that, due to Ukraine's infancy as a nation-state, a border agreement with Soviet Russia would be more practical [20]. This was not entirely nonsensical. Apart from a handful of

Ukrainian politicians who were active within the Austro-Hungarian multinational governing system, the majority never had an active role in politics. Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyj, the President of the Ukrainian National Republic in 1917, was a historian and not a politician. The governing body of Ukraine was also fractured. After Petliura took over the presidency of the UNR in 1918 and began peace negotiations with Poland, Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyj (who was in exile in Paris at the time) pleaded to the international community and the Ukrainian population to renounce the newly formed government [21]. Although Grabski's theories on Ukrainian inferiority were chauvinistic and discriminatory, they were also partly accurate: Ukraine was a nation that was created out of the collapse of an authoritative empire in which control was held with a firm grip and there was a lack of consensus and unity from Ukrainian politicians. These ingredients created the Polish fear of an uncoordinated Ukrainian state which could be subjected to Bolshevik influence and open the door to invasion. Without a firm commitment for peace from Bolshevik Russia, Poland would be swallowed up in turmoil and Russian totalitarianism once again.

The Treaty of Riga negotiations ended on 18 March 1921 and were ratified by the Polish government a month later. This Treaty acknowledged Ukrainian independence, but not the UNR. Official Ukrainian representation came from Soviet Ukraine under the head of Iurii Kotsiubyn's'kyi. The Treaty of Riga also created concrete borders between the Polish and Soviet states while, at the same time, guaranteeing minority cultural, intellectual, language and religious rights [22]. The only assurances the minorities of Poland had to equality was the Polish Republic's 1921 Constitution which guaranteed the protection of life, freedom and property without distinction of origin, nationality, language, race or religion and also cultural and linguistic rights of minorities. However, there were also articles within the Constitution which gave the Polish state the right to restrict any personal freedoms if it was deemed necessary, to enforce censorship on private correspondence and to control public and private schools and educational establishments¹³. Certain international agreements also guaranteed minority rights, most notably the one signed on 15 March 1923 under the League of Nations' Ambassador Treaty. Poland was conferred the right over all territory they obtained from the Paris Peace Treaty and border demarcations between Poland, Russia, Lithuania and Latvia were officially recognized by the League of Nations at the Ambassador's Conference. Poland also legally guaranteed eastern Galicia autonomy due to 'ethnographical conditions'. It again guaranteed respect for racial, linguistic and religious minorities within all its territory [23]. Unfortunately however, once the Riga Treaty was signed, the rights that were promised were forgotten and the SPR began to colonize and pacify Eastern Galicia. With the influence of Grabski and Dmowski, the region began to be colonized by Polish settlers from the Krakow and Warsaw area. There was a mass expulsion of Ukrainian students from the university in L'viv, the arrest of students at Ukrainian private universities and the dissolution of charitable Ukrainian organizations, along with severe persecution of the Orthodox church in the Volhynia and Chelm regions [24]. As Timothy Snyder illustrates, the war cost thousands of Ukrainian lives,

¹³ Polish Republic Constitution, 17 March 1921: Section V (General Duties and Civil Rights), article 95 states that all citizens are equal without distinction of origin, nationality, language, race or religion; Section V, article 110 protects minorities claims to national, religious or linguistic equality; Section V, Article 97 issues the right of personal restrictions; Section V, Article 106 gives the state the right to monitor personal correspondence; Section V, Article 117 allows for state supervision of all educational establishments.

'created a generation of frustrated veterans and confirmed a prevailing belief that Poland was the main enemy of Ukraine' [25]. This frustration increased throughout the 1930's when the Ukrainian minority would experience even more repressive measures.

The years following the Ukrainian territory's incorporation within the Second Polish Republic were turbulent. In 1924, the Parliament passed two anti-minority laws. The first dealt with the use of language: more bilingual and Polish schools were incorporated in the Polish state [26]. The outcome of this was detrimental to the Ukrainian schooling system:

In 1924-25, in the whole of Poland there were 2661 Ukrainian and 312 bi-lingual elementary schools, until in 1928-29 the number fell to 716...Moreover in Volhynia (where only 16.8 per cent are Poles even according to Polish figures) Polissia and [Chelm], there is not one single Ukrainian elementary state school... Out of 868 technical schools of various types, including 13 high schools, there is not one single Ukrainian. The 5 million Ukrainians have not one single [University] [27].

The second law – the Land Reform Act of 1925 – resulted in the redistribution of 800,000 hectares to new Polish settlers in Eastern Galicia and Volhynia [28]. This became a major reason behind Polish-Ukrainian contentions during the Second World War, when both nationalities claimed rights over the land.

The main political debate between the two nationalities during the interwar years, however, was the issue of political autonomy. This want of 'Home Rule', as the English termed it, was the hope of the majority of Ukrainians who were 'anxious for an independent state' [29]. A bitter debate arose within both the Polish Parliament as well as the League of Nations. A petition to the League of Nations was issued on 6 October 1932 which questioned the actions of the League in granting the territory to Poland. It insisted that national self-determination should have been the final incentive for autonomy for eastern Galicia. This petition also criticized the League for standing by and allowing Polish occupation of the region to become a reality. Finally, it questioned whether the 'Polish government fully realized their commitment to the decisions made at the Conference of 15 March 1923 when it granted autonomy to the territory known as Eastern Galicia?' [30]. The occupation that the petition was referring to was Pilsudski's drive of 'Pacification' of the Ukrainian territory. This began in 1930 and was seen by Ukrainians as a Polish repressive measure against their cultural, educational and political life. As war with Germany became more of a possibility in the later 1930s, the Polish increasingly repressed Ukrainians because they considered the latter to be Germany's fifth column.

The Polish state believed that the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) was this fifth column and made participation in OUN activities illegal [31]. Formed in 1929 under the leadership of Evhen Konovalets, the OUN united warring Ukrainian nationalists into a single entity that would be able to plan, coordinate and direct any terrorist actions needed against the Polish state. Konovalets was a colonel of the Sich Riflemen and fought against the Poles and the Bolsheviks in the early 1920's. The OUN strove for Ukrainian independence and placed 'itself in categorical opposition to all those powers, domestic and alien, which oppose[d] actively or passively [the] stand of the Ukrainian nationalists' which included cultural, economic, political and religious freedom. They also did not limit themselves to one particular territory but strove for the 'domination of the Ukrainian national reality on all Ukrainian lands and in foreign territories populated by Ukrainians' [32]. As its

promotional pamphlet suggests, the OUN's main goal was a Ukrainian revolution that would create a proper Ukraine with proper cultural boundaries in which a nationalistic spirit would flourish [33]. Increased Polish repression of Ukrainian culture and politics led to the OUN's extreme militant stance and the assassination of the Polish Minister of the Interior Colonel Bronislaw Pieracki in 1934. Other OUN terrorist attacks included civilian and political/military Polish targets throughout the 1930s. For the Polish state, the OUN were a menace, but for many Ukrainians, they represented a Ukrainian political ideology and so their membership grew during the interwar years.

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ПОЛІТИЧНА ІСТОРІЯ ПОЛЬСЬКО-УКРАЇНСКИХ ВІДНОСИН У МІЖВОЄННИЙ ПЕРІОД (1917–1939 РР.)

Стаття описує найважливіші події, що впливали на розвиток стосунків між Західноукраїнською та Українською Народними Республіками з однієї сторони та Польщею з другої. Аналізується також становище українців у відновленій польській державі, зокрема в її південно-східних воєводствах, які охоплювали Галичину, Волинь та Холмщину. Авторка висвітлює політичний та соціально-економічний контекст тих подій. Звертає увагу й на Варшавську угоду 1920, союз Петлюра-Пілсудський, Ризький Мирний Договір, обставини, за яких Галичина була приєднана до Польщі. Розкрито становище української меншини в польській державі, зокрема після прийняття закону про мову викладання в навчальних закладах і проведення земельної реформи 1925 р. Пояснюється зв'язок між вимогами українців надати їм автономію, пацифікацією 1930 р. та створенням і діяльністю Організації українських націоналістів. Багато уваги приділено аналізу різних політичних концепцій щодо українців, які існували в польській політичній думці. Табір польських націоналістів, так званих національних демократів, очолюваний такими політиками як Роман Дмовський чи Станіслав Грабський, був проти ідеї співпраці з Україною у 1919–1921 роках, а пізніше не тільки відмовляв українцям в праві реалізації їх основних національних вимог, але й зазвичай з погардою ставився до української національної ідеї. Ставлення центра та лівих сил до українців часто було лояльнішим, адже Юзеф Пілсудський на особистому досвіді знав негативні наслідки насильницької русифікації, а тому не був однозначним прихильником й насильницької колонізації. І хоча цей табір не був проти реалізації української національної ідеї як такої, але вище за долю українського питання та української меншини в Другій Речі Посполитій ставив інтереси польської держави, в том числі її територіальну цілісність. Авторка також порушує міжнародні аспекти українського питання у Польщі, в тому числі дебати, які відбувалися на цю тему в Лізі Націй.

Ключові слова: Польща, Україна, Друга Річ Посполита, Ліга націй, українська меншина, Пілсудський, Петлюра, Грабський, Дмовський, Організація українських націоналістів.